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Introduction
Behind the Walls: Re-Appraising the Role and
Importance of Madrasas in the World Today
Farish A. Noor, Yoginder Sikand
and Martin van Bruinessen
The term madrasa derives from the Arabic root darasa, which means ‘to
study,’ and is related to the term for lesson, dars. Technically, a madrasa is
an institution where lessons are imparted or, in other words, a school. In
the Arabic-speaking world, the term applies to all sorts of schools, including
both those that teach only the traditional Islamic subjects as well as those
that are completely secularised and have no provision for religious educa-
tion. In much of the non-Arabic speaking parts of Asia, however, the word is
generally understood in a more restricted sense – as a school geared essen-
tially to providing students with what is understood as Islamic education,
although the ways in which this is conceived and its scope are widely diver-
gent.
Madrasas, as understood in this sense – as schools for the imparting of
Islamic knowledge – have for centuries served the crucial function of train-
ing Muslim religious specialists or ulama, besides imparting basic Islamic
education to Muslim children who need not necessarily continue their
training to become professional religious experts. They are instrumental in
sustaining, preserving, promoting and transmitting the Islamic tradition
over the generations. They are not a homogenous phenomenon, however,
contrary to what the media generally presents them as. They differ widely
in terms of curricula, teaching methods and approaches to the challenges of
9
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modernity, which makes any generalisations about them hazardous and un-
tenable. They also differ in terms of the levels of religious education that
they provide their students, from the small maktab or kuttab attached to a
mosque and catering to small children, providing them with skills to read
and recite the Quran and perform basic Islamic rituals, to university-size
jamiªas and Dar al-ªulums.
Despite the central importance that madrasas play in the lives of Muslim
communities around the world, relatively little academic attention has been
paid to them. Advocates of the ‘modernisation’ thesis had assumed that
along with the economic and social ‘development’ of Muslim societies,
which they saw as following the path adopted by Western countries, the in-
fluence of religion, including of the madrasas, would decline significantly,
relegating the madrasas to the status of relics from a by-gone age. Conse-
quently, scholars of contemporary Muslim societies devoted relatively little
attention to the madrasas, focussing, instead, on groups such as ‘mod-
ernists’ and Islamists, who were thought to be the harbingers of a new age.1
However, the predictions made by advocates of the ‘modernisation’ the-
sis proved to be hollow. Despite the fact that in many predominantly Mus-
lim countries authoritarian governments either forcibly closed down
madrasas or merged them with the general or ‘modern’ educational stream
in many other parts of the world, most notably in South and Southeast Asia,
the number of madrasas increased substantially, a phenomenon that con-
tinues to the present day. The Islamic Revolution in Iran, the role of West-
ern- and Saudi-funded madrasas in Pakistan in training the mujahidin to
fight the Soviets, the coming to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan and so
on, all helped propel the madrasas, particularly of Asia, into the limelight of
the media.
This resulted in a sudden burst of writings on the madrasas, especially
by journalists. These reports were often sensational, focussing on those
madrasas or ulama that were depicted as ‘radical’, ‘militant’ and ‘funda-
mentalist’. Broad generalisations were made about all madrasas based on
these isolated instances. Consequently, madrasas, long forgotten by the
media, suddenly received a lot of bad press. The word madrasa was used to
conjure up lurid images of blood-thirsty mullahs, ranting and raving
against the ‘modern’ world and against ‘non-Muslims’ to help establish the
global hegemony of Islam. This was despite the fact that the vast majority of
madrasas did not fit this description, being concerned mainly with the
FA R I S H A . NOOR , YOG I ND E R S I K AND AND MAR T I N VAN B RU I N E S S E N
10
AUP-ISIM-IS-BW-Madrasa-DEF2:BW  24-09-2008  16:53  Pagina 10
transmission of the Islamic scholarly tradition, and remaining aloof from
overt political involvement, for which they are often derided by their radical
Islamist critics.
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks in the United States and the bombings in
Bali, madrasas came under even greater suspicion as alleged breeding
grounds for ‘terrorists’. From the Taliban to the Bali bombers, many radical
Islamic movements appeared to be rooted in madrasas, or so it was alleged
by many in the media as well as by many politicians. Al Qaeda’s leaders and
the men who carried out the 9/11 attacks had no madrasa backgrounds, but
media coverage indicated that Osama bin Laden was very popular among
many madrasa students across Asia. In the Western popular imagination,
madrasas came to be seen as ‘incubators for violent extremism’ and ‘jihad
factories,’ imprisoning Muslim youth in backwardness and indoctrinating
them with a hatred for the West that was considered to be the root cause of
all that was said to be ‘wrong’ with Islam.
Talk of madrasas today is thus often laced with suspicion if not outright
contempt and an attitude that can best be described as adversarial. Living as
we do in the age of the global ‘War on Terror’, where entire regions such as
Central and Southeast Asia have been designated as ‘front line conflict
zones’ by the dominant Western powers, madrasas are often seen and pre-
sented as sniping posts against the frontiers of the Occident, fortresses that
occasionally send out armies of would-be martyrs to die in the name of
Islam. In American deliberations on long-term strategies to prevent ‘Islamic
terrorism’, the madrasa became a subject of primary concern. Conse-
quently, there has been much pressure on regional governments, from Pa-
kistan and India to Thailand and Indonesia, to bring madrasa education
under closer control and monitor ‘radical’ tendencies. ‘Experts’ like the
Brookings Institution’s P.W. Singer have repeated the Huntingtonian thesis
of the inevitable ‘Clash of Civilisations’ with a vengeance, talking of the ‘new
cultural war to be won’ – a campaign whose success can only be guaranteed
with the taming of the madrasa beast.2
The madrasa was the first spearhead in the White House policy devel-
oped after 9/11 that attempted to change the face of Islam, with Pakistan
being its most immediate target. When President Pervez Musharraf visited
Washington, DC at the time of the offensive against Afghanistan, he was of-
fered additional aid for educational reform and was told in no uncertain
terms that there changes needed to be made in the madrasa curriculum to
I N T R ODUC T I ON
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ensure that its students became ‘integrated’ into the modern world.3 The In-
dian and Thai governments have, for reasons of their own, clamped down
on the madrasas and pondoks (the traditional Malay equivalent of the
madrasa), blaming them, without proper justification, for a string of violent
incidents and the widespread disaffection among the Muslims of Kashmir
and Southern Thailand. The governments of Malaysia and Indonesia were
pressured to place their pondoks and pesantrens under close surveillance. In
fact, however, the Bali bombings of October 2002 were the only major ter-
rorist attack in which a number of the participants had a madrasa back-
ground. Even in this case, the planners of the attack were – not unlike most
other acts of terrorism – men with modern college or university educations,
and who had never studied in madrasas. There is, therefore, good reason to
question the policy makers and media’s obsession with the madrasa.
This is not to deny, however, that some madrasas in Pakistan have indeed
been engaged in providing armed training to their students. Other
madrasas elsewhere may not do so directly, but may encourage their stu-
dents to see the world in starkly dualistic, almost Manichaean terms, ex-
horting them to wage war against ‘unbelievers’ in order to protect Muslims,
whom they see as under grave threat from the West or other non-Muslim
powers, or in order to establish global Islamic supremacy. The mistake that
is often made, however, is to regard these madrasas as representative of all
madrasas as such, a generalisation that is quite unwarranted. Further, these
‘radical’ madrasas also need to be understood in the particular contexts in
which they are located. The militancy that they espouse may have less to do
with any tendency inherent in the madrasa system as such than with local
and international political factors.
Increasing economic inequality, which is especially conspicuous in a
country like Pakistan but which has accompanied the neo-liberal remaking
of the world everywhere, has contributed significantly to the rise of radical
and anti-Western protest movements, as have the growing cultural contra-
dictions between Westernised urban elites and rural masses. Competition
between different claimants to religious authority has also often tended to
strengthen radical tendencies. But it would be naïve to the point of inanity
to deny that Muslim radicalism is at least to some extent a response to
Western policies. Without taking into account such factors as the heavy-
handed military interventions in defence of Western and more specifically
American interests (most recently the invasion and occupation of Iraq), the
FA R I S H A . NOOR , YOG I ND E R S I K AND AND MAR T I N VAN B RU I N E S S E N
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consistent Western support of dictatorships in the Muslim world, Western
connivance in Israeli aggression in Palestine, the phenomenon of militancy
in certain madrasas cannot be properly understood.
In the case of Pakistan, the only country where there has been any sig-
nificant involvement by selected madrasas in providing mental and physical
training for armed jihad, this connection goes back to the 1980s interna-
tional campaign to support the Afghan mujahidin, bankrolled by the US and
Saudi Arabia and co-ordinated by Pakistan’s military intelligence organisa-
tion ISI. The later Taliban movement as well as the various armed groups
fighting in Indian Kashmir since the 1990s were largely the creations of ISI.4
Seen in a sociological vacuum, radicalism is often projected as simply an
ideological problem or phenomenon, somehow inherent in Islam. Based on
this conclusion, the solution that is proffered to combat it is often through
measures that entail harsh physical control or even elimination, which, in
the long-run, only further compounds the problem rather than resolving it.
Clearly, in seeking to understand this sort of radicalism, the root causes
must be kept in mind.
It is unfortunate, but true, that today discussions about madrasa educa-
tion are generally framed in terms of their real or alleged security and po-
litical implications. In the process, the valuable functions that many
madrasas play in providing free or highly subsidised education, along with
boarding and lodging, for vast numbers of Muslim children from impover-
ished families, is readily forgotten. The expansion of the madrasa network
must be appreciated in the context of abysmal levels of poverty in many
Muslim communities, with governments, often under pressure from inter-
national, Western-dominated organisations such as the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund, being forced to cut back on welfare spending
and ‘opening’ up their economies, and egged on by dominant Western pow-
ers to enter into a fierce arms race so as to oil the machines of the interna-
tional weapons industry, thereby reducing resources for public education.
Obviously, if governments were encouraged and enabled to spend much
more on quality education for the Muslim poor than they are presently
doing, many Muslim families would prefer to send their children to general
schools rather than to madrasas. By situating the madrasa debate securely
within a security-driven paradigm, without appreciating the crucial socio-
economic roles that madrasas play in the lives of poor Muslims, this obvi-
ous point is obscured.
I N T R ODUC T I ON
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Madrasas and Modernity
It is ironic that the madrasa system today is often criticised and even
ridiculed for its supposedly antiquated ways and its alleged stubborn resist-
ance to any form of modernisation. In many parts of Asia, particularly in
Southeast Asia, the term ‘madrasa’ itself carries connotations of modernity
and development, because the earliest institutions thus called in Malaysia
and Indonesia emerged as a reaction to what was then seen as an outmoded
form of education provided by the traditional pondok or pesantren systems of
British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. These early madrasas represented
a response to colonial rule and missionary activities but were also influ-
enced by recent reforms in the traditional education system in India and
the Middle East, known to Southeast Asian Muslims through the connection
to Mecca. Mecca was not only the centre of the annual hajj pilgrimage but
also a centre of learning that attracted scholars and students from all over
the Muslim world, and where many who refused to live under colonial rule
took up residence. Indian traders and scholars established a modern
madrasa there in 1874, the Madrasa Sawlatiyya, which trained several gen-
erations of Indian as well as Southeast Asian scholars and played a part in
the national awakening in both regions.5 This school was part of the reli-
gious and national revival in North India that also gave rise to the famous
madrasa at Deoband.
The emergence of a new type of madrasas in the nineteenth century on
the Indian subcontinent, which was modelled in part on the new Western-
style schools introduced by the British, was not devoid of polemics and in-
ternal debates within the Indian Muslim community. The Indian revolt of
1857 against the British represented the last major effort on the part of
some Hindu as well as Muslim elites, faced with the rising might of the
British, to retain their increasingly threatened privileges. It appears that
leading ulama participated or even led the fighting in several places, con-
sidering this as a religious jihad against the infidels. After the British
forcibly crushed the revolt, they embarked on a bloody campaign against
Muslim elites whom they saw as primarily responsible for the uprising. Nu-
merous ulama, accused of having participated in or instigated the revolt,
were sent to the gallows.6 Scores more were dispatched to long spells of im-
prisonment in the Andaman islands.7
FA R I S H A . NOOR , YOG I ND E R S I K AND AND MAR T I N VAN B RU I N E S S E N
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As a result of this evident loss of power, Muslims all over the subconti-
nent sought refuge in the modern madrasas of the late nineteenth century,
which were meant to play the role of the last bastion of faded Mughal-Mus-
lim glory. The most significant of the madrasas to emerge in the aftermath
of the revolt of 1857 was the renowned Dar-ul-ªUlum, established in 1867 in
the town of Deoband, in the Saharanpur district of the then United
Provinces. The founders included leading ulama such as Qasim Nanotawi
(1832-80) and Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1828-1905), who were regarded as pi-
oneers of the Indian freedom movement by subsequent generations of Indi-
ans. In setting up the madrasa, the founders of the Deoband school saw
themselves as being engaged in an educational struggle, having now re-
alised the futility of armed struggle against the country’s new masters.8
Another prominent Indian madrasa to appear in the post-Mughal era was
the Dar al-ªUlum Nadwat al-ªUlama (established in 1898). The Nadwa repre-
sented a pragmatic compromise of the ulama with the exigencies of colo-
nial rule. The madrasa received generous financial support from rulers of
various Muslim princely states, including Bhopal, Bahawalpur and Hyder-
abad, as well as from the Aga Khan, the leader of the Nizari Ismaªili Shiªas,
in addition to donations from individual Muslim well-wishers. Over the
years, the Nadwa managed to attract some of the leading Islamic scholars of
northern India, such as the noted ªalim Shibli Nuªmani (1857-1914), who
joined the madrasa in 1905. In contrast to conservative ulama who saw the
West as wholly evil, Shibli advocated a middle path, exhorting Muslims not
to shun those aspects of ‘modernity’ that did not conflict with Islam. He
pointed out that Muslims had not hesitated in the past to take advantage of
the knowledge of people of other faiths, such as the Greeks, Romans, Per-
sians and Hindus. Hence, he recommended that madrasas must also include
modern subjects in their curricula, such as English, social and natural sci-
ences and mathematics, without this affecting their religious character.9
The Nadwa, and other such notable madrasas set up in India in the late
colonial period, represented a certain Islamic approach to and appropria-
tion of ‘modernity’.
In Southeast Asia, we find the stirrings of similar educational reforms
and political awakenings in the Straits Settlements, the cosmopolitan hubs
connecting mainland and insular Southeast Asia with the wider world.
Here, reform-minded Malay ulama such as Syed Sheikh al-Hadi and Sheikh
Tahir Jalaluddin were among the first to introduce the madrasa as a mod-
I N T R ODUC T I ON
15
AUP-ISIM-IS-BW-Madrasa-DEF2:BW  24-09-2008  16:53  Pagina 15
ern alternative to the more traditional pondok school system. In the modern
madrasas established in the British colonies of Singapore, Malacca and
Penang such as the Madrasah al-Iqbal al-Islamiyyah (Singapore), Madrasah
al-Hady (Malacca) and Madrasah al-Mashoor (Penang), new modes of teach-
ing were employed for the first time in the Malay states. These madrasas
were also the first Malay-Muslim institutions to pioneer the methods of the
modern printing press, publishing not only religious texts but also journals
and magazines that helped to create the fledgling imagined community of a
literate public in the Malay Peninsula.
The point, therefore, is that the media’s portrayal of madrasas as dens of
unrepentant and incorrigible ‘obscurantism’ urgently needs to be re-exam-
ined and critiqued. Here, as elsewhere, such broad generalisations are quite
unwarranted. It is true that certain madrasas are indeed hostile to any in-
fluence of ‘modernity’, but there are scores of others that today are pio-
neering their own Islamic ways to appropriate and express ‘modernity’.
Thus, for instance, the growing number of madrasas in many Asian coun-
tries that combine both secular and Islamic subjects, the many educational
societies that run both madrasas and general schools, allowing madrasa
students to enrol in the latter after finishing a basic course of study, and
the large numbers of madrasas that have adjusted their timings in such a
way as to allow their students to study in general schools simultaneously.
For the ulama in the forefront of such reforms, this is not a deviation from
Islam. Rather, they would argue that Islam is itself opposed to any rigid dis-
tinction between ‘religious’ and ‘worldly’ knowledge, and that, therefore,
madrasa students should be encouraged to acquire different forms of ‘use-
ful’ knowledge. This is a point that several essays in this volume address.
Unfortunately, given the way the grand madrasa debate has evolved in
recent years, with sections of the media bent on presenting certain ‘radical’
madrasas, a small minority, as representative of all madrasas, these efforts
of reformist ulama have hardly been given the attention they deserve. High-
lighting these new ways of understanding and formulating Islamic educa-
tion is, however, crucial, to opening up spaces for possible collaboration be-
tween madrasas, governments and non-governmental organisations to
work on common goals. Obviously, efforts on the part of certain govern-
ments to force madrasas to ‘reform’ cannot bear any fruit in the face of the
unwillingness of the ulama, and will only make them even more hostile and
suspicious of talk of ‘reform’. Surely, then, the way out is for governments
FA R I S H A . NOOR , YOG I ND E R S I K AND AND MAR T I N VAN B RU I N E S S E N
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to engage in serious dialogue with ulama proponents of madrasa ‘reform’,
who, despite their invisibility in the media, are numerous. This requires in-
tensive, field-based research in order to highlight these ulama voices, a task
that the contributors to this book take upon themselves in their own ways.
Madrasas as Hubs in Transnational Networks
Besides the role of madrasas around the world as fountainheads of religious
learning and guardians of tradition, and their increasingly important role
in bringing a degree of general education to broad groups at the grassroots
levels of society, another aspect that contributes to their societal impor-
tance is that they have long constituted nodes in extensive networks of
communication. No madrasa stood alone; each was linked to other
madrasas through a steady exchange of visiting scholars, teachers and stu-
dents. Even in pre-modern times, ideas travelled across the Muslim world
with surprising speed due to the madrasa network. In the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, when the number of madrasas expanded rapidly, the
pattern of communications also became more complex, and madrasas pro-
vided the infrastructure to various religious and political movements, re-
formist, anti-colonial, and nationalist. Whereas in the Ottoman Empire, the
last great Muslim state, the major madrasas were all established and super-
vised by the state, throughout most of Asia the madrasas were established
by private initiatives and they jealously guarded their autonomy vis-à-vis
the state. In their own way they contributed to the integration of the Mus-
lim world, bringing hitherto marginal localities within the orbit of a global
system long before the term ‘globalisation’ became commonplace. This was
a parallel globalisation driven not by the flow of capital but rather by the
traffic and circulation of ideas – perhaps the most remarkable form of
transnationalism from below.
Even at the lowest levels of education, the madrasa introduced its stu-
dents to an awareness of the wider world. The students at the madrasa hail
from different regions; the friendships moulded here, which are often for
life, broaden their horizons and facilitate travel. The teachers have usually
studied in various other madrasas, often completing their own education in
one of the major centres of learning in the wider region or abroad, and the
more ambitious students follow in their footsteps. For many Asian students,
I N T R ODUC T I ON
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the great mosque schools of Mecca and Medina or the Azhar in Cairo long
were considered highly desirable destinations, and most of the founders of
new madrasas had in fact studied in one of these centres. The different re-
gions of the Muslim world were connected with one another through these
centres. The annual pilgrimage to Mecca and Cairo’s privileged position in
book printing consolidated and strengthened the communication networks
emanating from these cities.
In the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, sev-
eral other centres of learning and dissemination of religious thought, often
more ‘modern’ than the old centres, emerged. The seminary at Deoband
and the Nadwat al-ªUlama seminary at Lucknow attract students not only
from all over India but from neighbouring countries and Southeast Asia as
well. A more recent madrasa that enjoys popularity among students from
all over Asia and Africa is the Abu Nur institute in Damascus (established by
the late Ahmad Kaftaru, Syria’s mufti and a Sufi of the Naqshbandi order),
and surprisingly, the seminaries of Qom in Iran attract not only students
from Shiªi communities abroad but even from predominantly Sunni re-
gions. Reformist, Islamist, pietistic and puritanical trends in Islam have es-
tablished their own prestigious centres, and most of these centres have
spawned their own networks of secondary and even tertiary centres.
The madrasa networks have become considerably denser and less cen-
tralised over the past century, and the movement of people and ideas
through these networks has grown more complex. This has been due at
least in part to the developments in communication and transportation
technologies, as well more generally the increased demand for education
and the proliferation of distinct sub-traditions of scholarship. The late-colo-
nial and post-colonial migration of numerous Asians to parts of Europe,
Africa and North America has added even more to the complexity of the net-
works and the range of ideas communicated in them. Contrary to wide-
spread prejudice, the world of the madrasa is not a stagnant and backward
relic of the past, isolated from and in opposition to the modern world; it is
precisely the madrasa networks that connect geographically marginal and
socially subaltern groups with other social circles and impart a more cos-
mopolitan outlook. The essays in this volume provide rare insights into the
transnational dimension of madrasa education and communication, docu-
menting not only transnational flows between Asia and the Middle East but
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also the increasingly significant exchanges of people and ideas between dif-
ferent parts of Asia.
Alleged links with Terror Networks and the Clampdown on
the Madrasas
These transnational madrasa networks never received much attention, either
scholarly or political, but that changed with the ‘War on Terror,’ when
madrasas came under suspicion as being hotbeds of radicalism and the
props of ‘international terror networks.’ With ‘radical Islam’ being cast as
the adversary to American ideas and America’s ambitions, the madrasa sys-
tem was soon brought to the fore and re-presented as a major cause of con-
cern for security and strategy analysts. American foreign policy outreach ex-
tends well beyond military-strategic objectives alone and American (as well
as European) strategy analysts have already begun talking about the final
battle for the ‘hearts and minds’ of Muslims via the proxy battle for control
of the madrasas. At the heart of the matter is the belief that madrasas re-
main fundamentally anti-Western in toto; are profoundly anti-secular and
bent on keeping Muslims separated from the rest of humanity. This impres-
sion was reinforced even more after the bombing attacks in London in June
2005, after which it was revealed that at least one of the bombers had trav-
elled to Pakistan for his religious education in a madrasa.10
As the logic of the ‘War on Terror’ followed its inevitable course, Amer-
ica’s political and military elite have tried their best to win the support of
Muslim leaders and governments. The warming of America’s frosty rela-
tionship with Pakistan came in the form of outright support for the military
government of General Pervez Musharraf, despite the fact that Washington
had initially condemned the coup d’état that brought the military leader to
power. US involvement in the country has included not only the importa-
tion of surveillance technology, expertise and personnel, but also a sus-
tained effort to help the Musharraf government crack down on ‘errant’
madrasas that are said to be linked to radical Islamist groups all over the
country.
In neighbouring Southeast Asia – a region that was dubbed ‘the second
front in the global War on Terror’ – US intervention in the domestic politi-
cal affairs of the ASEAN states was equally evident. In Indonesia, great ef-
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forts were made to help promote ‘moderate’ Islam via US funding for a wide
range of Muslim ‘civil society’ activism. Media coverage of the growing ten-
sions and increasing religiously inspired violence in places such as southern
Thailand and the southern Philippines also attempted to draw links be-
tween the escalation of bloodshed and the alleged ‘militant activities’ tak-
ing place in local madrasas there.
The madrasas of Southeast Asia have come under tremendous media and
political scrutiny since 2001. The governments of countries like Singapore
and Malaysia have attempted to control the development of local madrasas
through a combination of inducements and restrictions, isolating impor-
tant Muslim constituencies and risking further domestic political fall-out in
the process. In Malaysia, the situation was further complicated due to the
government’s repeated claim that many of the country’s unregistered
madrasas were indirectly linked to the main Islamic opposition party PAS,
and were thus being used as ‘recruitment’ and ‘training centres’ for future
supporters and members of the Islamic opposition.
The net result of this concerted campaign to demonise, stigmatise and
regulate the madrasa system has been the disruption of educational ser-
vices for thousands of young Muslims throughout the world. In some cases,
the governments concerned have attempted to shut down the madrasas al-
together without tackling the fundamental root problem that explains their
popularity and relevance in the first place: the near-total absence of a func-
tioning state educational system. Pakistan’s attempts to control its
madrasas is a case in point; the country has a high illiteracy rate and a sub-
stantial proportion of its population has no access to basic education in
state schools.11
In other cases, the attempts to reform the madrasas have been marred by
ill-disguised political agendas that have nothing to do with the desire to
‘modernise’ Islamic education in the first place. In India, Thailand, Singa-
pore and the Philippines for instance, talk of madrasas and the alleged
threats that are contained within their walls is often laced with a profound
and evident anti-Muslim bias. In India, in particular, attempts to start a sen-
sible and rational discussion on madrasa reform have been tainted by the
anti-Muslim sentiments of Hindu fascist parties. Under these kinds of cir-
cumstances it is easy to understand why many Muslims in these countries
regard any attempt to reform the madrasas as part of a grander strategy
against Islam and Muslim interests in general. In some Muslim-majority
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countries like Malaysia and Indonesia talk of controlling the menace of mil-
itant madrasas is equally coloured by domestic political concerns, based on
the belief that these institutions serve as the bedrock of popular support for
domestic Islamic opposition parties, movements and NGOs.
As a result of this growing climate of fear that is being actively stoked by
the media, political ideologues and security analysts alike, one of the most
expansive global networks that has emerged over the past few hundred
years is being increasingly threatened. In August 2005, Pakistan’s Pervez
Musharraf announced that foreign students would henceforth no longer be
allowed to study in the country’s madrasas. The few foreign students who
remain in the country have either gone into hiding or risk the danger of
being arrested and deported for overstaying their visas. In neighbouring
India, the flow of foreign students to the country’s historically important
and prestigious madrasas has fallen to a mere trickle. Across the Indian
Ocean, the countries of Southeast Asia have reciprocated by denying their
students the much needed ‘Certificate of Approval’ that would allow them
to travel abroad to further their studies. Consequently, it can be predicted
that in the coming years, this transnational network of itinerant students
and scholars may cease to exist altogether, bringing to a graceless and un-
timely end a significant page of Muslim history: that of the global transfer
of education and ideas across a global Muslim landscape that did not recog-
nise the formal boundaries of the modern nation-state.
The Essays in this Volume
This volume brings together essays by scholars who have worked exten-
sively on the issue of madrasa education in different Asian countries. They
highlight some of the features and challenges that madrasas in these coun-
tries share, as well as the fact of their considerable diversity, which makes
generalisations about madrasas hazardous and misleading.
Yoginder Sikand’s account of the developments taking place in the Dar
al-ªUlum in Deoband, widely regarded as one of the most important and in-
fluential madrasas on the Indian subcontinent and beyond, focuses on the
debate surrounding the theme of educational reform in the madrasa itself.
Sikand shows how the Deoband madrasa has from the outset dedicated it-
self to a singular mission: namely, to create a generation of morally-upright
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and independent Muslim scholars whose future role will be that of the reli-
gious leaders and scholars of their community. Yet, as Sikand demonstrates,
even an institution as well-known as Deoband has not been able to escape
the debate on reform due to internal and external pressures. Central to the
question of reform is the challenge of upgrading and improving the cur-
riculum of the madrasa without compromising its Muslim identity and
standards of religious education. Here Sikand shows that the reluctance to
expand the curriculum of the madrasas has less to do with a suspicion to-
wards ‘modernity’, Western sciences or the outside world, but is rather mo-
tivated by the belief that the madrasa is a unique institution that serves the
primary purpose of being the custodian and reproducer of authentic Islamic
knowledge and instruction. Sikand also illustrates the difficulties of reform-
ing the madrasas by setting the process in the wider context of an India
that has witnessed an alarming rise of right-wing conservative Hindu poli-
tics, where Hindutva parties have been vocal in their demands to alter the
teaching of the madrasas to make them conform to a ‘national mainstream’
that has increasingly been defined in Hindu-centric communitarian terms.
Sikand argues that the reform process has been an embattled one thanks to
these overbearing pressures on the madrasas as a whole, which in turn ex-
plains the slow pace of reform and resistance on the part of many Muslim
schools in a country like India.
Moving on from Sikand, Dietrich Reetz’s chapter on the Deoband
madrasa sets the school in a broader regional and international context,
showing how the Dar al-ªUlum at Deoband emerged from its historical role
as a bastion of Indian Muslim identity to become a well-knit and integrated
network of schools that foregrounds a specific and increasingly sectarian
school of Muslim thought. While Sikand explains the madrasa’s compli-
cated relationship with the wider Indian Hindu social milieu of modern-day
India, Reetz elaborates on Deoband’s role in foregrounding its own re-
formist and puritanical interpretation of Islam before that of other schools
of Muslim thought. Paying special attention to the role played by foreign
students, the Deoband alumni network, and Deoband’s numerous publica-
tions and organisational links, Reetz maps out the wider network of De-
obandi-linked actors and agents that make up the increasingly expansive
Deobandi universe today, that stretches from South Africa to Malaysia and
beyond. While Sikand explains why the Deoband madrasa has been reluc-
tant to embrace the process of change and reform wholesale, Reetz’s ac-
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count of the developments in the madrasa from the 1980s shows that sig-
nificant developments and innovations have taken place there, although
with the intention of further consolidating and streamlining a specific De-
obandi approach and understanding of Islam that has become the norma-
tive standard for the Dar al-ªUlum and its vast network of related alumni
madrasas.
Mareike Winkelmann’s chapter looks at the developments in one of the
few girls’ madrasas in India, a phenomenon that is seldom covered in the
press, even though it marks a significant development in the area of Mus-
lim education in particular. While Sikand’s and Reetz’s account of the
changes that have taken place in the madrasa of Deoband point to the ways
in which madrasa reform has often taken place due to the pressure imposed
on the madrasas by external variable political factors, Winkelmann’s ac-
count of the goings-on in this particular girls’ madrasa demonstrates an
even more complex intra-community debate taking place: namely the need
for basic levels of religious education for Muslim girls in a Muslim-minority
country like India as part of their search for a distinct identity. Winkelmann
also elaborates upon the complex and inter-dependent relationship be-
tween this madrasa and other Muslim institutions such as the prestigious
Nadwat al-ªUlama madrasa of Lucknow and the Tablighi Jamaªat movement
in India. In her detailed exposition of the daily life of the madrasa, she
demonstrates how Muslim notions of propriety, good conduct and the
moral education of girls – epitomised by the concept of purdah or seclusion
of women from the public eye – also helps to invert conventional gender hi-
erarchies and opens up new spaces for identity politics; resistance to mas-
culine dominance and creative individual agency; albeit against a backdrop
of masculine power and religious authority.
From India we move on to Pakistan, where the madrasas of the country
have attracted an inordinate amount of media attention over the past few
years. Mariam Abou Zahab’s account of the relatively recent phenomenon
of Shiªi women’s madrasas offers interesting material for comparison with
Winkelmann’s contribution. More clearly than in the Indian case, these
Shiªi madrasas in Pakistan appear to provide women with channels for a
modest degree of emancipation and empowerment – or at least to increase
their value as spouses. The inauguration of these schools and the gradual
growth of their number appears closely linked with the rise of the re-
formists in post-Khomeini Iran and with the opportunities for women to
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pursue advanced religious studies in Qom, one of the two major centres of
Shiªi learning. The three madrasas on which Abou Zahab focuses, that serve
very different social circles ranging from modern urban middle classes to
rural populations steeped in peasant syncretism, have close connections
with Qom, where several of the teachers studied and where many students
hope to continue their studies. Reformist influences emanating from Iran,
mediated by Iranian-funded cultural centres and madrasas, are transform-
ing Pakistan’s Shiªi communities, not without evoking angry defensive re-
sponses, however. Abou Zahab’s observations among Pakistani students in
the leading women’s seminary in Qom offer a tantalising glimpse of the
modalities of transnational communication and influence.
The theme of students’ movements is raised once again in Farish A.
Noor’s chapter, although the focus here is on the movement of male stu-
dents from Southeast Asia to pursue their studies in the madrasas of Pa-
kistan. Noor begins by highlighting the media attention that has been paid
to the role of foreign students in the madrasas of Pakistan, both real and
imagined. Following the arrest and deportation of more than a dozen
Malaysian and Indonesian students in two of the more notorious madrasas
of Karachi, he proceeds to question the media stereotype of madrasas and
madrasa students by looking at the process of enrolment and education
that is given in the madrasas of the country. To balance the image of Pa-
kistan’s madrasas as ‘jihadi training camps’, Noor’s chapter focuses on the
activities of another madrasa – the Syed Maudoodi International Educa-
tional Institute (SMII) of Lahore – and its links to the Jamaªat-i Islami party
of Pakistan. Noor argues that while the SMII is indeed a conservative
madrasa known for both its elite status and links to an Islamist political
party, it is also a ‘modern’ educational institution that is well-managed, reg-
ulated and has a clear purpose. Noor emphasises the need to keep in mind
that the madrasas of Pakistan, as well as the rest of the Muslim world, are
not a homogenous phenomenon and that madrasas vary in terms of their
size, reputation, religio-political orientation and long-term ambitions.
Moving east now, Jackie Armijo’s paper looks at the revival of Islamic ed-
ucation in China and its linkages to international centres of Muslim learn-
ing abroad. Armijo notes that while an estimated twenty million Muslims
live in China and Islam has had a presence in the country for centuries, lit-
tle is known about the Muslims of China and their educational centres,
which have features unique to the country, such as the relatively higher
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number of religious schools for girls. She shows that for a host of historical
and political reasons, Chinese Muslim education has been deeply entwined
with the politics of Muslim identity and nationalism in the country. For
China’s Muslims, Islamic education serves as a basis of their collective iden-
tity, a means to develop educational links abroad, as well as a means to gain
status and respectability in their own communities. Of late, however,
China’s Muslims have been exposed to other currents of Muslim thought
emanating from countries like Saudi Arabia and Iran, signs of which can be
detected in changes in Chinese mosque architecture, modes of dress for
Muslim women in particular, as well as their relations with non-Muslims in
China. The opportunity to travel to countries like Pakistan and Malaysia
also means that China’s Muslims today are able to select alternatives in
their search for knowledge, which will have an impact on the development
of Muslim identity and education in the long run. Finally, the impact of the
‘war on terror’ has also been felt in China, with the Chinese government
placing greater restrictions on the movement of Muslim scholars and stu-
dents and increasing control over the curriculum and activities of the Chi-
nese Muslim schools themselves.
The role of the pondoks and madrasas in the development of Malay-Mus-
lim political consciousness and their relation to the Islamic Party of
Malaysia (PAS) is examined in Farish A. Noor’s next contribution. Noor looks
at how the image of the pondoks in Malaysia have changed from the early
20th century to the present day; from once having been considered the bas-
tions of early Malay-Muslim political consciousness during the early nation-
alist period, to how they are now seen and treated with some degree of sus-
picion by the Malaysian government, which considers many of them to be
strongholds of Islamist support and recruitment centres for the PAS in-
stead. In the course of a century, the trope of the pondok and madrasa has
experienced many instances of semantic and semiotic slippage, as it was
configured as progressive, radical, exotic and dangerous at different points
in Malaysian history. The chapter also looks at the PAS’s cultivation of the
pondoks and madrasas that have come under the Islamic party’s patronage,
and how the Malaysian state in turn has sought to blunt the thrust of PAS
by creating its own network of government-funded and controlled pondoks
and madrasas in turn. Noor argues that the fate of the pondoks and
madrasas in Malaysia will ultimately depend on the political contest be-
tween the Malaysian government and the Islamic opposition party, and how
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this contest in turn ensures that the image and perception of the entire pon-
dok system will be shaped by other overriding political concerns as well.
The final two chapters take us to Indonesia. Martin van Bruinessen takes
a closer look at various pesantrens considered as ‘radical’ and locates them in
the context of the broader history and sociology of Islamic education and Is-
lamic movements in the country. The vast majority of pesantrens are tradi-
tionalist and have generally sought forms of accommodation with the gov-
ernment in power while maintaining a certain distance from it. Though
often said to be conservative and backward, their curricula and teaching
methods have undergone considerable changes in response to reformist
criticism and the government’s education policies, even while resisting
these. Social activism and critical thought flourished precisely among the
students and graduates of traditionalist pesantrens, rather than the more
‘modern’ reformist schools. The various ‘radical’ pesantrens were established
relatively recently, and Van Bruinessen shows that most of them share a
historical connection to the Darul Islam movement, an indigenous move-
ment to establish an Islamic state that first took shape during the struggle
for independence and continued in the form of regional rebellions against
the secular Republic. These schools have been more receptive to reformist
and Islamist thought from the Middle East than other pesantrens have, and
one of them served as a recruitment centre for hundreds of young men in
the 1980s and early 1990s who joined the jihad in Afghanistan. More sig-
nificant, however, has been the increasing volume of Indonesian pesantren
graduates who pursued their studies in the Middle East, many of whom
came under the influence of Arabic Islamist and Salafi thought.
Indonesia’s Salafi movement is a recent phenomenon and is entirely the
creation of a few men who studied in Saudi Arabia in the 1980s and 1990s
and upon their return established a number of different madrasas than had
hitherto existed. In the final chapter, Noorhaidi Hasan outlines the history
of this movement and comments on the brief but important role the
Afghan jihad played in it. He documents the emergence of two competing
factions in the movement: one being favoured by wealthy sponsors in the
Gulf region and with close ties to the Saudi religious establishment, while
the other affiliated itself with Yemeni ulama and accordingly had much less
foreign funding. The latter faction was for several years actively involved in
the jihad in the Moluccas and seemed to be allied with certain factions
within Indonesia’s military but has since returned to a more placid, non-po-
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litical stance. Noorhaidi’s treatment clearly brings out the essentially
transnational character of this movement as well as the local factors con-
tributing to its successes among certain segments of the population (most
remarkably the syncretistic peasantry!) as opposed to others.
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1 Voices for Reform in
the Indian Madrasas
Yoginder Sikand
Introduction
Reforming the madrasas has today emerged as a major concern for many.
Governments, such as those of India, Pakistan and countries in the West,
particularly the US, are now eagerly seeking to bring about changes in the
madrasa system, in the belief that ‘unreformed’ madrasas are rapidly
emerging as major training grounds for ‘terrorists’. In addition, many Mus-
lims, including numerous ulama themselves, are also in the forefront of de-
mands for change in the madrasa system. The different actors in this com-
plex political game have widely different understandings of reform, each re-
flecting their own particular agendas. This article seeks to examine the dif-
ferent ways in which reform of the madrasas in contemporary India is
imagined and advocated by a range of actors, including different sections of
the ulama, Muslim social activists, Hindu nationalists and the Indian state.
It also looks at state policies vis-à-vis the madrasas in recent years.
Imagining ‘Reform’
While discussing the question of madrasa reform, it is pertinent to keep in
mind the role that the ulama and many Muslims actually envisage for the
madrasas. Arguments for madrasa reform often miss the point that, as
many Muslims see it, the madrasa is not meant to be an institution for the
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general education of Muslims, training them for the job market. Rather, the
madrasa is regarded as a specialised institution providing Muslims specifi-
cally with a ‘religious’ education and transmitting the Islamic scholarly tra-
dition. This being the case, it would make sense to judge the performance of
the madrasas not according to any external criterion, but, rather, in terms
of the goals that the ulama of the madrasas and the students who study
there set themselves. As the former head of the Deoband madrasa,1 India’s
largest Islamic seminary, the late Qari Muhammad Tayyib, insisted:
When people criticise the madrasa syllabus, they forget that the aim of the
madrasa is different from that of a modern school … The only way to pass judge-
ment on the madrasas is to see how far they have been able to achieve their own
aims, such as inculcating piety, promoting religious knowledge, control over the
base self (tahzib-i nafs) and service of others. Therefore, no suggestion for reform
of the syllabus which goes against these aims is acceptable.2
Critics of the madrasas tend to see them in stereotypical terms, often brand-
ing all madrasas as backward and reactionary. They are routinely described
by their detractors, Muslims as well as others, as conservative and illiberal.
They are seen as a major burden on Muslim society, consuming much of its
meagre resources, and a stumbling block of the progress of the commu-
nity.3 Much of what they teach is said to be ‘useless’ in the contemporary
context. This complaint reflects a view that ‘useful’ knowledge is that which
helps equip a student to participate in the modern economy.
As one critic, Anwar ªAli, who is himself a Muslim argues:
The mushroom growth of madrasas has caused a great setback to the spread of
modern education among Muslims. Madrasas preach hatred for worldly
progress, and misinterpret the spirit of Islam and the teachings of the Prophet,
who actually insisted on the need to acquire knowledge. They preach poverty to
the Muslims by insisting that the only knowledge worth acquiring is that which
is taught in the madrasas, and that the learning of science, technology and so on
is un-Islamic and opposed to the shariªa.4
Such critiques, while not entirely bereft of truth, appear somewhat far-
fetched and exaggerated. To claim that all madrasas are static and impervi-
ous to change is grossly misleading. Madrasas today are considerably dif-
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ferent from their counterparts in pre-colonial and colonial India, although
there are significant continuities as well. As for the argument that
madrasas are conservative, this is to state the obvious, for, as the madrasas
generally see themselves, they are indeed the guardians of Islamic ‘ortho-
doxy’, regarding their principal role as the conservation of the Islamic ‘or-
thodox’ tradition, which, although diversely understood, historically con-
structed and in a constant process of elaboration, is generally seen by the
ulama as unchanging and fixed. Not surprisingly, therefore, many ulama
regard the existing madrasa system as not in need of any major reform.
They argue that since the madrasas in the past produced great Islamic
scholars there is no need for any change even today. If the madrasas are
not producing pious, God-fearing and socially engaged ulama today, the
fault lies, so it is asserted, in the declining standards of piety and dedica-
tion, the increasing materialism and the consequent straying from the
path set by the pious elders, and not in the madrasa system as such, which
is considered as largely adequate and not in need of any major reform. As
Maulana Sa‘eed Ahmad Palanpuri, professor of Hadith and a Deobandi
scholar argues:
It appears that the products of the madrasas today do not achieve the standards
expected of them. The cause of this is not the syllabus of the madrasa, but,
rather, the lack of adequate experts in various disciplines, the carelessness of the
students and their unwillingness to work hard.5
Traditionalist Ulama and the Challenge of Reform
The debates over madrasa reform reflect different understandings of appro-
priate Islamic education and indeed of Islam itself. As many ‘traditionalist’
ulama see it, since the elders (buzurgs) have evolved a perfect system of edu-
cation, and since Islam itself is the ultimate truth, there is no need to learn
from others. To attempt to do so is sometimes regarded as a sign of weak
faith and as a straying from the path that the elders of the past have trod.
Change in the madrasa system is, therefore, often considered as threaten-
ing the identity and devotional intensity of the faith. At the same time, and
perhaps more importantly, it is considered threatening to undermine the
power of the ulama as the leaders of the community and their claims of
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speaking authoritatively for Islam. Traditional ulama often see proposals for
madrasa reform as interference in, if not an invasion of, what they regard
as their own territory. Since their claims to authority as spokesmen of Islam
are based on their mastery of certain disciplines and texts, quite naturally
any change in the syllabus, such as the introduction of new subjects or new
books or the exclusion of existing ones, directly undermines their own
claims. Moreover, they fear that the introduction of modern disciplines in
the madrasa curriculum might lead to a creeping secularisation of the in-
stitution as such, as well as tempting their students away from the path of
religion and enticing them towards the snares of the world. Proposals for
reform of the madrasas by incorporating modern subjects are sometimes
seen as hidden ploys or even as grand conspiracies to dilute the religious
character of the madrasas. Religion is here understood as a distinct sphere,
neatly set apart from other spheres of life. This is readily apparent in the
writings of many ulama. Take, for instance, the following statement of
Ashraf ªAli Thanwi, a leading early twentieth-century Deobandi ªalim:
It is, in fact, a source of great pride for the religious madrasas not to impart any
secular (duniyavi) education at all. For if this is done, the religious character of
these madrasas would inevitably be grievously harmed. Some people say that
madrasas should teach their students additional subjects that would help them
earn a livelihood, but this is not the aim of the madrasa at all. The madrasa is ac-
tually meant for those who have gone mad with their concern for the hereafter
(jinko fikr-i akhirat ne divana kar diya hai).6
Other traditionalists may not go to such lengths in denying the need for in-
clusion of modern subjects in the curriculum, but, while accepting the need
for reform, might argue that this should be strictly limited, and must not
threaten or dilute the religious character of the madrasas. Madrasas, they
argue, are geared to the training of religious specialists, and so it is impor-
tant that worldly subjects must not assume the upper hand over religious
instruction. Instead, it is enough, they insist, if the students are able to read
and speak elementary English, perform basic mathematical problems and
are familiar with the basic social sciences, albeit suitably ‘Islamised’, and so
to that extent they welcome efforts for reform. It is enough, they stress,
that the madrasa students gain a general familiarity with these subjects so
that they can function in the modern world. It is also argued that if too
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much stress is given to modern subjects in the madrasas, the students’
work load would be simply too great, which in turn would be ‘of little use to
either the faith or the world’ (na din ke kam ka na duniya ka).
While these arguments may not be without merit, the opposition of
some ulama to proposals for reform in the madrasas must also be seen as
reflecting the challenges that they perceive from Muslims articulating a dif-
ferent vision of Islam and Islamic knowledge. If all knowledge, if conducted
within the limits set by the Qur’an and the Prophetic Tradition, is Islamic,
as many reformists insist, the monopoly over the authoritative interpreta-
tion of Islam enjoyed by the ‘traditionalist’ ulama is considerably under-
mined, if not eliminated altogether. If, as some reformers see it, a pious
Muslim scientist, researching the human cell or the stars in order to dis-
cover the laws of God, is as much an ªalim as one who has devoted his whole
life to the study of the Hadith, the superior position that the ‘traditionalist’
ulama claim for themselves based on their expert knowledge of certain clas-
sical texts is effectively undermined.
Yet, madrasas are far from being completely immune to change and re-
form. Likewise, few ulama could claim to be completely satisfied with the
madrasas as they exist today. Indeed, leading ulama are themselves con-
scious of the need for change in the madrasa system. As their graduates go
out and take up a range of new careers, in India and abroad, and as pres-
sures from within the community as well as from the state and the media
for reform grow, madrasas, too, are changing. Change is, however, gradual,
emerging out of sharply contested notions of appropriate Islamic education.
Reform: The Deobandi Case
The dilemmas that accompany change are well illustrated in the case of the
Dar al-ªUlum at Deoband, often considered to be a major bastion of ulama
conservatism in South Asia. The Deobandis stress conformity to traditional
understandings of Hanafi fiqh, and they tend to see the solution to all con-
temporary problems as lying in a rigid adherence to past fiqh formulations.
New ways of interpreting Islam are seen as akin to heresy and ‘wrongful in-
novation’. As Mumshad ªAli Qasimi, a critic of Deoband who is himself a
product of the madrasa, says, the traditional ulama ‘don’t want to change.
They are scared of the light because they have got used to darkness’.7 How-
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ever, today, there is mounting pressure from within the broader Deobandi
fold for reform in the system of madrasa education.
Faced with increasingly vocal demands that Deoband reform its syllabus,
in October 1994 the madrasa organised a convention attended by a large
number of teachers of Deobandi madrasas from all over India. The conven-
tion was ostensibly held to discuss the question of syllabus reform of the
madrasas at length, but the inaugural lecture delivered by the rector of the
Deoband madrasa, Maulana Marghub ur-Rahman, suggested how far the or-
ganisers were really willing to go in accepting change. The Maulana insisted
that there was no need to introduce modern education in the madrasas.
There were thousands of schools in the country, he pointed out, and Mus-
lim children who wanted to study modern subjects could enrol there in-
stead. Introducing modern subjects in the madrasa would, he argued, ‘de-
stroy their [religious] character’. He argued that Islam had clearly divided
knowledge into two distinct categories of ‘religious’ and ‘worldly’. ‘The
paths and destinations of these two branches of knowledge’, he claimed,
‘were totally different’, indeed mutually exclusive. ‘If one seeks to travel on
both paths together’, combining religious and worldly knowledge, he as-
serted, he would ‘get stuck in the middle’. Hence, he stressed, madrasas
must remain ‘purely religious’, as the Deobandi elders had themselves in-
sisted.8
Predictably, the convention concluded with a unanimous decision not to
make any concessions to those who were clamouring for reform of the
madrasa curriculum. The convention passed a resolution declaring that be-
cause Islam was a ‘complete and perfect way of life’ (mukammil din), it pro-
vided ‘solutions to all problems’. Hence, to meet the challenges of modern
life, Muslims needed to rely ‘only on the Qur’an, Hadith and jurisprudence’,
and there was no need for ‘Western knowledge and culture’.9 The only
change in the madrasa syllabus that the convention agreed to was merely
cosmetic, and entailed adding a couple of books for some subjects and to re-
duce the number of texts for others. As one critic, himself a graduate of the
Deoband madrasa, caustically remarked:
It seems that the convention had not been organised to seriously discuss the
madrasa curriculum, to make suitable changes in it in accordance with changing
social conditions, to meet modern demands and to improve the functioning of
the madrasas. Rather, it appears to have been held simply to announce that all is
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well with the madrasas, and that because they worked well in the past they will
continue to do so, and to accuse those who demanding reform of having dubious
intentions. If this indeed was the intention of this convention, there was no need
to hold it. To prevent one’s own weaknesses from being publicised and to pro-
claim the victories of the past is not a constructive approach.10
Despite the great reluctance of the administrators of Deoband to allow for
any significant reform in the madrasa system, the winds of change are
being felt today even in the hallowed portals of the Dar al-ªUlum. In fact, the
above-mentioned convention was probably owed to, among other factors,
the increasingly vocal demands of some Deobandis that the madrasa
needed to change with the times. Not every Deobandi is a die-hard conser-
vative, and not all of them are opposed to change in the madrasas. Qari
Muhammad Tayyib, the rector of the Deoband madrasa prior to Maulana
Marghub ur-Rahman, seemed to be somewhat more flexible and open to
change than his successor. Addressing a government-sponsored conference
on madrasa education, he argued that while no one could agree to change
the teaching of the Qur’an in the madrasas, as far as those subjects or books
that were considered ‘servants of the Qur’an’ (khadim-i Qur’an), they could be
altered according to changing conditions. He argued that the ways of un-
derstanding the Qur’an may change over time. In the past, when Greek phi-
losophy or Sufism were dominant, the Qur’an was understood through
their eyes. In today’s ‘scientific age’, however, the Qur’an needs to be stud-
ied from a scientific perspective, generating new ways of expressing the
eternal truths of the sacred text. Therefore, he went on, books or subjects
(specifically philosophy and logic) used to study the Qur’an must change
with the times. In other words, he argued, there was room for reform in the
madrasa syllabus, but he insisted that it was for the ulama alone to decide
the direction and extent of the reforms.11
The growing pressure for change at the Dar al-ªUlum is owed, in part, to
the influence of young Deobandi graduates, who, after completing their
studies at the madrasa, go on to regular universities for higher studies or
have accepted a range of occupations in India and abroad, but continue to
maintain a link with their alma mater. Aware of the rapidly changing world
around them, from which madrasa students are thought to be insulated,
they help transmit new ideas that, in turn, have given birth to new initia-
tives at Deoband itself. An important role in this regard is played by the
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Tanzim-i Abna-i Qadim, the Old Boys’ Association of the Deoband madrasa,
with its headquarters in Delhi. It has the following ambitious list of aims
and objectives:
– To set up study centres and libraries to promote awareness about na-
tional and international affairs.
– To promote the study of the Qur’an and Hadith, the movement of Shah
Waliullah [an eighteenth-century Indian Muslim scholar revered by the
Deobandis] as well as of non-Islamic movements and to publish litera-
ture on these.
– To publish articles in newspapers and journals on religious issues and
on social reform.
– To promote religious as well as modern education.
– To establish shariªa committees in Muslim localities consisting of ulama
and imams of mosques to solve disputes in accordance with the shariªa.
– To promote social reform in accordance with the shariªa, e.g., discourag-
ing wasteful expenses on celebrations, dowries, un-Islamic practices and
unwarranted divorces.
– To encourage Muslims to get involved in social work to help the poor.
– To work along with people of other religions and castes for common so-
cial aims and for the general relief and development of everyone, irre-
spective of religion and caste.
– To promote interaction and good relations between people of different
religions.
– To remove misunderstandings about Islam and Muslims among non-
Muslims.12
The Association publishes a monthly magazine in Urdu, the Tarjuman-i Dar
al-ªUlum, which is widely read by graduates, students and teachers of the De-
oband madrasa as well as of various other madrasas affiliated with De-
oband. The magazine serves as an important vehicle for the transmission of
new ideas, including issues related to madrasa reform. In contrast to many
ulama at Deoband itself, it insists on the need for reform in the madrasa
system if madrasas are to play a constructive role in society. It advocates a
controlled modernisation, seeing this, not as a departure from, but rather
as a return to Islam and the vision of the Deoband’s founders. Its advocacy
of a return to the authentic Islamic tradition serves to facilitate change and
reform, rather than to oppose it. Thus, for instance, in an article published
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in the magazine, Zain ul-Sajid bin Qasmi, a Deobandi graduate and now a
teacher of Islamic Studies at the Aligarh Muslim University, emphasises
that madrasas can no longer ignore modern challenges. ‘We need ulama
who are familiar with both religious as well as modern knowledge to serve
the community and reply to the attacks on Islam from the West in the
West’s own language’.13 While this proposal obviously suggests a defensive
posture vis-à-vis the challenge of the West, it also signals a recognition of
the importance of modern knowledge and might even represent an Islamic
appropriation of modernity itself.
In a similar vein, another contributor to the journal, the Deobandi grad-
uate ‘Abdur Rahim ‘Abid, writes that many younger ulama today rightly feel
that the madrasas need to broaden their curricula in order to include basic
education in subjects such as mathematics, science, the social sciences,
Hindi and English. It is not necessary, he stresses, that students at madrasas
be given detailed instruction in these modern subjects, but they should be
familiarised with them on at least an elementary level. He recognises that
this might be construed by some as a betrayal of the Deobandi tradition,
but assures his readers that in actual fact it is not so. He informs them that
the founder of the madrasa Maulana Qasim Nanotawi arranged for Sanskrit
to be taught at Deoband in its initial years, and that another leading re-
formist ªalim, Ashraf ªAli Thanwi had, likewise, suggested the need to in-
clude Hindi as well as basic modern law in the madrasa curriculum.14 In
other words, he writes, the Deobandi elders felt that the madrasa syllabus
should be made more dynamic in order to equip would-be ulama for the
changing conditions of the world around them so that they can provide an-
swers to modern questions and challenges. However, he notes with distress
that when a Muslim doctor based in the US offered to donate several com-
puters to the Dar al-ªUlum for the students, the madrasa authorities de-
clined, saying that they would be of no use to them. He laments that the
madrasa’s authorities, by opposing modern knowledge, are actually work-
ing against the original vision of the Deoband’s founders.15
These critiques of conservatives from inside the Deoband are routine in
the pages of the Association’s magazine, and reflect an increasing dissatis-
faction among several younger Deobandis with what they see as the inflexi-
ble, authoritarian conservatism of some of the madrasa’s authorities.
Waris Mazhari, editor of the Tarjuman-i Dar al-ªUlum is a graduate of the
Deoband madrasa who later studied at the Nadwat ul-ªUlama in Lucknow
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and then at the Jamiªa Millia Islamia in New Delhi. Besides editing the jour-
nal, he is involved in a number of projects promoting Islamic as well as
modern education among Muslims, including madrasa’s graduates. Like
many other contributors to the journal, he is also critical of various aspects
of the Deoband madrasa, particularly its curriculum, because ‘in many re-
spects it is irrelevant, and is not able to meet the challenges of modern life’.
Mazhari advocates a thorough revision of the texts used at Deoband, par-
ticularly those used for core subjects such as theology and jurisprudence.
The theology books still being used at Deoband, he points out, are largely
based on ancient Greek philosophy, having been written at a time when it
was still considered a major challenge to Islam. The books also focussed on
combating various other rival schools and sects, such as the Kharijites and
the Isma‘ilis, and so these texts deal at great length with their doctrines in
order to refute them. However, he emphasises that the challenge from
Greek philosophy and the rival sects no longer exists today, and so the tra-
ditional theology books are largely irrelevant. What madrasas need today,
instead, he advises, are theology books that deal with the confirmed find-
ings of modern science and that seek to engage with contemporary ideolog-
ical challenges, such as materialism, existentialism, atheism, Marxism,
post-modernism and so on. For this he suggests introducing new commen-
taries on the Qur’an. The medieval Qur’anic commentators, whose books
are still used in the madrasas, certainly did a great service to the faith, he
insists. However, he adds, they were, after all, just human beings and no
matter how pious they may have been they were certainly not infallible.
When they interpreted the Qur’an they always emphasised the fact that it
was a human effort, admitting that no human being could fully reveal the
will of God as expressed in the Qur’an. Hence, to regard their commentaries
as the ultimate word on the Qur’an, as many conservative ulama seem to
do, is wrong. Many medieval commentaries, he says, also suffer from the in-
fluence of concocted hadith reports and from polemical debates and contro-
versies. Moreover, the commentators were naturally also influenced in their
thinking by their own social circumstances, by the general prevailing social
environment as well as by the then available knowledge, and all this is re-
flected in the various commentaries written over the ages. Hence, he
stresses that today with social conditions having undergone such a radical
transformation and with the vast expansion of human knowledge, new in-
terpretations of and commentaries on the Qur’an are needed. ‘Since Mus-
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lims believe that the Qur’an is of eternal validity and provides guidance for
all times’, he observes, ‘newer interpretations and commentaries of the text
are needed as times change, in order to show the relevance of the Qur’an in
each new age’.
Similarly, Mazhari also advocates radical reform in the teaching meth-
ods of Islamic jurisprudence or fiqh, which occupies a central place in the
present madrasa curriculum. He is opposed to the practice of blind taqlid of
jurisprudential precedent and argues that fiqh must continue to evolve over
time, for as conditions change and new issues emerge, new fiqh responses
must be articulated. He calls for the need to exercise ijtihad to examine mat-
ters afresh and to take into account new developments. He further agrees
that in matters of faith (ªaqa’id) and worship (ªibadat) and other areas that
are specifically covered in the Qur’an, there can be no ijtihad, for these are
eternal. However, in major areas in the domain of social transactions (muªa-
malat) one must, he says, be open to the possibilities of new interpretations.
He regrets that this is strongly discouraged in the Indian madrasas, sug-
gesting that this could be because it would undermine the authority of the
conservative ulama, whose claims of being the spiritual guides of the com-
munity rest on their knowledge of the classical texts. He is hopeful, how-
ever, because the younger generation of Islamic scholars are increasingly
more willing to articulate their disagreements. ‘While we respect our pre-
decessors and cherish their great contributions’, he says, ‘we must not go to
the extent of putting them on a divine pedestal, for the “worship of elders”
(buzurg parasti) is strongly condemned in Islam.’
Mazhari’s vision for the reform of the madrasas is not limited simply to
their curricula, however. He recommends that the madrasas that have the
necessary funds should make arrangements for the vocational training of
those students who do not want to go on to become professional ulama. He
suggests that community leaders pay more attention to educating the girls
– both Islamic and modern. In this regard, he is critical of many ulama who
are not in favour of higher education for girls, arguing that their stance is
not in accordance with the Qur’an. He cites an article he wrote for his jour-
nal that lauded the achievement of a Muslim girl who came in second in the
Indian Police Service examinations in 2001, presenting her as a model for
other Muslim girls to follow. He received a number of angry letters from
ulama criticising the article, but, he adds, several Deoband graduates wrote
him to congratulate him for the article.16
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The influence of the new thinking as represented by individual ulama as-
sociated with the Old Boys’ Association, on the one hand, and the growing
wave of attacks on madrasas, on the other, is today forcing Deoband’s au-
thorities to consider the introduction of limited reforms in their syllabuses
and administrative methods. The media hype concerning the Deobandi’s
connections to the Taliban is said to have forced the authorities of the
madrasa to relent and allow some of their students to take English and
computer classes so that they can respond to the journalists and put their
fears to rest regarding madrasas’ alleged involvement in terrorism. The
madrasa has arrangements for 25 students who have passed the fazil course
(the advanced course that takes the student beyond the graduate or ªalim
level) to study in each of the two new departments. The madrasa has also
launched a media department to document media reports on Islam and
Muslim issues, to have a liaison with journalists and to prepare reports and
articles on issues related to the madrasas. Several leading Deobandi author-
ities are now encouraging Muslims to take both religious and modern edu-
cation, exhorting them to establish both madrasas and modern schools
where arrangements should be made for the proper Islamic education of
their children. Contrary to the image of Deobandis as hardcore conserva-
tives and vehemently opposed to change, many Deobandis today would
readily agree with Muhammad Aslam Qasmi, Hadith teacher, when he in-
sists that Muslims must enrol in both modern and Islamic education, ‘in a
balanced way’.17
The changes that are slowly making their presence felt in Deoband are
not an isolated exception. In fact, the voices of change in the madrasas have
been gaining strength in recent years, but are not particularly new. The ur-
gent need for madrasa reforms has been consistently articulated since colo-
nial times by Muslim reformers, including many ulama themselves, al-
though the actual pace of reform in the madrasa has been slow, while the
limits and actual content of the reform programmes are still hotly de-
bated.18 In a recent survey, Siddiqui discovered that the majority of the over
450 madrasas that he studied in Delhi were in favour of curricular reform
and the teaching of modern subjects, at least in the elementary classes.19
Likewise, Qamruddin, in his survey of 576 madrasas throughout India, esti-
mated that over 96 per cent of the madrasas were in favour of the introduc-
tion of modern subjects in order to ensure a better future for their stu-
dents.20 Yet, despite this widespread desire for reform, as Muhammad
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Qasim Zaman rightly notes, ‘The significance of the initiatives towards re-
forming the madrasa itself remains to be appreciated’.21
In South Asia today, advocates for reform in the madrasa system include
both trained ulama, madrasa graduates, as well those educated in modern
schools, including self-defined Islamists and Muslim modernists. Some of
them have studied in madrasas and have then gone on to receive their
higher educations in regular universities. Others may have been tradition-
ally-trained ulama, whose sons have studied in universities and have then
joined them to help improve the functioning of their madrasas, a phenome-
non that has become increasingly common in contemporary India, particu-
larly in the cases of some madrasas that are affiliated to official madrasa
education boards in various Indian states. It is important, however, not to
exaggerate the differences between the ‘traditionalists’, ‘Islamists’ and
‘modernists’. While these categories may be useful for heuristic purposes,
in actual fact, they do not exist as separate, neatly identifiable types. In-
stead, they represent a wide range of opinions with one blending almost im-
perceptibly into the other. It is often the case that an individual, who, for in-
stance, could be defined as a ‘traditionalist’, might express ‘modernist’ or
‘Islamist’ sympathies in some significant situations.
Islamists, Muslim Modernists and Madrasa Reform
The voices for madrasa reform reflect a wide range of community agendas.
Advocates of reform represent considerably different political positions,
from those who consider themselves as completely apolitical, to those who
feel that reform is needed in order to integrate madrasa students into the
wider society, to those who insist on reform in the belief that it is only by
combining Islamic with modern, particularly scientific, education, that
Muslims can win political power and establish an Islamic state, in the ab-
sence of which Muslims are believed to be incapable of leading truly Islamic
lives. Advocates of madrasa modernisation share a commitment to Islamic
tradition with their opponents and present their schemes for the mod-
ernised madrasa as a return to the authentic tradition as represented by the
Prophet and his companions, rather than as a radical departure from it. The
very notion of the authentic Islamic tradition, being a social construct and
an ongoing evolving project, is itself fiercely contested. Thus, different ver-
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sions of what constitutes the authentic Islamic tradition are advocated and
debated in the course of discussions about madrasa reforms.
Advocates for the introduction of modern subjects in the madrasa cur-
riculum are also aware of the limits of reform, and there is considerable de-
bate about how far reform should proceed. This tension centres on the per-
ceived role and function of the madrasa. Those who see the madrasas’ func-
tion as the training of students to become religious professionals argue that
modern subjects should be allowed only insofar as they might help their
students understand and interpret Islam in light of modern knowledge.
Others, recognising that not all madrasa graduates will end up becoming
professional ulama, have suggested the creation of two streams of madrasa
education. The first stream includes students who want just a modicum of
religious education and prefer going to a regular school. They would be
taught basic religious subjects along with modern disciplines. The second
stream would cater to students who want to become a professional ulama,
and their education would focus on religious subjects, teaching modern dis-
ciplines only to the extent necessary for them to interpret Islam in light of
contemporary contexts. On the other hand, a vocal minority has insisted
that an entirely new system of education must take the place of the tradi-
tional madrasas, where a unified syllabus, based on a harmonious blend of
religious and modern subjects would be taught in equal proportions, and
whose graduates could then go on to pursue a range of occupations, both
religious and secular. Some critics go so far as to suggest that the larger
madrasas, after being suitably reformed, should be converted into universi-
ties funded by the state, with smaller madrasas remaining affiliated to
them. This, however, is not a widely shared view.22 More acceptable is the
suggestion that madrasa education be reformed to allow madrasa graduates
to apply to regular universities after having finished their basic religious ed-
ucation.
While advocates of reform seem to agree on the importance of the
madrasa as an institution geared to the preservation and promotion of Is-
lamic knowledge and Muslim identity, there is a considerable variety of ap-
proaches to the nature and extent of the reforms as well as the rationales
employed to advocate their cases. However, there seems to be a consensus
that the core of the reform project should consist of modifying the syllabus
and teaching methods, in particular emphasising the teaching of modern
subjects, such as mathematics, the social and the natural sciences and lan-
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guages such as English and Hindi. New books for teaching religious subjects
and the excision of certain subjects and texts considered outdated or irrele-
vant in today’s context are also generally advocated. Although some propo-
nents of reform go so far as to call for new ways of imagining Islamic theol-
ogy and law, these are clearly in the minority.
The reformists’ rationale for introducing modern disciplines into the
madrasas is principally framed in four ways. Firstly, modernisation is seen
as a recovery of the authentic, holistic Islamic understanding of knowledge
as all embracing, covering both worship as well as social relations and
worldly pursuits, knowledge of God and of His creation. Secondly, it is seen
as indispensable so that the ulama may recover the quick decline of their
authority as spokespersons for Islam. Thirdly, it is expressed as a necessary
means for Muslims to prosper in this world as well as the next. Finally, it is
considered as essential in order for the ulama to engage in tabligh, or Is-
lamic missionary work. All these are intertwined with a new, more activist
understanding of the role of the ulama. The ulama are no longer restricted
to just teaching in the madrasas. Rather, armed with both modern and tra-
ditional knowledge, they can again become leaders in the community.
Madrasa Reform and the Worldly Prospects of the Ulama
Advocates for reform see the present syllabus used in most South Asian
madrasas – generally some variant of the dars-i nizami – a syllabus prepared
in eighteenth century north India, as stagnant and in many respects no
longer in tune with the demands and needs of the times. This notion is thus
based on the understanding of practical ‘usefulness’, with much of what
madrasas today teach no longer being considered ‘useful’ or ‘relevant’.
While it is recognised that the dars-i nizami syllabus did indeed produce its
share of brilliant scholars, it is also stressed that it was a product of a par-
ticular society and way of understanding the world, suited to the particular
social and administrative needs of its times. However, now that social con-
ditions have changed drastically and human knowledge has vastly ex-
panded, the madrasa curriculum must also change, so that madrasas can
provide a ‘useful’ and ‘relevant’ education.23 This is regarded as particularly
important for the future economic prospects of madrasa students.
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The notion of ‘useful’ knowledge is itself a novel one, and one that can
be traced to colonial discourse about what constituted appropriate learning.
As we have seen, the classical ulama insisted, as many traditionalist ulama
indeed still do, on the central importance of ‘pure intention’ (sahih niyyat) in
the acquisition of knowledge. The quest for knowledge was, ideally, seen as
being motivated simply to acquire God’s favour, and students were sternly
warned against any base or worldly motives. Knowledge, it was stressed,
was a divine gift, and should only be used to do God’s will, not as a means
for worldly advancement. Yet, today, numerous Muslim scholars including
even some traditionalist ulama, are arguing that madrasas should more se-
riously take the worldly prospects of their students into account when
framing their curricula.
The ‘useful’ knowledge that should be included in the madrasa curricu-
lum is described differently by different reform advocates. It generally in-
cludes the basics of the modern natural and physical sciences, as well as
Hindi and English. The need to include these subjects is often framed by the
classical notion of ‘pure intention’, and thus does not appear to be moti-
vated by worldly concerns. It is sometimes expressed as a way to help sal-
vage the sagging prestige of the ulama and reinforce their moral authority.
Thus, a Deobandi graduate writes, for instance, that the ulama’s lack of
basic Hindi or English skills, often lead to feelings of ‘humiliation’ when
they ‘step outside of the four walls of their madrasas’, and ‘have to depend
on others for even such elementary things as filling out a train reservation
form’. This leads to a loss of prestige on the part of the ulama, which augurs
ill for Islam.24 Thus, the emphasis is on the notion that unless modern sub-
jects are added to the curriculum, which will enable madrasa students to re-
main abreast of contemporary developments, there is little to stop the
growing irrelevance of the ulama in the eyes of the general Muslim public.25
For many advocates of madrasa reform, including, though not solely, the
Islamists, modernisation is proposed as a means of doing away with or at
least reducing the rigid dualism that sets modern educated Muslims apart
from the traditional ulama. If the madrasas were to incorporate modern
subjects into their curricula they might also begin attracting students from
better-off families, thus undermining the existing educational dualism, as
well as improving the standards of the madrasas and, as one ªalim suggests,
the moral standards of the students.26 Incorporating modern subjects into
the madrasa curriculum is also seen as a particularly urgent issue given the
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increasingly visible and strident Hinduisation of the secular education sys-
tem. Some suggest that in order to protect Muslim children studying in
modern schools from Hinduisation and ‘intellectual apostasy’, madrasas
need to incorporate modern subjects so that parents begin sending their
children to the madrasa to prevent them from becoming delinquent. This
appeal for madrasa reform is thus inextricably linked to broader concerns
dealing with the maintenance of community boundaries and identities. It is
also related to efforts by some ulama to reach out to modern educated Mus-
lims, who are seen as having virtually abandoned their faith, in an effort to
lure them back to Islam. In other words, it is seen as a way of extending and
reinforcing ulama authority over modern-educated Muslims lost to their
faith. As some Islamists envision it, this attempt to build bridges between
the ulama and modern-educated Muslims may ultimately result in fusion of
their distinct identities, leading to the formation of a new class of ulama,
firmly rooted in the Islamic tradition but, at the same time, fully capable of
functioning in the modern world. As a Deobandi ªalim pointed out, it seeks
to ‘put an end to the war between the minister and the maulvi’.27 However,
the mere introduction of certain ‘modern’ subjects in the madrasa curricu-
lum may not be enough to ‘modernise’ their worldview, especially given the
fact that few ulama advocates of reform mention the need to revise their
own understanding of traditional Islamic jurisprudence and theology.
Introducing modern subjects into the madrasas is also seen as providing
madrasa students with substantial real-world benefits. Given the fact that
madrasa teachers are often poorly paid and that the career prospects of
madrasa graduates are limited and not particularly lucrative, this is a par-
ticularly pressing concern for many advocates of reform. Reforming the
madrasa curriculum is regarded as essential in dealing with a central prob-
lem for many madrasa students, that of employment in an economy for
which they have little or no training. The problem of suitable employment
for madrasa graduates has now become a particularly serious one. With In-
dian independence in 1947, the absorption of Muslim-ruled princely states
and the eclipse of the Muslim feudal nobility, numerous madrasas and
ulama have lost valuable sources of patronage. The problem has only been
exacerbated in the face of general Muslim economic backwardness and the
rapid increase in the numbers of students matriculating from the growing
numbers of madrasas each year.
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Many ulama have responded to the issue by dismissing it altogether.
They believe that the madrasa exists to train religious specialists, not petty
clerks. Madrasa students, they insist, should not be concerned with where
and how they will earn their livelihood, for God shall provide for them.28 It
has also often been argued that religious knowledge should be sought for
its own sake, and not as a means to worldly advancement.29
Despite the widespread reluctance to discuss the issue, some writers, in-
cluding many ulama themselves, today recognise that employment is in-
deed a fundamental concern for madrasa students, most of whom come
from poor families, and are sent to the madrasas by their parents in the
hope that upon graduation they will be able to earn a livelihood as imams
in mosques or as teachers in maktabs and other madrasas. They see the in-
troduction of modern subjects as an important way of addressing the prob-
lem of acute unemployment among madrasa graduates, because, they
argue, the existing avenues of employment for them, mainly as teachers in
madrasas or imams and mu’azzins in mosques, is limited. If madrasas were
to include a basic modern curriculum, it is suggested, their students may be
able to later enrol in colleges and aspire to new and better careers. Madrasa
graduates, if is emphasised, will thereby be able to financially support
themselves, thus lessening their burden on the community.30 Several re-
form advocates have suggested that madrasas should introduce technical
and vocational training for those students who do not wish to seek religious
careers so that they can earn a respectable livelihood upon graduating from
the madrasa.31
The question of the empowerment of the Muslim community as a whole,
under the leadership of the ulama is related to the concern for shoring up
the authority of the ulama and improving the economic conditions of
madrasa students. Islamists as well as many traditional ulama sometimes
present the modernisation of the madrasas as linked to the quest for politi-
cal empowerment. This argument is sometimes expressed in terms of an
overarching commitment to a worldview in which Islam is irreconcilably
set against other religions in a desperate struggle for power, with the asser-
tion that, as the only true religion in God’s eyes, only Islam deserves to rule.
This obviously reflects the deep and painful awareness that Muslims have
been marginalised in the global order as they yearn for an age long past
when they were masters of much of the world. This is sometimes framed in
global terms in the form of a struggle between Islam and the West for world
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domination. Thus, Sayyid Muhammad Rabe Hasni Nadwi, rector of the Nad-
wat ul-ªUlama madrasa in Lucknow, north India, argues that Muslims need
to acquire more modern knowledge, of both the natural and social sciences,
albeit suitably Islamised, in order to ‘defeat the West using the enemies’
own instruments’.32 Similar statements are often voiced by many other
ulama and, of course, by Islamists.
Caution is advisable in taking these statements at face value, however.
While they undoubtedly represent a deep strain of hostility towards other
faiths and their adherents, they must be seen as reflecting a position of felt
marginality and oppression and as symbolic statements of protest. Rather
than actually setting Muslims against others militarily and politically, mod-
ernisation, suitably legitimised as a means for Muslim empowerment, may
actually result in greater integration into the wider society. However, it can
also be, as Arshad Alam argues, that in some cases the introduction of
‘modern’ subjects need not necessarily lead to a transformation in their
own worldviews, with science and technology being employed for the cause
of promoting traditional understandings of religion.33
Madrasa Reform and Muslim Missionary Activism
Introducing modern disciplines in the madrasa syllabus is also seen in the
writings of many advocates of reform as central to the divinely ordained
task of tabligh or the preaching of Islam. The ulama are regarded as having
a special role in this regard, although tabligh is seen as a binding duty for all
Muslims. It is stressed that Islam is for the entire world and not just Mus-
lims, and the ulama must assume responsibility towards their fellow coun-
trymen, the non-Muslim Indians, who are said to be ‘in dire need of their
guidance’.34 Several writers argue that in order to become effective mission-
aries, the ulama must willingly adopt new forms of knowledge. If Muslims,
the argument goes, were to lead the world in the development of knowl-
edge, others would simply accept their leadership, and might even be in-
spired to convert to Islam. By mastering modern knowledge, the argument
goes, the ulama would also be able to impress upon non-Muslims that Islam
has the ideal solution to all worldly problems, and this might inspire them
to accept the faith.
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The writings of advocates of reform highlight noted ulama from the past
who actively studied the languages, sciences and cultures of other peoples
in order to more effectively carry on the task of tabligh. The figure of the
eleventh-century Imam Ghazali, the most accomplished Islamic scholar of
his time, often comes up in discussions. Ghazali is said to have studied
Greek philosophy in order to refute those Muslims who had fallen prey to
its snares and had dismissed religion as a human creation. By mastering
Greek philosophy, he was able to refute its claims and argue for the superi-
ority of Islam. Likewise, it is urged that present-day ulama must closely
study, and indeed master, ‘non-Islamic’ philosophies — not for their own
sake, however, but to expose them and assert the truth of Islam. A new sci-
ence of Islamic theology (ªilm-i kalam) that seeks to present Islam in contem-
porary terms in order to appeal to the modern mind, is called for, one that
seeks to present Islam in contemporary terms in order to appeal to the
modern mind. For this, it is often stressed, the ulama must be familiar with
various contemporary ideologies and knowledge systems that are opposed
to Islam.35 Numerous writers also suggest that in order to prepare effective
Islamic missionaries and to rebut the claims of other faiths, there is a need
for madrasas to teach comparative religion and English. Some have also ar-
gued for students learning computer skills and the use of the Internet in
order to engage more effectively in tabligh work among people of other
faiths.36
Critique of the Existing Madrasa Curriculum
Calls for madrasa reform, as we have pointed out, include both the intro-
duction of modern subjects in the madrasa curriculum as well as the re-
moval of subjects or books considered to be irrelevant or no longer useful.
Reformists argue that since the world is in a state of continuous change, so,
too, must the curriculum of the madrasas continue to evolve if madrasas are
to maintain their relevance. In fact, they point out, the madrasa system has
always responded to changes in the wider society. Change, however, they
argue, must be selective and carefully controlled, and it must not result in
the transformation of the madrasas into something entirely different or in
a threat to what is seen as their specifically religious character. As they con-
tinue to absorb new developments and to respond accordingly, the
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madrasas must also continue to work to preserve, promote and transmit
the Islamic tradition, for that is considered their primary function.
This controlled project of reform is based on a distinction between two
forms of knowledge on which the madrasa syllabus is based: the transmit-
ted (naqli or manqul) and the rational (ªaqli or maªqul) sciences. While the for-
mer are seen as immutable and valid for all time, being of divine origin, the
latter are regarded as human products, which, therefore, can be reformed,
removed or replaced. While the former are an end in themselves, the latter
are regarded as simply a means for acquiring knowledge of the former. Ac-
cordingly, reformists argue, the rational sciences included in the existing
madrasa curriculum must be replaced so that students can gain a better un-
derstanding of the primary sources of Islam, because in a changed world,
these sciences, products of an age long past, are no longer adequate or
properly intelligible.37
Besides the rational sciences of philosophy and logic, certain other sub-
jects included in the present madrasa system are also regarded by numer-
ous advocates of reform as unnecessary and in urgent need of reform or re-
moval. One of these is the teaching of ªilm al-ikhtilaf, the discipline that fo-
cuses on the differences between the various schools of law and that all too
easily lends itself to delegitimising other groups as heterodox or even un-Is-
lamic. ªIlm al-ikhtilaf forms a central component of the syllabus in several
madrasas today, because each maslak or school of thought and its associated
madrasas regards the refutation of other Muslim groups as one of its pri-
mary functions. This serves to stress its own claims to Islamic authenticity.
Those who see the teaching of ªilm al-ikhtilaf as unnecessary and even dan-
gerous often complain that many madrasas play an inordinate role in pro-
moting intra-Muslim conflicts by teaching their students to condemn all
Muslim groups other than their own as virtually outside the pale of Islam.
They suggest that books that tend to promote hatred against other Muslim
groups should be excised from the syllabus.
Another contentious issue that is repeatedly discussed in the writings of
the advocates of reform is the issue of fiqh, which constitutes the core of the
madrasa syllabus. It is also the mainstay of the ulama’s authority, because
ulama are considered experts on the subject. A number of reformists who
have pleaded for a revision of how fiqh is taught in the madrasas have rec-
ommended the inclusion of modern subjects in the madrasa curriculum in
order to develop a new fiqh that is more attuned to contemporary India.
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They emphasise that this is because the classical fiqh books deal with many
issues that are no longer relevant and are also silent on contemporary mat-
ters that people are forced to deal with. Furthermore, many of the books on
fiqh, as well as other subjects, currently still used in the madrasas are said
to consist simply of commentaries upon commentaries or simply marginal
footnotes, written in an archaic style and language. Many of these commen-
taries are said to further complicate rather than explain what the original
books teach. Several of these books are said to promote ‘heated verbal de-
bates and quarrels and strife’ and, hence, ‘cannot open the minds of the stu-
dents’.38 It is thus suggested that these books be replaced by new, more ac-
cessible books on fiqh that deal with issues of contemporary concern and
practical realities.39
This new Islamic jurisprudence that reform advocates seek to formulate
necessitates ijtihad, or the skills of deducing rulings for new situations and
problems from the Qur’an and hadith. Accordingly, the reformists suggest,
the focus of the teaching of fiqh should be less about the details of jurispru-
dence (furuª) and more focussed on the principles of law (usul).40 One writer
even suggests that madrasas should familiarise their students with interna-
tional law and comparative legal systems in order to ‘meet modern chal-
lenges’.41 Another leading ªalim associated with the Jamaªat-i Islami, a lead-
ing South Asian Islamist movement, recommends that madrasa students
must be familiarised with the fiqh of other Muslim schools of jurisprudence
in order to break the stranglehold of taqlid and inter-maslak prejudices. This
ªalim further insists on the need for an ijtihad based on a thorough study of
the usul-i fiqh to deal with issues that the medieval compendia of fiqh either
do not mention or do so in terms that are irrelevant today, including such
subjects as religious pluralism, women’s rights and social justice for op-
pressed peoples.42
Advocates of madrasa reform have also written extensively on the need
for a change in the teaching of the core subject of tafsir or Qur’anic com-
mentary. The original dars-i nizami devoted little attention to Qur’anic com-
mentary, because it was envisaged as a syllabus to train government bu-
reaucrats rather than religious specialists. Many Indian madrasas continue
to pay scant attention to tafsir, using only a few texts by early medieval com-
mentators that are now widely recognised as inadequate to teach the sub-
ject. Reform in the teaching of tafsir is generally articulated in two principal
ways. Firstly, it is argued that the Qur’an is a simple, easily understandable
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book of practical guidance. Hence, it must be approached more directly and
not with the help of outdated commentaries. Secondly, it is often argued
that all commentaries naturally bear the imprint of their authors and their
own socio-historical background. While the medieval tafsir literature is not
dismissed as completely useless, it is argued that their authors were, after
all, human beings and not infallible. Hence, it is stressed, no interpretation
of God’s word can be said to be absolute or to actually represent God’s in-
tentions in their entirety. Conceding that every interpretation of the text is
partial and limited, some writers suggest that new commentaries, written
by modern-day scholars, and taking into account modern developments in
knowledge, should replace the outdated commentaries. This, however, does
not necessarily mean that the medieval tafsirs should be totally ignored.
This plea for reform is presented as a way of expressing the enduring rele-
vance of the Qur’an in our day. It is also seen as proof of the Qur’an’s divine
nature, for if the Qur’an provides suitable guidance for constantly changing
conditions, it must indeed be of divine provenance.43
Co-ordination Between Different Madrasas
Most madrasas function as independent bodies, run by their own manage-
ment committees. In the case of the country’s 7,000 Deobandi madrasas,
each madrasa is autonomous in administrative matters, although the vari-
ous madrasas share a similar ideology and commitment to what may be
called a common Deobandi vision. Every madrasa is, in theory, free to for-
mulate its own syllabus, select its own books, set its own standards, and
conduct its own examinations. Because of this and its fierce inter-maslak ri-
valries, there is no central co-ordinating body for all of the madrasas. This
presents major problems in matters involving the formulation of reform
policies of the madrasa syllabus, improving educational standards, student
exchanges between different madrasas, promoting unity among different
Muslim groups and combating various challenges that the madrasas must
collectively face. That the continued existence of sharp inter-maslak differ-
ences dooms all efforts to reform the madrasa system as a whole has long
been recognised. Writing in the early twentieth century, Maulana Abul
Kalam Azad, a leading Indian Muslim associated with the Congress Party
and later India’s first Education Minister, bitterly castigated the ulama of
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his day for their constant rivalries, going so far as to write, ‘It may be possi-
ble for reptiles to live in a common habitat, but among the ulama one indi-
vidual cannot agree to live in peaceful coexistence with another. Like dogs,
they fight with sharp claws and teeth whenever a bone is thrown to them’.44
In a more controlled manner, Tahir Mahmud, a leading Indian legal special-
ist, makes the same point:
It is naïve to expect [that] the ulama of India, with their tremendous differences,
would unanimously agree on a single item of reform, if they will even agree to
discuss it … In India, each group of ulama … has its own interpretation of the
Qur’an and Sunnah. They will take ages to express a unanimous opinion on any
reform to be applied to all Muslims alike.45
A number of Muslim writers have called for the building of bridges between
the many madrasas as part of a broader programme of madrasa reform.
Thus, Muhammad Zafiruddin Miftahi, a mufti associated with the Dar al-
ªUlum, Deoband, suggests that all Sunni madrasas, except those run by the
Barelvis,46 who are fierce foes of the Deobandis, should come together
under one all-India madrasa board, with branches at the state, district and
local levels. The proposed board would be responsible for preparing a com-
mon syllabus for the transmitted sciences, while each madrasa would be
free to teach whatever modern subjects it wants. In order to gain general ac-
ceptance, the board would consist of ulama from various Sunni schools.47
Another leading ªalim, Muhammad Shams Tabrez, appeals to all Muslim
maslaks, including even the Barelvis, to set up a single madrasa federation
which would set up a common syllabus for all madrasas and which could
work for their collective welfare. The board would set common standards
and conduct common examinations for the madrasas under it.48
Given the fierce rivalries between madrasas of different maslaks, efforts
to unite the madrasas under a common board have proved unsuccessful.
Madrasas, like other such institutions, cherish their autonomy, and many
would regard control by a higher institution as undue interference. Increas-
ingly, however, leading madrasas of each maslak are moving towards the es-
tablishment of loose federations in order to streamline educational stan-
dards and examination procedures. In recent years, the growing fear and
threat of interference by the state and attacks on the madrasas by extremist
Hindu groups has further boosted the process, leading madrasas of each
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maslak to consolidate their ranks so as to more effectively respond to moves
to control or regulate them. Separate federations have been formed, among
others, by the Dar al-ªUlum, Deoband, the Nadwat ul-ªUlama, Lucknow, the
Ahl-i Hadith49 Jamiªat us-Salafiya, Varanasi, and the nation’s leading Barelvi
madrasa, the Jamiªat ul-Ashrafiya, Mubarakpur. Each federation is headed
by an amir, generally the principal of the apex madrasa, and member
madrasas all belong to the same maslak. Regular meetings are organised to
flesh out plans and projects and to discuss common problems and concerns.
Reforms in Teaching Methods
Besides reforms in the curriculum of the madrasas, reformists have also
written extensively on the need for changes in teaching methods. Many are
critical of the ‘book-centred’ over ‘student-centred’ approach to education
in the madrasas, which places too much emphasis on parroting entire sec-
tions of books without exercising reason or critical thought. As a result, few
students actually comprehend what they are being taught. Even after years
of poring over ancient Arabic tomes, writes a Deobandi ªalim, few madrasa
graduates are able to speak the language, having simply memorised a few
sentences or chapters.50 This problem is said to be exacerbated by the inor-
dinate amount of emphasis that most madrasas put on particular books,
which generally means memorisation, as opposed to actually learning a par-
ticular subject or discipline.51 It has been observed that many madrasa man-
agers and teachers strictly forbid students from reading books written by
Muslim scholars from other maslaks and, indeed, any books not included on
the prescribed syllabus ‘which they believe might create doubts in their
minds about the aims of the madrasas’.52
While the merits of some aspects of the traditional pedagogic styles and
approaches are recognised, it is recommended that madrasas open up to
learning new teaching methods from others, including from ‘modern’, sec-
ular institutions. These proposals are wide-ranging, and include the intro-
duction of new methods of teaching language as used at various universi-
ties, which encourages students to debate and discuss issues, and trains
them to write for newspapers, and organises cultural programmes in order
to broaden the students’ horizons. Some writers have suggested combining
text-based learning with pragmatic learning, such as social work and inter-
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faith dialogue programmes. These efforts, it is argued, make madrasa stu-
dents more aware of the world around them, which, in turn, can help them
to be more effective in their future work as religious leaders. This would go
a long way toward salvaging the sagging prestige of the ulama, by making
them more relevant to people’s daily concerns. At the same time, it would
also help madrasa students develop a more contextually grounded and rele-
vant understanding of their faith.53
In recent years, some madrasas have made considerable headway in re-
forming pedagogical methods. For instance, the Jamiªat ul-Falah in Azam-
garh, a madrasa run by the Jamaªat-i Islami, now has a number of teachers
with a bachelor’s degree in education, almost all of whom are madrasa
graduates. The English teacher at the Islamic Centre in Lucknow has a de-
gree from the prestigious Central Institute for English and Foreign lan-
guages in Hyderabad. Exposed to new teaching methods in these institu-
tions, these teachers may be encouraged to introduce reforms of the tradi-
tional teaching methods, although this has to date, been a slow process. An
innovative experiment that may prove to be a major stimulus in this regard
is the madrasa teachers’ training centre that the Jamiªat ul-Hidaya, one of
the most progressive madrasas in the country, wants to establish in the
near future. Thus far, however, no such regular institution exists, although
some organisations such as the Uttar Pradesh Falah-i ªAm Trust in Lucknow,
the Ta’amir-i Millat in Hyderabad, the Samastha Kerala Sunni Vidyavasa
Board in Calicut, and the Centre for Promotion of Science in Aligarh, occa-
sionally organise short-term training sessions for madrasa teachers where
they are familiarised with new teaching methods.54 Moreover, the Jamiªa
Millia Islamia in New Delhi, and the Aligarh Muslim University have both
organised similar courses in recent years.55
The Pace of Reform
Given the current worldview of the traditional ulama, and the vested inter-
ests involved in maintaining the madrasa system as it is, it is hardly sur-
prising that the actual pace of reform of madrasa education in India has
been slow and halting. In the absence of mechanisms to make the madrasas
accountable to the community, changes in the madrasa system have been
mostly piecemeal and ad hoc, rather than wide-ranging and well planned.
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Since each madrasa is an autonomous institution, with its curriculum set
by its own management, reform in the system has thus far depended al-
most entirely on individual initiatives. In most cases, this has been done by
the management on its own, often based on the personal whims of its prin-
cipal or rector. Only a few madrasas have actively sought to involve aca-
demics from universities and trained education experts in reforming their
curriculum. Typically, the involvement of outsiders in curriculum reform is
seen as opening the door to ‘irreligious’ interference that will ultimately
threaten the religious identity of the madrasa. Critics, however, argue that
this opposition actually has more to do with the threats that university-
trained specialists represent to madrasa managers regarding their authority
even if Muslims still have a say in the running of their institutions.
The slow pace of change in the madrasa system might seem frustrating
to the advocates of reform. However, it needs to be understood with some
understanding, because critics of the madrasa system often ignore the im-
portant positive contributions of many madrasas in the field of Muslim edu-
cation today and the critical financial and various constraints that they face.
For the poor in India often the only available and affordable form of educa-
tion is provided by the government school system. The standard of edu-
cation provided by government schools, as the government itself concedes,
is woefully inadequate. Teachers are frequently absent, and if they do show
up, they spend little time actually teaching. Although government schools
in theory provide a free education, poor families often find it difficult to
meet the costs for clothing, books and food for their children. In many
madrasas, on the other hand, these are provided free of cost.
In seeking to evaluate the actual pace of reform in the madrasa system,
it is also important to bear in mind the considerable financial constraints
under which most madrasas operate. Many of them might wish to provide a
better education for their students and even to teach modern subjects, but
are unable to do so for want of the necessary funds. Recruiting good teach-
ers for modern subjects is often difficult, if not impossible, because many
madrasas cannot afford the high salaries that these teachers demand. A re-
lated, broader issue involves the social background of the vast majority of
the administrators, teachers and students in the madrasas. Most madrasa
administrators and teachers come from poor or lower middle-class families,
with little or no exposure to modern ideas or modern teaching methods.
Being themselves products of traditional madrasas, they have been taught
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to believe that many aspects of modernity are a revolt against Islam. Not
surprisingly, reform is thus often seen as an invitation to treason and apos-
tasy. Like most other religious specialists, the essential task of the ulama is
to preserve a received tradition and not to innovate or experiment. Hence,
to expect the ulama to wholeheartedly embrace reform is unrealistic and
impractical.
In the case of most madrasa students their social origins often also in-
hibit any enthusiasm for reform. Most of them come from poor families and
are wholly dependent on the madrasa for their educations and living ex-
penses. To demand reform in the madrasa system is a risky proposition that
few students are willing to take up, because this may lead to expulsion.
Modern-educated middle-class Muslims have not been very interested in
madrasa reform issues, often viewing the madrasas as obscurantist. Few
well-off families end up sending their children to a madrasa to train them
to become a professional ªalim. Because the general image of the madrasa is
determined by a largely poor and deprived student population, madrasas
often remain insulated from the kinds of changes and reforms that a more
diverse student population may stimulate.
What also hampers reform efforts is the widespread and growing per-
ception among the ulama and the Muslim community in India in general of
the grave threat that militant anti-Muslim Hindu forces pose to Islam and
Indian Muslims. This fear has a way of dampening any reform enthusiasm
and only further serves to strengthen the forces of Muslim conservatism
and the opponents of change. In this kind of charged climate, suggestions
for madrasa reform are often perceived as sinister ploys by the ‘enemies’ of
Islam to dilute the religious character of the madrasas, the ‘forts of the
faith’.
Although, as we have seen, reformists, including many ulama them-
selves, have advocated wide-ranging reforms in the traditional madrasa sys-
tem, in actual fact, reform has been largely limited to the introduction of
some new texts and subjects and the excision of others that are no longer
seen as useful. In other words, reform has, so far, been peripheral, rather
than structural or basic. Many madrasas have drastically reduced the num-
ber of books devoted to antiquated Greek philosophy and logic in their syl-
labus, and have replaced them with more books on hadith. In recent years,
several madrasas have introduced the teaching of selected modern subjects,
including basic English, and elementary social and natural sciences, along
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with Hindi and, in some cases, a regional language. However, in general,
the standard of teaching of these subjects leaves much to be desired. These
subjects are often not taken seriously by the teachers or the students, and
are considered relatively unimportant compared to Islamic subjects. In
many madrasas, these subjects are taught by teachers who themselves are
traditionally trained ulama, who have had little or no exposure to modern
knowledge or teaching methods.
Government Efforts at Madrasa Reform
In recent years, demands have been made for government regulation of the
madrasas in the name of reform. These calls were certainly not unheard of
in the past, but the rationale for government intervention through madrasa
‘modernisation’ was articulated in terms of helping the Muslims join the
‘national mainstream’, with madrasas being generally seen as ‘backward’,
unconcerned with the world around them and generally resistant to
change. Today, however, the rationale has shifted dramatically, with
madrasas now seen as somehow too ‘worldly’ for ‘proper’ religious institu-
tions, and allegedly churning out militant activists charged with a burning
sense of mission to gain political power. Rather than representing a radical
shift in the aims and methods of the madrasas as such, this new rationale is
a reflection of the growing strength of Hindu chauvinism in India, which is
based on an abiding hatred of the Muslim ‘other’.
In several Indian states, governments have increasingly sought to con-
trol the madrasas, arguing that this is necessary in order to control ‘terror-
ism’. However, they have failed to identify a single madrasa that is actually
engaged in promoting ‘terrorism’. In some states, those seeking to establish
madrasas must secure permission from the state after ensuring them that
they are not engaged in the promotion of ‘undesirable’ activities, a rule,
however, that does not apply to similar Hindu institutions. Madrasas in
some states are also required to furnish information about their student
body to the state authorities. In large parts of India, madrasas are regularly
visited by intelligence authorities, who on numerous occasions have been
accused of unwarranted harassment. There have also been several cases of
innocent madrasa teachers and students being shot dead or arrested by the
police on trumped-up charges of ‘terrorism’.
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Calls for the state to intervene in India’s madrasa system reflect the
state’s perception of madrasa autonomy as a challenge. Most madrasas are
not dependent on the state for funds. Their financial independence is seen
by state officials as providing the madrasas with a vast influence, over
which it has little or no control. Madrasa independence is generally per-
ceived, by government officials with a sympathy for Hindu nationalism, as a
particularly potent challenge to monolithic Indian nationalism based on
Brahminical Hinduism. As defenders of Islamic orthodoxy and Muslim com-
munity identity, and as alleged advocates of pan-Islamism or militancy,
madrasas are regarded by the Hindu chauvinists as particularly menacing.
Hence, Hindutva leaders have insisted on the need for more intense state
monitoring and control of the madrasas, and some have even gone so far as
to demand that the state close them all down. On the other hand, secular
political parties in power in some states have sought to extend assistance to
madrasas, aware of the considerable influence that the ulama wield among
Muslim voters. Moreover, they are also appreciative of the efforts that
madrasas are making to promote literacy among Muslims. The state’s rela-
tions with the madrasas are thus determined by a mixed set of motives.
Ostensibly, the state’s case for madrasa modernisation rests on two
premises: that such modernisation is necessary to promote modern and ra-
tional thinking and that it is only by modernising themselves that madrasa
students can become part of the nation’s educational mainstream.56 Some
claim that madrasa modernisation is necessary for the promotion of na-
tional integration.57 The assumption, therefore, is that a traditional
madrasa education hampers integration, and causes Muslim children to be
cut-off from the mainstream. The mainstream and the nation are generally
viewed in hegemonic terms, as represented by a distinctly upper caste
Hindu ethos. Joining the mainstream may simply be just a euphemism for
shedding a separate Muslim identity and submerging it within a larger In-
dian identity that is defined in largely Hindu terms.
This suggests that the state’s profession of concern for Muslim educa-
tional development through the modernisation of madrasas needs to be
carefully and critically analysed. Critics point out that if the promotion of
Muslim education was indeed a primary government concern, it should
have paid more attention to establishing more modern schools in Muslim
localities, which it has clearly failed to do. In fact, the level of educational
provision by the state in Muslim areas is far below the level of other, partic-
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ularly Hindu, areas, which leaves the state open to charges of obvious dis-
crimination against Muslims.58 Then again, proposals to legitimise state in-
tervention in madrasas on the grounds of helping to promote modern and
rational thinking seem completely hollow in the face of what is today seen
as a concerted effort on the part of the Indian state to thoroughly Hinduise
the education system, including the introduction of subjects such as astrol-
ogy and Hindu rituals and mythology in the syllabus of schools and col-
leges. Not surprisingly, many Muslims view the state’s efforts to interfere in
the madrasas as being motivated by ulterior motives. One prominent Indian
Muslim politician has even suggested that the real purpose of the govern-
ment’s proposals for modernisation of madrasas is to ‘monitor what goes
on inside the madrasas through a government-funded monitor in the form
of a teacher of English, mathematics and sciences’.59 In response to a state-
sponsored report that recommended that madrasas should teach ‘Vedic
Mathematics’ as part of a proposed modernisation scheme,60 numerous
ulama have argued that this is clear evidence that the state has been trying
to dilute the Islamic identity of the madrasas through the backdoor while
claiming to be assisting them.61
Government efforts to reform the madrasa have thus far taken, broadly
speaking, three forms: (i) state governments establishing boards for
madrasa education (ii) providing financial assistance to selected madrasas
to teach secular subjects, and (iii) arranging for recognition of certain
madrasas by certain state-funded universities.
Seven Indian states (Assam, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan,
Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal) have government-sponsored madrasa edu-
cation boards, which a number of madrasas are affiliated to. Not all of the
madrasas in these states are members of the state boards, however, and
madrasas are free to choose to join or not. Several of the affiliated madrasas
receive some sort of assistance from various state governments, such as,
teachers’ salaries. In turn, these madrasas have to abide by certain norms
laid down by the state, including in its curriculum. Graduates of most
madrasas affiliated to the boards can go on to apply to regular colleges.62 In
late 2006, the National Commission for Minority Educational Institutions
recommended the establishment of a Central Madrasa Board to the Govern-
ment of India to provide funding and introduce curricular reforms in the
madrasas. However, this proposal was met with stiff opposition from many
madrasas and so has not been acted upon.
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In recent years, the Indian Government along with some state govern-
ments have launched various small schemes such as providing paid teach-
ers to teach modern subjects ostensibly to assist certain madrasas. In 1986,
the Indian Government issued its new education policy, which included
proposals for government intervention in madrasa education through a
‘madrasa modernisation programme’. The Government’s revised plan is-
sued in 1992 suggested the introduction of modern subjects such as science,
mathematics, English and Hindi in the madrasas, the expenses for which
would be borne in part by the state.
Despite its claims of being seriously committed to madrasa modernisa-
tion, the government appears to have actually done very little in practical
terms.63 The funding for the madrasa modernisation scheme is said to have
been woefully limited. In actual practice, it has proved extremely difficult
for madrasas who wish to participate in the scheme to obtain financial as-
sistance from the state. According to the rules of the scheme, madrasas
would be only financed after receiving a security clearance from the state
governments. This entails long and complicated bureaucratic hurdles and
often the added burden of paying bribes to petty government servants,
which madrasas either cannot afford or else simply refuse to pay.64 What
further compounds the problem is the fact that some bureaucrats appar-
ently prefer to see the scheme fail. Thus, according to a report on the
madrasa modernisation project in the state of Bihar, some state civil ser-
vants ‘with a communal bent of mind’ effectively sabotaged the govern-
ment’s scheme to help the madrasas financially by not disbursing the
money allocated by the government. Apparently, the Ministry of Human Re-
sources Development had authorised a sum of 4.3 million rupees to Bihar in
1999-2000 under the madrasa modernisation scheme, which was to be im-
plemented by the Bihar State Madrasa Education Board. However, this
money was never given to the Board, and Board officials claimed they had
no knowledge of how it was spent. B.P. Srivastava, Bihar’s upper caste
Hindu education secretary and chairman of the committee dealing with the
scheme, confessed that he had failed to submit a ‘utilisation certificate’ to
the Central government that explained what happened to the money. He of-
fered the specious argument that the money was not provided to the Board
because it was ‘pre-occupied with other matters’. Because Srivastava did not
disburse the money, the Union Government decided not to allocate the 35.7
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million rupees to the Bihar government which had been earmarked for the
madrasa modernisation scheme for the coming year.65
In various other states, however, the scheme seems to have had consid-
erable effect, and several madrasas have agreed to co-operate. In 2001, some
3,500 out of a total of 6,000 madrasas in Madhya Pradesh, with some
175,000 students, were receiving modest financial assistance from the state
government for teaching secular subjects through the Madhya Pradesh
Madrasa Education Board.66 By 1999, some 600 madrasas in Rajasthan of a
total of some 5,000 had been recognised by the state government, and sev-
eral of them had received some sort of government funding. The govern-
ment had allocated a sum of 20 million rupees for madrasas in that fiscal
year, but since the entire budget could not be utilised, it was reduced to 7.8
million rupees in 2001. However, despite the drastic budget cuts, state-
recognised madrasas seem to have performed exceptionally well in Ra-
jasthan. According to one report, these madrasas had achieved new records,
with between 90 to 100% of their students passing their examinations, as
opposed to a pass-rate of 65% in government schools located in predomi-
nantly Muslim regions. 60% of the students in these madrasas secured a
first division, while the figure for government schools was an abysmal 20%.
Half of the passing madrasa students were girls. Impressed by the progress
of the madrasas, the state government, in co-operation with several
madrasas, had established a plan to appoint ‘education workers’ (shiksha
karmis) to teach secular subjects in selected madrasas.67 Moreover, the gov-
ernment had launched a scheme to distribute free science and other text-
books to selected madrasas through the Rajasthan Waqf Board.68 In a state
where only 0.15 per cent of the students in colleges and universities are
Muslim, well below the community’s representation in the state’s popula-
tion, the madrasas assisted by the government are clearly playing a major
role in the promotion of literacy.
Another way in which the state has sought to engage with the madrasas
is by allowing selected universities to recognise the degrees of certain
madrasas, enabling their graduates to enrol therein for higher education
and helping them join the educational mainstream. Several larger madrasas
have managed to secure recognition of their degrees by Muslim universities
such as the Aligarh Muslim University, Osmania University, Hyderabad, Luc-
know University, Jamiªa Millia Islamia and the Jamiªa Hamdard, New Delhi.
Madrasa students who join these universities generally enrol for courses in
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subjects such as Arabic, Urdu, Persian, Islamic Studies and History, but, in-
creasingly, some are going in for other disciplines, such as English. Some
madrasas actively encourage some of their brighter students to enrol in uni-
versities, in the hope that, equipped with modern knowledge, they would
return to their alma maters to teach and help improve their standards. In-
deed, a growing number of madrasas now include among their teachers for-
mer madrasa students who have also acquired degrees in regular universi-
ties.
Ulama Responses to State Assistance
For their part, the ulama seem to be sharply divided on the matter of
madrasas receiving state patronage. Some, probably a minority, see no
harm in receiving funds from the state, claiming that the state has not, at
least as yet, linked its offer of financial assistance to any preconditions,
such as the radical alteration of the content of their curriculum or interfer-
ing in their administration. On the one hand, many other ulama and Mus-
lim leaders argue that accepting funds from the state will eventually lead to
state interference in madrasa affairs, leaving them open to a subtle process
of Hinduisation. They claim that by linking assistance to the modernisation
of the curriculum, the religious content of the syllabus may eventually get
watered down and that, burdened with the need to learn both religious as
well as modern subjects, the students will end up doing well in neither.69 It
is also generally argued that the standard of education in government as-
sisted madrasas is considerably lower than in independent madrasas, since
in the former teachers, being paid by the government and assured of a per-
manent job, are no longer answerable to the madrasa management and do
not take their duties seriously, being concerned simply with getting a regu-
lar salary. Hence, it is stressed, madrasas should avoid taking any money
from the government. Thus, a noted Deobandi ªalim, Mufti Muhammad Su-
laiman Mansurpuri, warns the ulama not to fall prey to the blandishments
of the state, asserting:
To accept government aid from the state would lead to the death of the
madrasas. It would be a gross violation of the aims of their founders, and would
destroy their spirit of service to the faith …. It would lead to the madrasas be-
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coming the graveyards of the sciences of religion … Because of this, no self-re-
specting ªalim and servant of the faith can accept, even for a single moment, as-
sistance from the government. We may suffer great financial hardships thereby,
but we should reject government aid and rely only on Allah.70
Overall, then, the madrasas seem not to have been particularly enthusiastic
about government offers of assistance, although there are notable excep-
tions. This, of course, has much to do with the fact that the state’s profes-
sions of concern for Muslim education are viewed with considerable suspi-
cion. Rather than look to the state for assistance to promote reform, today
many madrasas are seeking to help themselves, developing innovative
forms of Islamic education.
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2 Change and Stagnation
in Islamic Education
The Dar al-cUlum of Deoband
after the Split in 1982
Dietrich Reetz
Only very recently has the West taken any notice of Islamic schools in South
Asia, where especially those following the purist Deobandi interpretation of
Islam have attracted much media attention. They were accused of inspiring
numerous radical Islamic movements in South Asia, including the Taliban
in Afghanistan, sectarian movements fighting against dissenting Islamic
groups in Pakistan, and separatist militants battling with the military and
the police in Indian Kashmir.1 While the vast majority of these schools focus
on classical Islamic education and not on politics or militancy, it is the nar-
row theological and ideological outlook of their graduates that has repeat-
edly been the target of criticism.
The root of the problem is often seen in the resistance of these schools to
change, as they cling to an age-old curriculum and time-worn patterns of
instruction. The Western perspective of stagnation in these schools, how-
ever, appears to be biased and – worse still – frequently misinformed. While
their methods of change may not conform to Western expectations, it is es-
sential to realise that from their own perspective these institutions have un-
dergone dramatic changes since the 1970s. The course and handling of
these changes will be discussed here, using the example of one of its most
prominent institutions, the Islamic seminary in Deoband, north India. The
71
AUP-ISIM-IS-BW-Madrasa-DEF2:BW  24-09-2008  16:53  Pagina 71
latter has become the leading seminary in the Deobandi school network, ex-
tending its influence throughout south Asia and to other parts of the Is-
lamic world.
Since the early 1980s, two events have been instrumental in forcing the
school to reconfigure its structure and agenda, and to adapt more resolutely
to the changing times. The first was the symbolic centenary celebration in
1980, a public event that attracted more than 8,000 delegates, including De-
obandi scholars, students, and activists from South Asia and other parts of
the world.2 The second was the split that took place in 1982, when one fac-
tion of the school’s leadership and teaching staff, was driven out because of
family loyalties, and this faction subsequently set up a rival institution, an
incident that culminated in violent student actions and the temporary clo-
sure of the school. This paper will focus on several paradigm shifts that oc-
curred in the wake of these two events. By paradigm we mean a set of prin-
ciples and references that guide the self-organisation, operation, and self-
perception of the school. As it adjusted to various internal and external
challenges, the school’s mode of operation gradually evolved from a person-
alised, closed, academic style to a more open, community-oriented, and
overtly political and ideological approach.
These shifts will be discussed in relation to the principles of the school;
its major educational subjects; the role of family politics; the mode of net-
working in Deobandi schools; the gradual modernisation of the institution
and its teaching methods; and the strong articulation of non-religious con-
cerns in ideology, politics, and society. Most of this data is being presented
publicly for the first time. The various aspects discussed demonstrate the
broad spectrum of change. Integrating these aspects requires an interdisci-
plinary approach widening the narrow confines of sociology and political
science, and complementing them with a broader analysis more akin to an
anthropological approach.
To understand the parameters of change as perceived by the Deoband
school system one must go beyond the Western-induced framework of mod-
ernisation and look at the shifts that have taken place within these institu-
tions. The Western modernisation paradigm measures Islamic movements
against expectations of the promotion of economic development, social ad-
vancement and liberal democracy. These groups, however, rely on their own
perspective based on their own movement’s objectives. Within these pa-
rameters, they not only pursue universal goals such as missionary aims, but
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also reflect group-specific issues regarding expansion, control or leadership
within the movement. Western analysts rarely see changes within these
areas as legitimate or relevant, since they are not necessarily a reflection of
modernisation in the West. But it seems wrong to conclude that such
group-specific dynamics of change will only create obstacles for broader
modernisation or preclude it altogether. In practice, such diverse objectives
cannot be clearly separated as they become so tightly intertwined.
The principles of the school
The Deoband school has become known for its specific take on the interpre-
tation of Islam. While it is mostly associated with a purist, Salafi-type of
teaching, its philosophy presents a far more complex mix of historical, cul-
tural and doctrinal aspects. Moreover, issues of competition and leadership
within the emerging Islamic sector have also modified its message and
forced it to evolve and adapt to changing circumstances.
The higher Islamic seminary, the Deoband Dar al-ªUlum, was founded in
1866 in northern India by Muhammad Qasim Nanaotawi (1832-1879) and
Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (1829-1905). The intention was to address the sup-
posed lack of religious education among the Muslims of British India. Reli-
gious scholars feared a loss of self-identity with the spread of Western val-
ues in society and English language instruction.3 After the defeat of the
anti-colonial uprising of 1857-58, in which many Muslim princes and schol-
ars took part, Islamic institutions were suspected of disloyalty and sedition
by the British rulers. Religious scholars decided instead to concentrate on
the reconstruction of religious knowledge and religiosity. Politically, they
preferred to prove their loyalty to the British during this period. A more rad-
ical section of seminary teachers emerged shortly after the turn of the cen-
tury, however. The new head teacher Mahmud al-Hasan (1851-1921) and
scholars like Husain Ahmad Madani (1879-1957) and Ubaidullah Sindhi
(1872-1944) presented highly politicised ideas that challenged British rule,
which they saw as a major impediment to true Islam in India and the Is-
lamic world in general. Deoband scholars, in particular, identified with Ot-
toman rule, defending if after WWI and together with Mahatma Gandhi
(1869-1948), they initiated the broad-based but unsuccessful Khilafat move-
ment (1919-1925).4
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The ideological foundations of the school were summarised in a set of
seven principles that defined the school’s concept (maslak).5 These are: (1)
conformity with Islamic law (shariªa), (2) Sufi-inspired self-purification and
the search for spiritual perfection (suluk-i batin), (3) conformity to the princi-
ples that guided the Prophet and his companions (sunna), (4) reliance on the
Hanafi law school, (5) certitude and stability in true beliefs with reference to
the Hanafi theologian al-Maturidi, (6) removal of unlawful things (munkirat),
and especially the refutation of polytheism, innovations, atheism and mate-
rialism, and (7) adherence to the principles personally embodied by the
founders of the school, Muhammad Qasim and Rashid Gangohi. These are
named after them and are referred to as ‘a taste for Qasimism and
Rashidism.’
Principles five and six form the basis of the reputed purism of the
school. The interpretation of Islam by Deobandi scholars has veered over
time in the direction of stringency. The school championed religious dis-
course in the reformist fashion of islah (reformation), which emerged in the
Middle East in the late nineteenth century. The founders of Deoband as well
as generations of students sought to spread true Islam. Deoband scholars
were characterised by a marked orthodoxy, as well as by purism and asceti-
cism. Relations between Deobandis and groups (maslak) representing other
interpretations of Islam were burdened by controversy. The Deobandis at-
tacked dissenting views, particularly those of the Barelwis, who represented
the shrine-based culture of Sufi-Islam. The Barelwis were named after the
town of Bareli, not far from Deoband, where their religious leader Ahmad
Raza Khan (1856-1921) had once resided. Relations between Deobandis and
Sufi-Islam were, however, not mutually exclusive. Most Deobandi divines
were themselves active Sufi shaykhs who followed the Sufi path, or tariqa,
which they perceived as being in accordance with the law and word of God,
or shariªa. As staunch followers of the Hanafi school of law (mazhab) they
were wrongly labelled Wahhabis, with whom they shared no more than a
slight bent for the radical and purist interpretation of Islamic tenets. They
anxiously distinguished themselves from other sects, notably the Shiªa and
especially the Ahmadiyya, whom they considered heterodox. Over time the
school became the head seminary of an elaborate network of schools and
activities inspired by the ideas contained in Deobandi teaching and its in-
terpretation of Islam. It introduced religious mass education in its own
seminary through hostel-based study programmes and in numerous
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branches and madaris (schools) across and beyond the confines of south
Asia.
Today’s Deoband school stands out as an orthodox reference point for
the rest of the Muslim world. It had spawned public activism in the form of
an association of religious scholars known as the Jamªiyat-ul-ulama-i Hind
(JUH), which had already emerged as a political party by the time of parti-
tion, and continued its political activities in Pakistan under the name of
Jamªiyat-ul-ulama-i Islam (JUI). Its Indian counterpart, the JUH, concentrated
on religious, educational and cultural activities.
While the formulated principles of the school have undergone little
change, the different methods of implementation have reflected their evo-
lution. Their practical application has repeatedly led to tension among
scholars and students. During the nationalist anti-colonial movement this
tension was largely played out in the polarisation between a more politi-
cally inclined faction and those who advocated scholarly pursuits as the pri-
mary objective of the school. The former group was represented by Hasan,
Madani, and Sindhi, whereas the latter relied on the authority of Ashraf ªAli
Thanwi (1863-1943), the school’s long-time patron, and on scholars such as
Muhammad Anwar Shah Kashmiri (1875-1933) and Shabbir Ahmad ªUth-
mani (1885-1949). This last group suffered defeat, which led to the expulsion
of its scholars and several students from the school in 1927.6
A further evolution in the implementation of these principles after 1980
was marked by the growing prominence of development and social con-
cerns. As will be discussed below, the introduction of computer skills in
1996 and the English language in 2002, albeit on a small scale, symbolised a
new direction in the school’s activities. The debate on the adaptation of the
school curriculum to the changing requirements of society, in which some
of the school’s young graduates participated, was an additional reflection of
this new trend.7 The issue centred around whether secular subjects should
be introduced or whether the institution should remain the preserve of the-
ological teachings. These developments changed the parameters of the de-
bate about the school’s principles. Whereas in the late colonial period it had
experienced the polarisation of political and academic orientations, it has
now shifted to accommodate the juxtaposition of orthodoxy and develop-
ment and community concerns.
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The main courses in Deobandi teaching
Since teaching is the principal task of the Deoband school, processes of ad-
justment and change should also manifest themselves. The sense of conti-
nuity is particularly tenacious, however, as a survey of the major courses
and degrees will reveal.
The most notable teaching element at Deobandi schools is the education
of religious scholars (ªalim, pl. ªulama). The curriculum covers a standard
eight-year degree programme, whereby students become scholars of reli-
gion and law (ulama). In essence, it is comparable to a graduate degree, it is
still based on the dars-i nizami, compiled and introduced by Mulla Nizamu’d-
din (d. 1748). Students study the Qur’an, the Prophetic traditions, the prin-
ciples of their, i.e., Hanafi, law school, along with a large number of often
arcane commentaries written mainly by traditionalists (cf. Ahmad 1985).
The degree consists of a number of licenses or sanads to teach the major
works of Islamic theology. The licenses identify the line of teachers who
have given instruction in the work throughout generations. Apart from
manqulat or transmitted science, which is related to divine sources, worldly
knowledge of a somewhat dated variety is represented by maªqulat or ra-
tional science, and includes subjects such as philosophy and logic, as well as
various branches of mathematics. Traditional medicine (tibb) is taught in a
separate department. Modern subjects such as English, geography and his-
tory have long been conspicuously absent. A basic five-year Urdu medium
curriculum prescribed by the government is taught at the primary level
that precedes the alim course.
The grade of ªalim (scholar) is conferred at the end of Class Seven, prior to
the final year (daura-i hadith) that begins when students focus on the study
of the Prophetic Traditions. Upon completion of Class Eight, students are
considered graduates or fazil. They are then free to specialise (takhassus) in
various directions and take courses of up to two years in different depart-
ments at the school. The number of students who take advantage of this op-
portunity varies from two to a maximum of twenty. The relevant depart-
ments include
– English language and literature;
– computer training;
– the Shaykh al-Hind Academy, which provides training in advanced theo-
logical research and religious journalism;
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– the ‘Defence of the Finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad’ (tahaffuz-
i khatm-i nabuwwat), which trains graduates to write texts and preach
against the Ahmadiyya sect, but also to refute rival interpretations of
Islam; this department operates in conjunction with the preaching de-
partment (shuªba-i tabligh);
– Legal Consultation (dar al-ifta), which provides training in the writing of
legal decisions (fatawa, sin. fatwa) in reply to inquiries from the Muslim
general public.
Formal post-graduate courses (takmilat) are currently offered in Qur’anic ex-
egesis (tafsir), in theology and the beliefs of the school (ulum), in jurispru-
dence (fiqh), and in Arabic literature (adab), after which students can obtain
the highest degree available, kamil, which verifies that they are accom-
plished scholars or doctors of theology.8
Larger Islamic schools become more significant because of their special
training of muftis. The Deoband school employs four to five muftis to answer
legal inquiries about the legitimacy of certain actions and types of conduct
under Islamic law. While Deoband concentrates on jurisprudence in the tra-
dition of the Hanafi law school, to which most South Asian Muslims adhere,
it also responds to inquiries regarding other law schools for which spe-
cialised scholars are available. In 1423 AH (2002) the Legal Department
trained an additional 37 students.9
Courses to train students to become a memoriser of the Qur’an (hafiz) or
a reciter (qari) are available. Basic Qur’an reading (nazara) and writing (kita-
bat) skills are taught separately. In 1423 AH (2002), 2,502 students attended
the Arabic faculty, including the eight-class ªalim course, while 717 students
attended the non-Arabic faculty, including the primary classes and minor
degree courses.10
The predominance of orthodox theology and religious training is evident
from this teaching structure. However, changes are slowly emerging at the
post-graduate level. A limited number of advanced students are exposed to
non-theological topics. About a quarter of them focus on ideological and po-
litical issues at the Shaykh-ul-Hind Academy and the Finality of Prophet-
hood Department, while the rest learn English and acquire computer skills.
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From family networks to family power in the name of politics
Leadership in Deobandi institutions has traditionally been influenced by
clan and family loyalties.11 Deoband shares this trait with many other public
bodies and educational networks in South Asia, irrespective of religious af-
filiation. The long-standing grip of caste and tribal structures on the social
fabric is usually held responsible. Although Islam is potentially more egali-
tarian in social matters, in South Asia in particular, it failed to escape the
influences of tradition. Religious schools – the Dar al-ªUlum and the
madrasas – were also affected. Over time, key positions such as that of rec-
tor, head teacher or hadith teacher tended to become hereditary by default.
Sons are deliberately groomed to assume the father’s post at some point in
time. Consequently family factions competing for control of the school and
its resources emerge. Although it’s a well-known fact, it is rarely discussed
openly. The Muslim public in India and beyond was therefore deeply
shocked when family feuds – i.e., between the Tayyib and Madani families –
broke out in the prestigious Deoband school and eventually led to a split.
In hindsight, we can see that the centenary celebrations in 1980 and the
concomitant preparations intensified the rivalry between these families for
control of the seminary, especially as its long-time rector, Muhammad
Tayyib, had by that time become increasingly frail and the issue of succes-
sion had emerged. Qari Muhammad Tayyib (1897-1983) assumed the post of
muhtamim or rector of the Deoband school in 1929, a post he held until
1982. As the grandson of Deoband founder Qasim Nanaotawi, he embodied
the classical tradition of learnedness and piety and had little interest in po-
litical manoeuvring.
The official version on the school website holds Tayyib and his advisors
responsible for the debacle. It maintains that subsequent to the elaborate
and highly successful centenary celebrations, Tayyib allegedly
requested that the Majlis-i Shura provide assistance because his administration
duties (ihtimam) were too much for a man of his advanced age. The Majlis-i Shura,
as per request, elected the current muhtamim Marghub-ur-Rahman. Thereafter,
he, [Tayyib] fell victim to the insincere policies of his close advisors. In December
1980, after returning from a trip to America, he appointed Maulana Muhammad
Salim vice-rector (na’ib muhtamim) and Maulana Anzar Shah (Kashmiri) head
teacher (sadr-i mudarris), all of these appointments were against school regula-
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tions. After the Majlis-i Shura protested he revoked his decisions. He then under-
took the radical step of convening an illegal meeting (ijtimaª) in which he an-
nounced the dissolution of the Majlis-i Shura. This incident disrupted the entire
Dar al-ªUlum administration. The political turmoil within the administration left
Muslims throughout the world with a sense of sorrow. In October 1981, the sad
incident of the eviction of students from the Dar al-ªUlum with the help of police
occurred, which led to its closure. The years 1981 and 1982 are well-known in the
history of the Dar al-ªUlum because, in addition to the state of emergency, the
Dar al-ªUlum closed its doors for five months (deprived of the sound of Allah and
his prophet’s words). The students retook possession of their Alma Mater on 23-
24 March 1982 and the administration was resurrected under the supervision of
the regular Majlis-i Shura.12
This account, which dominated the media and the official representation of
the events at the time, seems to be at odds with the reflections of members
of the defeated faction and the loyalist camp that remained at the school.
Twenty-three years after these events these factions remain surprisingly
unanimous in their criticism of the ‘Madani faction’,13 which consisted of
the offspring of Husain Ahmad Madani. Its main protagonists were Asad
Madani (1928-2006), former president of JUH, and his son Mahmud Madani,
general secretary of JUH. Respondents pointed out that Marghub was re-
lated to Madani and appointed solely to wrest control of the administration
from the Tayyib family, which was related to Deoband’s founder Qasim
Nanaotawi and together comprised the larger ‘Qasimi faction’. They
stressed that during his time in office, Marghub demonstrated little schol-
arly inclination or capacity to enhance the administration. In 2004, he ap-
peared frail and was on sick leave for long periods of time, during which
deputy-rector Qari ªUthman, Arshad Madani as head of the teaching depart-
ment (daftar-i taªlimat), and another member of the Madani family steered
the school through troubled waters.14
Respondents alleged that more scholarly and devoted teachers had left
the old school as a result of the split. However, they basically agreed that
they have been replaced by other teachers who are just as able. Asad Madani
presented his nominees to the Majlis-i Shura. When Marghub was gradually
judged as having failed his duties, Asad Madani was said to have laid claim
to the chairmanship of the Shura. He remained politically active for the Con-
gress Party. His son Mahmud tested the political waters for a regional party,
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the Rashtriya Lok Dal. While he lost the general party elections, he was
elected on its ticket to the upper house of the Indian Parliament, the Rajya
Sabha.15
The ‘Madani faction’ still draws sharp criticism for its approach in the
matter. Some of my respondents regarded the current phase as a period of
decline for the ‘Madani faction’s’ control over the Deoband school. They
claimed that the scholarly tradition had been replaced by a more policy-ori-
ented superficial activism. Numerous issues remained unsolved, such as the
maintenance of school buildings and student hostels. The library and the
archives (muhafiz khana) showed signs of decline and disorder. Staff mem-
bers frequently went on leave. Debates that might have redefined the role of
the seminary and Islamic teaching in today’s world were avoided or deliber-
ately stifled.16
However, the current leadership portrays the period since the split as a
success story marked by expansion and modernisation, as will be shown
below.
Both of the quarrelling factions insist that the differences have less to do
with principles than with personal matters. In 1982, the Qasimi group
opened a new school called the Dar al-ªUlum (waqf) at another location. The
name is derived from the endowment (awqaf) land to which they had laid
claim in the process of partition. The old school was associated with the
‘Madani faction’ and portrayed the ‘Qasimi faction’ as the ‘defeated’ party
that had caused the ‘split’, and accused them of causing the rift by founding
a new school. Maulana Salim Qasim, Tayyib’s son, became rector of the new
school. Maulana Anzar Shah Kashmiri was nominated head of the teaching
department. He represented a separate ‘sub-faction’ formed by the offspring
of Anwar Shah Kashmiri, who are mentioned above in connection with an
earlier conflict. He served as Shaykh al-Hadith and later head teacher of De-
oband from 1915 to 1927. At the new school, the ‘Kashmiri faction’ seemed
to be gaining ground, as demonstrated by a small but telling detail. A major
gate to the premises, previously known as Bab-i Tayyib, has been renamed
after Anwar Shah Kashmiri.17
In a typical illusory manner, the ‘Qasimi faction’ presented its school as
the only true Deoband school, especially in its students recruitment flyers
and brochures. In private, however, they were forced to concede that the old
school was still regarded as the standard of reference. The ‘Qasimi faction’
considered themselves Deobandis in terms of school of thought (maslak) and
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beliefs (ªaqida) and were waiting to be invited to join the network activities
of the main school, an invitation they suggested would be favourably ad-
judged. In the meantime, they used the increased demand for religious edu-
cation to consolidate and increase their own share of the market. This ex-
pansion was mirrored in the enrolment figures, which had already reached
1,500 and represented about half of the old school figure.18 Since the new
school was constructed on barren land, plans for expansion would be rela-
tively simple. Meanwhile, the ‘Kashmiri faction’ established graduate train-
ing institutes for computer science and English (maªhad al-anwar) here. ‘On
principle’, however, they do not provide these courses at their own Dar al-
ªUlum so that students are not distracted from their religious studies.
The family networks that run the school relied on traditional forms of al-
legiance, while also appealing to Sufi traditions. They presented the family
as constituting a line of transmission of blessing (barakat), which was
passed down from father to son more reliably than to unrelated disciples.
This argument was used when Tayyib was first appointed pro-rector in 1922
to refer to of the fact that he was a member of Deoband founder Muham-
mad Qasim Nanaotawi’s family.19 In the 1970s, the private privilege of fam-
ily rule was replaced by a more competitive game of politics at the institu-
tion. Both the old and new school have now been placed firmly and uncere-
moniously in the hands of a family faction that no longer seems to advance
arguments of spiritual blessing but instead exudes an attitude of sheer ex-
pediency based on political and economic survival.
From a School of Thought to a Network of Schools
Since its inception, the school has exerted its trans-local influence through
its teacher, student and graduate networks, extending across a number of
countries. They helped to set up a large network of school branches with a
shared ideology and theological curriculum, which for the most part func-
tioned autonomously. The joint tradition of legal thought embodied in the
decisions of the school and its stalwarts, the missionary activities of school
representatives, and the Tablighi Jamaªat missionary movement led by De-
obandi scholars were other historical bonding channels. This interaction,
however, was largely personal and spontaneous, with little procedural co-
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ordination or formalisation. The way in which the school co-operates has
undergone significant changes since 1980.
One remarkable development was how the Dar al-ªUlum set about for-
malising the influence it exerted as the head seminary of a particular school
of thought. The centenary celebrations in 1980 were a welcome occasion to
renew links with Deobandi schools in other parts of India, across South
Asia, and beyond. Long invitation lists were compiled so that graduates
from all over the world could be invited, although there had evidently been
no regular contact with the majority of them prior to this. The Ayodhya
controversy and the demolition of the Babri Masjid on 6 December 1992
seem to have marked a watershed in religious elite thinking in India. Sev-
eral respondents confirmed that it brought home to Islamic leaders the fact
that Muslims were now on their own in matters of religion, and could no
longer count on the support or protection of a more or less well-meaning
liberal and secular state. If Muslims wanted to preserve their religion and
their place in society they had to be more assertive and show greater sym-
pathy for the mainstream forces of society. Attacks by Hindu nationalist
forces on the madrasa system and their teachings strengthened Islamic re-
solve to defend it, and this went hand-in-hand with the vigorous resistance
to change. One solution to the dilemma was discovered in the formal or-
ganisation of the Deobandi madaris.
In the course of two meetings of like-minded Deobandi schools held on
29-30 June and 25-26 October in 1994,20 the Association of Arabic Schools
(Rabita Madaris Arabiya or RMA) was established, with its headquarters at
the Dar al-ªUlum. As per March 2004, it had 1152 affiliated madaris across
India. Once their rules and teaching practices had been appraised by the
RMA, their certificates (sanad) would be ratified. The RMA regularly con-
vened meetings with rectors and head teachers to discuss new challenges
and curriculum issues.21 By and large it served as a forum for Deobandi
scholars to close ranks and resist demands for ever far-reaching changes. At
the same time, changes concerning several matters were being discretely
sanctioned, mainly with regard to increased computerisation and the use of
English. It also contributed to the prevention of substandard religious
teaching in the burgeoning market of religious education presented in the
name of the eminent Deobandi school of thought. In a sense, this was like
branding their product and protecting its rights in a market that was both
lucrative and expansive. The Qasimi faction’ school remained excluded. In
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an interview, Anzar Kashmiri emphasised that they were not seeking affilia-
tion with the RMA because they regarded themselves as the true embodi-
ment of the Deobandi school. He pointedly added, however, that they would
not object to being invited, implying that they obviously viewed the rift as a
painful anomaly.22 When Asad Madani fell ill in 2005, increased efforts were
made to mend the rift between the two schools,23 and these efforts may be
accelerated now, following his demise.
Preliminary data on Deobandi schools affiliated to the RMA indicate an-
other notable development, i.e., the expansion and diversification of the ge-
ographic impact of the Deobandi school of thought. Not surprisingly, the
great majority of schools were located in northern India, primarily in the
state of Uttar Pradesh (402 schools). Somewhat more unexpected, however,
is the considerable number of affiliated schools in West Bengal (253), show-
ing that Deobandi thinking has made strong inroads into a region where
Sufi-oriented and ritualist Islam had a tradition of being very influential.
From the same perspective, the substantial number of Deobandi schools in
Jammu and Kashmir (44), in southern India, particularly Maharashtra (38)
and Andhra Pradesh (23), and in Assam in eastern India (121) are also worth
mentioning.
A look at the composition of students at the Deoband head seminary in
1414-15 AH (1994) confirms a similar pattern of geographical distribution.
Here the preponderance of the two states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar is even
greater, accounting for 85% of the students in a typical year. However, the
south Indian states of Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra are represented by
50 students each (in a total student population of almost 3,000), revealing
that Deobandi thought is gaining momentum and spreading its roots in the
south as well.24
Formalising the school’s network activities continued with the founda-
tion of a graduate association, Tanzim-i Abna-i Qadim, in 1991.25 Its estab-
lishment had already been suggested at the centenary celebrations in 1980.
The earlier efforts of Ubaidullah Sindhi in this direction in 1909 remained
fruitless. The new association now seems to be working successfully and
has established its headquarters in Delhi. Not only has it introduced two
post-graduate training institutes, one for spoken Arabic and one for Eng-
lish, it also edits a regular monthly, Tarjuman Dar al-ªUlum, established in
1993 with a world-wide graduate audience. The journal features debates
that explore in a cautious but resolute manner, occasionally pushing the
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boundaries of the Deobandi school of thought concerning the history of the
school, the need to review the religious curriculum, the inclusion of worldly
subjects, and relations with the West. It is particularly noteworthy that in
the interests of strengthening the Deobandi school of thought, the associa-
tion maintains contact with both the old school and the ‘Qasimi faction’.
This undoubtedly has to do with the reconstruction and updating of De-
obandi ideas in the modern era, especially as it is run by a new generation
of graduates aware of the need to adapt to changing circumstances. How-
ever, the more senior, conservative scholars who oversee the work of the As-
sociation as patrons try to limit and control change while, on the other
hand, they do not shy away from imposing their will by disciplining insub-
ordinate functionaries.
Although the networking of international Deobandi institutions, schol-
ars and students clearly multiplied during this period, formal links for for-
eign graduates of the school in Deoband are less easy to quantify.26 While
enrolment increased impressively over the years, their significance has si-
multaneously experienced a sharp decline.27 Annual enrolment has long
since dropped below the all-time high of the 1950s and 1960s, and currently
numbers approximately 30 to 60 graduates per year. Their composition has
also undergone a radical change. Whereas numerous students from outside
South Asia were enrolled here in 1980, they are now almost non-existent.28
The Indian government introduced formal restrictions on the enrolment
of foreigner students in the late 1970s. They were initially made more strin-
gent as a result of Hindu nationalist pressure and later anti-terrorism poli-
cies. Only students with an educational visa can be enrolled. Students have
rarely been granted this visa for Deoband, as the head of the school’s edu-
cation department acerbically pointed out to me. The reason why Muslims
are not allowed to study their own religion, he stated, is known only to the
powers that be.29
Nevertheless, international links have not been totally discarded. Al-
though it should be emphasised that responsibility for spreading Deobandi
thought lies with the madaris that were established by Deobandi graduates
specifically for this purpose. The organisation of a world meeting of De-
obandi schools, 9-11 April 2001 near Peshawar, Pakistan as a symbolic cele-
bration of the 150th anniversary of the Deoband Alma Mater, demonstrated
the willingness of Deobandi scholars to assert themselves more forcefully
on the international scene.30 While the Deobandi politicians from Pakistan
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such as Fazlur Rahman attacked the West for its policies on Islam, the In-
dian representatives chose to highlight the educational achievements of the
school in spreading Deobandi thought. This development was severely dis-
rupted by the aftermath of the September 11 attack in 2001.31 The Deoband
school claimed that it was at the receiving end of what it regards as mali-
cious attacks by Hindu nationalists and the West, who are intent on proving
its terrorist association with either the Taliban or militant so-called jihadi
groups in India and Pakistan, particularly in Kashmir. At the same time, De-
obandi scholars in India and Pakistan continue to argue that the Taliban’s
responsibility for these events has never been proved. They believe that the
attack of 9/11 was at best willfully engineered by the Americans, at the
worst organised by Israeli agencies.32 The reality gap in their line of thought
is compounded by the isolation of their outlook and the limited access to
both secular knowledge and information in English.
A major development in the expansion of Deobandi networking con-
cerns its interaction with the missionary movement of the Tablighi Jamaªat,
which was founded in India in 1926 by the Deobandi scholar Muhammad
Ilyas (1885-1944).33 The strengthening of links between Deobandi activists,
groups and institutions in South Asia and the rest of the world has been
greatly supported by the world-wide expansion of Tablighi activities since
the 1970s. Its national centres (marakaz) in India and Pakistan maintain
their own Deobandi schools, where the alim course is taught. Numerous in-
ternational students frequent these schools. Students from Islamic schools
in the provinces and states attend the final year – daura-i hadith – to obtain
a graduation certificate from the renowned Deobandi schools at the Tab-
lighi centres. The leadership of the Tablighi Jamaªat in Delhi enjoys a special
relationship with the Islamic seminary in Saharanpur, not far from De-
oband. Many former leaders of the Tablighi Jamaªat graduated from here.
This school also split along family lines, however. The offspring of Ilyas and
the co-founder of the movement, Muhammad Zakariyya (1898-1982), consti-
tute an extended family clan that controls many of the leadership positions
both in the Tablighi Jamaªat and the new Saharanpur school. Maulana Za-
kariyya and his disciples extended their influence throughout the world.
They founded several new Deobandi schools, above all in South Africa and
the UK, each of which maintains close links with the Tablighi movement
and integrate Tablighi literature into their curriculum.34
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Networking between Deobandi schools in India and other parts of the
world has thus undergone a major change since 1980. It expanded and be-
came much more formalised. The decline in foreign student enrolment at
Deoband during this period, however, was not an obstacle to international
co-operation between other Deobandi schools and graduates. Co-ordination
of Deobandi institutions at the global level remains personalised, although
the Tablighi missionaries and scholar networks have begun to introduce
more formal elements.
From traditional to ‘modern’ Islamic teaching
Moreover, the Dar al-ªUlum rebounded more formally from its moribund
state after the split. Following a brief break during the crisis years of 1982
and 1983 it expanded rapidly, as reflected in its budget figures, as well as
enrolment and number of teachers. The manifested increase in enrolment
has become a proud feature of the school’s modernity as touted by its lead-
ers. The programme to improve the school’s administration was primarily
directed at streamlining the organisation. Much attention was paid to the
impact of two innovations on the curriculum: the introduction of English
classes at the post-graduate level and computer courses. However, these
courses were only acceptable within the parameters of the school’s theologi-
cal objectives. The more traditional technical education, on the other hand,
which has been on offer for a long time, is currently suffering from neglect.
This change in the approach of the school leadership and the shift to-
wards quantitative growth is evident in the budget.35 Although data avail-
able for the pre-1989 period is patchy, it nevertheless leads to several con-
clusions regarding the volume and dynamics of the budget. By international
standards, it is modest. Full-time education programmes for more than
3,500 students are currently being run on an annual budget of $1 million.
Compared to the financial situations of other South Asian educational insti-
tutions, however, its budget growth is impressive. In the 32 years from 1971
to 2003, the budget in Indian rupies has increased by a factor of almost 50.
Throughout this period it had an average annual growth rate of 12% (calcu-
lated on a cost basis). The period of most rapid annual growth was between
1983 and 1989, after which it gradually declined in the 1990s and almost
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stagnated after 2000, reflecting the deteriorating political environment for
Islamic institutions.
Meanwhile, the administrative reports allow an educated guess regard-
ing the number of staff employed at the Deoband school, although the re-
porting is inconsistent and the data frequently incomplete. Since 1989, the
overall number of staff seems to have fluctuated between 240 and 280. The
number of teachers was comparatively stable at approximately 50 between
1965 and 1979 but increased notably to 74 in 1997 and 92 in 2002. However,
this was not enough to offset the intense growth rates in student enrol-
ment. As a result, the student/teacher ratio increased rapidly throughout
the 1980s and 1990s, but it has since shown a slight decline.
The ‘Madani faction’ prefers to point to the increasing enrolment, which
has almost doubled since 1980 and reached 3,556 in the year 2002-03. This
is regarded as proof of the school’s revival since the split. Moreover, the an-
nual number of graduates has almost doubled to 774. The rise in enrolment
has put new strains on the school’s administration. This in turn may have
spurred greater reform efforts, which have been primarily directed at re-
moving administrative bottlenecks. A pamphlet containing a summary of
the changes brought about since 1982 lists seven administrative reforms di-
rected at streamlining internal procedures.36 They concern the following:
– the admission of new students, where written tests have been replaced
by oral exams, allowing for the more efficient processing of applicants;
– the elimination of one of two mid-year examinations, lessening the bur-
den on the education department;
– the introduction of anonymous code numbers for examination papers,
ensuring impartial assessment;
– the supervision of teachers with regard to covering course material and
supply of competent teaching staff;
– the appointment of capable Qur’anic readers (mujawwidin) and reciters
(qurra) with a national reputation;
– greater efficiency at the department of memorisation of the Qur’an (hifz);
– the fusion of the Persian and (Urdu) religious studies departments for
primary level students with a uniform course length of five years.
The report also lists six areas of expansion in the teaching department.
They include improved supervision of the Class One to Class Four students
of the ªalim course, the recruitment of gifted students and trainees for
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teaching positions through scholarships, the increase in the numbers of
classes offered each course year, and the adjustment of the post-graduate
takmil courses.
However, innovations were not merely limited to those of an adminis-
trative nature. A number of new departments were established: the Shaykh-
ul-Hind Academy in 1982-83, the Tahaffuz-i Khatm-i Nabuwwat in 1986, the
Computer Training Centre in 1996, and the Department of English Lan-
guage and Literature in 2002.37 The latter acquired a particular symbolic sig-
nificance in the long history of the seminary, concluding a debate that
lasted for more than a century. While the chief arguments for and against
the learning of English had already been presented by the first decades of
the twentieth century, the factual introduction of the English language as
came up against a purported ‘lack of funds’. Interviews with those involved
in the momentous decision of the Majlis-i Shura to go ahead with English
courses were evidence that the old inhibitions and arguments were still
very much alive.
There was a fear that learning English would lead to an imitation of the
West, a grave doctrinal argument with Qur’anic connotations, and one that
ultimately undermines Muslim religious identity, paving the way for their
Christianisation. The apprehension was particularly acute during the colo-
nial period. Mahmud al-Hasan grappled with the consequences at the open-
ing of the Jamªiya Milliya in Aligarh on 29 October 1920:
Those amongst you who are well informed will know that I have never given a
religious decree (fatwa) declaring the study of a foreign language or of the sci-
ences and arts of other nations as kufr (unbelief). But I state categorically that the
final impact of English education in our view is that people are influenced by
(dyed in the colour of) Christianity, or mock and abuse their religion and their
co-religionists with atheist taunts, or begin to worship the government of the
day. It is right for a Muslim to stay aloof from such education.38
Badruddin Ajmal, a wealthy perfume merchant from Assam, a Dar al-ªUlum
graduate and Shura member, had taken the introductory English course
early on. Several respondents claimed that he had developed close relations
with the Madani family solely to obtain access to the Shura. He first raised
the issue of the English language in 1994 and was rebuked. He was asked to
prove that its introduction would not dilute the Islamic quality of the grad-
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uates, that the demand for English was genuine, and that learning the lan-
guage would add a new dimension to the task of spreading the true Islam.
He set up a post-graduate training institutes for ulama with his own money,
the Markaz al-Maªarif in Delhi and Bombay, where English was already being
taught. In two-year courses they produced a small but fine batch of ulama,
who were well-versed in English and made their way up the hierarchy of Is-
lamic institutions in India as a result of the urbane aura they now exuded.
One of these students, a Dar al-ªUlum graduate and today the head of a post-
graduate training institute, was called to the decisive meeting in 2001,
where the issue remained unresolved despite a prolonged debate.39 Ajmal
subsequently delivered the key argument that in today’s computerised
world, a proficiency in English was crucial to responding to the many ques-
tions on Islam raised by Muslims who do not speak Urdu, in particular
those from southern India and abroad, where they frequently live in isola-
tion without access to knowledge about the true Islam. Hence, English
could and should be seen as a means of tabligh and daªwa, i.e., of spreading
God’s message to non-believers and the uninformed.
Missionary goals are still a significant argument in legitimising the
study and knowledge of English. When in this class I asked about their mo-
tives for studying English, the students were unanimous in replying that it
served to spread Islam. In private, some acknowledged that many among
them watch films in English on television and in the cinema, or that they
contemplate secular career options – something categorically rejected by
the purist Deobandi dogma.
Some Deobandi madaris still reject the idea of teaching English, not to
mention other worldly subjects. Not unlike the elders of the new wing of
the famous Saharanpur Madrasa Mazahir al-ªUlum, which split on similar
lines to the Deoband school, they argue that learning English will distract
students from their religious vocations, for which the community has made
sacrifices to provide them with free educations.40 In other words, they feel
the need to ‘trap’ students from poor family backgrounds in the religious
profession by refusing them access to English. They have also argued that
the number of clerics per Muslim in India was still comparatively low com-
pared to that of Christians in the West. Another line of argument equates
engineering schools with madrasas, which simply specialised in religious
education. The students could choose, the curriculum came with the re-
spective specialisation. The latter argument sounds particularly odd since
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the traditional curriculum also contained the rational sciences, which were
originally for secular use. The current narrow religious specialisation of the
madaris was merely the historical result of Western and colonial influences,
which in the nineteenth century had deprived religious schools of their
standing as educational institutions in the secular realm.
While many ulama in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh defend the exclu-
sively religious profile of the current madaris, some are hoping to regain
their mainstream roles in education. It is interesting to note how a techni-
cal or economic vision of modernity is used by the ulama to advocate for
change. They describe computer training, for instance, as a ‘requirement of
the modern era’ (ªasr-i jadid ka ahm taqaza).41 This argument is related to an
old inner-Islamic debate in South Asia about the need to update Islamic
knowledge in line with the contemporary era (ªasr-i hazar). Similar to the
West’s concepts of modernisation, computer knowledge is seen here as the
key to obtaining an ‘Islamic’ view of modernity. Computer knowledge is ac-
cepted – like English – as long as it serves the school’s religious objectives.
In this context, the Deoband school sees the value of computers in how
much easier it makes the study and reproduction of religious texts in Urdu,
the most popular service offered by the computer centre. It makes the pro-
duction of pamphlets and tracts for the propagation of the school’s tenets
(daªwa, tabligh) much easier, and thus further enhances its public religious
profile. The centre charges a fee for other departments at the school that
seek assistance with Urdu texts. The centre earned a total of 33,749 rupees
on this service in 1423 AH (2002-03).
The computer centre also offers Internet access, but the number of com-
puters is negligible. Students are only permitted to use the Internet for ed-
ucational purpose and are closely monitored. However, students interested
in using the Internet are free to use the Internet cafés in town in their spare
time, although not many of them take advantage of this opportunity. The
computer centre is thus expected to slowly change the graduate profile. By
2003, 152 students had been trained here. Due to the anxiety of unlimited
access to uncontrolled information, and the lack of facilities and space, the
number of new students is currently restricted to 20 per year.42
The computer department’s proposals in the administrative report show
that its role will continue to gradually expand in line with the increased
computerisation of the school administration and its functions. The com-
puter department requests the construction of new rooms to house sepa-
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rate divisions for administration, computer teaching, and computer and In-
ternet access.43 The proposals pointed out that it has to process increasing
numbers of e-mail inquiries from outside, no less than 1,813 in 2002-3. The
more important ones are translated and sent to the respective departments
for reply. 268 legal inquiries (istifta, i.e., requests of a fatwa) were received by
e-mail during the year, all of which emphasised the significance of the In-
ternet for specific Islamic purposes. These details were apparently consid-
ered conclusive proof of the legitimacy of this new means of communica-
tion for the school elders. Moreover, 51 applications from other countries
were received by e-mail that year.44
A major function of the computer centre is the maintenance of the
school website, which is a key instrument in disseminating information
about the school to the outside world.45 The centre’s online publications in
2002-3 included a general introduction to the school on its Arabic-language
web pages, over 300 pages in Urdu dealing with the curriculum and system
of education, the school’s admissions regulations, departments, services
and scholars, as well as its legal recommendations (fatawa) and publications,
the 250 pages of Rizvi’s History of the Dar al-ªUlum in English, and 18 news
items in English, Urdu and Arabic.
New challenges for the computer department with regard to the Web
site as outlined in the administrative report include the translation of more
material into Arabic, English and Hindi, and the expansion of computer fa-
cilities to expedite replies to legal inquiries (fatawa). The department
stressed that it had received numerous e-mails congratulating the school on
its new online services and further encouraging its expansion. This feed-
back has in particular come from the UK.
The Web site illustrates the contradictory impact such technical innova-
tions can have, which is not unlike the role of printing in religious mobili-
sation. The technically-minded young ulama, who do not want to be left be-
hind by secular institutions in the presentation of Islam on the Internet, are
attracted by the sense of competition. On the one hand, this has raised the
ideological profile of the school and strengthened sectarian orientations.
On the other hand, it has increased transparency, making religious argu-
ments – and the inner workings of the school administration – more widely
accessible, a decided move in the direction of democratisation.
Technical education at the school has long since included vocational
training. The Dar al-ªUlum introduced this department (dar al-sanayeª) in
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1945.46 Students were to be given hands-on training in crafts, a measure
that would improve their chances of employment later on. The crafts
taught, however, were selected entirely in accordance with the needs of the
school and the scholarly disposition of the ulama.47 Today the department
has three divisions: (1) tailoring of school uniforms (khayyati) where four stu-
dents were employed on a full-time basis and 75 part-time students in 1423
AH; (2) bookbinding (tajlid), where books are repaired and the registries of
various departments bound by one permanent staff member assisted by
four students; and (3) embroidery (kashida kari), where one staff member
teaches students the art of embroidery, although the position was vacant at
the time of the 1423 AH report.48
The various ‘modern’ changes that have been implemented by the school
reveal the quantitative, technical and functional vision of modernisation
pursued by the school elders in the strict interests of ideological goals.
These goals are being reinterpreted in the process to make room for further
improvements. This reflects a paradigm shift in the school’s self-image, but
also in its everyday operations.
From Religious Education to Political, Ideological and
Development Concerns
The institutionalisation of non-religious concerns must be seen as a further
trend in adapting to modernising influences, and refers in particular to po-
litical and ideological debate, and development issues, all of which focus on
the status and perspectives of the Muslim community in India. The school
maintains separate departments for these subjects, the more active and
more prominent of which were established only after 1980. Other formats
to propagate the political and ideological concerns of the school include its
periodical, student clubs, and Deobandi NGOs founded by graduates. The
NGOs introduced a ‘Deobandi universe’ of interrelated graduate institu-
tions, thereby responding to the need to create jobs for graduates, but also
to participate directly in development efforts. The social impact of the
school can be detected in the urban life of Deoband, which has become a
high-profile Islamic university town.
Ideological debate should be understood here as the promotion of a po-
larised and reductionist world view. In the case of the Deoband school, it
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emanates from theological and doctrinal concepts showing a preference –
or bias – for a specific interpretation of Islam and its practice, and of the
world that surrounds it. This ideological debate contributes to the drawing
of battle lines between followers and opponents, where doctrinal concerns
are directly linked to internal, political, and international issues. It can be
read as a consequence of purist pretensions, where prevailing worship prac-
tices and conduct are not accepted as such but assumed to be in need of
cleansing.
A separate body to channel and support debate in defence of the ‘Finality
of Prophethood’ – the All-India Majlis-i Tahaffuz-i Khatm-i Nabuwwat was
created in 1986.49 Its headquarters is run as a separate department at the
Dar al-ªUlum. This organisation’s name is a euphemism for a sectarian per-
spective on Islam, which does battle with perceived enemies that suppos-
edly question the finality of Muhammad’s Prophethood or the status of
Muhammad as the ‘seal of the prophets.’ The first to be challenged were the
Ahmadiyya, in response to claims by their founder Mirza Ghulam Ahmad
(1839-1908) and subsequent leaders to some degree of prophethood. Ene-
mies were spotted everywhere. The publications of the Majlis targeted not
only the allegedly heretical Ahmadiyya, but also Shiªa, Christians, Hindus,
Barelwis, Jamaªat-i Islami, and Ahl-i Hadith. The organisation has also
spawned a world body of unmistakable radicalism.50 Its local chapters, par-
ticularly those in Pakistan, regularly make news with their persecution of
Ahmadis. The Pakistani branch is notorious for its links with other sectar-
ian organisations, such as the Sipah-i Sahaba and jihadi groups.51 The De-
oband office focuses on the formulaic reproduction of pamphlets targeting
the above-mentioned groups. Local chapters enjoy a wide degree of autono-
my, albeit the existence of a global network and mutual support cannot be
denied. The co-ordinating function of the Indian organisation appears to ex-
tend to Nepal. It conducts camps throughout India to train scholars in the
rejection of Ahmadi ideas.52 As there are few Ahmadiyya in India, the camps
were mainly used to mobilise followers and help the scholars get an ideo-
logical focus.
One scholar stands out in the 1423 AH (2002) report in the context of sec-
tarian preaching, i.e., Maulana Qari ªUthman, who was in charge of most of
the high-level attacks on Ahmadi ideas. He is the senior vice-principal of the
school and practically runs it when the principal, Maulana Marghub, is
either too ill or too frail to attend to his duties. From the extensive coverage
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of the department’s activities in the administrative report we can infer that
honing the sectarian profile of the school is still a high priority. The school
is thus by design a major ideological institution beyond its educational pre-
tensions.
The Tabligh office is closely connected to the Finality of Prophethood de-
partment, which is much older, having been founded in 1907.53 It continued
its mission with great zeal in 2002-3. Its three full-time preachers have a
gruelling schedule. Maulana Muhammad Yamin, Maulana Muhammad Irfan
and Maulana Rashid each participated in two to three hundred missionary
programmes, where they delivered more than 400 speeches during the
year.54
The aim of the Shaykh-ul-Hind Academy, established in 1403 AH (1983),
was to support academic in-depth studies with more sophisticated argu-
ments for the defence and dissemination of the beliefs of the school’s
founders. Staff members are responsible for writing many of the public
speeches delivered during the missionary work (tabligh), as well as those de-
livered by the rector and other luminaries on political issues. This function
falls under the category of post-graduate specialisation or takhassus. The
two-year course was attended by seven students in 2002-3.55 It enables se-
lected graduate students to practice Islam-related journalism and research.
One particular case attracted public attention while I was in Deoband. A
student was expelled from the Academy for publishing an article in which
he supported the demand for the introduction of secular subjects in the
school curriculum. He was heavily criticised for having revealed his associa-
tion with the Deoband school. This demonstrates that the debate has pene-
trated the very heart of the school’s ideological institutions, and it is only a
matter of time before these kinds of debates will be conducted more
openly.56
The school periodicals address matters dealing with ideology, politics
and development, and are closely related to the above-mentioned depart-
ments.57 The administrative reports make constant reference to their finan-
cial difficulties, stating that the subscriptions are inadequate. Besides, the
school tends to give away complementary copies. As school organs, the pe-
riodicals are closely monitored. More recently, the school has begun to fea-
ture the latest issues of the monthlies Dar al-ªUlum and Al-Daªi on the Inter-
net.58 It also runs a printing press and its own bookshop, which stocks reli-
gious texts reflecting the school’s philosophy. Many of its publications dis-
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cuss the evolution of the Deoband school, including the works of its promi-
nent ulama and its official history by Sayyid Mahboob Rizvi.59
Periodicals publ ished by the Deoband school
Periodical First published Circulation
Mahinama Dar al- ªUlum (Monthly) 1360 ah (1941) 3,081 (1423 ah)
Mahinama al-Rashid (Monthly) 1332 ah (1913) [Discontinued]
Mahinama al-Qasim (Monthly) 1328 ah (1910) [Discontinued]
A’ina Dar al-ªUlum (Bi-weekly) 1,000 (1423 ah)
Mahinama al-Daªi (Arabic) 1396 ah (1976) 1,000 (1398 ah)
Risala Daªwa al-Haq (Arabic) Discontinued
(1396 ah) 237 (1394 ah)
There are more than 100 student clubs (talaba ke anjumanen) active in the
school and they deserve particular attention. Structured according to the
original geographical origins of the students, their aim is to facilitate learn-
ing. Some of them reflect the interest in promoting the study of Arabic lit-
erature and language (an-nadi al-adbi). Office bearers are elected, albeit
under the direction of the teachers, who guide the groups as patrons
(sarparast). Those in office design the wall newspapers (diwari parche), which
adorn the walls and trees of the inner courtyards where students learn the
basics of religious journalism. Most are written in the vernacular, while
some are produced in regional languages, such as Bengali, Tamil, Nepali, or
in Arabic. One wall newspaper announces school events, news and special
announcements, such as the arrival of guests. The clubs have their own li-
braries and they hold regular meetings, primarily on Thursdays, which
function as debating societies. Although free speech is practised here in the
manner of a prayer leader addressing a congregation, topics cannot be
freely chosen, but strictly reflect doctrinal and ideological concerns. In prac-
tice, the wall newspapers serve as a powerful means of maintaining control
over students’ minds and sharpening the doctrinal profile of the school.
The fact that student unions were banned and have not been revived
since the split is being questioned today. Loyalists point to a similar situa-
tion in the Jamiªa Milliya, arguing that a ban on student unions and their
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removal are a matter of historical tradition in India. More critical voices
point out that the incident discussed above, in which a student was ex-
cluded from the Shaykh-ul-Hind Academy for his public criticism of the
school has shown the disadvantage of not having a functioning student
union. The demand for a student union will probably get new support at the
school in the near future.
The growing number of graduates at the Deoband school and other De-
obandi madrasas has now spawned a number of auxiliary Islamic institu-
tions operating as non-governmental organisations (NGOs)
Peripheral inst itut ions created by or influenced
by Deobandi graduates
Institution Year
All India Taªlimi wa Milli Foundation 2000
Dar al-Qazi 1994
Markazi JUH 1992
All India Milli Council (AIMC) 1992
Tanzim-i Abna-i Qadim 1991
Islamic Fiqh Academy 1989
Institute of Objective Studies 1986
Markaz al-Maªarif 1982
Jamªiyat ul-Ulama-i Hind (JUH) 1919
It is through these institutions that the nexus with the wider society and
the secular Muslim elite is being re-established. Both the Institute of Objec-
tive Studies and the JUH champion the political causes of India’s Muslims
and their minority rights. Education is the concern of the Milli Foundation,
the Milli Council, the Markaz al-Maªarif, and the Tanzim-i Abna-i Qadim.
The Dar al-Qazi and the Fiqh Academy investigate legal issues raised by
India’s separate Muslim Personal Law and its reconciliation with common
law and the shariªa. It is conspicuous that some of them, such as the Markaz
al-Maªarif and the Taªlimi wa Milli Foundation, also support the introduc-
tion of secular and non-denominational schools, where students can prac-
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tice their religions unhindered. Some of these schools are attended by local
Hindus, albeit in small numbers.60
Another option for Deobandi graduates is to continue their education at
a university or at one of the post-graduate training institutes mentioned
earlier. Deoband still faces the problem of having its degrees recognised by
secular universities. At the Jamiªa Millia and Hamdard Universities in Delhi,
and Aligarh University, the fazil degree was recognised as the equivalent of
the Intermediate graduation certificate on the condition that the respective
students passed supplementary tests in English. Moreover, the fazil degree
was recognised as the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree in Arabic and Is-
lamic Studies at Aligarh University, as was the case at Al-Azhar University in
Cairo and the Islamic University in Medina. The Hamdard University also
recognised the Deoband degree in traditional medicine (tibb) as the equiva-
lent of a bachelor’s degree in Unani (‘Greek’) medicine and surgery.61
The school and its graduates have left a lasting impression on the life
and economy of the small town of Deoband, which shot to prominence as a
result of the school. Several graduates and drop-outs set up their own busi-
nesses, opening bookshops, general stores, a medical clinic, a pharmacy, a
hotel, and a trading outlet for the famous leather stockings worn in the
madrasas and exported to other countries throughout the world.62 In 2003,
Deoband had a population of approximately 110,000. Muslims constitute
about 60% of the population, with Hindus and Muslims living more or less
separately in different parts of town.63 As a result of its many Islamic
schools, Deoband has become a centre of Islamic education and Islamic
studies comparable to the academic towns of Oxford and Cambridge in the
West. According to the latest local description of Deoband, it is home to 109
madrasas.64
Although diverse in character and format, these changes demonstrate
that the school is increasingly pre-occupied with non-religious concerns,
which both shape its activities and mobilise its students and graduates. An
outstanding characteristic of the school is that it remains in close contact
with society, despite its often polarised and selective views on religion and
social life. The school seeks to expand its legitimacy in this dialogue and to
address student concerns and their social environment.
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Directions of Change
Since the split in 1982, the school has undoubtedly undergone major
changes. From the multitude of school events, this paper has focused on
four major directions of change:
– from a family network to politics of influence;
– from a school of thought to a well-built network of schools that is be-
coming more formal and cohesive;
– from a ‘traditional’ mode of operation to the Islamist notion of moder-
nity that includes expansion and technical professionalism;65
– from religious instruction to the wider pursuit of ideological, political
and development concerns.
These changes illustrate the winding course of the Dar al-ªUlum Deoband. It
faces the challenges of modernity but endeavours to tackle them in the
spirit of its own largely ideological mission. It is clear that it is far from
being an homogenous school of thought, because it is powerless to prevent
the penetration of society’s mainstream concerns and perspectives into its
body politics.
Its graduates play a decisive role in the creation of new Deobandi insti-
tutions, which focus to a large extent on development and education issues.
Girls’ education,66 computer knowledge, and language qualifications in Eng-
lish and modern Arabic are among the growing demands of the students.
Its administrative operations are also undergoing adjustments. The ad-
ministrative reports analysed for this paper indicate that the school is be-
coming increasingly more professional by the year. The growth in trans-
parency of the school’s operations has been remarkable. Nevertheless, this
does not mean it is becoming ideologically more flexible, as it grows more
defiant in the face of what it perceives as mounting political adversity.
Looking at the Dar al-ªUlum Deoband, it is difficult to speak of a crisis of
orthodoxy in Islamic education, or of Islamic education in general.67 The
school continues to expand at a rapid rate. At the same time, its financial
resources have become more strained. Sustaining the standard of support
for students in terms of hostels, food, or medical aid seems more difficult.
The school is currently tapping into new private resources to upgrade its in-
frastructure. Income from the private sector, such as Badruddin Ajmal’s
contribution to the running of several departments (computers, English,
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Shaykh-ul-Hind Academy, Finality of Prophethood) could significantly alter
how the school is run, if only on the technical side.68
It holds fast to its ideological mission, training students in the school’s
narrow theological dogma and its ideological interpretation of the world. It
continues to rekindle sectarianism and polarisation among Muslim groups
in India and further afield.69 Its graduates, however, are still divided over
their activist role in society. Most are guided by a contemplative mood and
personal piety. The rigours of the school’s training make them humble and
disciplined servants of the school’s cause.
Debates on the school curriculum and its teaching methods will only
continue to increase, although the grip that the conservative elders have on
the school’s philosophy is still strong and often uncompromising. The
school itself is directly confronted with the problems and demands of a
broader society, particularly when it comes to such practical issues as the
application of Islamic law in India and other countries. These concerns will
continue to stimulate debate and exert pressure on the Deoband school to
adapt to changes in society.
The political and religious impact of the school in India and the rest of
the Muslim world has gathered momentum since 1982. Its diversity has
likewise increased. Although it became a national institution in India, with
students from every Indian state, it remains firmly rooted in the northern
Indian states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, and is highly influential in West
Bengal and neighbouring Bangladesh. Pakistan is still a powerful Deobandi
centre in its own right, with little evidence of direct influence from the De-
oband school in India.70
The Dar al-ªUlum will continue to be the focus of international attention
as long as militant groups in countries such as Pakistan, Afghanistan and
Bangladesh adhere to Deobandi doctrine. Its networking in India is becom-
ing increasingly formal and works through the Association of Deobandi
Madrasas (RMA), whereas Deobandi scholars and schools are linked at the
international level via public conferences, youth work meetings, and mis-
sionary objectives, but also through Tablighi Jamaªat channels.
In the academic field, efforts have multiplied to understand the charac-
ter and dynamics of Islamic schools.71 However, much of it is politically mo-
tivated.72 Detailed studies that take the concept of the schools and their ap-
proach into account, without refraining from critical assessment, are re-
quired. Measured against its long history, the Deoband school is under
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enormous pressure and is experiencing change at a breakneck speed.
Whether this will suffice to ensure its smooth adaptation to a new and rad-
ically changing world remains to be seen.
D I E T R I C H R E E T Z
100
AUP-ISIM-IS-BW-Madrasa-DEF2:BW  24-09-2008  16:53  Pagina 100
Notes
1 Cf. Jeffrey Goldberg, ‘The Education of a Holy Warrior,’ New York Times
Magazine, 25 June 2000. For a less sensationalist but yet negative reporting on
Deoband affiliated networks in Pakistan, see the International Crisis Group
reports Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military (29 July 2002) and Pakistan:
Karachi’s Madrasas and Violent Extremism (29 March 2007).
2 21-23 March 1980, see Mukhtasir rudad – Ijlas Sadsala Dar al-ªulum Deoband
munªaqida 21, 22, 23 March 1980 [Brief minutes of the centenary congregation at
Deoband University convened 21-23 March 1980]. Deoband: Daftar-i Ijlas
Sadsala Dar al-ªUlum Deoband. 1980, p. 17. In fact, 1980 marked 113 years of
the school’s existence since 1866.
3 Barbara Daly Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982.
4 Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement: Religious Symbolism and Political Mobilisation in
India. New York: Columbia University Press, 1982.
5 Cf. Reetz, Islam in the Public Sphere. pp. 316-318.
6 Dietrich Reetz, Islam in the Public Sphere: Religious Groups in India (1900-1947). Delhi
and London: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 180.
7 See various issues of the journal of the Old Boys Association of the Deoband
school, Tarjuman-i Dar al-ªUlum (Organ of the Islamic university), produced in
Delhi.
8 Sana 1422-23 AH dar al-ªulum Deoband men jadid talaba ke liye zaruri qawaªid-i dakhila
[Entry requirements for the new students at Deoband University during the
academic year 1422-23 AH]. Deoband: Daftar-i Taªlimat, 1422 AH (2001), pp. 15-16.
9 Administrative Report for 1423 AH (2002-3). Most of the school data refers to
the Hijri calendar and the academic year, which begins annually on the first of
Ramadan. For accuracy the Hijri references are preferred and converted
according to the beginning of the academic year.
10 Administrative Report for 1423 AH (2002-3).
11 Reetz, Islam in the public sphere. pp. 182ff.
12 http://darululoom-deoband.com/urdu/introulema/3/g.htm, accessed 1 March
2006.
13 Author’s interviews during field research in Delhi and Deoband in February-
March 2004.
14 Idem.
15 The Hindu, 29 March 2006,
http://www.hindu.com/2006/03/29/stories/2006032920401600.htm, accessed
1 July 2007.
16 My interviews with Deoband graduates in February 2004 – DR.
17 Photographs from the author’s own collection, taken in December 2001 and
February 2004.
18 Interviews by the author with Dar al-ªUlum waqf representatives from Feb-Mar
2004.
CHANG E AND S TAGNAT I ON I N I S L AM I C E DUCAT I ON
101
AUP-ISIM-IS-BW-Madrasa-DEF2:BW  24-09-2008  16:53  Pagina 101
19 Cf. Reetz, Islam in the Public Sphere, pp. 183f.
20 http://darululoom-deoband.com/urdu/departments/show.php?dept=rabita.gif,
accessed 1 March 2006.
21 See, for instance, All-India meetings of Islamic Arabic schools on 12 November
1998 and 30 April 2002. Khutba-i Sadarat - Kul Hind Ijtimaª-i Madaris-i Islamiyyah
ªArabiyyah 21 Rajab 1419 AH = 12 November 1998 [Presidential address – All-India
Convention of Islamic Arabic Schools, 12 November 1998]. Deoband: Markazi
Daftar-i Madaris-i ‘Arabiyyah, n.d.; ditto for Kul Hind Ijlas-i Majlis ªUmumi-i Rabita
Madaris-i Islamiyyah ªArabiyyah 16 Safar 1423 AH = 30 April 2002 [General session of
the All-India Convention of the Association of Islamic Arabic Schools, 30 April
2002].
22 Interview on 28 February 2004.
23 On efforts to heal the rift, see: ‘Whiff of breeze from Deoband,’ The Milli Gazette
(Delhi), vol. 6, no. 6, 16-31 March 2005.
24 Numbers of students by geographical origin are taken from Naqsha-i taªdad-i
talaba-i dar al-ªulum Deoband – Daftar-i Taªlimat [Table of student numbers at the
Islamic University of Deoband, Department of Education] for 1414-15 AH (1994).
25 Dastur-i Asasi – Tanzim-i Abna-i Qadim Dar al-ªUlum Deoband [Founding
constitution – Old Boys’ Association Islamic University Deoband]. Delhi:
Tanzim-i Abna-i Qadim, 1991.
26 See, however, Dietrich Reetz, ‘The Deoband Universe: What makes a
transcultural and transnational educational movement of Islam?’, in: Dietrich
Reetz, and Bettina Dennerlein (eds.), South-South Linkages in Islam: The Making of
Continuity and Disparity in the 19th-21st centuries. Contemporary Studies of South Asia,
Africa and the Middle East, Durham: Duke University Press, 2007, pp. 139-159.
27 5,078 foreign students graduated from the school between 1866 and 2001. Dar
al-ªulum (Deoband 2001, no. 11), 43.
28 The Naqsha-i taªdad-i talaba-i dar al-ªulum Deoband – Daftar-i Taªlimat for 1979 lists
34 foreign students, including 9 from Bangladesh, 5 from Nepal, 6 from
Malaysia, and 9 from Africa; that for 2002-3 lists 61 foreigners, including 32
from Nepal, 27 from Bangladesh, and 1 each from Burma and Malaysia.
29 Maulana Arshad Madani, head of the education department at the Deoband
school, in the course of interviews in December 2001 and Feb-Mar 2004 – DR.
30 See the report by Maulana Ahmad Kathrada, ‘An eye-witness account of the 150
year Deoband Conference’, in Al-Jamiat (Johannesburg), vol. 4, no. 8, June 2001,
at http://www.jamiat.org.za/al-jamiat/june/sreport.html, accessed 15 March
2006. In was actually the 135th anniversary.
31 Rahimullah Yusufzai, The News, 12 April 2001, at http://www.institute-for-
afghan-studies.org/AFGHAN%20CONFLICT/TALIBAN/deobandi_conf_2001.htm,
accessed 1 July 2007.
32 Interviews with various respondents at the Deoband school in December 2001
and February 2004; also Maulana Abdul Ghafoor Haideri, JUI General Secretary,
during a visit to Berlin with a Parliamentary delegation on 11-12 May 2004 – DR.
D I E T R I C H R E E T Z
102
AUP-ISIM-IS-BW-Madrasa-DEF2:BW  24-09-2008  16:53  Pagina 102
33 Dietrich Reetz, ‘Keeping busy on the path of Allah: The self-organisation
(intizam) of the Tablighi Jama‘at,’ in: Daniela Bredi (ed.), Islam in South Asia (=
Oriente Moderno, 84:1). Rome 2004, pp. 295-305.
34 See the directory of Zakariyya’s disciples in: Muhammad Yusuf Mutala, Maulana
Muhammad Zakariyya aor un ke Khulafa-i Kiram. [Maulana Zakariyya and his
venerable disciples]. 3 parts in 2 vols. Bury: Dar al-ªUlum al-ªArabiyya al-
Islamiyya, 1986.
35 The following paragraphs are based on an analysis of the Administrative
Reports, held in Archive of the Dar al-ªUlum Deoband. Summary data compiled
by the author in February 2004.
36 Dar al-ªUlum Deoband shuªba nashr-o-insha’at, Dar al-ªUlum Deoband — ªUlum-i
kitab-o-sunnat ke amin, sarmayia-i millat ke pasban. Khidmat, halat, mansube. [The
Islamic University of Deoband — Guardian of Knowledge of the Quran and
Sunna, Flagbearer of the Treasure of the Community. Its Service, Current
Conditions and Future Plans] Deoband: Dar al-ªUlum, 1422 AH (2001).
37 After the website of Deoband school http://www.darululoom-deoband.com;
Administrative Report 1423 AH / 2003
38 Miyan Muhammad, Asiran-i Malta [Interned on Malta]. Delhi: Al-Jamªiyat Book
Depot 1976, p. 58.
39 My interviews in March 2004 – DR.
40 My interviews with Maulana Shahid and Maulana Muhammad Salman at the
Madrasa Mazahir al-ªUlum Jadid Saharanpur on 2 March 2004 – DR.
41 http://darululoom-deoband.com/urdu/departments/show.php?dept=computer.gif,
downloaded 01 March 2006.
42 Administrative Report for 1423 AH (2002-3), p. 11.
43 Ibid., p. 12.
44 Ibid., p. 12.
45 www.darululoom-deoband.com.
46 Sayyid Mahboob Rizvi,. History of the Dar al-ªUlum. 2 vols. Deoband: Idarah-i
Ihtimam, 1980, vol. II, pp. 244ff.
47 Cf. Reetz, Islam in the Public Sphere, pp. 288.
48 Administrative Report for 1423 AH (2002-03), p. 32-33.
49 http://darululoom-deoband.com/urdu/departments/show.php?dept=k-
nubowat.gif, accessed 1 March 2006.
50 Alami Majlis Tahaffuz-i Khatm-i Nabuwwat, 35 Stockwell Green, London, SW9.
(http://www.islamicfinder.org/getitWorld.php?id=26201&lang); see their Web
site at http://www.khatme-nubuwwat.org/; see also the Web site of the US
branch of the Irshad-o-Da‘wat, a pro-Ahl-i Hadith organisation that co-sponsors
its international activities: http://www.irshad.org/finality/significance.php.
51 Muhammad Amir Rana, A to Z of Jehadi Organisations in Pakistan. Lahore: Mashal,
2004.
52 These camps took place once a year in 1988, 1990-95, 1997-98. See Dar al-
ªUmum, Dar al-ªUlum Deoband … Khidmat, halat, mansube, p. 25.
CHANG E AND S TAGNAT I ON I N I S L AM I C E DUCAT I ON
103
AUP-ISIM-IS-BW-Madrasa-DEF2:BW  24-09-2008  16:53  Pagina 103
53 Reetz, Islam in the public sphere, pp. 153ff.
54 Administrative Report for 1423 AH (2002-3), p. 20.
55 Ibid., p. 25.
56 The student’s name was Arshad Fayzee. Based on interviews by the author in
Deoband, March 2004.
57 Dietrich Reetz, ‘Dar al-Ulum Deoband and its Self-Representation on the
Media.’ Islamic Studies (Islamabad: Islamic Research Institute), vol. 44, no. 2,
2005, 209-227.
58 http://darululoom-deoband.com/urdu/magazine/index.php, accessed 16 March 2006.
59 For a list of its publications, see http://darululoom-
deoband.com/urdu/publications/publications2a.htm, accessed 16 March 2006.
60 Author’s interviews in March 2004.
61 Ibid. and Ahmad 1985: 28.
62 Interviews and inquiries conducted by myself and my research assistant, a
Deoband graduate, from Feb-March 2004, during which we listed at least 16
businesses in Deoband.
63 Salim Ahmad, Mustanad tarikh-i Deoband [Authentic history of Deoband].
Deoband: Maktaba Rah-i Islam, n.d., pp. 222, 31.
64 Ibid., p. 222.
65 For a discussion of various dimensions of Islamism, see Dietrich Reetz,
Aktuelle Analysen islamistischer Bewegungen und ihre Kritik. In:
Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen, Stuttgart 17(2004)4, pp. 61-68.
66 Mareike Jule Winkelmann. ‘From Behind the Curtain’: A study of a girls’ madrasa in
India. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2005.
67 A strong sense of crisis pervades such studies as: A. H. Nayyar, ‘Madrasah
Education Frozen in Time’, in: Pervez Hoodbhoy (ed.), Fifty Years of Pakistan:
Education and the State. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp. 215-250;
Qamaruddin, Hindustan ki dini darsgahen. Kul Hind sarwe [Religious schools in
India. All India survey]. Delhi: Hamdard Education Society, 1994; Kuldip Kaur,
Madrasa Education in India: A Study of its Past and Present. Chandigarh: Centre for
Research in Rural & Industrial Development, 1990.
68 Author’s interviews in March 2004.
69 Muhammad Yusuf Ludhianwi, Differences in the Ummah and the Straight Path.
Karachi: Zam Zam Publishers, 1999.
70 Nayyar, ‘Madrasah Education’; Jamal Malik, Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of
Traditional Institutions in Pakistan. Delhi: Manohar, 1996.
71 Jan-Peter Hartung and Helmut Reifeld (eds.). Islamic Education, Diversity, and
National Identity: Dini Madaris in India post 9/11. Delhi, London: Sage, 2006;
Yoginder Sikand, Bastions of the Believers: Madrasas and Islamic Education in India.
Delhi: Penguin, 2005.
72 Alexander Evans, ‘Understanding Madrasahs’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, no. 1,
2006, pp. 9-16.
D I E T R I C H R E E T Z
104
AUP-ISIM-IS-BW-Madrasa-DEF2:BW  24-09-2008  16:54  Pagina 104
3 ‘Inside and Outside’ in a Girls’
Madrasa in New Delhi
Mareike Winkelmann
Introduction
Historically speaking, late-nineteenth-century Muslim reformist ideas influ-
enced the establishment of the earliest public schools for Muslim girls. Prior
to that period, education for girls in Islamic matters was mainly a private
affair, but it eventually became one of the main issues of public discourse,
as it unfolded in the then just introduced Urdu print-culture, in the re-
formist (male) madrasas, and in voluntary associations or anjumans, which
formed the link between the domestic and public realms. By the early twen-
tieth century, education for girls in the confinement of the zenana or
women’s quarters of the home existed side by side with the first public
girls’ schools for Muslim girls.1 These developments, along with the overall
increasing literacy, Urdu print culture, and the democratisation of access to
Islamic texts were precursors to the establishment of girls’ madrasas. While
there are several valuable studies examining boys’ madrasas in India, pub-
lished information on their female counterparts is scanty.2 In the course of
my research my interlocutors suggested that the first larger, public girls’
madrasas in post-Partition India still bore witness to the earlier forms of
‘home teaching’, for example in the preservation of value-oriented or adab
education.
As practices are best discerned through participant observation, inter-
views, and informal conversations with students, teachers, and founders of
girls’ madrasas over a longer period of time, a large portion of my study is
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based on ethnographic fieldwork in a girls’ madrasa in New Delhi, which
hosts roughly 180 students between twelve and seventeen years of age. The
madrasa that I shall henceforth call Jamiªat al-Niswan was established in
1996 under the patronage of the Nadwat al-Ulama in Lucknow and recruits
students from Delhi and other cities as well as villages from all over India.3
The links between the Jamiªat al-Niswan and the Tablighi Jamaªat formally
began via the Nadwat al-Ulama madrasa in Lucknow, as the founders of the
girls’ madrasa adopted its curriculum with its strong emphasis on Arabic.
Moreover, the male founders of this particular madrasa and the male mem-
bers of its core families are active in the lay preacher’s movement known as
the Tablighi Jamaªat.4
This paper focuses on three issues, namely (1) the transmission of Is-
lamic knowledge in the girls’ madrasa, (2) the ‘informal’ curriculum
through which the broader aim of moulding the person as a whole is
achieved, and finally (3) the role of the Tablighi Jamaªat in the everyday run-
ning of the madrasa.
Islamic Education for Girls
Recent reports claim that there are approximately 35,000 madrasas in
India5, which often form networks along lines of affiliation with various
schools of thought, such as the Deobandis, the Jamaªat-i Islami-i Hind, the
Ahl-i Hadith, the Barelvis, and the Nadwat al-Ulama – all of which represent
important and large Muslim organisations that emerged roughly between
the late nineteenth and the mid-twentieth centuries.
To date, there is no central administrative institution or madrasa board,
which creates an initial impression of relative opacity regarding the
madrasas’ organisational structure. Second, the opacity toward the outside
goes hand in hand with the estrangement between Islamic and non-Islamic
education in India, as the madrasas have largely remained outside the scope
of state intervention for over fifty years. However, especially following the
events of 11 September 2001, the madrasas have received increasing
amounts of attention in the Indian media, and the need to establish a cen-
tral Madrasa Board has been voiced frequently.6 But the proposal has been
perceived as controversial, because many Muslims feel that such a central
MAR E I K E W I N K E LMANN
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Madrasa Board would jeopardise the independent status of the madrasas
and allow for too much state control.
Even though Islamic education in madrasas has a long-standing history
in India,7 public madrasas for girls only began to mushroom roughly in the
last two decades. Until the Partition of India in 1947, Muslim girls were pre-
dominantly taught at home in Islamic matters.8 Well-to-do families patron-
ised Islamic lessons for girls from the mahalla or neighbourhood in their
homes. This informal way of teaching did not conflict with the require-
ments of purdah, as the girls were taught by female teachers in the women’s
quarters of the home, known as the zenana. Accounts of what has been
termed ‘home teaching’ for girls in Delhi have been preserved in oral histo-
ries of women who still remember the era prior to Partition. Moreover, the
late nineteenth-century ‘advisory literature’ for women by authors such as
Ashraf Ali Thanawi, Nazir Ahmad, and Altaf Husain Hali,9 has preserved
lively impressions and became a model later used in the establishment of
the first girls’ madrasas shortly after Partition.
As most of those who had once patronised Islamic home teaching for
girls in north India had migrated to the newly formed state of Pakistan, a
gap emerged in India that had to be filled with new forms of Islamic educa-
tion for Muslim girls. The most common explanations given by people I
asked as to why madrasas for girls were established in the early 1950s was
the following: first, the earlier educational patrons had departed; and sec-
ond, the Muslim minority in independent India had to find new ways of pre-
serving their Islamic legacy and herein women played a pivotal role. As the
saying goes, ‘The mother’s lap is the first madrasa’. In a study carried out by
the Delhi-based Hamdard Education Society, it has been suggested that of
the estimated 35,000 Indian madrasas only between 8 to 10% are madrasas
for girls.10 However, many Muslims remain unaware of or even surprised at
the suggestion that girls’ madrasas exist, even if they are located in their
own neighbourhoods, which suggests that even the madrasa buildings are
often, as it were, in purdah, hidden from public view.
A Glance Behind the Curtain
The Jamiªat al-Niswan offers a five-year fazila degree course in Islamic Stud-
ies for girls between twelve and seventeen years of age.11 The students hail
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from lower to lower middle-class backgrounds, from Delhi and from far-
flung places across India, and are from both rural and urban backgrounds.
The teachers have been recruited from the first two batches of graduates
since 2001 and from two affiliated girls’ madrasas in Malegaon and
Lucknow. The founder’s family originates from the Barabanki district close
to Lucknow and claims Ansari background.12 Moreover, the founder, his son-
in-law who is the manager of the madrasa, as well as the fathers of two
other teachers are closely affiliated with the Tablighi Jamaªat, whose global
headquarters in Nizamuddin lies in the direct vicinity of the madrasa. The
above-mentioned ulama also studied in the Tablighi boys’ madrasa known
as the Kashf al-ªUlum, where two of them continue to teach to date. There
are further ties between the madrasa and the Tablighi headquarters, such
as the Thursday programme, as both the Jamiªat al-Niswan and the Tablighi
Jamaªat organise women’s bayan or lectures on Thursday afternoons.
The tiny school building hosts the almost impossible number of one
hundred eighty students at present, but a larger compound has been ac-
quired in Okhla, a Muslim neighbourhood in New Delhi. Once the construc-
tion of the school building has been completed, the madrasa will eventually
host some one thousand students. Up to now, there are three to four hun-
dred applicants annually, out of which only an average of forty-five students
make it into the Jamiªat al-Niswan. Recently, a total application stop has
been implemented, as the school building is overcrowded. The require-
ments regarding purdah, which is a term that denotes both the veiling of the
female body as well as the physical segregation of women from male spaces,
are laid out in the madrasa’s enrolment brochure:13
‘2. Rules and Regulations
… If the student has to go out, permission of the head teacher and the hostel
warden must be requested.
Students must always wear their school uniforms during school hours.
Students must remember that the Jamiªa is a centre of morality (akhlaq).
The aim of the Jamiªa is the reform (islah) of morality and actions (ªamal).
Students’ behaviour should be in accordance with Islamic law (shariªat).
Student dress should be in accordance with Islam.
Purdah is to be observed at all times.
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3. Holidays
… Students who go to melas, cinemas, or other places of entertainment will be ex-
pelled from the Jamiªa.
Students are strictly prohibited to wear jewellery.
Students must observe the obligatory Islamic rituals (ªibadat).
Students must attend the daily gathering (majlis) of the virtues of pious deeds
(faza’il).14
Students must fully respect the teachers, founders, and Islamic scholars (ulama)
behind the Jamiªa.
Students must stay avoid controversy and chaos (fitna) at all times. …
4. Student’s Pledge
I promise to observe these rules and regulations and that I shall study with great
dedication and avoid things that are a waste of time and that I shall never dis-
play any immoral behaviour. I promise to dedicate 24 hours of every day to my
studies in accordance with the timetable of the Jamiªa and that I shall obey the
command of those in charge of the Jamiªa and accept any punishment if I break
any of the rules and regulations. …
6. Contact with Parents
Parents are permitted and encouraged to call the Jamiªa during certain times, to
enquire about their daughters’ progress. Students are allowed to talk on the
phone for three minutes., Students can go home to visit their parents every first
Thursday of every month. When they are picked up from the Jamiªa, the students
must be accompanied by a mahram man whose photo is on file at the Jamiªa.15 A
woman is not permitted to fulfil this function. A student cannot meet a ghair
mahram man, even if he is a close relative of hers. One can meet students on
Thursdays after 12 noon and Fridays from 9am to noon. Parents are expected to
check regularly with the Jamiªa about their daughters’ progress and possible
problems’.
Regarding the seclusion of women, Cora Vreede-de Stuers has raised the
question of whether purdah excludes women from male domains or ex-
cludes men from female domains, similar to the argument made in Lila Abu
Lughod’s Veiled Sentiments.16 There is a small front room at the Jamiªat al-
Niswan for the founder, the manager and their guests to meet, but what
goes on behind the literal purdah or curtain is largely inaccessible for the
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men.17 Even though it is the girls and women who ‘observe purdah’, one
could also argue that men are excluded from the women’s domain. How-
ever, the mobility of women outside these exclusively female domains is
clearly more restricted than that of men, who are only excluded from a rela-
tively small area in girls’ madrasas.
The girls are allowed to leave the madrasa only for clearly specified occa-
sions. For example, the students are allowed to go home on weekends on a
regular basis. These visits home be it over the weekend, for the school holi-
days during the month of Ramadan or during the summer, one of the girls’
‘guardians’ (i.e., a male relative who is ‘forbidden for the girl in marriage’ or
mahram) must pick up the girl from the madrasa, escort her home and bring
her back to the madrasa on time. If he fails to do so, the family will be fined
or the student may even be expelled. Male guardianship is thus central to
the girls’ mobility outside the madrasa. Many other students and teachers
do not reside in Delhi and thus the issues of male guardianship and mobil-
ity are more complicated for them. For example, apart from those girls who
come from remote areas in and around the capital, the Jamiªat al-Niswan
also hosts students from places as divergent as Lucknow, Bahraich, Bijnor,
Saharanpur, Malegaon, and even Mumbai, to name but a few. These girls
generally only visit their homes during the longer vacations during the
month of Ramadan and over the summer, when the madrasa is closed. Other-
wise, many students stay behind at the madrasa for most of the school year
and hence their lives are marked by a sense of austerity, as the physical
space is minimal with almost no diversions.
An Opportunity to Speak Up
Every Thursday between 11:30 a.m. and 2 p.m., teachers and students or-
ganise a weekly programme, which a few local women can also attend, in-
cluding the female relatives of students and teachers from the neighbour-
hood. The programme is held in the largest part of the building on the
ground floor, where approximately 200 girls and women can be accommo-
dated in orderly rows of seats supervised by senior students. Every week the
teachers in charge of organising the programme sit facing everyone else in
a slightly elevated section of the hall. With the hand-written programme for
the day in hand, they take turns announcing the students’ contributions via
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a microphone, a gesture that appears somewhat exaggerated, considering
that the space is not that big, and the technical equipment leaves a lot to be
desired. The amplifier and sound system are located in the adjacent front
room, where the manager sits with his guests and listens to what is going
on behind the door that separates them from the girls.
When the teachers give the word, the students come to the fore and re-
cite a portion of text from the Qur’an, present an interpretation of a
Qur’anic text in Urdu (tafsir), recount hadiths, tell an Islamic story, or sing a
religious poem called tarana or naªat. Simultaneously, one of the other
teachers present may call students to the fore and reprimand them for per-
forming poorly during the past week. While most of the programme is in
Arabic, which most of the women attending from the neighbourhood are
unable to understand, great care is taken that tafsir, or the exegesis of a
Qur’anic text, is in Urdu. Moreover, following the formal exegesis of a
Qur’anic text, the students explain the text again in their own words. Those
sections of the programme are characterised by a contrastingly familiar
tone and the students’ explanations tend to merge with numerous moral
appeals to the audience, in the style of the adab literature.
Adab or Moral Education
Although lessons in adab or ‘moral education’ only take up a relatively
small portion of the schedule, namely eight hours a week, observations con-
firm that adab permeates the everyday affairs and overall atmosphere of the
Jamiªat al-Niswan. Moreover, introducing and grooming the students to the
rules laid out by the community’s understanding of adab appears to be piv-
otal when it comes to the madrasa’s explicit aim of bringing about ‘the islah
(reform) of the akhlaq (morality) and ªamal (actions), as the madrasa’s
brochure puts it. Finally, the admission papers also state that ‘the students
must fully respect the teachers, founders, and ulama behind the Jamiªa’.
The question is how these aims can be established and put into practice.
Apart from the formally scheduled classes in adab, during which texts
such as Maulana Ashraf Ali Thanawi’s well-known and much discussed Bi-
hishti Zewar,18 and the Arabic Qira’at ur-Rashida19 are carefully studied begin-
ning in the first year of their schooling, the adab is also transmitted, prac-
tised, and reproduced through a non-formal teaching regime, i.e., through
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rules, discipline, bodily control, and behavioural expectations, especially
vis-à-vis those considered authorities in the madrasa. Hence, the overall aim
of bringing about a sense of adab in the students is not limited to the formal
didactic activities that take place in the classroom. As the teachers are
barely older than their students, the students in turn feel free to interact
with them in an informal way. Nevertheless, the students address the teach-
ers using the formal ap or appa, instead of a less formal form of address
such as by their first names or tum, which are other options, considering
that some of the teachers actually graduated from the Jamiªat al-Niswan a
year earlier, and thus the girls interacted with them as fellow students only
a year earlier. There is one exception to the use of ap or appa, namely in the
case of the manager’s wife, who at the same time is also the madrasa
founder’s daughter. Being in her late twenties, this young woman is the
most senior teacher in the madrasa, and hence everyone respectfully refers
to her as badi appa or ‘big elder sister’. In her case, the fictive kinship rela-
tion expressed in the omnipresent reference to badi appa suggests that re-
spect is not gained through family relations or ascribed status alone, but
also through kindness and knowledge, as she is also considered the most
learned young woman. Badi appa’s father teaches Arabic in the Kashf al-
ªUlum madrasa for boys in the Tablighi headquarters and she received her
secondary education in the Jamiªat us-Salehat girls’ madrasa in Malegaon,
where she also learned Persian, apart from a fluency in Arabic, which is con-
sidered a marker of knowledge and status at the Jamiªat al-Niswan.
The very first lesson the students learn about adab is that they have to
show respect for their teachers, for books and their authors, and finally for
the madrasa itself. One of the books used for the adab classes, titled the Qi-
ra’at ur-Rashida, includes stories about the lives of the Prophet, his Compan-
ions, and the first Caliphs. The stories deal with social etiquette, and teach
the reader how to eat and drink properly, how to attend and organise mar-
riages, or how to run a household with a view toward pleasing God. The
teachers in turn ensure that the students not only understand the texts lit-
erally but also encourage them to find in their own lives applications of the
examples highlighted in the texts.
Furthermore, the all-pervading effect of adab becomes more evident
when we look at the case of a girl who initially worked in the Jamiªat al-
Niswan as a cleaner. The girl was in her early teens and stood out, as her
shalwar kameez tended to be very colourful, in contrast to the students’ other-
MAR E I K E W I N K E LMANN
112
AUP-ISIM-IS-BW-Madrasa-DEF2:BW  24-09-2008  16:54  Pagina 112
wise sober, white, school uniforms. Moreover, her head was generally un-
covered and her hair was sloppily tied back. After some time, a gradual
change began to set in, as she began to linger around in the staff room
more and more. From that point onwards, the cleaner was taught to read
and write Urdu and Arabic properly, and apart from her ongoing chores,
she was often found in a corner of the small staff room, her head covered by
a clean white dupatta (loose scarf), reciting texts from her Urdu and Arabic
primers. She no longer left her head uncovered, even though she still
seemed rather new to the habit of covering it, and hence the dupatta often
slipped off her head, revealing that she had also started to use hair oil,
which had made her hair more shiny, and she tied it back more mindfully.
The girl’s favourite pastime seemed to be observing and listening to the
teachers’ conversations in the staff room, while dedicating herself more or
less fully to her studies. The former cleaner seemed to take pride in her
newly acquired and visibly more demure appearance, as she spoke in a
muted voice, tended to lower her eyes when addressing someone, and
walked about in a much more lady-like manner than before. Even though
her age was roughly the same as that of the other students, she did not so-
cialise with them, and there did not seem to be a place for her among their
circle. Nevertheless, her status in the Jamiªat al-Niswan had changed, as she
gained respectability through her interest in Islamic education. Moreover,
as she began to show interest in what they were doing and a willingness to
adjust to their dress and behaviour codes, the teachers seemed obliged to
pay her more mind, instead of just ordering her to fetch them tea, clean up
the floor or put away their breakfast dishes.
A second example is that of twin girls, around six years of age, who
started coming to the Jamiªat al-Niswan every day for their first lessons in
reading and memorising the Qur’an. The girls were rather shabbily dressed
with their make-do dupattas loosely covering their heads and they looked
quite unhealthy, as if they were not used to being outside the house. Over
the months, things began to change. First, their daily walks to the madrasa
led to the young girls looking increasingly healthy, with their hair neatly
brushed and oiled, and with their dupattas were properly tied around their
heads. Second, while in the beginning the girls used to carry their Qur’ans
wrapped in plain pieces of cloth, it wasn’t long before they began to proudly
carry their Qur’ans in beautiful green silken covers with matching buttons.
Third, soon the girls were no longer seen with the Qur’an lying on a cush-
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ion or a pile of books in front of them, as both possessed ornamentally
carved wooden Qur’an stands, which they folded up at the lesson’s end and
carried them under their arms together with their copies of the Qur’an. Fi-
nally, while in the beginning the girls had appeared quite anxious and
scared, after a while they felt at ease in their new environment, even
though they seldom spoke to anyone, as they studied in a strikingly disci-
plined fashion for girls their age.
Even though the girls learn that, according to Islam, they have the right
to acquire knowledge and that they also have the right, for example, to ig-
nore certain household chores considered ‘un-Islamic’, such as the exten-
sive preparations for lavish weddings, this new level of self-assertion of
these learned young women also has the potential for creating tensions in
the domestic field.
For example, one teacher was made aware of her being overweight when
she married into a family of very slender people. Adding to this teacher’s
misery was the fact that all of the younger female in-laws were also either
teaching or studying at the Jamiªat al-Niswan, although the young women
were clearly taking her side by saying that they wished to be more like her.
However, the young teacher was put under tremendous pressure to lose
weight, because she admitted that her husband liked slim women and
threatened to divorce her if she gained any more weight. Thus, she went on
a strict diet and started exercising regularly. Her physical ideal of becoming
thinner had nothing to do with Islam, she insisted, arguing that ‘we (ham
log) believe human beings are good the way God created us’. Nevertheless,
she noted that, according to Islam, her primary duty was to please her hus-
band and losing weight had everything to do with that. The young woman
had tried to reconcile two conflicting issues, namely the idea that she
should not alter her body because of community pressure and the notion
that her primary duty was to please her husband.
Penetration of External Influences into the Girls’ Madrasa
While there seemed to be an outright rejection of what is perceived as neg-
ative Western influences, there is also an awareness that one cannot en-
tirely avoid coming into contact with certain aspects of Western culture.
For the women and girls of the madrasa, avoidance of the outside world is
MAR E I K E W I N K E LMANN
114
AUP-ISIM-IS-BW-Madrasa-DEF2:BW  24-09-2008  16:54  Pagina 114
practically impossible in the context of present-day cosmopolitan India, and
this was made all the more evident on several occasions during my research
there.
There is an obvious difference between declared demonstrations of piety
and what actually happens in real life. For instance, when the students and
teachers were asked what they had done during a vacation following Ra-
madan, most responded by saying that they had rested and studied, which
suggested a continuation of the sober lifestyle observed in the madrasa. But
spontaneous references to advertisements shown on television were often
made in the staff room, implying that some of the young women do watch
television; a ‘revelation’ they became very self-conscious about once the ini-
tial laughs had died down. However, it seems that generally the male family
members are more exposed than women to what are regarded as forbidden
‘Western influences’, including media and film, often under the pretext
that ‘one has to know one’s enemy’ in order to find the best strategies pos-
sible to win him over to one’s own cause, which is an argument often heard
among the Tablighis.
For the staff and students of the madrasa it is almost impossible to avoid
being exposed to these ‘evils’ in a multicultural environment, where, for ex-
ample, Hindi film music is played in the bazaars. Evidence of this exposure
resonates in the songs called taranas or naªat, which the students write and
sing for their own entertainment as well as for the weekly occasion of a pro-
gramme at school. The taranas and Urdu naªat are sung very often to popu-
lar Hindi film tunes, which must have found their way inside the madrasa
somehow.
Hardly anyone at the Jamiªat al-Niswan has had any contact with other
non-Islamic forms of education prior to enrolment in the madrasa, because
most of the students and teachers received their primary educations either
in a maktab or in Islamic centres offering primary school educations for
girls. As an exception to this rule, in the case of badi appa it was interesting
to observe that both of her daughters attend the prestigious Delhi Public
School every afternoon during its free Hindi classes. Badi appa has expressed
her wish to see her children enrol in an English medium school on more
than one occasion, even though, she considered the prospect highly un-
likely, because, after all, ‘these schools are only for rich people, not for poor
people like us’.
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The Jamicat al-Niswan and the Tablighi Jamacat
In the course of carrying out my research, the Tablighi Jamaªat appeared
time again, both physically and in conversations. As mentioned above, the
Tabligh’s international headquarters is located in the vicinity of the Jamiªat
al-Niswan. Hence, on my daily walks to and from the madrasa, I observed
some of the activities in that part of the area, such as the arrival of overseas
delegations, the departure of local delegations of Tablighi activists, prepara-
tions for major meetings and the like. Moreover, many bookshops, cassette
tape peddlers, and petty traders affiliated with the Tablighi Jamaªat often
proved to be important sources of information with regard to both the Tab-
lighi Jamaªat’s activities as well as the Jamiªat al-Niswan’s background.
Many of the male relatives of the students and teachers at Jamiªat al-
Niswan are active in the Tablighi Jamaªat or teach in the Kashf al-ªUlum
madrasa for boys inside the Tablighi headquarters. When students and
teachers spoke about their male relatives’ Tablighi activities, such as their
regular travels ‘in the path of God’ (fi sabil Allah), they did so with admira-
tion and sometimes also with a tinge of envy, because the lives of their male
relatives represented the mobility and freedom they themselves did not
have and because they valued their Tablighi activities highly. Some of the
students and teachers expressed regret that such activities, best subsumed
in the rubric ‘travelling in the path of God’, were not open to them, because
they observe a very strict form of purdah.20
It is equally important to note that the men’s travels also account for the
Jamiªat al-Niswan’s most important recruitment strategy. In fact, the
founder and manager regularly travel throughout the country to raise
funds for the madrasa. Many students from places outside Delhi heard
about the Jamiªat al-Niswan from these travellers associated with the
madrasa. Besides recruiting new students – which in the case of the Jamiªat
al-Niswan is a lesser concern as they are well connected with two similar
girls’ madrasas in Lucknow and Malegaon – the men also establish and
maintain contacts outside India, which, in some cases, plays a role in the
girls’ marriage prospects. During my fieldwork, I was exposed to cases in
which girls from the core families associated with the Jamiªat al-Niswan
married boys whose parents had settled outside India, in Saudi Arabia and
South Africa, for instance.
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Both the Tablighi Jamaªat and the Jamiªat al-Niswan represent institu-
tions that are quite different from those in their immediate surroundings.
For instance, they differ in their (temporary and limited) inversion of gen-
der roles,21 or in their disregard for the lavishness associated with house-
hold rituals such as weddings. With regard to the inversion of gender roles,
it is noteworthy that in the Jamiªat al-Niswan it is men who prepare the
food for the students and teachers, while the latter in turn have to take care
of the normally male job of cleaning the school building as well as launder-
ing, since men are not allowed to enter the school building. Some observers
have suggested that these forms of (limited and temporary) inversion of
gender roles is typical of the Tablighi Jamaªat as well, because the men who
‘travel in the path of God’ are left to their own devices in terms of taking
care of their daily needs for the duration of their journey. Moreover, this
particular Muslim group, in line with earlier reformist ideas, considers lav-
ish ceremonies to be a major problem and a widespread social evil. They dis-
approve of big weddings, which are usually grand social events allowing the
display of social status, which is considered a positive value in society. Both
the Tablighi Jamaªat and the Jamiªat al-Niswan condemn such practices as
they represent unnecessary and even sinful luxury. All of this affects the
identity of the young women in the Jamiªat al-Niswan; the height of a dowry
is not much of a concern in this community and there is correspondingly
less reason to fear the role of a bahu or daughter-in-law. Marriage is consid-
ered an act of piety to be consummated in a simple ceremony. Nevertheless,
the young girls love discussing the gifts they may or have already received.
However, the Principal reprimands them for these small signs of resistance,
just as the wearing of jewellery and fancy clothes are frowned upon.
There is a sense of equality of the sexes regarding the actual pursuit of
knowledge, the similarity of the girls and boys’ curricula in the madrasa,
but also with regard to purdah, as the concept is interpreted to denote mod-
esty in dress and behaviour for men and women alike. The Jamiªat al-
Niswan also attempts to promote equality among the students with regard
to sartorial modesty and discouragement of jewellery., However I did ob-
serve that there were exceptions and that the girls developed subtle strate-
gies to project their individuality within the given constraints. For example,
some students adorn their hands and feet with floral mehendi or henna de-
signs, or they decorate their simple white blouses and trousers with hand-
painted floral patterns, or they choose fine material for their dresses, or
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they wear jewellery after they get married and then justify it as abiding by
their husbands’ wishes, which, of course, have to be accommodated.
Both the Jamiªat al-Niswan and the Tablighi Jamaªat seek to create a mi-
lieu characterised by deep piety. In the case of the Tablighi Jamaªat, this be-
comes explicit in the Faza’il-i ªAmal, the principal text that they use in their
preaching, in which the processes of sanctifying everyday life and its ac-
tions are laid out in minute detail. The book teaches that certain virtues dis-
played in one’s daily behaviour are valuable for the accumulation of sawab
or merit for the hereafter. One of the Faza’il’s main teachings, namely that
one should abstain from futile endeavours, is also central to everyday life in
Jamiªat al-Niswan. The young women never seemed to be idle and were al-
ways occupied with something useful, be it their studies, additional read-
ing, handiwork or other chores.
Future Trajectories of Madrasa Graduates
With regard to the madrasa’s curriculum, the official curriculum does not
reveal that in many if not most cases, the books mentioned are not studied
completely. For example, I observed that in the case of the Hidaya, the stan-
dard text on Hanafi jurisprudence, the chapters the girls were obligated to
study suggests that the ambitious curriculum has often been narrowed
down to fit the constraints of a five-year course (as opposed to the original
sixteen and later eight years of study for boys). More importantly, these
changes seem to have been made with the aim of reinforcing the madrasa’s
educational goals. In other words, the founder and administrator of the
Jamiªat al-Niswan set the curriculum, thus their underlying educational
ideals determine what will be the focus of studies for the girls. As a result,
by the time they graduate they can only legitimately claim to be well in-
formed in Hanafi law in subjects that pertain to women, such as marriage,
divorce, inheritance, and child custody, or subjects that were deemed ap-
propriate to learn in the first place. Overall, the curriculum appears ambi-
tious for a five-year course. Compared to Malik’s list of the standardised
madrasa curriculum according to the dars-i nizami, it also shows that many
works have been left out (mainly those regarding fiqh, usul al-fiqh, logic, phi-
losophy, mathematical sciences, astronomy, and rhetoric). But many other,
newer subjects have also been added.22 Overall, there seems to be a heavy
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emphasis on teaching the Hadith, both according to the curriculum and in
practice.
When I asked the senior students at the Jamiªat al-Niswan what they
wanted to do after graduation, their first response was usually that they
wanted to get married, while several expressed a desire to teach either in
this madrasa or elsewhere.23 When they speak of ‘elsewhere’, this suggests
the possibility of an intellectual migration. It happens occasionally that a fe-
male madrasa graduate relocates in order to take up a teaching position in
a girls’ madrasa other than the one she graduated from, located far from
her paternal home or that of her in-laws. The above trajectory provides an
opportunity for a professional career to some of the (unmarried) teachers at
the Jamiªat al-Niswan, whose migration depends on the ijazat or permission
from their guardians, i.e., their parents or husbands. When I asked teachers
whether their parents found it difficult that they lived and worked so far
away from home, they replied that their families considered it a religious
honour to have a daughter who teaches in a madrasa.
The above examples indicate that adab is central to the madrasa’s mis-
sion of bringing about reform through education when it comes to the
morality and actions of the girls, although the ideals as stated in the Jamiªat
al-Niswan’s admission statement may or may not tally with the lives the
girls lead outside the madrasa, be it in their paternal homes or their own
homes once they get married. The girls’ point out that the acquired status
of being knowledgeable in Islamic matters is sometimes acknowledged and
sometimes not. In the case of the teacher who was trying to lose weight, we
saw how fragile her position in the household was, despite her knowledge
and her being a significant breadwinner in the family. Similarly, with re-
gard to the obligation for all Muslims to seek knowledge, women and men
may not be as equal as some of my interviewees claimed. At the formal
level, women are still excluded from a variety of positions of authority, such
as muftis and qadis. When I asked one of the teachers in the Jamiªat al-
Niswan what she thought about this issue, she replied that the ulama did
not believe a woman could attain such a position. She also did she believe
that a mufti course for women would ever be realised.
A number of Indian universities, such as the Osmania University in Hy-
derabad, Aligarh Muslim University in Aligarh, and the Jamiªa Millia Islamia
and the Jamiªa Hamdard in Delhi, recognise the fazila degrees issued in well-
established girls’ madrasas as being equal to a ‘10+2’ graduation level from
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a non-Islamic secondary school, or sometimes a BA in subjects like Arabic,
Urdu, Persian, Islamic Studies, or Unani medicine.24 This, however, is not
yet the case for the Jamiªat al-Niswan. The above concerns regarding recog-
nition, funding, and the potential to expand are what characterise everyday
life in this particular madrasa and are like those of most of the Indian girls’
madrasas. Although at present, madrasa education for Muslim girls appears
to be in transition, the demand for more and larger girls’ madrasas also in-
dicates the possible development of future trajectories for madrasa gradu-
ates in the labour market. India’s girls’ madrasas open up a limited range of
future trajectories in the professional sector for Indian Muslim girls who
hail from families where they may be the first female family members to
find a paid job. Equally important, however, is that madrasas for girls be-
tween 12 and 17 years of age provide an Islamic alternative form of educa-
tion that may persuade many parents to send their daughters to school in-
stead of keeping them at home.
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1 This overview brief is based on Gail Minault, Secluded Scholars: Women’s education
and Muslim Social Reform in Colonial India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press
1998; Barbara Daly Metcalf, Perfecting Women: Maulana Ashraf ªAli Thanawi’s
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Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
3 The name Jamiªat al-Niswan is fictive, but it resembles the real names of girls’
madrasas I encountered during my fieldwork. Madrasas offering higher levels
of education are often named jamiªa, which is also the term for university. On
the Nadwat al-Ulama see Malik, Islamische Gelehrtenkultur.
4 On which, see Muhammad Khalid Masud (ed.), Travellers in Faith. Studies of the
Tablighi Jamaªat as a Transnational Islamic Movement for Faith Renewal. Leiden: Brill
2000.
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http://www.milligazette.com/Archives/15072002/1507200259.htm.
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dans le monde musulman. Paris: Arguments 1997.
8 See Minault, Secluded scholars.
9 For a detailed analysis of these and other authors, see Margrit Pernau,
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German Catholicism and Indian Islam’, in: Margrit Pernau, Imtiaz Ahmad and
Helmut Reifeld (eds.), Family and Gender: Changing Values in Germany and India.
New Delhi: Sage Publications 2002, pp.140-161.
10 Qamaruddin, Hindustan Ki Dini Darsgahen.
11 The madrasa system of education recognises a secondary degree, namely the
ªalim(a) degree, as well as a tertiary degree, namely the fazil(a) degree. Today, in
the case of some girls’ madrasas, the highest degree, namely the fazila, is
recognised by a few Muslim universities as equal to graduation from a
secondary non-Islamic school and sometimes as being equal to a BA degree in
certain subjects.
12 It is interesting to note that the term Ansari here refers to two distinct caste
groups of very different status: (1) the low caste of weavers in northern India
referred to as Ansaris; and (2) a group of high-status Muslims who claim to be
descended from the Ansar or Muhammad’s helpers in Medina.
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13 The translation of the following sections is the author’s.
14 Again, there is an allusion to the above-mentioned Faza’il-i ªAmal, the
instruction ‘manual’ central to the reformist work of the Tablighi Jamaªat.
15 Mahram denotes a man not eligible for marriage to a woman, who can serve as
her guardian until she gets married. Similarly, ghair mahram denotes an eligible
bachelor and in whose company she should wear a veil, or in whose company
she is not even permitted.
16 See: Cora Vreede-de Stuers, Parda: A Study of Muslim Women’s Life in Northern
India. Assen: Koninklijke Van Gorcum & Comp. Ltd., 1968, p. 42. and Lila Abu
Lughod, Veiled Sentiments: Honor and Poetry in a Bedouin Society. Cairo: American
University Cairo Press, 1987.
17 Qualification of this statement is necessary because the school building is so
small that the men sitting in the front room are bound to hear what is going
on inside the classrooms.
18 See Metcalf, Perfecting women.
19 The Qir’at ur-Rashida was written by Maulana Saiyid Abul Hasan Ali Nadwi of
the Nadwat al-Ulama. It teaches social etiquette based on the exemplary lives
of the first Caliphs of Islam.
20 Among this particular group of Muslim women, purdah includes wearing a
burqa at all times when they step outside the madrasa or the face veil or niqab
when they step outside their homes, the, wearing thick socks up to their knees
and also putting on long black gloves until above the elbow, which goes for the
hot summer months as well. The girls don’t complain, in fact, they seem to
take pride in this strict form of purdah.
21 See Barbara Daly Metcalf, ‘Tablighi Jamaªat and women’, in: Masud (ed.),
Travellers in Faith, pp. 44-58.
22 On the dars-i nizami, see Malik, Islamische Gelehrtenkultur, pp. 536-541.
23 The answers reflected the following order of preference: (1) get married; (2)
teach in a girls’ madrasa; (3) do tabligh; and finally (4) lead jamaªat (women’s
gatherings).
24 The differences in how much madrasa degrees are recognised hinge on the
standards and requirements of the respective government institutions in
various Indian states.
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4 Between Pakistan and Qom
Shici Women’s Madrasas and
New Transnational Networks
Mariam Abou Zahab
The Iranian revolution has had a major impact, directly and indirectly, on
the presence of Islam in the Pakistani public sphere. Indirectly, it has con-
tributed to the flourishing of various Sunni Muslim institutions and move-
ments, including some radical ones. Both local and foreign sponsors, espe-
cially from the Arabian peninsula, who have wished to counter the revolu-
tionary messages coming from Iran, have resorted to supporting the radical
strain in Sunni Islam. But more directly, the revolution has galvanised the
Pakistani Shiªi communities, as it did Shiªi communities all over the world,
setting in motion a strong movement of religious intensification and purifi-
cation, and creating or strengthening transnational networks that con-
nected Pakistani Shiªis with their co-religionaries in Iran and elsewhere.
This paper deals with one particular aspect of the resurgence of Pakistani
Shiªism, the emergence of women’s madrasas and the movement of some of
the best graduates of these madrasas to Qom in Iran for advanced studies.1
Shiªism, in its various forms, has had a long presence in the regions that
make up present-day Pakistan. Currently, Shiªis are believed to constitute 15
to 20 per cent of the population.2 Most of them are Twelver (ithnaªashari)
Shiªis, but there is also a certain presence of Ismaªilis, especially in Karachi
and in the northern territories. According to local tradition, Shiªism here
goes back to the first centuries of Islam, when members of the Ahl-i Bait,
the Prophet’s family, fled eastward from Sunni persecution and found a safe
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haven on the banks of the Indus. The genealogies of the Pakistani sayyids
(descendants of the Prophet) trace their family origins all the way back to
the seventh century and believe their ancestors settled here soon after Hu-
sain’s martyrdom at Karbala and the persecution of his descendants. Most
sayyids in Pakistan are Shiªis.
However, the majority of Pakistani Shiªis are the descendants of Hindus
who were converted to Islam by Ismaªili missionaries (daªi), whose presence
in the region can be attested from the tenth century onwards.3 The state of
Multan in fact even adopted Ismaªilism as the state religion for a brief pe-
riod in the tenth century, under an independent dynasty allied with the
Qarmatis, until its conquest and incorporation into the Sunni Ghaznavid
empire under Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna in 1010.4 Another wave of conver-
sions, this time to Twelver (ithnaªashari) Shiªism, took place in the Safavid pe-
riod (1505-1722). Ismaªili shrines in the Panjab and the present Northwest
Frontier Province were taken over by Twelver Shiªa. Conversions to Shiªism
did not come to an end after the Safavid period but have continued to our
day. A number of well-known Shiªi ulama and preachers today are converts
from Sunni Islam.
The Shiªi population is highly fragmented and heterogeneous, divided
into numerous ethnic, linguistic and social communities, with rituals and
practices showing great variety from region to region and even from one
city to another. The mourning rituals (ªazadari) are particularly rich and
complex, with apparent adaptations of Hindu rituals, but quite different
from the more austere rituals observed in Lebanon, Iraq and Iran.5
In terms of gender relations, Shiªism has often been considered as more
liberal than Sunni Islam on the Indian subcontinent, and as offering a more
important role for women in social life. Shiªi women have access to reli-
gious public spaces whereas. apart from visits to the shrines, Sunni women
are not permitted to participate in public religious activities. Moreover, Shiªi
religious law favours women more than does the Hanafi mazhab, especially
in matters of marriage, divorce and inheritance.
Juan Cole has shown that women in urban circles in the Shiªi principal-
ity of Awadh (1722-1856) enjoyed a high degree of independence vis-à-vis
men, which, together with the practice of gender segregation, “contributed
to the development of a specifically feminine Shi’ite religious discourse that
was … more syncretic and innovative than the scripturalism of literate
males.”6 Cole adds that these women believed in astrology and were much
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influenced by Hindu rituals. All this contributed to the elaboration of a dis-
tinct female Shiªi culture that is still very much alive among the sayyid fam-
ilies that settled in Multan, Lahore and Karachi as refugees (muhajir) after
the Partition of British India.
One remarkable aspect of this relatively independent position of women
combined with strict gender separation in Shiªi communities is the exis-
tence of a class of female informal religious experts. Many daughters of es-
pecially the poorer sayyid families remained unmarried, because they were
not allowed to marry commoners and their families could not afford the
high dowries demanded by the more well-off sayyid families.7 These women
were then trained as religious teachers and preachers. They would teach the
Qur’an to the daughters of the aristocracy and during the month of Muhar-
ram they would lead women’s gatherings (majlis) and recite the mournful
stories of the martyrdom of Husain and the suffering of the other imams.
The female religious experts constituted a widespread network of learning,
independent of the male ulama networks.
In contemporary Pakistan, such celibate sayyidas are not the only class of
educated women among the Shiªa, however. The Pakistani Shiªa, and espe-
cially the Urdu-speaking Muhajirs among them, have long given more im-
portance to girls’ education than the Sunnis. Before the 1980s, this con-
cerned mainly secular education. Due to their relatively high educational
achievements, Shiªi women were over-represented in the media (on televi-
sion and in the English-language press) as well as in the professions
(lawyers, doctors, academics) and in literature and the arts.
The Iranian revolution and its apparently empowering effect on
women’s social roles had a pervasive effect on the self-perception and ideals
of south Asian Shiªi women, who took Iranian women as their role models.
It was especially in the field of religious education and in the increased vis-
ibility of women in the religious space that the Iranian influence made itself
felt. A number of girls’ madrasas were established, initially with financial
support from Iran. (It was especially during Khatami’s presidency that the
export of revolution gave way to the support of educational institutions as
an instrument of foreign policy.)
Consequently, the number of women seeking a religious education or
taking courses in such a madrasa while continuing their secular studies has
increased tremendously. Moreover, since the mid-1980s, a growing number
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of Pakistani women have been going to Iran for advanced studies in the
seminaries of Qom.
The remainder of this chapter discusses three of these new women’s
madrasas in Pakistan and the seminary for foreign female students in Qom,
the Jamiªat al-Zahra, where some of the best graduates of these madrasas
have gone to continue their studies. These madrasas are located in very dif-
ferent geographical and social settings, were established for different rea-
sons, and serve different constituencies. One is an urban elite institution in
Lahore, that is highly ‘Persianised;’ another is a school in a Shiªa village
with a largely sayyid population; and the third, with which I begin, is located
in an isolated rural district, where Shiªism is deeply anchored in local tradi-
tion and culture.
The Jamicat Khadijat al-Kubra
One of Pakistan’s largest madrasas for girls is the Jamiªat Khadijat al-Kubra
in Pakki Shah Mardan, a remote Shiªa village about 40 kilometres from Mi-
anwali, in a socially conservative area where the female literacy rate is par-
ticularly low. The founder of this madrasa is Sayyid Iftikhar Hussain Naqvi,
a Shiªi ªalim who was born in 1951 in the Multan district. Upon his return
from studying in Iraq in the 1970s, Naqvi became a close associate of Allama
Arif Hussain al-Hussaini, the most prominent leader of the reformist group
among Pakistani Shiªi clerics, and he became actively involved in politics.8
His first venture into education was his founding of the Madrasa Imam
Khomeini for boys in Marri Indus, near Mianwali, in 1982. The Jamiªat
Khadijat al-Kubra began its activities in 1993 in a small house next to the
boys’ madrasa. Land was later acquired in Pakki Shah Mardan, where the
madrasa was inaugurated in September 1996. In the first year, 40 girls re-
ceived admission; currently the number of students is close to 200, and the
school has some 60 full-time and part-time teachers, of whom 20 are men.9
At the time of my last visit, in December 2004, a new dormitory was under
construction, indicating that expansion was continuing. The madrasa at-
tracts students from far afield, but the complex includes two institutions
catering to the needs of the local community: a training centre where local
girls are taught practical skills such as sewing, embroidery but also com-
puter skills, and a dispensary. The current director of the madrasa is
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Iftikhar Naqvi’s daughter, Wajiha Naqvi, one of the early Pakistani gradu-
ates from the Jamiªat al-Zahra in Qom.
Some of the students belong to clerical (ruhani) families, and could be
said to be stepping into a known though previously male domain. They are
a minority, however. The other girls have chosen to study in a madrasa be-
cause of their personal interest in religion, or because they perceived these
studies as a way to advance socially. Quite a few students are from the
northern areas (Gilgit, Baltistan), although this region has many madrasas
supported by Iran. I also met a number of British Pakistani girls, who had
enrolled in the madrasa both in order to receive a religious education and
to get better acquainted with their own culture.
The madrasa offers four types of courses, each designed for a different
audience. The curriculum follows the prescribed curriculum for Pakistani
Shiªi madrasas elaborated by the Wifaq al-Madaris al-Shiªa (Union of Shiªi
madrasas), the body in charge of religious studies that organises exams and
issues degrees.10 The courses are taught in Urdu, and many of the prescribed
books are translations from Persian textbooks, published in Lahore in co-op-
eration with Iranian publishers.
The first course, fahm-i din, which lasts three months, is a basic course in-
tended especially for girls studying in government schools or living abroad.
It consists of a basic knowledge of Islam: ªaqa’id (the articles of faith) and
akhlaq (morality); the girls are taught how to read the Qur’an and the Sirat
Fatima (the life of the Prophet’s daughter Fatima – the ultimate role model
for Shiªi women); they learn the correct form of the rituals and memorise
numerous invocations (salawat) to be recited daily.
Wajiha Naqvi explained the objectives of this course, which are that the
basic knowledge imparted should enable the girls to develop their personal-
ities and give spirituality a proper place in their lives. It should offer girls a
better understanding of Shiªism and also correct the negative image of
madrasas in Pakistani society. Students are formally required to pass a ma-
triculation exam, which means having successfully completed ten years of
general education, before they can apply for admission. In exceptional
cases, girls who have only completed intermediate level (8th grade) or even
primary level (5th grade) of education, can be admitted if they have the re-
quired intellectual capacities and motivation and the courses are then ap-
propriately adapted to their levels of education.
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Wajiha Naqvi argues that there are good reasons for offering this type of
basic religious education in a school context instead of, as was common in
the past, at home. The family, she claims, is not the best environment for
providing even this basic level of discipline; a more structured learning en-
vironment is needed. With more systematic methods of discipline, even
those girls who do not continue their educations after this basic course will
contribute to spreading the faith as ‘silent preachers’: by daily performing
the prayers and wearing the hijab, they become role models for children and
draw them towards Islam.
During the ten years that this course has been offered, about 500 girls
have followed it. The madrasa attempts to stay in touch with the former
students and has thus gradually built up a network of pious, committed
young women.
The second course, which lasts a full year trains girls to be muballigha (fe-
male preachers) and zakira (the ritual experts who lead the majalis, the gath-
erings where the suffering and martyrdom of the imams is commemo-
rated). The teaching focuses on memorisation and the practical aspects of
the majlis. Students memorise Qur’anic verses together with their Urdu
translation, they learn about the life of the Prophet and of the imams, and
they receive basic notions of Arabic (in order to pronounce the Qur’anic
verses correctly), tafsir (exegesis) and fiqh (jurisprudence). They memorise
the songs of mourning, laments and elegies (marsiyas, nohas, and qasidas)
that are sung during the majalis. The courses focus on the performing tech-
nique whereby the students view videocassettes of famous (male) zakirs and
waªiz (preachers),11 and they learn how to write sermons in Urdu and in Sir-
aiki (the local language) for various types of audiences. They also acquire the
technique of reciting the faza’il (meritorious qualities) of the imams and
masa’ib (misfortunes) of the Ahl-i Bait. A good zakira must have a strong
voice, and she must be able to arouse emotions among the participants and
make them cry.
The madrasa aims to produce a new type of zakira, different from the tra-
ditional zakiras, who lacked a formal religious education and learned their
skills from their mothers or older, more experienced zakiras. The traditional
religious ideas mediated by the old-style zakiras often bordered on the het-
erodox. The training of better qualified (and more orthodox) zakiras contin-
ues an earlier movement of reform of the majalis (islah al-majalis) and the ra-
tionalisation of ritual that was launched in as early as the mid-1960s by
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Maulana Mohammad Hussain Dhakku. Dhakku’s initiative at that time pro-
voked hostile reactions from the more traditional elements, who called him
a ‘Wahhabi’ intent on destroying religion. The revolution in Iran, however,
gave a strong boost to the reformist effort to purify belief. As a part of their
training, students are required to do textual research in preparation of
their having to recount one of the episodes of the imams’ lives. Their teach-
ers have them compare the written texts with the popular oral versions told
by traditional zakiras and denounce the latter as erroneous and heterodox.
Wajiha Naqvi says that she considers the majalis an excellent occasion
for tabligh (predication), but that these are unfortunately mostly organised
and led by men. Women do attend the majalis, but they usually return home
after listening to the faza’il and masa’ib, without acquiring any religious
knowledge. Therefore, educated women have had to take charge and organ-
ise separate women’s majalis as a vehicle for the transmission of religious
knowledge that is both accessible to rural women and adapted to their spe-
cific needs.12
In rural areas, where women are not highly educated and often illiterate,
the graduates of this one-year course can make a significant impact on soci-
ety because of their access to the women. Muballighas travel from village to
village especially during the months of Ramadan and Muharram, delivering
pious homilies, teaching the Qur’an, and leading invocations.
This second course has so far been completed by 120 students, some of
whom have opened schools in their own villages or neighbourhoods. They
act as role models; many of the current students claim that they joined the
madrasa because they were influenced by these muballighas. After complet-
ing this course, the students who wish to do so have the right to take part,
as external candidates, in the final exams of the secular higher secondary
school.13
The third course, which lasts two years, is a proper madrasa curriculum
that prepares the students for the degrees of fazil-i Arabi and sultan al-afazil.
The holders of the latter degree can obtain a statement that states that it is
the equivalent of an M.A. in Arabic or Islamic Studies from the University of
Panjab.14 After they pass an examination that tests their didactic abilities at
the Allama Iqbal Open University, they are also allowed to teach these sub-
jects in government schools. During the past decade, 140 students have ob-
tained the degree of sultan al-afazil, and many of them have in fact become
teachers.
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The course is traditional in content: it is based on the dars-i nizami, that
has constituted the standard curriculum of south Asian madrasas since the
mid-eighteenth century, along with some specifically Shiªi texts prescribed
by the Shiªa madrasa board (Wifaq al-Madaris al-Shiªa).15 The students must
also acquire a solid, passive knowledge of Arabic, which is taught by a
Lebanese woman married to a Pakistani cleric who lived in Syria for 17
years, studying at the Imam Khomeini madrasa in Damascus. Language
classes are also traditional and consist of the memorisation of nahw (mor-
phology) and sarf (syntax) textbooks. Persian is also taught, using more
modern textbooks published in Iran, but the students do not acquire more
than a passive knowledge of this language either.
The fourth course, which lasts another two years, leads to the ªalima de-
gree. The program of study includes the methods of tabligh, or teaching and
research with an emphasis on munazara (theological debate). This course is
primarily for students who wish to continue on to more advanced studies in
Iran. It prepares them for the entrance exam of the Jamiªat al-Zahra in Qom,
where they will study for at least another two years. In the past decade, 38
graduates of this course have been admitted to the Qom; 22 of them have
returned to Pakistan since completing their studies. Some of them are di-
rectors of madrasas in Pakistan now; the majority have become well-known
preachers, whose majalis attract large crowds. They have experienced a defi-
nite rise in social status and prestige due to their stay in Qom.
Rajoa Sadat
Rajoa Sadat is a Shiªi village in Punjab, situated close to the road linking
Faisalabad to Chiniot, built around the shrine of a local Shiªi saint, Shah
Daulat Bukhari. As the name of the village indicates (sadat being the Arabic
plural of sayyid), the majority of the inhabitants are sayyids, and most of
these sayyid families are large landowners, whose land is cultivated by peas-
ants who live in the same and surrounding villages. These landlord families
have strong connections to Iran, where many of the men have gone for reli-
gious studies; some of them have been commuting between Iran and their
own villages for the last 12 to 15 years.
In September 2005, I visited a girls’ madrasa here that was founded in
2002 by a young university-educated member of one of these landholding
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sayyid families. The madrasa then had 125 students, who were living in two
large but dilapidated houses donated by one of the sayyid families, and the
school appeared to be operating on a very modest budget. However, a huge
new building was under construction near the entrance to the village on a
piece of land donated by another feudal family. According to the director of
the madrasa, once this building is completed it will accommodate 1,500 stu-
dents. He claimed that the demand for the type of education the school pro-
vides is very high; at present many prospective students cannot be admitted
because of a lack of space. Currently, the staff of the madrasa consists of
only two female teachers and the (male) director. Both teachers are married
to clerics, and both have spent over 10 years studying in Qom. They are as-
sisted in their teaching by the more advanced students, who instruct the
younger ones. For subjects such as hifz (memorisation of the Qur’an) and
tajwid (its proper articulation) they also use video and audio cassettes.
The madrasa is located in a rural environment, although less isolated
than the one in Pakki Shah Mardan, and the girls who are admitted after
completing their matriculation (the secondary school exam taken at the end
of the 10th grade) are from rural backgrounds, mostly from villages in
south and central Punjab. Few of them belong to religious families and
many of them admit that they chose a religious education after hearing the
muballighas preach in their villages during Ramazan and Muharram.
Unlike the one in Pakki Shah Mardan, this madrasa does not focus on
the training of zakiras or preparing girls for higher educations in Qom, but
focuses on providing a basic religious education and promoting values.
There is a section for hifz and a short course for muballighas. As the director
stated, most of the girls do not complete the five-year madrasa course, and
for them tarbiyat (moral disciplining and training to be good wives and
mothers) is more important than taªalim (textbook learning). Girls take
courses in the madrasa for one or two years prior to their marriage because
a girl with some education gained in a madrasa has more value on the mar-
riage market.
The madrasa has no fixed syllabus and no exams. Its objective is, in the
director’s words, to enable girls to develop their capacities (prayer tech-
nique, recitation of the Qur’an and perhaps leading a majlis) and to change
their personalities so that upon their return to their own villages they will
be ‘vehicles of silent tabligh’ and by their example bring about a ‘social rev-
olution’ to their environment. Furthermore, the director believes that it is
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more important to teach girls how to raise their children and resolve con-
flicts with their mothers-in-law than to immerse them in fiqh or complex
Arabic grammar, which will be of little use to them in their daily lives. Edu-
cation should be relevant to the students’ lives, and the students are ex-
pected to live their lives within these limited horizons.
Jamicat al-Muntazar
The third women’s madrasa I visited is the girls section in the Jamiªat al-
Muntazar in Lahore, the most prestigious Shiªi madrasa of Pakistan. This is
the major intellectual centre of Pakistan’s Shiªa community, and the Wifaq
al-Madaris al-Shiªa (Council of Shiªi madrasas), the institution in charge of
religious studies which organises exams and issues degrees, is based here.
Unlike the earlier two, this madrasa primarily recruits students with an
urban background, and modernising Iranian influences even more strongly
felt here.
The girls’ division was established in 1988, by Safdar Hussain Najafi.
Originally based in another neighbourhood in Lahore, it recently moved to
the main campus in Model Town for security reasons. At the time of my
visit in September 2005, there were 38 students, who had been admitted
upon completing their matriculation or intermediate levels, i.e., after 10 to
12 years of general education. Only about one-quarter of them came from
Lahore, two were from northern Pakistan (Gilgit), while the remainder came
from central and south Punjab, and Jhang and Multan were especially well-
represented. For some of the students, the madrasa diploma is a goal in it-
self – it greatly increases their value on the marriage market – while many
others have academic ambitions. Several of the girls, besides pursuing reli-
gious studies at the madrasa, were also preparing to take the state F.A. or
B.A. exams as external candidates; one of them, in fact, had just passed her
M.A.
The atmosphere in the Jamiªat al-Muntazar is strikingly different from
the other two madrasas I visited. This is an elite institution, more strongly
‘Iranianised’ than the others, and it caters to an urban middle-class public.
The girls wear neat uniforms consisting of white shalwar-qameez with dupat-
tas of different colours for each of the four grades. The syllabus is very simi-
lar to the one at the seminary in Qom, with an emphasis on the Arabic lan-
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guage. Unlike the other madrasas, however, hifz is not taught here, nor is
there a department for training muballighat.16 Their basic four-month
course, which is similar to successful courses elsewhere, seldom attracts
any students – another indication that this madrasa serves a different type
of public, one with higher academic ambitions.
Most of the girls want to continue their studies in Qom, which is, along
with Najaf, the main centre of Shiªi learning in the world. Every year, a com-
mittee from Qom visits Pakistan’s best madrasas to select students; how-
ever, the number invited to Qom is not high, two per year from this partic-
ular madrasa, for instance. Those fortunate enough to be selected join a re-
markable transnational scholarly network that brings them into contact
with colleagues from all over the world.
Iran: The Jamicat al-Zahra in Qom
The madrasa Jamiªat al-Zahra in Qom, the first women’s madrasa there, was
inaugurated in 1984 and the foreign students department was established
two years later.17 In February 2004, the madrasa moved to more spacious
premises on a new campus, which continues to expand. At the time of my
visit in November 2004, there were some 200 girls studying in this madrasa,
from some 40 different countries. The 60 or so Pakistanis comprised the
largest contingent among them, followed by 20 to 25 Indian Shiªis, with a
smaller number of British Muslims of Pakistani background, many of whom
were Gujaratis. Another conspicuous group consisted of some ten French-
speaking ithnaªashari Khojas from Madagascar.18 More surprising was the
presence of a number of Sunni students, notably from China, Tajikistan and
various African countries. The director of the madrasa told me that the de-
mand from China is overwhelming and there would be many more Chinese
students if the admission policies were less restrictive. The same is true of
Pakistanis: many more capable students are eager to study in Qom than the
school can accommodate.
Most of the Pakistani students at the Jamiªat al-Zahra hailed from the
Punjab (Lahore and Islamabad/Rawalpindi) or from Karachi and many be-
longed to clerical (ruhani) families. Most of them had completed four years
of study in a Pakistani madrasa before coming to Qom. I found a few stu-
dents among them whom I had first met in Pakki Shah Mardan, three years
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earlier. There were also a number of students from well-to-do, secular-
minded urban families. They were the first in their families to receive
higher religious educations, and some of them had had to struggle hard to
overcome their parents’ reluctance to let them follow this path.
The students at the Jamiªat al-Zahra are not the first Pakistani women to
study at Qom. Several Pakistani women had already done so before the
madrasa was established. One of them (whom I also met in Qom), in fact,
even acquired the title of mujtahida, meaning she had completed the highest
level of education available. This woman, from a Muhajir family in Karachi,
had first arrived in Qom in 1982, after her marriage to a Pakistani cleric
who was studying in Qom then (and who is now an influential Shiªi person-
ality in Karachi, where he directs a cultural centre with close links to Iran,
and a part-time resident of Qom, where he is the director of a research in-
stitute). At that time, there was no madrasa for girls and she followed a very
heavy traditional program of studies for nine years, being tutored in her
teachers’ private homes. She remembers that the relationship between the
(female) teachers and students was very convivial, and the students were
highly motivated. Several of the Pakistani women who were studying in
Iran in those early days, she claims, have upon their return established
their own women’s madrasas in Pakistan, and many others have become
madrasa teachers. None of those who have completed their studies in Qom
have become simple housewives; they are all active in public life. They enjoy
prestige and most earn considerable incomes.
The Jamiªat al-Zahra has set itself the task of producing a Shiªi female
elite in a competitive environment, and it is very selective in the recruit-
ment of foreign students. Those who are selected, however, pay nothing.
They must be in the 17-25 age bracket, unmarried, and have at least the
equivalent of a Pakistani F.A. or F.Sc. diploma.19 In fact, the girls I spoke with
found the level of teaching so demanding that they thought a B.A. degree
would actually be a better preparation. The complete course for foreign stu-
dents lasts five years and is divided into an introductory year and two
higher levels. The students are evaluated at the end of each year, and ad-
mission to the second level is not automatic even for those who have passed
their exams; only the best students are allowed to proceed with their stud-
ies.
Foreign students begin with preparatory coursework, the first four
months of which are used to acquire a working knowledge of Persian. For
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Urdu speakers this appears to be sufficient; to my surprise the Pakistani
girls were even speaking Persian among themselves. Those who did not
study in a madrasa in their own countries before coming to Qom have to
follow this up with an intensive basic course in religious subjects that takes
another six months. The other students take exams and, if successful, are
admitted directly to the first level of the general course (dawra-i ªumumi).
The curriculum has been revised and modernised over the past few
years, following the appointment of Sheikh Mohammad Ali Shomali as the
director of the madrasa. Shomali had graduated in Western philosophy at
Tehran University, alongside his religious studies in Qom and had gone on
to obtain a Ph.D. in philosophy from Manchester University. Of the various
subjects, great importance is given to fiqh, philosophy, pedagogy and educa-
tional theory and practice. The textbooks used here are mostly modern
texts, unlike in Pakistan. The works of Ayatullah Mutahhari, in particular,
have a prominent place in the syllabus.20 There is also a strong emphasis on
Arabic (20 credits out of 77 for the first level), which appears to present the
greatest degree of difficulty for many students. They express their frustra-
tion at not being able to speak the language despite the amount of teaching
devoted to it. In an attempt to improve their mastery of the language, some
of the Pakistani women living in Qom with their families have arranged to
be tutored in spoken Arabic by Iraqi women at home.
During the second level, comprising the final two years of the five-year
course, the emphasis is on the methodology of critical textual studies. The
students can choose between two educational profiles at this level: knowl-
edge of Shiªa doctrine and ethics or the teaching of Islam. They have to
write more than a dozen research papers and a dissertation to obtain their
degree (tahsilat-i takmili). Upon completion, they are expected to return to
their home countries. The madrasa is not meant to produce Islamic scholars
who will remain in Qom but rather highly qualified teachers who will go
back to their countries of origin to become agents of tabligh. Some of the
most successful students, who are still under the age of 23 when they pass
their tahsilat-i takmili exams, are allowed to pursue an advanced M.A.-level
course. Two advanced course programmes have recently been introduced
that specialise in Islamic spirituality and Shiªa studies (the history and soci-
ology of Shiªism), respectively. Most of the students in these programmes,
however, are semi-permanent residents of Qom, who live there with their
husbands or parents.
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Besides the five-year course, the Jamiªat al-Zahra also offers three- to six-
week summer courses that are very popular with the students from Pak-
istan and the Pakistani diaspora. A six-week course in 2004 was attended by
34 girls from Karachi. There are also teacher-training courses, and a basic
one-year course. A knowledge of Persian is not required for these shorter
courses; the lectures are in English or Arabic, or even French, depending on
the audience. Unlike the five-year course, however, these short courses are
not offered free of charge.
The madrasa offers the Pakistani students a cosmopolitan environment
and a relative freedom that contrasts starkly with their situation at home.
Their stay in Qom means a temporary escape from the stifling control of
families and neighbours. Many also commented on the freedom of move-
ment that women enjoy in Iran, unlike the situation in Pakistan. Moreover,
coming from a country where Shiªis feel constantly threatened, have to
maintain a low profile and sometimes even hide their religious affiliations,
it was a liberating experience for them to live in a Shiªi environment. One
would expect that the cosmopolitan composition of the student population
would be conducive to the strengthening of transnational connections, but
as the largest national group, the Pakistanis, who constitute one-third of
the total student population, tend to keep to themselves and do not mix
much with the other students – and notably not with the Indians. The stu-
dents whom I interviewed had no idea of how many Indian students were
enrolled at the madrasa.21 However, the years spent at the Jamiªat al-Zahra
have a profound effect on the world views and attitudes of these students,
who eventually return to their homes as different persons, eager to reform
their own communities.
The Jamiªat al-Zahra and its relation with the growing number of Shiªi
women’s madrasas outside Iran exemplify the new pragmatic policy
adopted by Iran under the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami
(1997-2005). Iran’s previous policy of attempting to export the revolution
had proved counter-productive and led to widespread sectarian violence, in
Pakistan and elsewhere. The reformist policy consists of attempting to cre-
ate a transnational Shiªi elite in the madrasas of Qom while simultaneously
stimulating the development of networks among the graduates.
The Pakistani women who graduate from Qom are part of this new elite,
a self-consciously new type of Shiªi women. They have adopted the Iranian
style of dress (a long raincoat and headscarf) that has become a symbol of
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modernity among young urban Shiªi women in Pakistan. Their studies have
earned them a considerable amount of prestige, and a level of religious au-
thority that is also recognised by their male counterparts. Moreover, to a
certain extent, these female scholars represent a form of Islamic feminism,
based on a deconstruction of the Qur’an and of the hadith with a view to im-
proving women’s rights. Islam, as they preach it, is not a religion of fear, of
strict rules and severe punishments, but one of simple principles of belief
and conduct in one’s everyday life. In their public discussions, they explain
details of belief but also address the practical and mundane matters that
women face in their daily lives, from health and child care to the psychol-
ogy of education.
The moderately reformist trend that these women ulama represent is
often seen as a threat to the cultural specificities of popular south Asian
Shiªism and they are sometimes branded by conservatives as ‘Wahhabis,’
who want to destroy the very foundation of Shiªism as it has developed over
the centuries in South Asia. Some of them have understood that Shiªism can
only exist if it is rooted in a particular culture and they have developed a hy-
brid style of majlis in which the sermon uses a rational language and
spreads a reformist message, whereas the part dealing with masa’ib remains
very traditional. The moderate reformism of these women ulama have at
times provoked violent reactions. In February 2005, a reformist zakira origi-
nally from Pakistan but resident in Kenya, who had been invited to Bombay
for Muharram, was expelled after she criticised some of the local traditions
before an audience of 400 women, inviting them to reject these ‘deviant’
practices.
Conclusion
The development of women’s madrasas catering to young Shiªi women in
Pakistan, and the emergence of a new, female, scholarly network with Qom
as its prestigious centre, was due to a change in Iranian foreign policy. The
efforts of the 1980s to export revolutionary ideology had created a negative
backlash among Pakistan’s Sunni population and led to violent clashes be-
tween Sunnis and Shiªis. After the death of Khomeini, and especially under
the presidency of Khatami, Iran began to concentrate its efforts on the edu-
cation of a new transnational Shiªi elite. The presence of women within this
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elite of religious scholars was not new in Iran, but it was further strength-
ened after the revolution. In countries like Pakistan, the availability of
higher religious education to women at special women’s madrasas consti-
tuted a minor revolution. These madrasas form an effective channel for the
transmission of religious reform into conservative environments as well as
a means of stimulating social mobility and greater autonomy among these
‘new Shiªi women.’
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Notes
1 This chapter presents the preliminary findings of a research project that is still
in progress. It is based on fieldwork in Pakistan (July 2001, December 2004 and
September 2005) and in Qom (November 2004). In Pakistan, I visited three
madrasas: Jamiªat Khadijat al-Kubra in Pakki Shah Mardan (Mianwali), Rajoa
Sadat (Chiniot) and Jamiªat al-Muntazar (Lahore). In Qom, I visited Jamiªat al-
Zahra, a madrasa for foreign female students, where roughly one-third of the
students were from Pakistan. An earlier version of this was published in
French as ‘Madrasas de femmes entre le Pakistan et Qom’, in: Sabrina Mervin
(ed.), Les mondes chiites et l’Iran, Paris: Karthala, 2007, pp. 287-300.
2 No actual statistics exist, but these figures are commonly given in official
Pakistani publications. With 25 to 30 million, this is the second largest Shiªi
community after Iran.
3 See, for details, Derryl N. Maclean, Religion and Society in Arab Sind. Leiden: Brill,
1989.
4 Cf. ‘Multan’ and ‘Karmati’, Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed.
5 Vernon James Schubel, Religious Performance in Contemporary Islam. Shi’i Devotional
Rituals in South Asia. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1990; David
Pinault, The Shiites: Ritual and Popular Piety in a Muslim Community. London:
I.B.Tauris, 1992; David Pinault, Horse of Karbala: Muslim Devotional Life in India.
New York: Palgrave, 2001.
6 See the chapter ‘Women and the making of Shi’ism’ in Juan Cole, Sacred Space
and Holy War: The Politics, Culture and History of Shi’ite Islam. London: I.B.Tauris,
2002, pp. 138-160. The quoted passage is found on pp. 150-1.
7 As elsewhere, south Asian sayyid families have a strict code of status
maintenance that forbids women to marry non-sayyids.
8 Allama Hussaini, a Pashtun ªalim from Parachinar, who studied in Najaf and
Qom, was the wakil (representative) of Khomeini in Pakistan. He was the leader
of the Shiªi political movement Tahrik-i Nifaz-i Fiqh-i Jaªfariya (later renamed
Tahrik-i Jaªfariya Pakistan) from 1984 until August 1988, when he was
assassinated. He transformed this originally religious movement into a
political party and became an inspiration for the Shiªa students’ movement
and the leader of the ‘Iranianised’ group among the Pakistani Shiªi clergy. He
was succeeded as the leader of the Tahrik by Allama Sayyid Ali Naqvi.
9 These numbers are based on my observations during my visit in December
2004.
10 Pakistan has such an umbrella organisation, responsible for maintaining
standards of education in the madrasas of each of the major denominations,:
Deobandis, Barelwis, Ahl-i Hadith, Jamaªat-i Islami and Shiªa. See Jamal Malik,
Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of traditional institutions in Pakistan. New Delhi :
Manohar, 1996, passim.
11 The video cassettes in circulation are exclusively of male preachers and zakirs,
because the public visibility of women to male audiences is a controversial
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matter in pious circles. However, audio cassettes of female preachers and
zakiras do exist.
12 On women’s majalis as they are organised in Peshawar, see: Mary Elaine
Hegland, ‘The power paradox in Muslim women’s majales: North-West
Pakistani mourning rituals as sites of contestation over religious politics,
ethnicity, and gender’, Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 23, 1998,
391-428 ; and idem, ‘Flagellation and fundamentalism: (trans)forming meaning,
identity, and gender through Pakistani women’s rituals of mourning’, American
Ethnologist 25, 1998, 240-266.
13 This concerns the F.A. and F.Sc. exams (of the arts and science majors,
respectively), which are taken at the end of the 12th year.
14 The madrasa reform proposed by the government of Pakistan in 1980 entailed
among other things a rule of equivalence that gave the highest degrees of
madrasa education parity with the M.A. degree in Islamic or Arabic studies at
one of the universities. Most universities, incidentally, rejected this idea of
equivalence. See: Malik, Colonialization of Islam, pp. 140-1.
15 The dars-i nizami owes its name to the scholar Maulana Nizamuddin Sihalvi of
Lucknow. It has remained, with some revisions, the standard curriculum not
only of Sunni, but also of Shiªi madrasas in India and Pakistan.
16 Hifz, or memorisation of the Qur’an, is only in demand in rural areas. Students
interested in hifz would not apply to the Jamiªat al-Muntazar. The training of
muballighat is not considered as an academic discipline here; one of the
teachers told me that this is not a skill that can be imparted through formal
teaching; it takes much more than one year of on-the-job training to become a
muballigha.
17 There is another madrasa for foreign women in Qom named Bint al-Huda,
where the emphasis is more on the Arabic language. According to Pakistani
sources, circa 25 Pakistani students were studying at the Bint al-Huda in 2005.
Most of the students in this madrasa were Iraqis and many of them appear to
have returned to Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussain.
18 Most of the Khojas are Nizari Ismaªilis, but in the early nineteenth century,
part of the community converted to Twelver Shiªism. There are sizeable
ithnaªashari Khoja communities in both South Asia and among the diaspora
(East Africa, Europe).
19 Other rules apply for long-term foreign residents of Qom. Married women up
to the age of 35 can be admitted; the madrasa even offers a day-care centre for
their young children.
20 The curriculum lists numerous works by Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahhari, on
philosophy and the fundamentals of Shiªism.
21 This is true for the students at the madrasa. The Pakistanis who have settled in
Qom as long-time residents, however, have developed wide-ranging contacts
with Shiªi residents of Indian origin, and the common Shiªi and Urdu identity
appears to be overriding national affiliation.
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5 The Uncer tain Fate of Southeast Asian
Students in the Madrasas of Pakistan
Farish A. Noor
Pakistan’s Madrasas and the Phobia of Foreign Students1
In the wake of the attacks on the United States of America on 11 September
2001; the US-led invasions of Afghanistan in 2002, and the bombings in Lon-
don in July 2005, Pakistan has emerged on the international stage as both a
crisis-riddled country where radical religious politics has gone out of con-
trol and – at the same time – as a key ally in Washington’s ‘war on terror’.
The ambivalent image of Pakistan as a strategic frontline state has been
reflected upon by scholars and media commentators alike and this ambiva-
lence has been projected upon the country’s madrasas as well.2 Since the
1980s, Pakistan has witnessed a boom in the madrasa sector, with hundreds
of new madrasas being created along the Afghan-Pakistani border; mainly
to provide rudimentary education for the thousands of Afghan refugee chil-
dren who had fled their country, but also to train many of the young boys
in the ways of warfare and to produce the rank-and-file of the Mujahidin
who would later return to Afghanistan to take part in the Afghan jihad
against the Soviets. Later in the 1990s, many of these madrasas would also
be used to recruit and train the Taliban who would also play a key role in
the politics of Afghanistan and Central Asia.3 Following the discovery that
several of the London bombers of 2005 had travelled to Pakistan and stud-
ied at madrasas there, another concern was raised: namely that of foreign
students who travel from one country to another in search of Islamic edu-
cation and what might happen to them in the madrasas they visit. Again,
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there were calls for the Pakistani government to take decisive steps in con-
trolling the activities in the madrasas, monitoring their links with radical
Islamist groups as well as the movement of students between them.
Long before the latest wave of measures to control the madrasas of Pak-
istan, the Pakistani government had already embarked on an ambitious re-
form process to regulate, control and monitor the activities of the country’s
madrasas as well as the movement of students between them. This was one
of the stated goals of General Pervez Musharraf’s government, which came
to power in October 1999 after toppling the government of Nawaz Sharif
and the Pakistan Muslim League (PMS-NS). Upon assuming control of the
country, General Pervez Musharraf has tried to improve his international
image by wearing his ‘moderate’ Islamic credentials on his sleeves. In re-
sponse to pressure from the American government and local Pakistani
NGOs, on 12 January 2002 he banned six of the major jihadi militant organ-
isations based in Pakistan, namely the Lashkar-i Tayyiba (LT), Sipah-i Sahaba-i
Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-i Jhangvi (LJ), Jaish-i Muhammad (JM), Tahrik-i Jafariya Pak-
istan (TJP) and Jamaªat al-Furqan.
This crackdown on the radical Islamist militias was accompanied by
other measures that were also meant to improve Pakistan’s image as a
country worthy of investment. These measures included (1) the reform of
the madrasa educational system, (2) closer regulation and control of the
entry and circulation of students within the madrasa network, (3) promo-
tion of literacy and education among girls, (4) guaranteeing equal access to
education and other social services to women, (5) an anti-corruption cam-
paign that targets the corrupt Pakistani businessmen and companies who
are said to have transferred their earnings and savings abroad. While the
anti-corruption measures were pursued publicly with the arrest of several
prominent businessmen and attempts to repatriate their capital from over-
seas, the reform of the madrasas proved to be the most difficult task of all.
The changes proposed for the madrasa system in Pakistan have been the
most comprehensive and taxing, as they came at a time when the country’s
madrasas felt that they were under pressure to reform solely for the sake of
placating American foreign policy and to improve the image of the Mushar-
raf government. They were also made in the context of a country that
spends circa 2 per cent of its annual gross national product on education,
and where the national literacy rate was estimated at circa 40 per cent at
best.4 The reform measures included the following:5
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1. The establishment of a national roster for all madrasas in the country,
under the Pakistani Central Board of Religious Schools;
2. The declaration of assets on the part of the trustees, organisers and ad-
ministrators of the madrasas themselves. This will allow the authorities
to ascertain their level of development and competence and help deliver
the government-allocated funding and support to the most needy
madrasas;
3. Actions taken against foreign funders and NGOs suspected of having
links or sympathies with radical Islamist groups abroad;6
4. Declaration of identity of the trustees, administrators and teaching staff
of the madrasas, enabling the government to identify the political affili-
ation of each institution and its links to the various political parties and
Islamist movements in the country;
5. Improvement and modernisation of the curricula of the madrasas, to en-
sure that 50% of subjects taught will be compatible with that of the
mainstream national education system that is on offer in state schools.
It should be noted, however, that since 2002, the Musharraf government’s
reforms have not gone a long way as alluded to in the 2007 report on the
country’s madrasas done by the International Crisis Group (ICG).7 Underly-
ing the madrasa reform project and reports such as the one released by the
ICG is the assumption that too many of the country’s madrasas have fallen
under the control of violent militant groups that seek to use them as re-
cruitment and training bases. Related to this is the claim that many of the
foreign students studying there have come to Pakistan with the intention of
joining radical groups.8 Long before the controversy over foreign students
was stoked in the aftermath of the London bombings of 2005, Pakistani au-
thorities had already cracked down on the numbers of foreign students
from other parts of Asia in the country’s madrasas.
It was against this backdrop of paranoia, media hype and growing inse-
curity in Pakistan that between 20 and 23 September 2003 a series of ar-
rests took place at a number of madrasas in Karachi. Those arrested were all
foreign students from Southeast Asia, notably Malaysia, Indonesia and
Myanmar (Burma).
During the initial wave of arrests that took place in September 2003 at
the Jamiªat Abu Bakr and Jamiªat al-Dirasat al-Islamiyya madrasas in
Karachi, Pakistan’s President-General Pervez Musharraf was abroad on a
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trip to the US. Washington had put a considerable amount of pressure on Is-
lamabad to force it to comply with its demands to crack down on the
madrasas. This demand led to the arrest of the Indonesians and Malaysians,
whom they accused of being part of a clandestine cell belonging to the neb-
ulous Jamaªah Islamiyyah group operating in Indonesia, Singapore and
Malaysia – an underground movement which, we are told, wanted to estab-
lish a Pan-Islamic state that spans all of maritime Southeast Asia.
It later turned out that on the day of the arrests at the Jamiªat al-Dirasat
al-Islamiyya madrasa, the madrasa’s ‘guest of honour’ was none other than
Hafeez Muhammad Saeed, leader of the Jamaªat al-Daªwa, which is linked to
the militant jihadi group Lashkar-i Tayyiba.9 Following the Presidential de-
cree of 2002 that banned many of Pakistan’s radical militant groups, Hafeez
Saeed was a wanted man. However, no attempts were made to arrest Hafeez
Saeed when the police entered the madrasa: instead, the authorities
swooped down on its Malaysian and Indonesian students.
To gain a better understanding of the events that took place in the
Jamiªat Abu Bakr and Jamiªat al-Dirasat al-Islamiyya madrasas in September
2003, I contacted the spokesman for the Jamaªat al-Daªwa movement, Yahya
Mujahid who informed me that ‘the madrasas in Karachi where the foreign
students were arrested had nothing to do with the Jamaªat al-Daªwa. Despite
what the media claims, the Jamiªat Abu Bakr madrasa is not under Jamaªat
al-Daªwa control. It was actually a madrasa run by the Ahl-i Hadith move-
ment’.10 Although the Jamaªat al-Daªwa emerged from the Ahl-i Hadith
movement, Yahya Mujahid insisted that the two were separate institutions
with separate leaders and membership structures. Furthermore, Yahya in-
sisted that both the Karachi madrasas had come under the control of the
banned Jamaªat al-Daªwa movement only after the Malaysian and Indonesian
students had registered there and began their studies, which would suggest
that they did not know of the Jamaªat al-Daªwa’s presence at either madrasa
prior to their enrolment there.
Yet, this was not the only high-profile arrest involving Southeast Asian
students studying in a Pakistani madrasa. Earlier in 2001, the Malaysian
government had arrested a number of Malaysian Islamist activists, includ-
ing Nik Adli Nik Aziz, son of Nik Aziz Nik Mat, the murshid al-ªam (spiritual
leader) of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic party (PAS) on the charge that he was
the leader of an underground militant movement known as the Kumpulan
Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM, Malaysian Mujahidin Group). It was claimed that
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Nik Adli had been radicalised during his studies in Pakistan.11 He had stud-
ied at the Jamiªat al-Dirasat al-Islamiyya in Karachi and the Maªhad Salman
in Peshawar before travelling on to Afghanistan. During the time of the
crackdown in Karachi a number of foreign students were residing in the
two madrasas. The Jamiªat Abu Bakr madrasa was home to 62 Afghan, 68
Thai, 15 Malaysian, 9 Indonesian, 17 Ugandan and 7 Somalian students –
however, it should be noted that Southeast Asian students were dispersed
all over Pakistan’s madrasas, and there were also Southeast Asian students
in India’s madrasas. (Nik Adli’s younger brother, Nik Abduh, who had stud-
ied at Deoband’s Dar al-ªUlum in India, however, was not arrested.)
The arrest and deportation of the Malaysian and Indonesian students in
Karachi marked a significant step in the breaking down of the centuries-old
student exchange network between South and Southeast Asia. Its implica-
tions were twofold: To further reinforce the image of the madrasas as ‘dens
of terrorism’; and to also reinforce the image of foreign students as danger-
ous individuals who may be up to no good. The aim of this paper is to bal-
ance this view by looking at other madrasas in Pakistan with student ex-
change programmes and to examine how some of the madrasas have opted
for a process of modernisation and reform on their own terms to not only
offer a better education, but also to help create a transnational network of
religiously-conscious students who may later become part of the global Is-
lamist network.
Pakistan’s Madrasas: Interface for Transcultural Production of
Knowledge or Transit Points for a Global Network of Terror?
“Pakistan is no longer a safe place for foreign students studying in our madrasas.”
Mufti Muhammad Jamil of the Wifaq al-Madaris, in Newsline, October 2003
As a result of the crackdown on foreign students in the religious schools of
Pakistan, a large number of these students have been forced to return to
their home countries or have simply relocated to other Islamic educational
institutions in India or the Middle East.
Media hype aside, it should be noted that much of what has been said
and written about Pakistan’s madrasas has come from media personalities
or so-called ‘anti-terror experts’. Yet few of these media practitioners, tech-
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nocrats or ‘securocrats’ have actually conducted any sustained research or
fieldwork in the affected region. Practically none of the security personnel
or security experts in Southeast Asia have offered any direct evidence,
gained from close-proximity fieldwork or direct interviews with the
madrasa community itself, to back up any of their claims.
To further complicate matters, there is precious little documentation on
the madrasa community in Pakistan itself. It is difficult, if not impossible,
as the 2007 ICG report testifies, to get a figure for the total number of
madrasas currently operating in Pakistan.12 According to the Pakistani
monthly Newsline (October 2003), in the province of Sindh alone there were
said to be 1,248 madrasas with 869 located in the bustling and overcrowded
provincial capital of Karachi. The Karachi madrasas are said to have more
than 200,000 students, of whom some 10,000 are foreigners from all over
the world. In the Hyderabad region, there are approximately 260 madrasas
with 30,000 students; while the Sukkur region has 115 madrasas with a
total of 9,000 students.13
An official figure does not exist and a definitive figure cannot be reached
because many of these institutions may also serve as mosques, refugee
camps, welfare aid centres, imambargas (Shia ritual convention halls), Sufi
shrines and so on. The Wifaq al-Madaris (Pakistani Central Board of Reli-
gious Schools) estimates that 10,000 madrasas are registered while there
may be another 10,000-15,000 that operate outside their control. Newsline es-
timated that circa 700,000 students may be enrolled in the Pakistan’s
madrasas at any one time, with some 15,000 of them being foreign students
from around the world.14
The madrasa educational system is not a homogenous phenomenon.
Since the nineteenth century, the Indian subcontinent has been home to a
myriad of Islamic educational initiatives, ranging from the modernist-re-
formist Aligarh Muslim University that was founded by Syed Ahmad Khan
to the Dar al-Ulum Deoband madrasa that was founded by Maulana
Muhammad Qasim Nanotawi and Maulana Rashid Ahmad Gangohi. Many
well-known Muslim leaders in Malaysia and Indonesia have travelled to the
Indian subcontinent to further their Islamic educations there, including Dr.
Burhanuddin al-Helmy, who was the third President of the Pan-Malaysian
Islamic Party (PAS), who had studied at Aligarh and Tuan Guru Nik Aziz Nik
Mat, the spiritual leader of PAS and a Deoband graduate. But thanks to the
virtual hegemony of the global ‘war on terror’ discourse, the word
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‘madrasa’ has now entered the arena of public discourse and has been con-
flated with all kinds of religious extremism and violence. To balance the
negative depiction and stereotyping of the madrasa as the ‘bastion of ossi-
fied traditionalism’ or ‘jihadi factories’, we shall now turn to another Pak-
istani madrasa – the Syed Maudoodi International Islamic Educational Insti-
tute (SMII) – as an example of a modern madrasa institution that has played
an important role in the formation of Islamist cadres and intellectuals in
Pakistan and beyond.
‘Knowledge is my Weapon’: The Syed Maudoodi International
Islamic Educational Institute as a Modern Madrasa
“Back in Malaysia they are all busy watching the television. It is not as bad in
Pakistan as the TV reports make it out to be. From what I hear, back in Malaysia,
every time there is a television report on the Taliban they also show images of
madrasas. Now parents are scared to send their children to Pakistan, and our
numbers are diminishing. Since 11 September there are very few (Malaysian) stu-
dents left here.” 15
Mohammad Amin, Malaysian student leader at the Syed Maudoodi Islamic Institute
The Syed Maudoodi International Islamic Educational Institute (SMII) is the
foremost Islamic educational institute linked to, and patronised by, the
Jamaªat-i Islami party of Pakistan. While the Jamaªat-i Islami is known to
have more than 100 madrasas under its control, with 41 of them located
along the Afghan-Pakistani border, the SMII remains its most well-known
and prestigious institution.16
The Jamaªat-i Islami was founded in pre-partition India in 1941 by Syed
Abul Alaa Maudoodi; following the partition of India and Pakistan it was di-
vided into two, and after the break-up of Pakistan three, mutually inde-
pendent sister organisations in Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. But it was
in Pakistan that the Jamaªat-i Islami really developed into a political party
with political ambitions, and today it stands as one of the most prominent
Islamist parties in the country with close links to other internationally-
known Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt. Nasr
(1994) has described the Jamaªat-i Islami as a modern Islamist party with a
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somewhat elitist approach towards the building of a strong base of cadres,
and which seeks to transform Pakistan into an Islamic state via both the po-
litical and educational processes.17 As the Jamaªat’s flagship educational in-
stitute of international standing, the Syed Maudoodi International Islamic
Educational Institute that is named after the founder-leader of the Jamaªat
was originally founded within the confines of the headquarters of the
Jamaªat-i Islami known as the Mansoora complex in Lahore.
Mansoora is located on Multan road, which is off Lahore’s main road-
way, on the outer fringes of the northern part of the city. The complex is a
self-contained (though not self-supporting) community set within an en-
clave of its own. Established in 1974, it signifies how the Jamaªat-i Islami
would like to see the rest of Pakistan governed. Approximately 500 party
members live in 150 houses on some 50 acres of land.18 Individual members
own 25 acres, while the other 25 acres are owned and rented out by the Ma-
jlis-i Ahya al-Islam (Organisation for the Revival of Islam). The Mansoora com-
plex is linked to the Syed Maudoodi Institute as well as the Markaz Ulum al-
Islamiya (Islamic Research Centre), the Mansoora Model Schools and Col-
lege, and the Jamªiyat al-Muhsinat (Society of Benefactors). Medical facilities
are provided for residents and non-residents alike at the 80-bed Mansoorah
Hospital. Security is maintained by a private Jamaªat-run security force that
is armed. The main feature that dominates the landscape is the mosque,
whose minaret towers above all the rest. The central inner courtyard is
named after a martyr of the Jamaªat, Hafeez Muhammad Yusuf, who was
killed just outside the gates during a protest against the government of
Nawaz Sharif in 1998.
The SMII lies just off Wahdat Road, around the corner from Mansoora, a
distance of less than one kilometre away. It can be reached on foot in about
20 minutes. The SMII was established in 1982, while the founder of the
Jamaªat-i Islami, Syed Abul Alaa Maudoodi, was still alive. Maudoodi was
given the King Faisal Award by the government of Saudi Arabia for his serv-
ice to Islam. With this money, he and the leaders of the Jamaªat then estab-
lished the SMII in 1982.
The first chairman of the SMII was Maulana Khalid Ahmed Hamdi. Dur-
ing that time, the SMII was located within the Mansoora complex on Multan
Road itself. The lack of land and the non-availability of a permanent teach-
ing staff meant that the SMII could only offer madrasa education to a small
number of students. All of the SMII students in the 1980s were Pakistanis.
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There was no foreign recruitment during this time. The SMII was only
moved to its present location on Wahdat Road in 1986, when the Jamaªat-i
Islami managed to purchase more land there. The SMII was officially inau-
gurated in 1986 and its opening was conducted by the then Amir of the
Jamaªat-i Islami, Mian Tufayl Muhammad, who was the second Amir of the
Jamaªat following the death of Maudoodi.
At present, the SMII’s Principal is the retired Brigadier Professor Omar
Farooq Dogar, who leads the institution’s staff of teachers and who is him-
self a member of the Jamaªat. Since the late 1980s, the Jamaªat-i Islami has
been strengthening its contact and co-operation with other Islamist move-
ments and parties in Asia and the Arab world, and its main contact in
Southeast Asia is the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS).19 Since the late
1980s, PAS has been sending students to SMII via the Jamaªat-i Islami.
Malaysian and ASEAN students who go to SMII have their study and living
costs paid for by the Jamaªat, which, in turn, received donations and finan-
cial support from local Pakistani members, foreign supporters and foreign
donor nations like Saudi Arabia.
There has never been an attempt made to properly monitor the number
of foreign students in attendance at the SMII or other madrasas in Pakistan
in the past. During my earlier visit in 2001, I encountered students from
Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, China, as
well as Central Asia. A small number of Chinese Muslim students (mostly
Uighur) are also enrolled in the SMII, as young students who are learning
Arabic and memorising the Qur’an. Many of these students are orphans
who have been sent to Pakistan by international Islamic donor agencies and
welfare organisations. During my subsequent research trip in 2003 to Man-
soora and SMII the total number of Malaysian students there was estimated
at around 40. The total number of ASEAN students was approximately 100,
with Malaysians making up the largest group. Other ASEAN students in-
clude Indonesians, Southern Thais, Filipinos, Burmese and Chams from
Vietnam and Cambodia. It is interesting to note that, according to enrol-
ment records, there have been no students from Singapore.
The number of ASEAN students at the SMII has now been dramatically
reduced thanks to increased surveillance and control at immigration posts.
Prior to September 2001, a significant number of foreign students came to
Pakistan on tourist visas, and simply overstayed their visas until the time
came for them to return. With the imposition of new restrictions on Pak-
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istan by the US, and the introduction of new border control methods and
public monitoring facilities instituted with US support, the numbers of for-
eign students entering the country have been dramatically reduced: Since
2002-2003, there have been fewer Malaysian students in Pakistan and there
were no Malaysian students at all in attendance during the 2003-2004 aca-
demic year. During my last visit to the SMII in February-March 2004, it was
discovered that the number of ASEAN students still studying there has been
reduced to only seven Malaysian, three Indonesian and 15 Thai students,
from what was once one of the biggest foreign student groups at the SMII.20
The debate on Madrasa Reform and the formal curriculum
of the SMII
Due to its acknowledged linkage to the Jamaªat-i Islami and other foreign Is-
lamist parties and movements, the SMII has had to be very selective in its
teaching and recruitment methods of local and foreign students. Between
2001 to 2004, there were significant improvements in the quality and con-
tent of the teaching provided at the SMII. These changes have brought the
SMII curricula up to a par with that of mainstream educational institutes
and the SMII has been granted an official certificate of approval and recogni-
tion by the Interior Ministry and the Pakistan Madrasa Education Board,
which falls under jurisdiction of the Pakistani Ministry of Religious Affairs,
Zakat and Ushr.21 The SMII’s teachers, however, insist that these reforms
have more to do with their own desire to provide a modern form of Islamic
education that is comprehensive and which equips their students with all
the tools necessary to live in the modern age. All of the teachers I spoke to
expressed their concerns that the reform measures proposed by the Mushar-
raf government were meant to dilute and ‘secularise’ the Islamic curricula .
Today, the SMII uses the same techniques and borrows from the curric-
ula of Punjab University based in Lahore. In its teaching outline, the direc-
tors of the SMII refer to the following goals:
1. To teach Muslim youth from throughout the Muslim world and from O
levels to the B.A. (Bachelors of Arts) level;
2. To educate Muslims about the concepts of Islam and their meaning, os-
tensibly ‘free of sectarian differences’ and ‘without following any partic-
ular mazhab (school of jurisprudence)’;
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3. To train students in research work and techniques;
4. To train students to be fluent in English and Arabic, up to the point
where they can speak and translate in both languages;
5. To train students to be cadres of the world-wide Islamist movement so
that they can be Islamist leaders in their home countries;
6. To train students in good conduct and the moral values of Islam;
7. To train them in communication skills like public speaking, debating
and polemics.
Since the instituted changes to the madrasa educational system, the SMII
now teaches a combination of strictly religious and non-religious subjects.
The non-religious component of the curricula (i.e., sciences and humanities,
including non-religious approaches to the study of the Muslim world) com-
prises 50% of SMII curriculum. It should be noted that while improvements
and adaptations continue, the SMII has always taught a combination of Is-
lamic and non-religious subjects.
The non-religious subjects taught at SMII include:
– English (up to B.A. level);
– Economics;
– Political science;
– Sociology;
– Psychology;
– Geography of the Muslim world;
– History of the Muslim world;
– Current Affairs and Contemporary Islamist Movements;
– Comparative Religion (covering the Abrahamic religions: Judaism, Chris-
tianity and Islam);
– Computer skills.
All of the non-religious subjects are taught in English and some are taught
at a rudimentary level. The textbooks for courses like political theory, so-
ciology and psychology are taken from or based on the teaching material
used at Punjab University. For the courses on current affairs and contem-
porary Islamist movements, the works of Syed Abul Alaa Maudoodi,
founder of the Jamaªat-I Islami, serve as the core texts. Apart from these
subjects that are deemed non-religious, the SMII also teaches religious
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subjects that are offered by many other madrasas in Pakistan. These reli-
gious subjects include:
– Qur’anic studies;
– hadith studies;
– fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence);
– ªaqida (doctrine);
– akhlaq (ethics and morals); and
– the history of Islamic political and social movements.
All of the religious subjects are taught in Arabic and the texts are derived
from the material that has been used at the SMII since its formation in
1982. It is important to note that there has been little development or mod-
ification of the religious component of the curriculum at SMII since my first
visit in 2001. As far as the range of religious subjects taught at the SMII is
concerned, the institution’s curriculum is based on the dars-i nizami cur-
riculum that was set at the Farangi Mahal madrasa of Lucknow during the
time of the Moghul Emperor Aurangzeb. Furthermore, the SMII has also
taught a number of non-religious subjects which conforms to the Wifaq al-
Madaris’s goal of introducing scientific subjects to the madrasa curriculum
in Pakistan.
Students at the SMII can begin at the primary level as hafiz (memorisers
of the Qu’ran). During my visits there I encountered students as young as
seven years of age doing precisely that, and, upon a successful completion,
will earn the title of hafiz. The core text for the four-year standard course
taught at the Institute is Fiqh al-sunna (Jurisprudence according to the sunna
of the Prophet) by the Egyptian author Sayyid Sabiq.22 This book was written
upon the request of Sabiq’s mentor and teacher, Hasan al-Banna, who was
the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun). Unlike
earlier fiqh works, that commonly restricted their discussion to one of the
four major mazhabs or schools of Sunni legal thought, the Fiqh al-sunna tran-
scends the mazhab system by presenting the reader with a series of legal
questions and situations, each of which is addressed by recourse to legal
opinion of the different Sunni schools. Sabiq then compares and contrasts
the similarities and differences between the four major legal schools, giving
final authority to the sunna of the Prophet as it is laid down in the hadith.
Sabiq thus managed to do something that had never been done before: he
compared the differences between the schools of thought and then granted
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final authority to the tradition of the Prophet alone. By independently seek-
ing different comparative opinions by consulting the different schools of
thought, Sabiq introduced the practice of ijtihad (independent reasoning) to
solve legal questions, albeit with the hadith as the final arbiter.
The bulk of the religious education conducted at the SMII institute is
made up of Qur’anic and hadith studies, exegesis (tafsir), Arabic language
training, history (tarikh) and jurisprudence (fiqh). It is interesting to note
that the Urdu language is not taught at the Institute – though students pick
it up incidentally in their discussions with each other – while Arabic and
English are the main languages used for daily instruction in the religious
and non-religious subjects respectively. This in effect means that the foreign
students are not easily able to converse with the local Pakistani community,
an observation I made during my trips to the SMII and which has also been
remarked upon elsewhere in the reports on foreign students in Pakistan.23
The effect of this policy is that it engenders solidarity and a group-feeling
among the foreign students and creates a linguistic community of its own,
as we shall show below. By forcing the students (including the Pakistanis) to
speak Arabic, the students at Mansoora quickly learn the meaning of Is-
lamic brotherhood and a strong sense of camaraderie develops. (Inciden-
tally, the Jamaªat are not unique in their insistence on Arabic as the sole
medium of religious instruction and communication. The same approach is
adopted by the Jamªiyat-ul-Ulama-i Islam (JUI), the Deobandi ulama associa-
tion, in their madrasas throughout the country).
Indoctrination, both formal and informal, at the SMII
In the course of fieldwork carried out in Pakistan between February and
March 2004, I observed how the SMII was run: There was a clearly-defined
chain of command and authority with Prof. Farooq Dogar as its head; its
teaching modules and syllabus have been established and are abided by; the
teachers are hired on a contractual basis and there are established rules of
conduct, academic performance and entry requirements for its students.
Furthermore the SMII’s use of Arabic and English; the teaching of social sci-
ences and humanities; the provision of computers and computer literacy
classes, etc. are all designed to produce students whose religious educa-
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tional backgrounds are supplemented with a working hands-on knowledge
of the modern tools of the age we live in (communications, media, etc.)
However, it should also be noted that the SMII does not disguise the fact
that it is fundamentally an elitist institution and that its aim is to produce
cadres for the Islamist movement both in Pakistan and abroad, according to
the Jamaªat-i Islami’s stated goal of ‘spearheading the global Islamic revolu-
tion’.24 From the moment the visitor walks into the compound of the im-
pressive Mansoora complex, he/she is presented with a bold statement of
the Jamaªat’s vision for Pakistan and the Muslim world at large. The private
compound of the Mansoora complex further adds a touch of exclusivity and
prestige to the SMII, which is already considered an elite madrasa in Pak-
istan and abroad and has undertaken the goal of producing ideologues and
leaders for the Islamist movement world-wide.
Thus it should not come as a surprise that a considerable degree of ideo-
logical indoctrination also takes place in the SMII, which takes place under
the direction of the institute’s directors as well as the ideologues and lead-
ers of the Jamaªat-i Islami. Ideological indoctrination occurs in the teaching
of non-religious subjects in the SMII curricula via the inculcation of the
ideas and values of the Jamaªat-i Islami. This is specifically done via the
choice of subjects and teaching methods. History and geography are taught
from a Muslim standpoint, and history and geography primarily cover the
Muslim world. Comparative religion, meanwhile, concentrates on proving
the validity of Islam and the supremacy of Islamic ideas, culture and civili-
sation over other religious and belief systems.
The ideas and values of the Jamaªat-i Islami are communicated via the
study of Current Affairs and Islamist movements world-wide. The ideas and
teachings of Syed Abul Alaa Maudoodi, the founder of the Jamaªat, are dis-
seminated and taught to the students, who are expected to understand and
reproduce these ideas during their course work and studies. For this pur-
pose, the SMII uses many of Maudoodi’s works such as The Role of Muslim Stu-
dents in the Reconstruction of the Islamic World (Dawr al-Talabah fi Bina Mustaqbal
al-ªAlam al-Islami), The Finality of Prophethood (Khatm-i Nabuwwat, a refutation
of the teachings of the Qadiyani Ahmadiyya), Purdah and the Status of Women
in Islam, etc. as the standard teaching material. Other textual sources come
from Maudoodi’s collected works and his exegesis of the Qur’an, entitled
the Tanzim al-Qur’an. It is important to note that while the SMII offers a
course in the history of Islamist movements world-wide, this subject is also
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taught from the exclusive point of view of the Jamaªat-i Islami itself. There
is little exposure to other Islamist movements and currents of thought that
are contrary to that of the Jamaªat.
Besides the teaching of religious and non-religious subjects, the SMII
also focuses extensively on the enforcement of discipline and moral charac-
ter; encouraging group activities and developing solidarity and camaraderie
among the boys. The inculcation of group identity and fellowship is done
via sports and other forms of extra-curricular activity. Under the direction
of the retired Brigadier Omar Farooq Dogar, individual discipline and col-
lective group activity are stressed as important elements in the process of
creating upright and resourceful Muslims, sports features prominently in
the daily lives of the students. In this respect, the Jamaªat-i Islami is similar
to other Islamist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and
the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) of Indonesia. All boys are expected to
take part in games as part of their educational experience and sports are
compulsory for all fit students. Sports include cricket, football, netball, bad-
minton, volleyball, kabadi (a popular South Asian sport) and sepak takraw (a
Southeast Asian sport introduced and played by students from Malaysia and
Indonesia). Chess is also listed among the sports.
The SMII’s extra-curricular activities are extensive and the institute’s di-
rectors are proud of the students’ achievements to date: The SMII football
team won the all-Punjab tournament in 2003, while the Malaysian and In-
donesian boys seem to be the best at badminton. Sporting activities con-
tribute to credit points in the overall student’s performance assessment and
medals and prizes are awarded for high achievers. The SMII campus is di-
vided into schools like in the English public school system, with different
blocks being divided into different School Houses. Apart from sports, all stu-
dents are also obliged to take part in public speaking, debates and quizzes.
Prizes and credit points are also awarded for these activities and contribute
to a student’s academic credits.
Besides the formal modes of discipline and indoctrination that accom-
pany the educational process at the SMII, students of the institute are also
exposed to the activities and ideas promulgated by other movements linked
to the Jamaªat-i Islami, notably the student wing of the Jamaªat, the
Jamªiyat-i Talaba-i Islam (JTI), which is known for both its confrontational
tactics and violent rhetoric. During the 1970s and 1980s, the JTI was re-
sponsible for some of the violence that took place on the campuses of the
T H E UNC E R TA I N FAT E O F SOU TH E A S T A S I A N S T UD EN T S I N T H E MADRA S A S O F PA K I S TAN
155
AUP-ISIM-IS-BW-Madrasa-DEF2:BW  24-09-2008  16:54  Pagina 155
country, such as Punjab University, where the youth wings of the various Is-
lamist and non-religious parties were engaged in a violent turf war to gain
control of the campus.25 In the course of my fieldwork in Pakistan during
February and March of 2004, I also visited the city of Peshawar in the North-
west Frontier Province, where I witnessed a somewhat violent demonstra-
tion by members of the JTI who set out to tear down and deface posters and
publicity ads featuring images of women not wearing the veil. This demon-
stration was carried out in the name of ‘public decency’ as the JTI insisted
that such ads were obscene.
The JTI are and have always been active in the SMII, recruiting new mem-
bers and followers among both local and foreign students there. The JTI also
hold regular weekly meetings and rallies in Mansoora’s mosque and in the
various public speaking halls in and around the Mansoora complex. Most of
their public talks are on contentious issues such as the conflict in Kashmir
and the necessity of jihad against the enemies of Islam. However, it should
be added that it is not known whether any of the ASEAN students have been
enrolled in the JTI or if any of them have actively participated in their activ-
ities.
The Southeast Asian students at the SMII: An overview
‘Why are they targeting us? All the foreign boys are good boys, they work and
study hard, and they haven’t done anything illegal.’
Interview with Brigadier (rtd.) Prof. Omar Farooq Dogar, Principal of SMII, 26 March 2004.
No comprehensive survey of the foreign students in attendance at the SMII
has ever been done. During my visit there in March 2004, I was informed by
Professor Farooq Dogar that many of the Chinese boys who were enrolled in
the hafiz course were orphans who had been rescued from China by various
Islamist NGOs and relief organisations. There were no African Muslim stu-
dents to be seen, although as we have noted above, there were a fair num-
ber of Southeast Asian students in attendance – at least until the early
2000s anyway.
Most of the Malaysian students at the SMII were admitted as a result of a
complicated and competitive selection process that began in Malaysia. Many
of them were graduates of the Madrasa of Kampung Rusila, which is located
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in the northeastern Malaysian state of Trengganu. This madrasa is run by
the President of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), Tuan Guru Hadi
Awang. The most promising graduates of Madrasa Rusila are given the
chance to continue their studies abroad at other famous madrasas, the SMII
being one of them. The cost of studying at the SMII is borne by the SMII it-
self, and the Malaysian students are only expected to cover their travel costs
to Pakistan. It is not known if this arrangement is unique between the SMII
and the Madrasa Rusila, the Jamaªat-i Islami and PAS. But what is clear is
that most of the Malaysian students at the SMII come from families that
support the Pan-Malaysian Islamic party.
Life for the foreign students on campus is competitive and challenging
in many ways: For most of the ASEAN students this is their first time away
from home and they are expected to cope with living, working and studying
on their own in a new environment that is alien to what they were accus-
tomed to. Living under the protection and patronage of the SMII and the
Jamaªat-i Islami means that foreign students are sheltered from the com-
plex internal conflicts and internecine struggles between the rival Islamist
movements in Pakistan. But this sheltered environment has also incurred
its price, including a lack of exposure to daily events in the country and the
alternative currents of Islamist political thinking in Pakistan and the rest of
the world.
Furthermore, it should be noted that the SMII, like many other madrasas
in the Muslim world, is an all-male environment where men and boys are
not exposed to members of the opposite sex and have very little with the
outside world. Contact with females is strictly forbidden, which means that
the boys at the SMII have had little chance to interact with Pakistani girls.
In the course of my interviews with some of the Malaysian and Indonesian
students, several of them noted that this was their first time in a foreign
country where contact with the locals was kept to a minimum. Needless to
say, their lack of knowledge of Urdu, coupled with the restrictions on their
movements outside the SMII and their lack of exposure to women meant
that few of them have had any opportunity to form any kind of relation-
ships with Pakistani women. There has not been a single documented case
of a Malaysian or Indonesian student marrying a Pakistani woman and set-
tling down in Pakistan.
Inter-personal contacts among the SMII students also contribute to the
creation of a common group identity and unity of purpose among the stu-
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dents there. The international profile of the SMII’s student body is meant to
favour the establishment of lasting relationships between students from
various nations. The use of English and Arabic also encourages them to
communicate in a neutral language that is not their mother tongue, and
their common learning of these two foreign languages means that bonds of
commonality and feelings of solidarity are bound to develop. I should point
out, however, that on the two occasions when I was invited to speak to the
students at both the SMII and Mansoora my lectures were delivered in Eng-
lish (for the benefit of the Jamaªat leaders who were also present), and in the
course of the discussions that followed it was not clear to what extent my
lectures in English were understood by the Southeast Asian students. In the
course of my private discussions with the boys from Malaysia, Thailand and
Indonesia it was clear that they preferred to talk in Bahasa Malaysia or Ba-
hasa Indonesia rather than English.
Further studies should be done to establish the extent to which SMII
graduates maintain their contacts with one another when they return to
their mother countries. Though contacts between ASEAN students with
their non-ASEAN (African, Arab, European and South Asian) counterparts
seem negligible, it was clear that strong bonds of solidarity have developed
among the Malaysian, Thai and Indonesian students. During the course of
my interviews in 2004, I did not come across a single instance of an ASEAN
student who had established long-term contact with students from Africa
or the Arab states. This does not mean that these contacts have never oc-
curred, but it would suggest that they are rare in comparison to the con-
tacts established among the ASEAN students themselves.
Compared to the Malaysian students, many of whom came from families
who are active supporters of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), the Thai
and Indonesian students seemed to have more varied backgrounds. Many of
the Thai-Muslim students came from the southern Thai province of Patani
and spoke Malay in the same dialect as their Kelantanese schoolmates and
friends. Apart from language, cultural affinity was also evident in the games
they preferred to play like sepak takraw, a popular sport in many parts of
Southeast Asia but particularly in the region between the northern
Malaysian peninsula and the southern Thai provinces. The Malaysian and
Thai boys often cooked together, sometimes in the company of their In-
donesian schools mates. The most common complaint among them was the
lack of rice in the daily meals offered by the madrasa’s kitchens.
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The Thai students we interviewed did not admit to belonging to ‘politi-
cal’ families while the Indonesians admitted it readily. What is clear, how-
ever, is that, like the Malaysian students, their SMII studies were paid for by
the institution and the Jamaªat, the only financial burden being their travel
costs to and from Pakistan.
Because most of these students seemed to come from poorer families,
few of them have had the opportunity to return their homes in Malaysia, In-
donesia or Thailand during the holidays. Most of the students I met in 2004
were in the final years of their studies and they often complained of home-
sickness; a factor that was further aggravated by the diminishing numbers
of foreign and especially Southeast Asians students at the SMII. During the
few breaks in the academic year, students were taken on trips to sites
within Pakistan, again at SMII expense. In the 2003-2004 academic year, the
Southeast Asian students were taken on two school outings: One was a
weekend tour of Lahore to visit the sites of the old Moghul Empire such as
the Red Mosque; and the second was a longer trip to Kashmir to ‘see the
mountains’.
A common concern among the students I met at SMII was what their
fate would be upon their return to their home countries. Although televi-
sion and newspapers are not allowed in the SMII, students have access to
newspapers and magazines outside the madrasa during their daily lunch-
breaks. Many of them were aware of the news in their own countries and
knew of the arrest of Malaysian and Indonesian students in Karachi in 2003.
The arrest of the Malaysian Islamist Nik Adli Nik Aziz earlier in 2001, as we
have mentioned above, set the stage for the stigmatisation of Malaysian stu-
dents studying in Pakistan’s madrasas. The SMII was also tainted by its as-
sociation with another famous graduate, Ja’far Umar Thalib, who studied
briefly at the SMII in 1987 before going on to Afghanistan to join the Afghan
jihad against the Soviets. Ja’far Umar Thalib later returned to Indonesia to
establish the militant group Laskar Jihad, that was actively involved in the
Muslim-Christian conflict in the Moluccas.26
The Southeast Asian students at the SMII were not only cognisant of po-
litical developments in Pakistan, but in their home countries as well.
Thanks to the availability of computers and the Internet, students could
keep in contact with their families and friends back home. Mobile phones
were also permitted for foreign students and all of the students I met had
mobile phones with Pakistani phone numbers. Despite the institution’s rel-
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ative isolation, they were not cut off from the outside world, and despite re-
strictions on popular media and entertainment, the foreign students were
very well informed about developments around the world. This became ob-
vious in the discussions I had with the Malaysian students who were fully
updated on the developments within the Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) and
the internal politics of PAS as well as Malaysia.
Notwithstanding the media attention paid to Pakistan’s madrasas, most of
the SMII’s teachers and students wished to be left alone to pursue their stud-
ies uninterrupted. The SMII’s Principal, Prof. Farooq Dogar, added that ‘the
Malaysian, Thai and Indonesian students are among the best students we
have from overseas. They work hard, speak Arabic fluently, and always finish
among the top of their classes. So why is the media and government target-
ing us all the time?’27 The Principal noted that the Southeast Asian students
were the best in Arabic, Qu’ran and Hadith, and excelled in sports like bad-
minton. Moreover, he also noted that the Malaysians, Thais and Indonesians
were the most disciplined and rule-abiding students of the SMII and no seri-
ous cases of unruly behaviour had ever been reported among them.28
The major complication faced by the Malaysian students in particular is
the obvious association between the SMII and its parent party, the Jamaªat-i
Islami. Due to the fact that most of the Malaysian students I met at the SMII
were from families that supported the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS)
and had graduated from the Madrasa Rusila which has always been a PAS
madrasa and the headquarters for Tuan Guru Hadi Awang, the party’s
leader, the political connection between the two parties and their respective
educational institutions are rather clear for all to see.
It should, however, be stressed that the SMII also stands a world apart
from the Jamiªat Abu Bakr and Jamiªat al-Dirasat al-Islamiyya madrasas in
Karachi where the arrest of ASEAN students took place in September 2003.
The SMII has instead managed to secure the recognition of the Pakistani
government and Pakistani universities such as Punjab University, by ex-
panding its curriculum to include non-religious subjects. Furthermore, the
SMII has always been transparent about its teaching activities and its enrol-
ment procedures, which is one of the reasons why research on and in this
institution could be carried out with relative ease compared to the more
opaque madrasas in places like Karachi. Some of the SMII’s activities, such
as the annual awards-presentation day, which I attended, are carried out in
the public domain such as public parks or the main courtyard of the
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Jamaªat’s Mansoora complex, where outsiders – including the media and po-
litical figures – are invited to attend as guests of honour. Furthermore, the
SMII’s enrolment process has always been transparent and regulated. Mean-
while, Malaysian students are admitted to the school upon formal comple-
tion of their basic studies in madrasas in Malaysia.
While the SMII cannot be seen as representative of all madrasas, neither
can or should the Jamiªat Abu Bakr and Jamiªat al-Dirasat al-Islamiyya
madrasas be. The fact is that the thousands of madrasas that dot Pakistan’s
landscape today cannot be reduced to a single stereotype.
One thing, however, is certain: Life at the SMII is characterised less by vi-
olence and militancy than the daily humdrum of laborious study. The SMII
is far from the clichéd stereotype of the madrasa as a ‘jihadi factory’ or cen-
tre for the training of militants, and stands out as a modern madrasa – al-
beit with a religious curriculum every bit as conservative as other institu-
tions of its ilk – with modern facilities and high expectations imposed on its
students. The students themselves do not conform to the stereotype of the
semi-literate fanatic currently beloved by the popular media, which posits
the grossly exaggerated picture of madrasa students being radical conserva-
tives in toto.29 If anything, the SMII and its student body is more like a con-
servative English public boys’ school or a Catholic missionary school, pro-
ducing students who are expected to one day rise to leadership positions in
their respective societies. And English public schools, we should remember,
are not noted for their open-mindedness either.
The Uncertain Fate of ASEAN Students in the Madrasas of Pakistan
in the Age of the ‘War on Terror’
“Since 11 September, the Americans have realised their mistake and suddenly
they are calling these groups terrorists. Everyone is shifting the blame on the
other: Washington wants to blame Pakistan, so Islamabad is now putting pres-
sure on the jihadi groups. But these groups have become entrenched and they
have gone mainstream… They are not willing to close their doors and so when
the pressure is on they sacrifice a few of their followers as scapegoats. The only
innocent ones in this whole scenario are the foreign students themselves, who
are young, naïve, innocent and vulnerable. They are the real victims.”
Interview with Ahmed Rashid, Lahore, March 2004
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While there are indeed madrasas in Pakistan that are linked to radical mili-
tant groups where violent hate-discourse is being taught and hatred of non-
Muslims is being preached,30 I have also tried to balance this view with an
account of another type of madrasa where religious education leads not to
the creation of violent militants but rather professional, educated members
of an Islamist movement. The findings offered here are far from exhaustive.
Nor do I claim that the SMII model disproves the allegation that some
madrasas may be engaged in radical activities such as the training of future
jihadi militants. It is, however, possible to end with the following conclu-
sions:
Firstly, the case of the Jamiªat Abu Bakr and Jamiªat al-Dirasat al-Islamiyya
madrasas in Karachi show that some madrasas are public institutions that
are both rooted in society and open to the shifts and changes occurring in
the social milieu around them. The case of the two madrasas where the
Malaysian and Indonesian students were arrested in 2003 demonstrate that
the control of the madrasas can and often does pass from one group to an-
other, particularly in the case of newer, lesser-known madrasas that rely on
public financial contributions for their support. This dispels the notion that
madrasas are static institutions, permanently under the control of particu-
lar groups/movements. Thus we must admit that there are other madrasas
that have been run by various other types of groups at different times, such
as the Jamiªat Abu Bakr and Jamiªat al-Dirasat al-Islamiyya madrasas in
Karachi.
The bogeyman of the itinerant madrasa student continues to tarnish the
image of foreign students in the madrasas of Pakistan, however. In the wake
of the London bombings of 2005, in August of that same year, President
Musharraf announced that henceforth student visas would no longer be ex-
tended to foreign students who come to study in the country’s madrasas.
This, in effect, has brought to an end the long-established global network of
itinerant scholars and students who have travelled across Asia over the cen-
turies. And as we have already noted earlier, by the early 2000s, the enrol-
ment of foreign students in institutions like the SMII has come to a stand-
still.
Secondly, it has to be noted that while some madrasas do engage in
forms of violent sectarian politics, there are also elite madrasas that are
more inclined towards political education. The SMII – like its patron organ-
isation the Jamaªat-i Islami – does not disguise its pretensions to elite and
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exclusive status. The Jamaªat has always presented itself as a selective or-
ganisation that is solely preoccupied with the task of creating Islamist
cadres, leaders and intellectuals to lead the global Islamist movement and
the institutions that have come under its patronage reflect this elitist out-
look and its values. Another grander project, the university city of Qurtuba
that was modelled on the Oxbridge system in the UK and is to be built near
the Pakistani capital of Islamabad, reflects this same concern for exclusivity
and prestige.
It is this desire to remain at the forefront of Islamic education that
partly accounts for the Jamaªat-i Islami’s willingness to address the issues
and concerns of the times, and this is reflected in the broader teaching cur-
riculum at the SMII and the use of modern technologies such as computers
and computer training. The SMII is cognisant of the growing concern about
the viability of madrasa degrees and awards, and has consistently upgraded
and improved its teaching methods to ensure that its graduates receive a
well-rounded education and that they are taught social sciences like eco-
nomics, political theory and history as well. The SMII is also aware of the
stigma and misconceptions that have surrounded the madrasa system over
the years, and thus the focus on sports and extra-curricular activities is ob-
viously designed to counter the negative stereotype of madrasas as institu-
tions of rote learning that offers students few opportunities for social activ-
ities.
None of this should distract us from the fact that the SMII, like its other
madrasa counterparts, is primarily a religious school with an undisguised
political-ideological agenda. The social activities, extra-curricular events, ex-
tensive promotion of sports on its campus, etc. are all intended to create a
class of disciplined Islamist cadres who are united in their singular vision as
future leaders of the Islamist movement and the Muslim umma by exten-
sion. Though on a superficial basis the trappings of the SMII may resemble
that of an English public boys school (complete with its cricket field, sports
events, public speaking contests and trophy room brimming with cups and
medals) the net result is the creation of a body of students who are actively
encouraged to internalise the ideology of the Jamaªat-i Islami and to exhibit
these values in their future careers.
From a Foucauldian perspective, the regime of education and discipline
that characterises the SMII is thoroughly modern, and aimed at the produc-
tion of cadres shaped by a singular political and religious vision of the
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world. It is a form of modern education aimed at ensuring the unity of dis-
persion of the Jamaªat’s ideas, which can only be achieved after the individ-
ual characteristics of each student are controlled, regimented and sub-
sumed beneath the collective identity of the greater student body and the
institution itself. Those who fear the Jamaªat-i Islami and what it stands for
may balk at the thought of the SMII being the engine of reproduction for
the party, but they cannot deny the thoroughly modern mode of ideological
reproduction that takes place in its most prestigious educational institu-
tion.
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6 Muslim Education in China
Chinese Madrasas and Linkages
to Islamic Schools Abroad
Jackie Armijo
Introduction
This chapter looks at two aspects of Muslim life in China: the development
of Chinese Muslim schools, with a special emphasis on girls’ schools; and
the linkages and networks of Chinese Muslim students who have travelled
abroad to further their Islamic educations. The data presented here was col-
lected over a period of five years of fieldwork carried out in southwest
China among Muslims while researching the early history of Islam in this
region. The aim is to show how the development of Muslim educational in-
stitutions in China and linkages to Muslim educational centres abroad has
helped to give the Muslims of China a sense of identity in the context of a
Muslim-minority country where Muslims have come under considerable
pressure to assimilate to the dominant culture of the non-Muslim Han Chi-
nese.
Muslim identity politics in China is linked to the development of the
Muslim educational sector in many ways. Across the province of Yunnan,
for instance, there is currently a tremendous revival in Islamic education.
Virtually every mosque offers Qur’anic classes for children, known as kuttab
in the Muslim Middle East, as well classes for older people who were denied
the chance to study when they were younger. In Yunnan alone, at least 12
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full-time independent Islamic colleges or madrasas have been established
over the past ten years. These schools offer a full curriculum including
classes on the Qur’an, hadith, tafsir, fiqh, Islamic history, Arabic grammar,
and the Chinese language. At present, most of the textbooks used for the
traditional Islamic sciences are from Saudi Arabia, the Arabic language text-
books from the Foreign Language Institute in Beijing, the Islamic history
texts are translated from the Arabic, and the texts on the history of Islam in
China are currently being published. Many of the graduates from these col-
leges go on to teach in smaller schools and establish new schools through-
out the country (except for Xinjiang).1 Recently, growing numbers have cho-
sen to continue their Islamic studies overseas.
Another visible feature of Muslim life in China today is the growing net-
works of students and teachers as they pursue their studies and travel to
different regions to offer their services as teachers. I met Muslims from all
over China who had travelled to the far southwest to continue their studies
and teach, and Muslims from the southwest who had travelled to distant re-
gions for the same purpose. One of the many important consequences of
these networks is that even in the most remote and impoverished Muslim
villages one encounters people who are well informed about local, provin-
cial, national, and even international affairs.
Muslims in China: A Historical Overview
With a Muslim population of 20 million, China today has a larger Muslim
population than most of the Arab countries of the Middle East. The Muslims
of China are divided into 10 different ethnic groups, nine of which are con-
centrated in the northwest, while the tenth and largest group, known as the
Hui, is spread throughout the entire country. In addition to being the
largest group, the Hui are unique in that they are also the most assimilated.
Descendants of Arab and Persian immigrants who came to China during the
earliest period of Islam and in larger numbers during the Mongol Yuan dy-
nasty (1274-1368), over the centuries the Hui adapted to whichever region
or community they settled in. In the majority of cases, that has meant
adapting to the dominant Han Chinese culture: speaking Chinese, wearing
traditional-style Chinese clothing, and practising all manner of social cus-
toms except those that contravened Islamic practices. However, if the Hui
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community settled in a minority region of China, such as Tibet, or among
the Dai, Bai, or Yi of southwest China, or among the Mongols of northeast-
ern China, they assimilated into those communities and cultures.
According to the 2000 China national census, the Hui population of
China is approximately 9.2 million while the Uighur number 8.6 million.
The other Muslim populations are: Kazak 1.3 million; Dongxiang 400,000;
Kirghiz 171,000; Salar 90,000; Tajik 41,000; Uzbek 14,000; Baonan 13,000;
and Tatar 5,000. The concentration of China’s Muslims across the country
has also changed due to demographic and political factors. In Xinjiang, the
Uighurs, who at the time of the establishment of the People’s Republic of
China (1949) made up 90% of the population of the province, now make up
less than 45%, with Han Chinese migrants from other parts of China mak-
ing up the remainder. The overwhelming majority of Muslims are Sunni
and they follow the Hanafi school of law.
There have been Muslims in China since shortly after the advent of
Islam. During the period of the Mongol Yuan dynasty (1274-1368), hundreds
of thousands of Muslims from Central and Western Asia were both forcibly
moved to China or migrated there to assist the Mongols in the establish-
ment of an imperial dynasty. However, during the Ming dynasty (1366-
1644), Muslims together with other foreigners who had settled in China
were subject to new laws requiring them to dress like the Chinese, adopt
Chinese surnames, speak Chinese, and essentially become Chinese. In the
mid-seventeenth century, the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) was established,
marking the beginning of a period of unparalleled growth and expansion.
Travel restrictions were lifted, and China’s Muslims were once again al-
lowed to make the pilgrimage to Mecca and study in the major centres of
learning in the Islamic world. However, this period also witnessed unparal-
leled violence against China’s Muslims. The collapse of the Qing dynasty in
1911 saw a period of political unrest and social chaos that eventually led to
the creation of two powerful political groups: the Nationalists of the Guo-
mindang (known as the KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
During the ensuing years of civil war between the CCP and KMT, both
parties sought the support of the nation’s largest minority groups, includ-
ing the Muslims of China. Many of the Hui chose to support the Commu-
nists, and in the initial period of the People‘s Republic of China, the Hui and
other Muslim minority peoples enjoyed a period of religious freedom.2 How-
ever, during subsequent political campaigns, culminating in the Cultural
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Revolution (1966-1976), the Muslims of China found their religion outlawed,
their religious leaders persecuted, imprisoned and even killed, and their
mosques defiled, if not destroyed.
In the years immediately following the Cultural Revolution, the Muslims
of China lost no time in rebuilding their devastated communities. Their
first priority was to rebuild their damaged mosques, thereby allowing com-
munities to create a space in which they could once again pray together,
but also so that the mosques could reassert their role as centres of Islamic
learning.
As Muslim communities sought ways to revive their traditions of Islamic
learning, the state also began to establish Islamic colleges around the coun-
try.3 These schools were administered by the Islamic Association of China,
which is part of the state’s central Religious Affairs Bureau. Spread out in
different regions of China, these schools were fully funded and controlled
by the state: teacher appointments, student selection, curriculum, course
materials, etc., were all decided by government officials. In addition to of-
fering the traditional courses in Arabic and the Islamic sciences, these
schools also required that students take courses in patriotism.4 Although
these schools play an important role in educating Chinese Muslims, as they
fall under the control of the state, they are not held in universal high re-
gard. Some Muslims are wary of any institution that falls under such direct
government control. As independent Islamic schools have been set up
throughout China, the importance of the role of the state schools has di-
minished. However, given that they are able to offer scholarships to stu-
dents in need, and continue to attract excellent teachers and students, they
continue to play an important role.
Meanwhile, in addition to the independent Islamic schools that have
been set up, communities have also organised Islamic pre-school pro-
grammes, after-school and summer school programmes for primary and
secondary students, day-time programmes for the elderly, as well as
evening and weekend programmes for working adults eager to gain knowl-
edge and a deeper understanding of Islam. These efforts represent some of
the most important ways in which Muslim communities are reviving their
religious identity.
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Early Islamic Education in Southwest China
Islamic education traditions in different parts of China evolved in different
ways, reflecting local histories. The case of Yunnan is one of the more im-
portant and influential. First settled by Muslims from Central and Western
Asia in the Yuan period (1274-1368), Yunnan has for centuries attracted
Muslim students from throughout the country and region. As early as the
Ming period (1368-1644), Muslim scholars from Yunnan were invited to
teach in other parts of China, and scholars from outside were invited to
teach in Yunnan, thus creating networks linking the Muslims of Yunnan
with Muslims in the rest of China and Southeast Asia. Throughout this pe-
riod, Islamic education took place in mosques and was known as jingtang
jiaoyu (education in the Hall of the Classics).
While Islamic education in other parts of China has always concentrated
on the study of Arabic, Persian and Islam, in Yunnan the tradition has been
one of Zhong-Ah bing shou (side-by-side Chinese and Arabic education). In the
past, this consisted of intensive instruction in classical Chinese, whereas
today it includes the study of modern Chinese with Chinese history and cul-
ture, together with Arabic language and Islamic Studies.
A Tale of Two Schools
In southwest China, two of the most interesting schools happen to be an in-
dependent girls school in an extremely impoverished region of northeast-
ern Yunnan province and an independent Islamic college outside Dali in
western Yunnan.
In 1998, I visited the girls school established in 1985 outside Zhaotong
and was believed to be the first girls school in southwest China. Although it
was still quite a modest affair, it had a compound with several small build-
ings attached to it. The head teacher spoke of the ongoing difficulties of
teaching in such an impoverished community and the growing numbers of
students who were not even literate in Chinese. As a result, more class time
was being allocated for Chinese language classes. The school did not charge
fees and it provided boarding facilities for students who lived far away.
Funding for the school came from the local communities, but also from reg-
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ular contributions in wealthier Muslim communities in other parts of the
province.
In 2001, I learned more about the history of the school when Salima, the
young woman who had founded it in 1985, returned to Yunnan after study-
ing in Pakistan for 10 years. She had grown up in a religious family and had
decided when she was young that she wanted to study Islam. In 1981, at the
age of 16, she left home to enrol in the mosque school in Shadian, a two-day
bus ride away. There were 100 students in the school, 20 of whom were fe-
male. She completed her studies two years later, and though she had
wanted to travel to northwest China to continue her studies at a women’s
Islamic school in Gansu, she instead returned to Zhaotong and began teach-
ing at a small mosque school. During this time she learned of the growing
need for a school for girls in the region, which is one of the poorest in all of
China. She developed a plan for a girls school and presented it at a meeting
of representatives from ten mosques. Although a few were opposed to the
idea, she was able to convince most of them of the need for a girls school
and the mosques found a small two-room school house which opened its
doors in 1985.
Although nine years of education is required for all children in China,
and is supposed to be free, central government support of education has de-
creased dramatically over the past twenty years. As a result, local schools
have had to institute various fees in order to cover educational expenses. In
impoverished areas like Zhaotong the result has been that parents end up
sending only one child to school and preference is invariably for boys.
The Zhaotong girls school quickly attracted some 80 students, over-
whelming the tiny school house, with students sitting on the floor and
standing during classes. Most of the students were 16 or 17 years old, al-
though some were in their twenties. In addition to the basics of Islam, Sal-
ima also taught basic language skills as many of the students had not com-
pleted their public school studies. She also quickly realised that there was a
tremendous need for health and hygiene classes as many students were
woefully ignorant of the most basic understanding of these issues. After an
exhausting first year of teaching by herself, she enlisted the help of four of
the more advanced students from her first class to teach additional classes
the second year. In the third year, 19 students graduated, and four of them
were immediately recruited by mosques to start girls schools. That summer
she decided to travel around China to visit other Muslim communities that
J A C K I E A RM I J O
174
AUP-ISIM-IS-BW-Madrasa-DEF2:BW  24-09-2008  16:54  Pagina 174
had established girls’ schools, as well as share her experiences of setting up
a school in one of the poorest regions in China. She returned for a fourth
year (1987-89), but then decided at the end of the school year that it was
time to further her own studies. She was able to find financial assistance
that allowed her to study Arabic at a well-known foreign language univer-
sity in Beijing, and while there she learned of a delegation from a Pakistani
Islamic college that was recruiting students. Salima passed the exam, and,
after much difficulty obtaining a passport, left for Pakistan on 1 January
1990. She was the first female Chinese student to study at the International
Islamic University in Islamabad, Pakistan. At that time, there were already
about 30 male Chinese students studying in Islamabad and a similar num-
ber in Karachi. She ended up staying in Pakistan for ten years, completing a
bachelor’s and master’s degree. Her thesis compared Islam to Confucian-
ism. Upon returning to Kunming in 2000, she and her husband decided to
teach at the government-run Kunming Islamic College, which was founded
in 1987.
The outstanding feature of the Zhaotong girls’ school is its emphasis on
girls’ education, as well as giving Muslim women the right to teach Islam.
However, it is not a unique example of a Muslim girls’ school: of the twelve
major independent Islamic schools I visited in Yunnan, four are for women
only, and most of the other schools, while predominantly male, do allow
women to attend.
The female graduates of these schools have taken a very active role in
promoting the study of Islam among other Muslims. Most become teachers
themselves upon graduation, either working in Islamic schools that are al-
ready established or helping to establish new schools in poor and remote re-
gions. Several recent graduates have also established Islamic pre-schools
and after-schools for Muslim children.
The women with whom I spoke to in these schools expressed the impor-
tance of Islam in their lives, their commitment to Islamic education, and
their determination to educate others. I met several young women who,
upon graduation from Islamic colleges, had volunteered to teach in remote
impoverished villages, isolated from friends and family. I also met several
exceptionally strong-willed women who had established independent Is-
lamic girls’ schools. One spoke of the fundamental role women played in so-
ciety and the importance of the role of education; for as she put it, ‘Educate
a man, educate an individual; educate a woman, educate a nation.’ She ex-
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plained the various ways in which a young woman’s education could have a
positive influence not only on her own life, but also later on the lives and
social well-being of her children and grandchildren, and eventually the en-
tire community.
In addition to playing an important role in the revival of Islamic educa-
tion throughout China, in certain regions of the country, Chinese Muslim
women also have the unique opportunity to serve as imams in women’s
mosques. In the Hui communities of the Central Plain provinces of Henan,
Shandong, Anhui, Hebei, and Shaanxi, there is a long history of women’s
mosques and women have traditionally served as imams there.5 According
to one prominent expert of Islamic law, Khaled Abou El Fadl, the tradition
of female imams in China is a remnant of a practice that existed in the ear-
liest days of Islam but was gradually undermined by traditional Arab patri-
archal values together with those of other cultures encountered as Islam
spread.6 As growing numbers of Muslims travel to different regions of China
to further their Islamic studies, more and more women are being exposed
to these traditions found in Central China. Research by French scholar
Elisabeth Allès shows that the practice of women’s mosques has recently
spread to other regions of China, as students who have studied in places
where they are common return to their home communities.7 And as female
imams from this region travel to other areas to further their own studies,
they introduce the concept of women serving as imams (within women’s
mosques). According to a Chinese press report, there are now women
imams in Ningxia, which shares with Gansu the reputation of being home
to the most conservative Muslims in China, especially when it comes to is-
sues related to gender.8
Apart from the girls’ school at Zhaotong, another highly respected Is-
lamic school in Yunnan is the Wuliqiao Islamic College. It was established
in 1991 by several retired Hui public school teachers. Although at that time
there was already the government Islamic college in Kunming, a group of
Hui educators decided there would be several advantages to having an inde-
pendent private school. For one, every aspect of the teaching and adminis-
tration of the state Islamic college was controlled by government officials:
from faculty and student selection to curriculum and textbooks. Many were
surprised that the government approved the independent school at that
time. However, the fact that the founding faculty consisted of retired Hui
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school teachers who had dozens of years experience teaching in the public
school system no doubt helped their cause.
The school opened in the autumn of 1991, with an enrolment of 60 stu-
dents (50 male, 10 female) from throughout China. That the school was able
to attract students from such a range of places in its first year is evidence of
the complex networks of communication linking Muslim communities
across China. The school made two decisions early on that proved some-
what controversial. The first was that all classes would be co-educational.
Having taught in public schools for years, the faculty were confident that
the students would benefit from mixed classes, and that they would not be
distracted from their studies. The second proved somewhat more controver-
sial. Early on, a decision had been made to focus on Chinese language stud-
ies in addition to Islamic studies. Although in other regions of China, espe-
cially the northwest, Muslim communities have been reluctant to study Chi-
nese language and civilisation as they are seen as somehow undermining Is-
lamic traditions and values, in Yunnan they have always practised a form of
Islamic education known as Zhong-Ah bing shou, as was mentioned above.
However, when the headmaster chose a Han Chinese rather than a Hui as
the Chinese language studies teacher, the decision was not universally ac-
cepted.9 However, headmaster Na Wenbo stood by his decision, and the Chi-
nese language teacher proved to be an outstanding teacher who respected
the school’s values.
Another interesting characteristic of the school was its decision very
early on to recruit young people who it believed would not only be out-
standing teachers upon graduation, but also people who were committed to
teaching fellow Muslims about Islam. Many of the graduates I interviewed
expressed their commitment to spreading Islam to Muslim communities
who had not been exposed to Islam.
The commitment of Na Wenbo and his colleagues to the establishment
of the school and selection of outstanding faculty and students did not end
there. An equal amount of consideration went into the placement of gradu-
ates upon completion of their studies. The headmaster himself travelled to
Muslim communities throughout southwest China, identifying areas with
the greatest need for Islamic studies teachers, noting the atmosphere and
local conditions as well as the needs of the community. He then carefully
matched these criteria with the abilities, interests, and personalities of the
graduating students who wanted to teach. Students would then be assigned
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two-year teaching posts. However, before the graduation ceremony and be-
fore the final decision was made on assignments, students were expected to
spend one month teaching in their assigned communities. At the end of this
month they were asked if they were committed to spending two years
teaching in that community, and only then was the final assignment made.
This method proved extremely effective, and the graduates with whom I
spoke were satisfied with their assignments.
The Complementarity of Secular and Religious Education
Apart from Chinese Muslims studying in madrasas in places like Yunnan,
there are also a considerable number of Chinese Muslim students who
study in the local universities and who form Muslim student associations to
promote and encourage the study and practice of Islam. There are four uni-
versities in the Northern district of the city of Kunming. Muslim students at
each of these institutions have joined together to organise classes as well as
other activities. The Muslim students often come together to provide for
needs that are specific to their religious community. A few years ago they
set an initiative to make fasting during Ramadan more convenient for Mus-
lim students. Although all large college and university campuses have Mus-
lim cafeterias their hours of operation do not necessarily correspond with
fasting times during Ramadan, and it becomes difficult, if not impossible,
to get a proper early morning meal. The students located an apartment
nearby, rented it, and set up a kitchen. This same group also organised a se-
ries of events including a public celebration of Eid al-Fitr that helped edu-
cate non-Muslim students about Islam.
Students who were active in this group expressed their commitment to
both religious and secular education. For example, one student who had
majored in English literature was planning to return home and teach Eng-
lish in a local Islamic college, whereas another English literature major
chose to teach English at a public university with a large Muslim student
population. A student with a degree in information science from a highly
respected science and technology college was planning to leave for Malaysia
upon graduation to join the Islamic studies programme at the International
Islamic University of Malaysia. When asked why, he replied, ‘My years of
studying science and technology have made it clear to me that science and
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technology are not what the people of China need, they need an under-
standing of God.’10
Expanding Networks
In the course of my research it became clear that many Muslim villagers I
met were informed not only about the situation of Muslims living in other
parts of China, but also about the latest issues concerning Muslim commu-
nities throughout the world. This phenomenon was, in part, a result of the
large number of Chinese Muslims travelling to different regions of China to
study, but also because of the increasing numbers of students who chose to
study overseas. In addition to the growing number of Islamic schools in
China, the past few years have also seen a dramatic increase in the number
of Chinese Muslim students studying overseas. Although no official records
are kept, it is estimated that a total of between 500 and 1,000 Chinese Mus-
lims are presently studying in Egypt, Syria, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia,
Libya, the Sudan, Turkey, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Al-Azhar has the largest
number, with approximately 300 students. Most of the students are spon-
sored by their families and communities, and receive small stipends from
the Islamic university they end up attending. The students I interviewed at
Al-Azhar in 1999 spoke of how difficult it was to adapt to the lifestyle of
such a crowded and overwhelming city, but they were also very cognisant of
the importance of Al-Azhar and its role in Islamic history. Some, however,
expressed their disillusionment with the realities of living in a modern Mus-
lim society. For the Muslims of China, who have always been a small minor-
ity in a sea of Han Chinese and who have survived for centuries isolated
from the rest of the Islamic world, often experiencing intense periods of
persecution, the idealistic expectations they have of Islamic countries can
serve as the source of disappointment.
Initial Impacts: Scarves, Mosque Architectural Styles and Gender
Roles
The most visible influence of the growing numbers of Muslims studying
overseas is the rapidly increasing number of women wearing headscarves.
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Although there had been a tradition of headscarves among different Muslim
communities, they had almost all died out and only elderly women were
seen wearing scarves. Now, however, many more women wear scarves, not
in one of the traditional Chinese styles, but a modified version of the style
worn in Malaysia.11
The potential impact of overseas studies is also evident in the rapidly
changing attitude towards the traditional mosque architecture of China.
Strongly influenced by the design of Buddhist temples, mosques are often
almost indistinguishable from temples from the outside, but upon closer
examination one sees how they reflect an extraordinary blend of two very
distinct traditions that have evolved over time. Some mosques, like the Hua-
jue in Xi’an, have been preserved and are well maintained by their congre-
gations. But other mosques dating back to the Ming and Qing periods have
been torn down and replaced with what can best be described as ‘neo-
pseudo-Middle Eastern’ style mosques. When questioned about their deci-
sion to tear down ancient mosques, most community members point to the
need to build mosques that are more ‘authentic’ and less Chinese. That a
loose interpretation of an architectural style from the Middle East should be
held up as more ‘authentic’ is just one of the ways in which unconscious as-
sumptions about the purity of Islam in the heartland is perpetuated. Al-
though the destruction of these traditional mosques is a devastating loss to
the cultural history of Muslims in China, both old and young Muslims as-
sured me of the benefits of their wonderful newly constructed concrete and
tile ‘modern’ mosques. In at least some instances, students returning from
their studies overseas played a role in the community’s decision to tear
down and rebuild a mosque. Thus far, most of the mosques that have been
torn down are in towns and villages with the necessary funds to carry out
such a major project. Older mosques in more remote and impoverished re-
gions are much more likely to escape this fate.
In Kunming, the most obvious example of this phenomenon can be seen
at the South City Mosque. This new mosque, which replaced an older one, is
a white tile two-story building with no evidence of traditional Chinese Mus-
lim architectural details. Even the calligraphy on the front is not traditional
Chinese Islamic calligraphy but instead one of the standard forms common
in the Middle East. What makes the building that much more awkward is
the fact that it has been squeezed behind a large commercial building that
was built for income generation to help pay back the loan used to build the
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mosque. The commercial building is eight stories high and has several large
domes on top, as a token reminder of its Islamic identity. The original
mosque dated back to the Ming period but had been seriously damaged dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution. The young imam who helped design the new
mosque had studied overseas.
However, at least in Kunming, during a period in the past few years
when several mosque communities had to decide on the style during the re-
building a centuries’ old mosque in disrepair, the community chose to re-
build it in a style that was as close to the original as possible. The most im-
portant example is that of the Shunchengjie mosque. Originally built dur-
ing the Ming dynasty, the mosque has been repaired several times over the
centuries. However, in 2004, the community chose to rebuild it in the origi-
nal style, using as many traditional building methods and building materi-
als as possible. As this was the largest and most prominent Muslim com-
munity in the region, they were able to shoulder the huge expense of this
method of construction. The newly completed mosque looks almost identi-
cal to the original. Ironically, during the time the mosque was being rebuilt,
the city of Kunming was in the process of tearing down the large Muslim
neighbourhood that surrounded the mosque. While it was once surrounded
by dozens of Muslim restaurants, food stalls, and speciality stores, not to
mention thousands of Muslim homes, the mosque is now located next to a
high-rise apartment building and a huge construction site.
Another of the outcomes of this newly emerging network of Chinese
Muslim students studying in Muslim countries abroad and returning to
China is the change in gender relations and the role of Muslim women in
the community. Despite the active role played by many Muslim women in
different parts of China, there is anecdotal evidence that male students
studying in schools in Saudi Arabia may, upon their return, have a negative
impact on the role of Chinese Muslim women in their communities. During
one of my interviews, I met a young woman living in a city in northwestern
China who had helped establish a large Islamic women’s school based in a
mosque and attended by over 500 students ranging in age from 5 to 80. She
had also organised a wide range of development projects to assist Muslims
living in the most impoverished villages in the region. She mentioned that
she started an advanced Islamic studies degree in Malaysia, but had to drop
out because her husband, who was already studying in Saudi Arabia when
she received her scholarship, was not pleased with her going overseas to
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study. When he learned that classes at the Islamic University in Malaysia
were coeducational he demanded her return to China.
I asked several dozen Chinese Muslims, both in China and overseas, how
they would interpret this story. The majority felt it would only affect stu-
dents who were enrolled in the Wahhabi-controlled schools in Saudi Arabia
who might adopt this type of attitude toward women (generally referred to
as zhongnan, qingnu, ‘valuing men and belittling women’). Students from
Yunnan maintained that although they believed Muslims from northwest-
ern China (who seemed to be fairly patriarchal to begin with, as a result of
the influence of more traditional Han Chinese attitudes regarding women
in that region of China) might be susceptible to this type of indoctrination
regarding gender roles, they were quite adamant that Muslims from Yun-
nan would not allow themselves to be manipulated in this way.
In addition to the Saudi Arabian government’s sponsorship of dozens of
students in Saudi Arabia every year, individual Saudis also travel to China
on a fairly regular basis to conduct intensive Islamic studies workshops. In
Yunnan, for example, for the past several years, Saudi religious scholars
have organised one-week workshops in towns relatively distant from the
provincial capital of Kunming. To the best of my knowledge, there have
never been any workshops in the capital, nor are these classes sanctioned
by the authorities. In fact, there is a law that forbids the Hui from inviting
foreign Muslims to teach Arabic and religious studies. Although the Dai (a
minority related to the Thai) in southern Yunnan, who are Buddhist, have
been able to sponsor monks from Thailand to teach classes in their recently
revived temples, no foreign Muslims have been allowed to teach in any of
the newly established Islamic schools.
Perhaps as a response to these workshops, a group of moderate Muslims
in Yunnan, including several who have studied overseas, have started more
elaborate workshops that sometimes last as long as two weeks. Young Mus-
lims, mostly college students, are invited to take part in workshops that are
led by a series of religious teachers, with expertise in various subjects. The
college students are allowed to bring non-Muslim friends who have ex-
pressed an interest in Islam, and in the past, some of them have ended up
converting during the workshop. During the workshop retreat in the sum-
mer of 2002, there was a clear and obvious government surveillance pres-
ence at the event and efforts to discover the identities of those who at-
tended were obvious.
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Naqshbandi Influence
The Chinese government has for decades been sending students to study
Arabic in many of the major public universities in the Middle East, to pre-
pare them for careers as future government officials and diplomats. More
recently, independent students have also been allowed to study abroad, and
Chinese Muslims have been studying in various centres of Islamic learning.
One of the first independent groups of students to be allowed to study over-
seas was sent to Abu Nur Islamic College in Damascus, the school estab-
lished and led by the late Naqshbandi shaykh and chief mufti of Syria,
Shaykh Ahmad Kaftaru, which draws large numbers of students from all
over Asia.12 This group consisted of ten men, who are now among the most
respected young Muslim scholars of their generation. At present, there are
over 100 Hui studying at the Abu Nur.13 They study a general madrasa cur-
riculum, with a special focus on fiqh, but because of Kaftaru’s position as a
leading Naqshbandiyya shaykh, most of them also become acquainted with
the practices of this Sufi order. They do not, however, actively teach Sufism
upon their return to China. One of the imams commented that what he
learned about Naqshbandi Sufi philosophy he kept close to his heart for
himself. And what he learned of more traditional Islamic philosophy he
shared with his students. He avoided getting into any arguments about reli-
gious interpretations, and found himself frequently remembering the ad-
vice of Shaykh Kaftaru to ‘be a doctor, not a lawyer.’
This imam was also one of the very few who was able to find a place
within the traditional Muslim religious leadership almost immediately
upon his return. In most of the areas that I visited, I learned that the young
men were usually not welcomed into the religious leadership upon their re-
turn from their studies overseas. Thus, I was surprised that within months
of his return, he had been appointed a teacher at one of the major mosques
in Kunming. He said that the elders had told him that they were making an
exception for him, and although they were very impressed with him, they
were going to keep an eye on him. Religious leaders told me that although
they had confidence in the religious knowledge of those who had studied
overseas, they were not confident of their knowledge of the Muslim com-
munities in China. Thus, they were not considered qualified to hold leader-
ship positions within these communities, and thus they first had to prove
their understanding of Islam as practised in China.
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There are, in fact, only a handful of relatively young imams who have
studied overseas and who are also held in high regard by Muslims in China.
This small group, which travelled abroad in 1990, were the first in post-1949
China to pursue their studies overseas. They were among the few who had
managed to attain a high level of Islamic learning even though all forms of
Islamic education had been forbidden for decades. As a result, they were al-
ready well versed in traditional Chinese Islamic thought by the time they
first went overseas, and upon their return this group was consequently ac-
corded special status.
I wish to conclude this chapter with some observations on contemporary
trends that are still very fragmentary but, in the absence of more systematic
studies, may nonetheless be of interest. They concern how surprisingly ap-
preciative China’s Sunni Muslims are about the education they received in
Shiªi Iran, and the negative impact of the ‘war on terror’ on the widening of
their transnational horizons.
Iranian Influence
In 1999, I met a young Hui woman in Damascus who had completed her
studies in Iran and had thereafter returned to China. She said that, of the
original group of students, that she was the only who had decided to stay in
Iran for several years after her graduation. She spoke very highly of the ed-
ucation she had received there, the living conditions, and the way her and
her fellow students had been treated. The program there is fully funded by
the Iranian government, and thus the living situations are quite comfort-
able. She noted that many from this first group of students strongly en-
couraged their siblings, friends, and even their parents to come study there.
She said that by the end of her six-year stay in Iran, the number of Hui stu-
dents had increased dramatically.14
The only other similar graduate I interviewed had returned to Yunnan a
couple of years after graduation and was teaching Persian at the provincial
university. He had been asked by educational leaders in Yunnan and Iran to
organise a series of student exchanges between the two universities. He
spoke very candidly about his Islamic education and his treatment by fellow
Muslims upon his return. He felt strongly that those who had studied in
Iran had received an outstanding Islamic education that was perhaps supe-
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rior to the education that others received. In addition to studying the major
works of Shiªa thought, they also studied the four traditional Sunni Islamic
legal schools and the major works of Sunni religious thought. Moreover, in
addition to learning Persian, students were also expected to learn Arabic. As
for his own religious views, he identified himself as Muslim, without distin-
guishing between Sunni or Shi‘a. He also spoke of encountering suspicion
from fellow Muslims in China when they learned he had received his train-
ing in Iran. This surprised me because most Chinese Muslims I know are un-
aware of any major sectarian differences among Muslims, and it is highly
likely that this new prejudice against Shi‘ism has to do with the views of
those returning from their studies at the Islamic University of Medina in
Saudi Arabia.
The Impact of the ‘War on Terror’ on Religious Education in China
and the Case of Xinjiang
China, like numerous other nations, was quick to jump on the ‘war on ter-
ror’ bandwagon in order to justify and expand domestic policies that fur-
ther restricted the lives of its Muslim minorities. Throughout China, Mus-
lims found it more difficult to obtain the passports that were necessary to
travel overseas to continue their studies, or to take part in the hajj. More-
over, new government programmes were established for imams to insure
that they had a ‘correct’ understanding of the role of the state vis-à-vis reli-
gion, and the role of religion vis-à-vis society. These policies to restrict and
control the practice and study of Islam in China have in the post-9/11 era
been taken to near draconian levels in Xinjiang.
For reasons both unclear and unjustified, the Chinese government has
chosen to conflate the practice of Islam with Uighur separatist movements
in Xinjiang. As China’s largest province and the one with the most impor-
tant natural resources in terms of oil and natural gas, it has been the focus
of major national development projects. However, according to the Uighurs,
those who have benefited the most from these development projects have
been the immigrant Han Chinese and not the local population. Beginning in
the 1980s, there were a series of violent clashes between Uighur nationalist
groups and government forces. Most of these clashes were in response to
government efforts to control religious practice, but were also due to the
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growing resentment of the unequal distribution of benefits from both the
development projects and the extraction of local natural resources. How-
ever, there have been no serious incidents since 1998, even though there are
now literally thousands of violent demonstrations every year throughout
the rest of China.
The most important difference between Xinjiang and the rest of China is
the absence of any form of independent Islamic education. There are no pre-
school, after-school, or summer programmes of study for children and no
classes for adults or the elderly. There is only one officially sanctioned Is-
lamic training school for imams in the provincial capital, and it is closely
monitored by government officials. The government appears especially con-
cerned that children are not exposed to religious teaching or practices. Chil-
dren are forbidden from attending Islamic studies classes even after regular
school hours. There are signs posted on mosques stating that no one under
18 years of age may enter. According to a recent Human Rights Watch
study, parents reported that they were afraid to even speak to their own
children about religion.15 When some parents decided to send their children
abroad or to other parts of China to receive an Islamic education, that was
effectively prohibited as well, since it would now require government per-
mission, which would most certainly not be granted and would expose fam-
ilies to being classified as ‘separatists’.
Moreover, China’s increased restrictions on the lives of Muslims in the
aftermath of 9/11, together with tighter surveillance of all religious activity
throughout the country, has heightened Chinese Muslims’ feelings of iden-
tity and solidarity with Muslims around the world. Moreover, the govern-
ment has also made it significantly more difficult for Hui students to study
abroad by frequently refusing to issue passports to Chinese Muslims. As re-
ligion (in the case of Muslims) is conflated with ethnicity in China, and all
official identification documents list a person’s ethnicity, it is quite easy for
the government to control the issuance of passports to Muslims.
As a result of these measures, the number of students able to study over-
seas has levelled off, and it will probably decline as well. However, accord-
ing to some of those who have completed their studies and returned to
teach in established Islamic colleges in China, there is, in fact, no longer
that much need for Chinese Muslims to study overseas as there are now
enough teachers with sufficient training in China that it has become more
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attractive for students to just continue their advanced Islamic education in
China.
Conclusion
The tradition of the ‘search for knowledge’ has played a primary role in the
history of Muslim society world-wide, and China is no exception. I have
tried to show how the quest for Muslim education in China has been linked
to the struggle for a distinct Muslim identity, and at the same time, has also
opened up alternative avenues for Muslim women in particular as well as
itinerant students who have travelled abroad. The search for knowledge has
been facilitated by both more efficient means of travel as well as the estab-
lishment of international centres of Islamic learning that seek to educate
Muslims from around the world. My own research has concentrated on the
recent re-emergence of traditional Islamic educational projects in China,
and the growing role of students travelling overseas to complete their train-
ing. It is through examining their experiences of living amongst other Mus-
lims with their different societies and communities (although their experi-
ences are actually fairly similar as well) that I seek to represent ways in
which identities are shaped and reshaped, and the potential impact of these
changes on their communities upon their return home. The Muslim em-
phasis on education, both secular and religious, is not a surprise. As other
minority groups who have survived the vicissitudes of state persecution
over time, they have learned that the only thing that cannot be taken away
from them is their education.
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Notes
1 The situation in Xinjiang, in northwestern China, is so different from the rest
of China that it will be dealt with separately. For a variety of historical,
geographic and political reasons, the state has always maintained a much
stricter level of control over all aspects of Muslims’ lives there.
2 For a comprehensive overview of Islamic education efforts in China in this
period, see Leïla Chérif-Chebbi, “Brothers and Comrades: Muslim
Fundamentalists and Communists Allied for the Transmission of Islamic
Knowledge in China,” in: Stéphane Dudoignon (ed.) Devout Societies vs. Impious
States? Transmitting Islamic Learning in Russia, Central Asia and China, through the
Twentieth Century, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2004, pp. 61-90.
3 The first of these schools was established in Beijing, in 1955; later, government
madrasas were set up in Xi’an, Shenyang, Xining, Lanzhou, Yinchuan, Urumqi,
Zhengzhou, and Kunming.
4 A common slogan seen in many mosques and government Islamic schools is ‘ai
guo; ai jiao’ or ‘love your country; love your religion;’ the point is that you
should remember that your country comes first.
5 For a comprehensive overview of the role of women’s mosques in China, see
Maria Jaschok and Shui Jingjun, The History of Women’s Mosques in Chinese Islam:
A Mosque of their Own, Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2000.
6 Professor Abou El Fadl also goes on to express the hope that ‘perhaps, from the
margins of Islam, the great tradition of women jurists might be rekindled.’
Lousia Lim, ‘Chinese Muslims Forge Isolated Path’, BBC News, 15 September
2004.
7 Elisabeth Allès, ‘Chinese Muslim Women: From Autonomy to Dependence’, in:
Stéphane Dudoignon (ed.) Devout Societies vs. Impious States?, pp. 91-103.
8 ‘First Generation of Female Imams Emerges in Western China’, Xinhua News
Service, 24 August 2003.
9 Many Hui in the community felt strongly that only Muslim teachers should be
allowed to teach in the Islamic college. Perhaps some felt that because so much
had already been taken away from the Muslims by the government, they
should be allowed one institution that was entirely their own. Also, since
Muslims have suffered through long periods of persecution over the centuries
in China, as well as more systematic racism and discrimination in more recent
times, some of the Hui were reluctant to trust a Han teacher to respect their
values and traditions.
10 Although one might interpret this statement as a plan to proselytise among
non-Muslims, in fact, I found no Muslims who were actively seeking to convert
others. What I did hear was stories of young people who had been raised as
Han Chinese, only to find out by accident that they were in fact Hui or part
Hui. Because of government persecution over time, many Muslims simply
abandoned their faith. Several teachers who taught evening Islamic and Arabic
classes told me about students coming to their classes to learn more about a
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faith they had only just discovered they had some connection with. There were
also other cases of young people with no connection to Islam who suddenly
became interested, but cases like these were much less common.
11 This style of headscarf is especially popular in the southwestern part of China.
One explanation provided by a local imam from Kunming was that when large
groups of Muslims from Yunnan began going on hajj, many travelled via
Thailand and while there they were provided with headscarves from Malaysia.
Upon their return to Yunnan after their hajj they simply started wearing their
newly acquired headscarves, and these ultimately became popular.
12 Shaykh Ahmad Kaftaru, who died in 2004, was for many years a pivotal figure
in president Hafez Asad’s policy towards Islam. See Annabelle Böttcher, Syrische
Religionspolitik unter Asad, Freiburg im Breisgau: Arnold-Bergstraesser-Institut,
1998, and Leif Stenberg, ‘Naqshbandiyya in Damascus: strategies to establish
and strengthen the order in a changing society’, in: E. Özdalga (ed.),
Naqshbandis in Western and Central Asia, Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute in
Istanbul, 1999, pp. 101-116.
13 I visited Damascus in 1999 and 2004 and interviewed several of the Hui
studying at the Abu Nur Institute at that time. Moreover, I have also
interviewed imams who had returned to teach in China after completing their
studies at Abu Nur.
14 See also the observations on foreign students in Qom by Mariam Abou Zahab
in this volume (editors’ note).
15 Human Rights Watch, ‘Devastating Blows: Religious Repression of Uighurs in
Xinjiang’, Human Rights Watch, vol. 17, no. 2 (2005).
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7 From Pondok to Parliament
The Role Played by the Religious Schools
of Malaysia in the Development of
the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS)
Farish A. Noor
The pondok or madrasa has for centuries been a core institution of Malay so-
ciety, as the centre where the indigenous elite were trained. The pondok
school takes its name from the dormitories in which the students (predom-
inantly male) live, often simple huts clustered around the home of the
teacher or teachers. In the past, states like Kelantan, Trengganu and Patani
(which today is a province in Southern Thailand) were known for their pon-
doks that produced successive generations of Muslim scholars who in turn
contributed to the Malay world of letters. Pondok schools also played an im-
portant role in the development of early Muslim political consciousness and
were instrumental in the early stages of the anti-colonial struggle in
Malaya, much in the same way that madrasas did in many other colonised
Muslim societies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
This chapter looks at the phenomenon of the pondok schools of Malaysia
with reference to the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS), that was formed in
1951.1 It will consider the development of both the Malaysian Islamic party
and the network of pondok schools from which it emerged, and which it
later nurtured and developed as its political power base. It has to be noted
from the outset that the pondok schools of Malaysia have been the subject of
intense debate since the beginning of the twentieth century, and that until
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today there are those in Malaysia – notably the leaders of the ruling United
Malays National Organisation (UMNO) party – who regard these institutions
with some degree of suspicion, branding them as schools that teach a con-
servative interpretation of Islam. The Malaysian government has been par-
ticularly critical of those pondoks and madrasas that are known to have links
with PAS, and the criticism of PAS’s madrasas and pondoks as training cen-
tres for potential radical militants and as institutions that preach hate
against the state has remained a constant leitmotif in Malaysian politics
until the present day while the country is under the leadership of Ma-
hathir’s successor, Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi.2
Since the events of 11 September 2001, many Muslim countries have re-
doubled their efforts to control, monitor and even shut down these institu-
tions that have been cast in a negative light, as bastions of conservative
Muslim thinking and training centres for violent Islamist groups. Reports
by various intelligence agencies and research centres have pointed to the al-
leged links between these religious schools and militant Muslim organisa-
tions, and the South Asian Analysis Group’s (SAAG) report in 2004, for in-
stance, went as far as claiming that at least 167 Malaysian students were en-
rolled in the militant-linked madrasas of Pakistan in 2002.3 Consequently,
since 2001, the Malaysian government, both under Prime Minister Mahathir
Mohamad (1981-2003) and Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (since 2003), has tried,
time and again, to control the development and proliferation of these insti-
tutions.4
Notwithstanding the media hype over the network of pondok schools in
the country, the Malaysian government’s apparent concern over the pondoks
and madrasas of Malaysia has more to do with the fact that many of them
were formed by and supported by the Malaysian Islamic party today. In the
Malaysian context, therefore, discussion of the alleged ‘threat’ represented
by some pondok schools is a loaded one, where the real issue is not the exis-
tence of religious schools (that have existed for centuries, in any case) but
rather the political challenge posed by PAS. This party was formed in 1951
and has evolved into an Islamist party that explicitly calls for the transfor-
mation of Malaysia into an Islamic state and which enjoys considerable sup-
port among Malay Muslims. However, PAS has since the late 1990s also
adapted itself to the realities of multiracial, multicultural and multi-confes-
sional Malaysia where circa 40% of the population are non-Malays and non-
Muslims. Over the past two years (2005-7), PAS has instituted a series of im-
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portant changes in its outlook and self-representation, reaching out to non-
Malays and non-Muslims across the country as well as the new breed of
urban-based Malay-Muslim professionals.
Notwithstanding the new urbane look of the Malaysian Islamic party,
one should not overlook the fact that the party’s emergence on the local po-
litical scene was largely aided and abetted by its links to more traditional
Muslim educational institutions, the sekolah pondok and madrasa system in
Malaysia. In order to get a better insight into PAS’s historical links to the
latter, we begin with a cursory overview of the development of the Muslim
educational system in British Malaya from the late nineteenth century on-
wards, which sets the scene for the subsequent emergence of PAS.
The Madrasa and Political Mobilisation in Colonial Malaya
The mode of British colonial rule in Malaysia (then known as British Malaya)
was complex, combining various forms of direct and indirect rule. 5 While
attempting to create a colonial import-substitution economy based on a
pluralistic economic system, the British colonial administrators were also
cognisant of the fact that the society they had colonised was deeply influ-
enced by Islam, which had arrived in the Malay archipelago and taken root
in the thirteenth century. 6
Fearful of the prospect of causing a nation-wide Malay-Muslim backlash
against Western colonial rule, the British – while seeking to expand their
economic interests and exploitative practices – tried to maintain some sem-
blance of traditional Malay-Muslim identity as well. Hence, there was little
interference on their part in the areas of Malay religion and customs, and
few attempts were made to control the development of the pondoks and
madrasas of the Malay kingdoms across the Peninsula.
That the Malay-Muslim community had to be pacified and possibly co-
opted into the colonial economic-political apparatus was evident then for it
was during the period of the late-nineteenth century that opposition to the
British and their mode of colonial rule first emerged among the Malay and
Peranakan (Indian-Malay or Arab-Malay) Muslims of Malaya.7 Caught be-
tween a secular mode of governance in the Straits Settlements and the con-
servative mode of feudal governance in the Malay kingdoms, many of the
younger generation of Malay and Peranakan Muslims began to organise
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themselves into political associations and movements that sought the bet-
terment of Muslims via education. This loosely assembled group was called
the ‘Kaum Muda’ (Younger Generation) who were opposed to the conserva-
tive ways of the ‘Kaum Tua’ (Older Generation).
During this period the pondoks and madrasas of Malaya were among the
first centres of political mobilisation for the new generation of the Kaum
Muda reformers, mostly Malay and Peranakan Muslims who had grown up
in the British colonial settlements of Penang, Malacca and Singapore. Un-
like the native subjects of the Malay kingdoms, these urban-based Malay
and Peranakan Muslims did not live under the influence of courtly protocol
or customary adat law. They were shaped by the values and lifestyle of a
modern, cosmopolitan mercantile community where economic and politi-
cal success was the key to survival.
Among the influential figures of the Kaum Muda were Sumatra-born
Sheikh Mohamad Tahir Jalaluddin al-Azhari and Malacca-born Syed Sheikh
Ahmad al-Hadi. Both were regarded as representatives of the Kaum Muda
generation and they were very attracted to the reformist and modernist
ideas then in vogue in the Muslim world. Interestingly, it was during the
British colonial era that the pondoks and madrasas of the Kaum Muda re-
formers became more closely connected to other institutions of learning
abroad, thanks to the development of modern transport and communica-
tions. The spread of modernist ideas was facilitated by the advances in mod-
ern transport and communications made possible by the opening of the
Suez Canal. Like other reformers of the Malay world, men like Sheikh Mo-
hamad Tahir had travelled to the Arab lands and studied in Mecca and at al-
Azhar University in Cairo. With other prominent Malay-Muslim reformers
such as Sheikh Muhammad Basyuni Imran of Sambas, these reform-minded
Islamists studied with Malay-Muslim ulama and scholars already based in
Mecca. It was also during their travels to the Arab countries that the Kaum
Muda reformers were first exposed to the ideas of the Egyptian scholar and
disciple of Muhammad Abduh, Rashid Rida.8
As a result of colonial intervention and the introduction of new trans-
port, communication and media technologies, the form and content of
teaching that took place in the more modern pondoks and madrasas of the
Kaum Muda reformers began to change as well. Some of these reformers
founded new religious schools of their own: Syed Sheikh al-Hadi was the
most active in setting up reform-minded modern madrasas in the Crown
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Colonies of Penang, Malacca and Singapore. Among the numerous
madrasas he set up were Madrasah al-Iqbal al Islamiyyah in Singapore,
Madrasah al-Hadi in Malacca and Madrasah al-Mashoor al-Islamiyyah in
Penang. Many of these madrasas also served as printing presses and publi-
cation houses where new books and journals promoting the cause of reform
were published and disseminated. On 23 July 1906, Sheikh Mohamad Tahir
established his own reformist magazine al-Imam (the Leader), modelled on
the reformist publication al-Manar (the Beacon) published in Cairo by Rashid
Rida. Among the more popular and influential of the journals then were al-
Imam (published by Sheikh Mohamad Tahir and Syed Sheikh al-Hadi in Sin-
gapore), Al-Ikhwan (published by Syed Sheikh al-Hadi in Penang), Seruan
Azhar (published by Kesatuan Jamiah al-Khairiah (Malay Students Associa-
tion of al-Azhar, Cairo), Pilihan Timur (published by Indonesian students at
al-Azhar, Cairo) and the teachers’ magazine, Majalah Guru. Through the edu-
cational efforts of Sheikh Mohamad Tahir and Syed Sheikh al-Hadi, the mod-
ern reformist ideas of the new generation of Muslim thinkers like Muham-
mad Abduh and Rashid Rida were introduced to the Malay-Muslims of the
peninsula.
Thus, in the early twentieth century, the colony of British Malaya was
witnessing the development of a relatively new phenomenon: modernist-in-
spired pondoks and madrasas that set themselves up as alternative sources
of Islamic teaching that were more inclined towards political mobilisation
and developing the political clout of the Muslims of Malaya. By the 1930s, a
period characterised by global economic depression and a period when the
economic strength of the Malay-Muslim rubber planters and rice farmers
was at its weakest these modern pondoks and madrasas took the plunge and
entered the world of politics. Foremost in the emerging nationalist struggle
in Malaya was a madrasa in the village of Gunung Semanggul in Northern
Perak, called Ma’ahad al-Ehya as-Sharif, that had come under the control of
the Kaum Muda.9 The Ma’ahad al-Ehya was set up on 15 April 1934. It was
built on the foundations of an older educational establishment, the Sekolah
Pondok al-Rahmaniah, founded by Ustaz Haji Abdul Rahman bin Mahmud,
who had studied in Mecca as well as al-Azhar University, Cairo.
The earlier Sekolah Pondok al-Rahmaniah was a more traditional and
conservative institution that offered basic religious education and classes in
Arabic and Islamic history. But as Nabir Abdullah (1976) notes, by the early
1930s, the teachers of Sekolah al-Rahmaniah felt that it was time to expand
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its services and facilities. They were readers of reformist magazines and
journals like Seruan Azhar, Pilihan Timur and al-Ikhwan published by reformist
thinkers like Syed Sheikh al-Hadi in Penang. They decided to turn their
school into a modern madrasa. Discipline at the revamped reformist
madrasa was strict. Ustaz Sheikh Abu Bakar al-Bakir, the first principal, re-
quired that all students wear white uniforms and the black felt songkok (not
the white skull cap, kepiah, associated with traditional pondok schools),
shave their heads and work six days a week. The school taught a combina-
tion of religious and worldly subjects, including art, music, world literature
as well as Indian, Chinese and European culture and civilisation. This
madrasa was one of the few religious educational establishments with a
special department for female students. (There were not as many girls as
boys; by the late 1930s, the female enrolment was circa 30.)
Many students of the madrasa became activists who later joined Sahabat
Pena (Pen Pals Association) as well as other Malay associations in the 1930s.
On 1 January 1940, the madrasa formed a company of its own, the Persa-
tuan al-Ehya as-Sharif Berhad, with 1,786 members. Within a year the com-
pany’s membership rose to 3,258. In the 1940s, the school became the focal
point of many Malay-Muslim political activities from which the country’s
first Islamic party, Hizbul Muslimin, was to emerge.10
In March 1947, the Malay National Party of Malaya (Partai Kebangsaan
Melayu Malaya, PKMM) under the leadership of Dr. Burhanuddin al-Helmy
sponsored the first Pan-Malayan Islamic conference at the Ma’ahad al-Ehya
as-Sharif. The madrasa was then run by Ustaz Sheikh Abu Bakar al-Bakir,
who was also one of the PKMM’s founders. The conference set out to address
the economic problems faced by the Malay-Muslims. It was meant to bring
together the more politically active and progressive Islamic movements and
thinkers in the country. As a result of this conference, the Majlis Agama Tert-
inggi (Supreme Religious Council, MATA) of Malaya was created. At the sec-
ond MATA conference on 17 March 1948, the Partai Orang Muslimin Malaya
(Hizbul Muslimin) was formed, after the second Pan-Malayan Islamic confer-
ence declared that MATA should be reorganised as an Islamic political party.
The Hizbul Muslimin put forward the claim that Malaya should be independ-
ent and that the country should be governed according to Islamic law.11
However, the Hizbul Muslimin was not destined to last long. The British
colonial authorities who had returned to Malaya after the Second World
War were already engaged in a low-level conflict with the Malayan Commu-
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nist Party (MCP) and were also wary of the Hizbul Muslimin, fearing that its
links with the left-wing Malay nationalists and the Islamic movements of In-
donesia might make it a powerful force in Malay political circles. In a report
entitled ‘Effect of Action by Government in Malaya to Counteract Malayan
Communist Party Plans’, issued in August 1948, the Malayan Security Serv-
ice claimed that the MCP had ‘made a further approach to the Malays under
the religious cloak of the Supreme Islamic Council and later the pseudo-po-
litical party Hasbul Muslimin (sic).’12
By late 1948, growing political tension in the colony led to the declara-
tion of a state of emergency and the banning of the Malayan Communist
Party. Also on the list of banned parties was the Hizbul Muslimin, whose lead-
ers were arrested. Their detention spelled the end of the Ma’ahad al-Ehya as-
Sharif madrasa, because colonial authorities had also arrested and detained
the party’s president Ustaz Abu Bakar and six other leaders. These arrests
adversely affected the educational and political activities at the Ma’ahad.
Nearly half the students left as there were no longer enough teachers. It was
from this period onwards that the pondoks and madrasas of Malaya came
under the scrutiny of the Malayan security services, for it was now clear
that these religious schools could also play a role in the politics of the
colony.
Despite the arrests of the teachers at the Ma’ahad al-Ehya as-Sharif, the
madrasas and pondoks of Malaya continued to flourish throughout the late
1940s and 1950s. In summing up the early history of these institutions in
Malaya, it can be said that as a result of the colonial encounter a new type
of modernist, politically-inclined pondok system had developed in Malaya,
running parallel to their more traditional and conservative counterparts.
The links of the Ma’ahad al-Ehya as-Sharif to the country’s first Islamic
party demonstrated that pondoks and madrasas were not solely educational
institutions and that they could also play a role in the political lives of Mus-
lims. It was therefore not surprising that the development of the country’s
second (and longest-lasting) Islamic party PAS took place in the bosom of
the country’s pondok and madrasa network as well.
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The Founding of PAS and its Links to the Pondok and Madrasa
Network of Malaysia
The nucleus of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party actually lay in the Bureau of
Religious Affairs of the ethno-nationalist Malay party, the United Malays Na-
tional Organisation (UMNO) that was founded in 1946 by a coalition of na-
tionalist Malay organisations at the peak of the struggle against British
colonial rule.13 At that time, UMNO’s bureau of religious affairs was domi-
nated by Malay-Muslim imams and teachers of pondok and madrasa schools,
and many of their concerns (such as the need to develop Islamic education
in Malaya) reflected their own professional interests in keeping the pondok
system alive in the country. But deep-rooted ideological differences between
the ulama and political elite of UMNO eventually led to the split between the
two factions and the emergence of PAS on 24 November 1951.
PAS’s close links to the world of Muslim education was evident in the
name of the organisation itself. When it was formed in 1951, PAS was then
called the Persatuan Alim Ulama Sa-Malaya (Organisation of Muslim Scholars
of Malaya) and it was led by Haji Fuad Hassan, who was the head of the
UMNO party’s bureau of religious affairs. The party’s first official headquar-
ters was based at the Madrasah al-Masriyyah at Bukit Mertajam in Penang,
an old establishment that had been founded by Sheikh Salleh Masri in 1906,
and which happened to be the madrasa where Fuad Hassan himself had
studied. At the second PAS General Assembly, held in 1952 at another
madrasa in Bukit Mertajam, Penang – the Madrasah Da’irat al-Ma’arif al-
Wathaniah that was founded by Sheikh Ahmad Badawi (father of the cur-
rent Prime Minister of Malaysia, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi) – the party estab-
lished its youth wing known as the Dewan Pemuda PAS. Later the party’s
youth wing would open its own offices at a third madrasa, the Madrasah
Khairiyyah at Pokok Sena in Kedah. During PAS’s early years, many of its
leaders and members happened to be religious teachers, imams and lebais at
the madrasas, pondoks and mosques of the northern Malay states, and it was
no accident that PAS’s opponents referred to the party as one of the three
P’s: Padi, Pondok, PAS (rice fields, pondoks, and PAS).
From its earliest days, PAS’s leaders were keen to develop their contacts
and links to Malaysia’s pondok and madrasa network. In the period 1956-
1969, Dr. Burhanuddin al-Helmy and Dr. Zulkiflee Muhammad – both of
whom were the products of both religious and as secular educations – were
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the leaders largely responsible for turning PAS into a political party with a
rationalised organisational structure, a chain of command and links with
other Islamic parties and movements abroad. Cognisant of the fact that the
new Islamic party was desperately in need of funding and manpower, PAS
leaders like Dr. Burhanuddin and Dr. Zulkiflee turned to the pondoks and
madrasas for help. It was during this period that PAS began to develop its
sub-elite strata of party-political functionaries consisting of PAS-supporting
ulama, imams, gurus and dakwah missionaries.
In the 1960s, PAS began to lay down its foundations of a cadre system by
developing its network of Islamic schools. Through their contacts in the pon-
doks and madrasas that dotted the Malay Peninsula, the PAS was able to
spread its message quickly, effectively and most important of all, cheaply.
Under the leadership of Dr. Burhanuddin al-Helmy, PAS developed into an
Islamist party that was both nationalist and anti-imperialist in its outlook.
The party articulated concerns related to economic independence, the
struggle against colonialism and neo-colonial hegemony, as well as the
need to promote a dynamic and issue-based form of popular Islam. But in
1969, Dr. Burhanuddin passed away after being detained without a trial by
the Malaysian government. PAS then came under the leadership of Mo-
hamad Asri Muda, who was a staunch defender of Malay rights and privi-
leges.
The period of Asri Muda’s leadership of PAS was a highly controversial
one. In Malaysian political circles, he was known as a fervent Malay ethno-
nationalist as well as one of the few upcoming Malay-Muslim politicians
whose educational background was entirely local. In his youth he had stud-
ied at both the madrasas and Malay vernacular schools of Kelantan and
neighbouring states.14 Between 1970 to 1982, Asri Muda turned PAS into an
ethno-centric Malay-Muslim party that was concerned with the promotion
of the status of Malay-Muslims in Malaysia.
It was during Asri Muda’s time that PAS’s power base was rooted in the
northeastern state of Kelantan, and it was in Kelantan that Asri worked
hardest to secure PAS’s organic links with the pondok and madrasa network.
The predominantly Malay state of Kelantan was, at that time, one of the
most remote and isolated states on the peninsula and was viewed with a
mixture of curiosity and contempt by the elites in the capital, Kuala
Lumpur. But despite the relatively low level of development, Kelantan was
known as a centre of Islamic learning, earning it the reputation of being
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both the heart of Malay culture on the peninsula and as the serambi Mekah
(porch of Mecca). Kelantan was also closely linked to the Malay community
of Patani to the north, which had once been a Malay kingdom but had been
incorporated into the state of Thailand (formerly Siam) after the Anglo-
Siamese treaty of 1909. Both Kelantan and Patani had been at the forefront
of Muslim education and like Kelantan, Patani was also known for its ex-
tensive pondok school network.15
Soon afterwards, Asri was able to expand his local support base when he
was given the opportunity to set up party branches in the predominantly
Malay state of Trengganu, directly to the south of Kelantan. Besides lectures
given at mosques, surau and madrasas, they also used the more informal
modes of communication used by Islamist movements in other parts of the
world. Like Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt, Asri Muda preferred winning new supporters via informal personal
contacts at places such as coffee shops.
Meanwhile, Kelantan’s southern neighbour, Trengganu, also had a repu-
tation as a centre for Islamic learning. While Kelantan was known as the ser-
ambi Mekah, Trengganu proudly declared itself the serambi Madinah (porch of
Medina) in the peninsula. The first PAS branch in Trengganu was set up in
1956 in Dungun under Asri’s personal direction. Henceforth, Asri concen-
trated most of his efforts on the northern states of Kelantan and Treng-
ganu, working closely with his lieutenants and trying to convert the local
imams and pondok teachers to PAS’s cause. Asri realised that when one dealt
with the local guru of the pondok schools and madrasas he had to adopt a
very different approach. The local imams and gurus of Kelantan and Treng-
ganu were not particularly happy with PAS’s success, as it represented a
threat to the status quo ante. Traditionally, the state’s gurus and imams were
respected and revered men of learning, but they kept their distance from
the world of politics. Winzeler (1975), among others, has noted that the
gurus of Kelantan were generally conservative and traditional in their out-
look, belonging to the more reactionary Kaum Tua generation.16 They shied
away from politics and were reluctant to embrace any kind of Islamist
movement that called for socio-political reform. Some were also supporters
of the traditional establishment, which was identified with the Kelantan
royal family and UMNO, under Tunku Abdul Rahman. Asri knew that he
had to win the support of this vital local constituency if he was to win con-
trol of Kelantan for good. To win over these conservative and recalcitrant re-
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ligious functionaries and leaders, Asri needed to adapt his own Islamist dis-
course to emphasise both his Islamist and his Malay-centric nationalist con-
cerns.
Through the careful cultivation of personal client networks with the
local religious teachers and patronage of the pondoks and madrasas of Ke-
lantan and Trengganu, Asri Muda managed to secure their loyalty and sup-
port during the elections of 1959 right up to 1969. During the 1959 elec-
tions, PAS’s election campaign in the states of Kelantan and Trengganu was
aided and abetted by the state’s religious teachers and schools, helping the
party rise to power in both states for the first time ever. This made PAS the
first Islamist party in Asia to be legally elected into office.
The close co-operation between PAS and the religious schools network
continued right up to the late 1960s, which allowed PAS to again win big in
both states during the 1969 elections. The results of these elections, how-
ever, were nullified as a result of the declaration of a state of National Emer-
gency in May 1969 by the UMNO-led government, which had lost consider-
able support across the country.
Economic and Structural Change in the 1970s and its Impact on
PAS and the Pondok Network
It is evident that the existence and development of the pondoks and
madrasas of Malaysia were determined by various political-economic factors
and the changes that took place in Malay-Muslim society as a result of struc-
tural-economic changes as well. Earlier we argued that pondoks and
madrasas existed in the Malay world well before the coming of Western
colonial rule, though the encounter with Western colonialism did ulti-
mately force some of the pondoks and madrasas of Malaysia to adapt to the
political and economic realities of the times. That the Kaum Muda’s modern
pondoks and madrasas emerged in the 1920s was to be expected, considering
the migration of Muslims to the Crown Colonies of Penang, Malacca and
Singapore whose political economies were very different from that of the
traditional agrarian feudal economies of the Malay kingdoms. The different
socio-economic realities of the Crown Colonies opened up new opportuni-
ties for the economic and political mobilisation of Malayan Muslims, which
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also led to the emergence of these new modern pondoks and madrasas that
were interested in issues of economic and political emancipation.
By the 1970s, Malaysia was beginning to undergo more radical socio-eco-
nomic changes that likewise affected the development of the pondoks and
madrasas and their place in Malaysian society. Thanks to economic and de-
mographic factors brought about by Malaysia’s economic development and
the transition to a more urban-based polity, the country’s religious schools
were gradually sidelined by the rise of the nation’s new urban-based univer-
sities. By 1969, Malaysia was witnessing the emergence of new Islamist ac-
tors and agents on the national scene, mainly the urban and campus-based
Islamist student movements such as the Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia
(Malaysian Islamic Youth Movement, ABIM) and the Sufi-inspired tradition-
alist-mystical Darul Arqam movement.17
ABIM and the Darul Arqam movement were both campus-based, urban
organisations that were symptomatic of the changes taking place in
Malaysia and in Malay-Muslim society at the time. The introduction of the
New Economic Policy (NEP), which sought to improve the economic lot of
the Malays, coupled with the creation of new industrial zones on the west
coast of the Malaysian Peninsula and the opening of new urban settlements
meant an expansion of the urban services sector, which led to more rural
youth migrating to the cities for educational and work opportunities while
the Malay hinterland was slowly but eventually significantly depopulated.
As a result of the gradual urbanisation of the Malay community, the reli-
gious schools of Kelantan and Trengganu shrunk in size, numbers and im-
portance; only to be overshadowed by the new modern universities, Islamic
colleges and the International Islamic University that was founded in Kuala
Lumpur in 1982.
The gradual socio-economic changes that were taking place in the Malay
community meant that both PAS and UMNO had to adapt to the develop-
ments among their primary political constituency. By the 1970s and 1980s,
the UMNO-led government was already trying to reform Malaysia’s pondoks
and madrasas by bringing some of them under state control and patronage.
PAS in its turn sought to maintain its links with the pondok network by
sponsoring religious schools of their own, and providing opportunities for
the best graduates of these pondoks and madrasas to continue their studies
in the religious schools of Pakistan and India. By 1980, about 14% of
Malaysia’s total student population was estimated to be engaged in Islamic
FA R I S H A . NOOR
202
AUP-ISIM-IS-BW-Madrasa-DEF2:BW  24-09-2008  16:54  Pagina 202
studies in the strict sense.18 But both the UMNO-led government and PAS
were aware of the political potential of the religious schools, and, further-
more, the Iranian revolution of 1979 had demonstrated how students, when
indoctrinated and mobilised, could be a potent force.
PAS was then under the leadership of Haji Yusof Rawa, who was of
ulama background and who led the so-called ‘ulama faction’ that had grown
in power within the party. Yusof Rawa was himself a product of religious
education in Malaysia’s madrasas and was later a student at several Islamic
madrasas and colleges in Cairo and Mecca. Yusof Rawa had come under the
influence of the Muslim Brotherhood during his studies in Egypt, and it was
he who re-oriented PAS’s struggle and brought it in line with other Islamist
movements and political organisations in the rest of the Islamic world. Bor-
rowing some of the methods of the Muslim Brotherhood, PAS under the
leadership of Yusof Rawa introduced the practice of usrah (group meetings)
in madrasas and mosques intended to bring party members together and to
encourage them to understand, develop and propagate the ideology of the
party among themselves as well as among non-members. These usrah ses-
sions were divided into different types: usrah sessions for the party leaders
and usrah for ordinary members. Usrah sessions for the muslimat (women
members) were also encouraged. On some occasions, the usrah was accom-
panied by a kenduri (feast) held in members’ homes to which non-members
were also invited. These meetings helped to generate a sense of common be-
longing and fellowship (ukhuwwah) among the PAS members and bring
them closer together. Apart from tarbiyah and usrah sessions, Yusof Rawa
and PAS’s leaders also played an active role in supporting (and often lead-
ing) many religious meetings and rituals performed by PAS members. Qia-
mulail (Ar. qiyam al-layl, ‘rising from sleep in the night’) sessions were also
held on every Thursday evening.
Yusof Rawa and the other ulama leaders of PAS were instrumental in
promoting the pondoks and madrasas that served as their political base as
well as privately-run educational centres. Besides Yusof Rawa subsequent
decades also saw the rise to political prominence of two pondok-based
ulama, Tuan Guru Nik Aziz Nik Mat in Kelantan and Tuan Guru Hadi Awang
in Trengganu. The much-revered Tuan Guru Nik Aziz Nik Mat was based in
Kelantan and became the first PAS leader whose education was almost en-
tirely based on the traditional pondok and madrasa system. His father, Ustaz
Nik Mat Alim, had his own religious school, the Sekolah Agama Darul
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Anwar, and, in his youth, Nik Aziz was sent away to study in various fa-
mous traditional pondoks in Kelantan and Trengganu, completing his educa-
tion with a long stay at the Dar al-ªUlum of Deoband in India. He emerged
to play a crucial role in the transmission of the Deobandi concept of educa-
tion and the Deobandi curriculum amongst the Malay pondoks.19
Like Yusof Rawa, Nik Aziz’s outlook on Islamic education and the role of
the pondoks and madrasas was shaped in part by his own experience and the
teaching he had received abroad in Deoband, India. Upon his return to
Malaysia in 1962, Nik Aziz first worked at Tarbiyyah Mardiah Islamic Sec-
ondary School. He then began working at his father’s school, the Madrasah
Darul Anwar. Worried about the prospect of the demise of the pondoks and
madrasas of Kelantan and equally concerned by the government’s constant
attempts to reform these institutions, Nik Aziz began to tour the state, giv-
ing speeches in which he compared the state of Islamic education in
Malaysia with that of other Islamic countries. He argued that Muslims
should pay for their own Islamic education, and cited the example of al-
Azhar University in Cairo, which was sponsored by public donations. This
produced the desired result, and the public began making donations to the
Darul Anwar school.
For PAS leaders like Nik Aziz, a religious education was a means for cre-
ating a class of spiritually inclined leaders who would safeguard the welfare
and concerns of Muslims and see that shariªa law would eventually be im-
plemented in Malaysia.20 Students of the religious schools were seen as as-
sets in the struggle to promote a stricter adherence to Islam in the country.
Another aspect of Deobandi thinking clearly evident in Nik Aziz’s style of
leadership is the desire to purify Islam and Muslim culture from elements
regarded as superstitious (khurafat), polytheistic (shirk), unlawful innova-
tions (bidªa) and deviant teachings (ajaran sesat). Some of the traditional
ulama, he argued, were wrong because their scriptural knowledge rested on
old Malay textbooks (kitab Jawi) that were poorly translated.21 He insisted
that only a thorough campaign to eliminate and remove all of these ele-
ments from Malay society could transform them into true Muslims. This
brought him into conflict with the traditional ulama of the more traditional
madrasas and pondoks of Kelantan.
The other PAS leader and alim who was noted in his efforts to promote
the pondoks and madrasas was the Trengganu-based Tuan Guru Hadi
Awang, who was strongly entrenched in his Madrasah Rusila in the small
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coastal town of Rusila (near Marang, Trengganu). Ustaz Hadi Awang had in-
herited control of the madrasa from his father who was also known as one
of the foremost Ustazs in the state. Both of these prominent madrasas were
attended by Malay-Muslim children whose families were mainly members
or supporters of PAS. In the case of Hadi Awang’s Madrasah Rusila, the in-
stitution would eventually develop working links with major madrasas
abroad such as the Syed Maudoodi International Islamic Institute (SMII) of
Lahore that was run by the Pakistani Islamist party, the Jamaªat-i Islami.
The best graduates of Hadi Awang’s Rusila madrasa would be selected to
continue their studies at the SMII in Pakistan, which, in turn, further bol-
stered the links between the two Islamist parties across the Indian Ocean.22
However, while PAS leaders like Yusof Rawa, Nik Aziz and Hadi Awang
were busy trying to expand and develop the network of pondoks and
madrasas linked to PAS, other developments in Malaysia further compli-
cated the already complex image of these traditional institutions. The
UMNO-led government was relentless in its efforts to cast the PAS-con-
trolled pondoks as centres of obscurantist teaching and militant anti-govern-
ment activity. In 1985, another opportunity to demonise the pondok institu-
tion arose.
Suppressing the Radical Tendency in PAS: The Memali Massacre
The 1980s witnessed the rapid industrialisation and urbanisation of
Malaysia as it was led by the country’s fourth Prime Minister, Dr. Mahathir
Mohamad. Dr. Mahathir was a modernist at heart who wished to transform
Malaysia into a fully-industrialised country. He was also known for his an-
tipathy towards and suspicion of PAS – which he regarded and cast as a fun-
damentalist party – and its links to Malaysia’s pondoks and madrasas. Un-
derstandably PAS’s ulama and teachers of the PAS-controlled pondoks re-
garded Dr. Mahathir as a dangerous secular leader who was keen to radi-
cally transform and modernise the madrasas and pondoks altogether, in
order to deprive the Islamic party of one of its most important support
bases and networks.
Throughout the 1980s, the tenor of the strife between UMNO and PAS
reached its most virulent peak, with several PAS leaders openly condemning
Dr. Mahathir and the UMNO-led government for being secular, Westernised
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and anti-Islam. Among these scholar-leaders was Ustaz Ibrahim Mahmood,
a well-known religious teacher in Kedah, who had studied at various pon-
doks and madrasas in Malaysia and later abroad at places such as the Dar al-
ªUlum Deoband in India and al-Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt. Later he
completed his studies at the University of Tripoli in Libya, earning him the
nickname ‘Ibrahim Libya’.
Upon his return to Malaysia, Ibrahim Libya worked for the Malaysian
government’s Islamic Centre, which was one of the offices linked to the
Prime Minister’s Department. He soon left government service and joined
the opposition PAS instead, and founded his own madrasa, the Madrasah Is-
lahiyyah Diniyyah, in the state of Kedah.23 The madrasa soon became recog-
nised as one of the most active centres of PAS activities in Kedah, and it was
from his madrasa that Ibrahim Libya began to issue his calls for jihad
against the Malaysian government on the grounds that UMNO, as an ethno-
nationalist party, was in fact a secular party opposed to the values and ob-
jectives of political Islam. Ibrahim Libya’s call for open revolt against the
state eventually led to a warrant for his arrest being issued.
On 19 November 1985, the state’s security forces surrounded the village
of Memali in an attempt to arrest the PAS leader and his followers. In the
clash that ensued, Ibrahim Libya and fourteen of his followers were killed.
On the same day, a state of emergency was declared in the state of Kedah
and restraining orders were imposed in the neighbouring states of Kelan-
tan, Trengganu and Perak. Henceforth, the Malaysian government’s rela-
tions with PAS’s madrasas and pondoks became troublesome and difficult, to
say the least.
The killings at the Memali madrasa marked the nadir of the UMNO-led
government’s relations with the pondok and madrasa network in Malaysia.
PAS, in its turn, used the Memali incident as proof that the Malaysian gov-
ernment was not sincere in its claims that it wanted to promote Islamic ed-
ucation in Malaysia, and reacted to the UMNO-led government’s criticisms
by further intensifying its support of and co-operation with the pondok and
madrasa network. During the Federal Elections of 1990, PAS managed to
win many of the State Assembly seats and all of Kelantan’s Federal seats,
thereby wiping out all traces of UMNO influence there. Tuan Guru Nik Aziz
was elected as the Chief Minister of Kelantan, the first ulama ever to be
elected to such a prominent political position.
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Having thus risen to power, one of the first things that Tuan Guru Nik
Aziz did was to table a financial aid package to the state’s madrasas. This
was because all Federal government funding to the religious schools in the
state had been stopped by the UMNO-led government. In the 1991 Kelantan
state budget, the PAS-led government allocated 15 million Ringgit (4 million
USD) to the Yayasan Islam Kelantan (Kelantan Islamic Foundation), to improve
the standard of religious (Islamic) education. State funds were also allocated
to pondok schools.24 Tuan Guru Nik Aziz even arranged for the Sultan of Ke-
lantan to tour the pondok schools during his birthday celebrations in 1991.25
These investments paid off very quickly. In 1990, 34,721 students were en-
rolled in religious schools sponsored by the Yayasan Islam. In 1991, the fig-
ure rose to 37,726; in 1992, 39,633; and in 1993, 41,864.26
The Future of Malaysia’s Madrasas and Pondoks, and Their
Relevance to PAS
The future development of Malaysia’s madrasas and pondoks hangs in the
balance as the country continues in its march towards economic develop-
ment accompanied by massive rural migration to the urban centres and the
creation of a new urban-based Malay-Muslim constituency. The question
therefore arises: What will the fate of Malaysia’s predominantly rural
madrasas and pondoks be in the long run?
This chapter has focused primarily on the strong historical links be-
tween the Pan-Malaysian Islamic party and Malaysia’s madrasa and pondok
networks. As we have shown, PAS’s early success would not have been pos-
sible without the close co-operation between the Islamist party’s leaders
and the madrasas and pondok schools in the predominantly rural Malay
states of the north. From the very beginning, PAS, the party whose leaders
and members were originally composed of religious scholars and func-
tionaries, had close links to the religious schools network that spread across
Malaysia’s Malay-dominated rural hinterland, which has served as its sup-
port base and communications centres till this very day. When the party
began to adopt hi-tech modes of communication to maintain its links with
its members and to spread its message even further, one of the first innova-
tions it introduced was the practice of filming and transmitting the ser-
mons and speeches of the party’s ulama leaders from the madrasas and pon-
F R OM PONDOK TO PA R L I AM EN T
207
AUP-ISIM-IS-BW-Madrasa-DEF2:BW  24-09-2008  16:54  Pagina 207
doks via the Internet. The Friday sermons and lectures by PAS leaders like
Tuan Guru Nik Aziz and Tuan Guru Hadi Awang from their respective
madrasas in Kelantan and Trengganu are still being beamed across the
planet to their followers and supporters through the party’s Web site and
other related services such as PAS-TV.
For obvious reasons, PAS is not about to abandon its long-standing rela-
tion with Malaysia’s pondok and madrasa network. Though no definitive sta-
tistics are available and little research has been done on the religious
schools in Malaysia today,27 it is estimated that some 125,000 Malaysian
boys and girls are enrolled in the country’s madrasas and pondoks.28 Fur-
thermore, there is still no definitive register today that includes all of the
religious schools in the country; or a register of religious schools that are
linked to, and supported by, the Malaysian Islamic party itself. What is
clear, however, is that the Malaysian government is now forced to deal with
the issue of madrasas and the phenomenon of educational dualism (to bor-
row Hashim Rosnani’s phrase).29
The Malaysian government is fully cognisant of the fact that madrasas
and pondoks are here to stay, and that PAS will continue to nurture its links
with these institutions of Muslim learning, and it has since the 1970s at-
tempted to create, fund and develop its own network of state-sponsored Is-
lamic religious primary and secondary schools, Sekolah Rendah Kebangsaan
Agama (SRKA) and Sekolah Menengah Kebangsaan Agama (SMKA). While the
Malaysian government has been less successful in determining the form
and content of the independent madrasas and those that have come under
the support and patronage of PAS, it has at least been able to extend its ed-
ucational reform measures to the SRKAs and SMKAs under its control,
where today English has become a compulsory subject for all students.30
The Malaysian government’s concern about what is taught in these pondoks
and madrasas also extends further abroad, to the point where the
Malaysian government has even suggested that it may play a role in im-
proving the teaching curriculum of the madrasas in the troubled Muslim-
dominated provinces of Patani, Jala, Satun and Narathiwat in Southern
Thailand.31
The stakes in the campaign to rein in the pondoks and madrasas were
raised even higher following the attacks on the United States of America in
2001 and the Malaysian government’s tacit endorsement of Washington’s
global ‘War on Terror’ that ensued. While the government of Dr. Mahathir
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Mohamad was not exactly known for its love of Washington, the advent of
the ‘War on Terror’ allowed the Malaysian government to strategically re-
position itself in a favourable light thanks to its own long-standing cam-
paign to weaken the appeal of the Islamists of PAS.
The transnational networks of itinerant scholars and students who move
around the world from one madrasa to another was among the first things
to be affected by the new of the post-9/11 geo-political realities. By 2002, the
Malaysian government was already clamping down on foreign students
coming to Malaysia to study in its religious schools, and other Muslim gov-
ernments followed suit. By 2004, the number of Malaysian (and other
Southeast Asian) students in countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh and India
had dropped to a trickle and the government of Pakistan refused to offer
new student visas to Southeast Asian students who wanted to study in the
madrasas there. Furthermore, in January 2002, the Malaysian government
ordered its security forces to raid and close down the madrasa of the con-
servative Indonesian cleric Abu Bakar Ba’asyir (who was on the run from In-
donesian authorities and who had been living in exile in Malaysia) that was
based in the southern Malaysian state of Johor, bordering Singapore.
Though Ba’asyir had no relations or contact whatsoever with PAS, the clamp-
down on his small madrasa came at a time when all pondok and madrasa
schools were suspected and this only further exacerbated the negative
image of these institutions as a whole.
In 2002, the Malaysian government also suspended funding to 260
madrasas and pondoks across the country that were run privately by non-
state and non-UMNO trustees and directors, on the grounds that some of
them might be directly or indirectly linked to PAS.32 In 2003, the then Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohamad was actively discouraging Malaysian parents
from sending their children to pondok schools (particularly those with open
links to PAS) on the grounds that these schools were ‘preaching hate’
against the Malaysian government and being used as recruiting grounds for
both PAS and other more radical dissident Islamist groups in the country.
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Fear and Loathing: The Demonisation of the Pondoks and
Madrasas of PAS in Malaysia Today
As we have shown earlier, pondok schools and madrasas have existed in
Malaysia since before British colonial rule. What is significant, however, is
how the impact of Western colonialism gave birth to a new type of pondok
and madrasa that was not only modern in its teaching methods and cur-
riculum, but also in its political ambitions. A new generation of kaum muda-
led pondoks and madrasas emerged in the early decades of the twentieth
century, which were overtly political and played a key role in the political
empowerment and mobilisation of the Muslims of Malaya. During the early
stages of the anti-colonial struggle in British Malaya, the Malay-Muslim elite
were less wary of these politicised pondoks and madrasas for the simple rea-
son that their struggle against British colonial rule concurred with the in-
terests of the Malay-Muslim elite who also wanted to see the end of British
colonialism in Malaya. Thus the pondok and madrasa schools were seen (and
characterised) by the Malay elites as generally positive, and were com-
mended for the role they played in preserving Malay-Muslim identity as well
as developing the first generation of Malay-Muslim proto-nationalists who
later took active part in the anti-colonial struggle in British Malaya.
The view of the pondoks and madrasas began to change in the late 1940s,
when it became clear that some of these religious schools were aligned to
the radical Malay Left who not only wanted independence but also wanted
to create an independent Muslim state, which would cater to the interests
of the Malay peasantry. By the time the conservative UMNO party was
formed (in 1946) and the Malaysian Islamic Party PAS had entered the arena
of post-colonial politics (in 1951), PAS’s pondoks and madrasas were specifi-
cally singled out as potential threats to UMNO’s political fortunes, and by
extension, to the Malaysian state.
As we have shown earlier in this chapter, the UMNO-led Malaysian
state’s reaction to the pondok and madrasa network in Malaysia has been
two-fold: On the one hand, the UMNO-governed state has tried to co-opt and
patronise non-political pondoks and madrasas as their own; while, on the
other hand, doing its best to limit the popularity and influence of those re-
ligious schools that have come under PAS’s influence. This was the back-
ground to the numerous attempts at Islamic educational reform in Malaysia
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during the Mahathir era (1981-2003) and which persists to this very day
under the leadership of Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi.
This sustained campaign to control the pondoks and madrasas of the
country has often been couched in a discourse of paternalistic concern for
Malaysia’s Muslim citizens that posits the view of pondoks and madrasas as
being, at best, quaint, rustic and traditional institutions that need to be
overhauled and reformed: In 2001 the country’s Education Minister Musa
Muhammad noted that less than 25% of the madrasas and pondoks’ gradu-
ates qualified for admission to the country’s universities (as compared to
some 90% of secular national school graduates).33 Shortly after other
Malaysian leaders such as Abdul Ghani Othman, Chief Minister of Johor,
added that ‘there must be a balance between religious education and scien-
tific knowledge so that students from religious schools will not lag behind
in the modern world’.34 Some Malaysian politicians have even suggested
that some of the pondok schools be re-packaged as potential sites for foreign
tourists to visit, in order to get a glimpse of the ‘authentic, traditional’ life
of rural Malays.35 However, this paternalistic and sometimes patronising
discourse of care and control once again reiterates the common jaundiced
view (favoured by Malaysia’s Western-educated elite) that the pondok and
madrasa are exotic, outdated institutions that have not kept up with
modernity and that if left to their own devices, can only produce poorly-ed-
ucated graduates whose knowledge skills are useless in a modern industrial
economy.
In its attempt to keep the nation’s pondoks and madrasas under its con-
trol, the UMNO-led state has sought to promote the religious schools that
have come under its own patronage. With higher-level Islamic education
being offered by institutions like the International Islamic University of
Malaysia and research on Islamic issues being carried out at institutes such
as IKIM and ISTAC, the government-sponsored religious schools (SRKAs and
SMKAs) of Malaysia have also received further financial, material and logis-
tical support in the form of higher budget allocations, donations of com-
puters and special promotional campaigns (via the Internet and other forms
of communication) to advertise themselves as alternative institutions of Is-
lamic learning to PAS’s madrasas and pondoks.36
In tandem with this paternalistic discourse of care and patronage that
posits the stereotypical image of the traditional pondok and madrasa as an
outdated institution is a more aggressive and sinister discourse of security
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and anti-terrorism, which puts forward the claim that the pondoks and
madrasas of PAS in particular have been instrumentalised by the party to
create its own pool of fanatical party cadres; and that some of PAS’s
madrasas may even have links to violent militant groups both inside and
outside of the country. As we have shown above, this second discourse has
been particularly well served since 11 September 2001 and Washington’s
unilateral declaration of a ‘War on Terror’. The government of Malaysia (like
the governments of Pakistan, Indonesia, Egypt, Turkey and many other
Muslim countries) seized upon this shift in geo-strategic realities to renew
its assault on PAS’s pondoks and madrasas, this time with the tacit endorse-
ment of Western agencies, governments and media who were likewise wor-
ried about the prospect of the rise of militant radical Islam world-wide.
However, this discourse of security-maintenance and terror-prevention
also reiterates the trope of the pondok or madrasa as an institution that
should be kept at arm’s length and mistrusted. In the Malaysian context, it
also involves the historical erasure of the genuinely emancipatory role
played by many of the pondoks and madrasas of the past in the anti-colonial
struggle for independence (which was indeed a political struggle with radi-
cal political objectives).
The fate of the pondoks and madrasas of Malaysia today therefore hinges
on the twists and turns of geo-politics and how the combined pressure of
the discourse of paternalistic education reform as well as the discourse of
terror-prevention will be utilised by the UMNO-led state in the future. As we
have shown above, this conflict is primarily a political one, which has more
to do with the constant battle for Malay-Muslim votes between the two
biggest Malay-Muslim parties of Malaysia, UMNO and PAS, than with the
teaching of Islam in the Muslim schools themselves. After all, the UMNO-led
government has shown that it is more comfortable with the pondok and
madrasa schools that have come under its control, thereby demonstrating
that Islam and Islamic education is not the problem per se, but rather PAS
and its support of other pondoks that have eluded governmental patronage
and surveillance. Thus the long-term future of Malaysia’s pondoks and
madrasas will be determined by the outcome of this political contest be-
tween UMNO and PAS, as both sides will undoubtedly remain relentless in
their claim to be the party that best caters to the needs of Muslim education
in Malaysia.
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8 Traditionalist and Islamist Pesantrens
in Contemporary Indonesia
Martin van Bruinessen
Like the madrasas in India and Pakistan, the Indonesian pesantrens – reli-
gious boarding schools, the local variant of the madrasa – have in recent
years drawn some unfriendly attention due to suspicions of their involve-
ment in radical and possibly terrorist activities. The Indonesian authorities
did not appear to share those suspicions, certainly not concerning the pe-
santren in general, but those of the Philippines, Singapore, Australia and the
US, as well as numerous international journalists have shown grave con-
cern. This was mostly due to the fact that some highly visible terrorism sus-
pects share a connection with one particular pesantren in Central Java, the
PP (Pondok Pesantren) Al-Mukmin in Ngruki near Solo or with one of a
small number of offshoots from this school.1 Ustad Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, who
was one of the founders of this pesantren in the early 1960s, returned in
1999, after having spent fourteen years in Malaysian exile. He has been ac-
cused of being the spiritual leader of an underground movement known as
Jama’ah Islamiyah, which is believed to be active throughout Muslim South-
east Asia and to have carried out a large number of terrorist acts in this re-
gion. Several of the perpetrators of the Bali bombing of 12 October 2002,
which killed some two hundred people, were associated with a small pe-
santren in East Java where Ngruki graduates gave lessons; all of them held
Ba’asyir in high regard as the most learned and disinterested of the ulama.
The links that this particular pesantren had to terrorist acts appeared,
upon closer inspection, to be more tenuous than had been originally
claimed. Furthermore, nothing could be more misleading than to extrapo-
late from ‘Ngruki’ to other Indonesian pesantrens. The PP Al-Mukmin and the
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handful of secondary pesantrens that it has spawned were established with
the express purpose of constituting an alternative to the existing ‘tradi-
tional’ pesantrens; its founders were Muslim reformists highly critical of the
pesantren tradition. The curriculum and the general culture of this pesantren
make it stand out from the vast majority of pesantrens in Java and, for that
matter, Southeast Asia as a whole. The pesantrens of Java and similar institu-
tions (surau, pondok) in other parts of Southeast Asia are the centres of rural
religious life; they tend to be tradition-oriented and socially conservative,
the mainstays of beliefs and practices against which reformists have turned
their most fervent efforts. Besides the pesantren at Ngruki, there have been a
few other attempts to establish alternative types of pesantren. Some of these
were associated with the reformist movements in Islamic Indonesia, such as
Persis and Muhammadiyah; others with various Islamist currents from the
past three decades or, most recently, the Saudi-inspired Salafi movement. In
general, however, the reformist movements have been associated with
‘modern’ school types with a heavy emphasis on general, non-religious sub-
jects, oriented towards secular professional careers.
In the first decades of Indonesia’s independence, mainstream Islam was
conventionally represented as consisting of a ‘modernist’ and a ‘traditional-
ist’ stream, with the associations Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama as
their major organisational vehicles.2 ‘Modernists’ were typically urban and
(lower) middle class and sent their children to a modern school; ‘tradition-
alists’ were largely rural (or urban lower class) and sent their children to a
pesantren, where they learned some Arabic and Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh)
but little or nothing about more general subjects. Muhammadiyah, estab-
lished in 1912, focused most of its energies on education and welfare, estab-
lishing hospitals and modern schools, both modelled on Christian mission-
ary examples. In matters of religious belief and practice it was reformist
and fiercely opposed to ‘syncretistic’ practices such as those surrounding
death and the visiting of graves and all other practises for which no prece-
dent could be found in the Qur’an and hadith. The Nahdlatul Ulama associa-
tion (NU) was established in 1926 specifically to protect the institutions and
practices that were criticised by the reformists and then actually threatened
by the then recent Saudi conquest of Mecca and Medina, the centres of tra-
ditional learning.3 The NU was an association of kyais (pesantren-based
ulama) with a mass following, which after Independence became a political
party. In the 1950s, most of its active members only had a pesantren educa-
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tion, which at the time did not include many general subjects, so that the
party had great difficulty finding qualified personnel to fill positions in the
government and bureaucracy to which it was entitled on the basis of its nu-
merical strength. The Ministry of Religious Affairs thus became its only fief
in the newly independent Republic of Indonesia.
Between them, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama can lay claim to
the loyalties of about half the Indonesian population. In a recent nation-
wide survey, 42% of the respondents indicated that they felt more or less
represented by the NU, 12% by Muhammadiyah.4 The way the questions
were framed suggests, however, that those who identified with the NU did
not mean so much the organisation itself as the religious attitudes it is as-
sociated with, including an openness to local traditions (and even syn-
cretism), flexibility and tolerance, as opposed to the more principled and
puritan, if not fundamentalist, attitudes associated with Muhammadiyah.
In the NU’s organisation itself, the pesantren remains the major institutional
prop, and the ulama of major pesantrens remain the chief authorities.
The Traditional Pesantren: Origins and History
Dutch colonial scholars have wanted to see in the pesantren the continuation
of pre-Islamic institutions: forest hermitages, mandala communities, or cen-
tres of transmission of Hindu and Buddhist scriptural knowledge. Although
it is not impossible that certain families and certain locales may represent
such a continuity, and although there is an obvious similarity in function –
some pesantrens are more than just centres of scriptural transmission and
are actually centres of spiritual and mystical exercises or supernatural heal-
ing besides– the pesantren tradition as found in twentieth-century Indonesia
is of much more recent origin.
Islam began to spread among the indigenous population of Java in the
fifteenth century. The earliest mention of a Muslim religious school thus far
is in a Dutch East Indies Company document of 1718, that is based on
hearsay and refers to the establishment of a ‘training school for religious’
near Surabaya.5 The oldest pesantren still in existence was established in the
late eighteenth century in the village of Tegalsari near Ponorogo in East
Java.6 A survey of indigenous education by Dutch authorities in 1819 found
few institutions that we would recognise today as pesantrens. Basic religious
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education was given informally in the mosque or in the private home of
someone who was slightly more learned than the people in his surround-
ings. Some of the more advanced students, the report states, were sent to
schools in the Madiun-Ponorogo region (where the said Tegalsari pesantren
was located). In an 1831 survey, simple Islamic schools are mentioned in the
coastal districts of Cirebon, Semarang and Surabaya but there were very few
inland. Java appears not yet dotted with pesantrens at the time of these sur-
veys, which is quite unlike the situation a century later.7
Most of the prestigious old pesantrens that still exist do not date further
back than the late nineteenth century, and many not even that far.8 Their
founders were usually men who had spent years studying in Mecca or Cairo.
Rather than imitating Hindu and Buddhist precursors, these late nine-
teenth- and early twentieth-century pesantrens appeared to be modelled on
institutions with which their founders had become familiar during their
studies in Arabia: the study circles (halqa) in the Great Mosque of Mecca (the
Masjid al-Haram), Cairo’s Azhar, which had a dormitory assigned to South-
east Asian students (the riwaq al-Jawa), and especially the slightly mod-
ernised madrasas in Mecca at the time. The most prominent of the latter
was the Madrasa Sawlatiyya, which was established by Indian Muslims in
1874 and which also attracted many Indonesian students. In 1934, following
an incident in which their national pride was impaired, the Indonesians
abandoned this madrasa and founded their own school, Dar al-ªUlum al-
Diniyya, which exists to this very day and has been a major centre of orien-
tation for the Indonesian traditional ulama.
Some of the founders of the early pesantrens may have belonged to fami-
lies that already enjoyed some religious prestige; others were bright young
men who could make the voyage to Mecca due to patronage; others again
supported themselves by engaging in trade. By the mid-twentieth century,
and perhaps even earlier, we find the pesantren-based ulama or kyais consoli-
dated into a caste-like rural elite, among whom descent is as important as
learning. A kyai’s sons shared their father’s prestige irrespective of learning;
and a bright and learned young man of low descent could only join their
ranks by marrying an established kyai’s daughter.
The teaching methods in Indonesian pesantrens followed those of Mecca
and Cairo, and educational reforms in these centres (classrooms, a grading
system, changes in curriculum) gradually spread from there to the Indone-
sian pesantrens. The curriculum in Indonesia was very similar to that of
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other regions where the Shafiªi school is followed: a few basic compendia of
Ashªari doctrine and the major handbooks of Shafiªi fiqh were the dominant
texts. Hadith collections, which are very important to Muslim reformists,
until recently hardly figured in the pesantren curriculum. When hadith were
studied at all, it was in the form of such collections as Nawawi’s ‘Forty Ha-
dith’ (Arbaªin) or his Riyad al-salihin, which legitimised popular devotional be-
liefs and practices the reformists frowned upon. The pesantren tradition held
devotional practices associated with the veneration of the Prophet and the
visiting of graves in high esteem, and many of its teachers were involved in
Sufi orders and Islamic healing. The reformist call for a return to the Qur’an
and hadith (to replace the uncritical following of classical fiqh texts) was
strongly rejected by the pesantren world, but it did have the effect that in the
course of the twentieth century the canonical hadith collections of Bukhari
and Muslim and an increasing range of Qur’anic commentaries became in-
corporated into the curriculum of many pesantrens.9
An important aspect of the pesantren tradition is the emphasis on the
oral transmission of knowledge, even of written texts. In the traditional di-
dactic styles, that are still maintained in many pesantrens, the student stud-
ies a specific text with a specific teacher, and upon finishing this text may
move on to another teacher, at another pesantren, to study another text. The
student may sit with others in a circle (halqa) around the teacher, who reads
the text aloud while students read along with him in their own copies of
the book. The teacher stops from time to time to comment on a point of
syntax or vocabulary, but he seldom if ever offers a critical interpretation or
comments on the applicability of the text. In a more individual mode, the
student may himself read passages of the text aloud while the teacher lis-
tens, questions, and comments on his reading. Both the teacher and the
teachings he handed down were treated with great respect, which pre-
cluded a critical discussion. The student was aware of being connected to
great masters of the past through the chains of oral transmission (isnad) of
the texts he studied, just like any follower of a Sufi order had a spiritual ge-
nealogy (silsila) linking him through successive teachers to the order’s
founder and ultimately to the Prophet. Love and even veneration for the
ulama of the past was and is an important part of the pesantren tradition.
Where possible, one was expected to follow their example, especially in
legal thought. Reformists criticised taqlid, the ‘blind’ following of the rul-
ings of ulama of the past, and proclaimed the need for independent inter-
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pretation, or ijtihad, instead.10 For traditionalists, however, fiqh belongs to
the essential core of Islam, and fiqh is impossible without taqlid, following
the rulings of the great ulama of the past who had developed the Shafiªi
madhhab or school of fiqh.
The debates between reformists and traditionalists, which were at times
very heated, revolved around such issues as taqlid, rituals for the dead and
the visiting of saints’ graves, the recitation of devotional texts for ‘magical’
purposes, etc. Reformists also criticised pesantren education for its emphasis
on rote learning without critical understanding and the study of post-classi-
cal scholastic texts rather than the original sources, Qur’an and hadith.
Under the influence of such criticism and the demands of a changing labour
market, most pesantrens introduced changes into their curriculum in the
course of the twentieth century. Among the religious subjects, hadith and
Qur’anic exegesis gradually took a more prominent place; many pesantrens
added general subjects and organised the curriculum in school classes par-
allel with those of the public school system.
In Indonesia, the term madrasa (spelled as madrasah in Indonesian) is re-
served for religious schools with classes and a standardised curriculum in-
cluding mostly general subjects. Government-supervised madrasas with 30
percent religious subjects and 70 percent general subjects offer diplomas
that give an opening to employment as a religious teacher as well as access
to state institutes of higher religious studies (IAIN) and eventually an av-
enue to a modern career. Many pesantrens have adopted the madrasa system
besides, or sometimes even instead of, more traditional modes of teaching,
and have thus to some extent become part of the national education system
(although not under the Ministry of Education but that of Religious Affairs).
Those pesantrens that maintained the ‘traditional’ curriculum and meth-
ods of teaching came to be known as ‘Salafiyah’, which may be translated as
‘in the way of previous generations’. This term has recently given rise to
confusion, when the Saudi-inspired Salafi movement came under suspicion
of violent radicalism.11 Both Salafiyah pesantrens and the Salafi movement
name themselves after al-salaf al-salih, ‘the pious predecessors’. But for the
latter, these salaf are the first three generations of Muslims in the time of
the Prophet and for the former the great ulama of an idealised, much more
recent past. In terms of religious belief and practice, they represent oppo-
site extremes within Indonesian Islam.
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Reformist Alternatives to the Traditional Pesantren12
As remarked earlier, the major reformist association is the Muhammadiyah,
which became best known for its modern schools, that offered a good gen-
eral curriculum with relatively little time devoted to religious lessons. Stu-
dents in these schools learned no Arabic. Muhammadiyah people spoke of re-
turning to the Qur’an and hadith but most could only read them in transla-
tion – and their actual religious reading consisted almost exclusively of con-
temporary reformist writers. Muhammadiyah established a few madrasas to
train its own religious teachers, but these remained rather unremarkable in-
stitutions.13
A more interesting effort to bridge the gap between the Muhammadiyah
religious attitude and traditional pesantren education resulted in the ‘mod-
ern pesantren’ of Gontor in East Java, which was established in 1926. Gontor
combined the study of classical texts with modern concepts of education
and a reformist spirit; it became the example on which a range of other re-
formist-oriented schools later modelled themselves.14 For inspiration, the
founders of Gontor not only looked at the reformist trend in Egypt (the Dar
al-ªUlum, where Abduh and Rashid Rida were active) but also at more mod-
ernist experiments in India, the Anglo-Muslim college of Aligarh and even
Rabindranath Tagore’s philosophy of education and his Santiniketan ex-
periment. The didactic methods were those of the modern school, and stu-
dents were obliged to communicate in either Arabic or English, in order to
train them in active mastery of these languages. The religious teaching ma-
terial continued to include some classical fiqh texts, notably Ibn Rushd’s Bi-
dayat al-mujtahid, which compares various legal schools. The pesantren of
Gontor thus positioned itself ideologically between the NU and Muham-
madiyah; some of its graduates became teachers in the NU pesantrens, others
in Muhammadiyah schools. Several went on to establish their own pe-
santrens on the Gontor model, or to reform an existing one, with their
Gontor experience guiding them. Since the 1960s, the school has developed
close relations with the Saudi-based Muslim World League (Rabitat al-ªAlam
al-Islami).
Other reformist associations also established religious schools that were
to have a wider influence. Al Irsyad is a social and religious reform move-
ment active among Indonesia’s Hadrami community, that broke away from
an earlier, more conservative Arab educational association, the Jamiat Khair
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(al-Jamªiyya al-Khayriyya). Al Irsyad’s madrasa in Jakarta, established in
1913, taught a curriculum of religious and general subjects exclusively in
Arabic, for which it employed mostly teachers from the Arab Middle East.
The school was oriented towards Egyptian reformism; instead of classical
fiqh texts it placed emphasis on the Qur’an and hadith, usul al-fiqh, and the
works of Abduh and other modern authors. The general subjects (at the sec-
ondary school level) included mathematics, Arab history and modern Euro-
pean history.15 Many graduates of this madrasa spread the reformist mes-
sage as teachers and preachers beyond Hadrami circles in Indonesia.
Persatuan Islam (‘Islamic Union’) or Persis, established in Bandung in
1923, was by far the most puritan of Indonesia’s reform movements and it
developed a religious attitude close to that of Saudi Salafism, although not
under any noticeable direct influence from Arabia. Unlike Muhammadiyah,
it had little interest in welfare work and it concentrated its efforts on ‘cor-
recting’ religious belief and practice. The fatwas of its founder, A. Hassan,
which referred exclusively to the Qur’an and hadith but reflected a rational
spirit, found eager readers among reformist-minded Muslims outside Persis
as well. Persis ran a well-known school in Bandung, not unlike Muham-
madiyah schools but with a stronger emphasis on Qur’an and hadith in the
religious classes. Towards the end of the colonial period, A. Hassan moved
to Bangil in East Java, where he established a pesantren (of secondary school
level) that was to teach only religious subjects. For a long time, this was the
only pesantren in Indonesia that was deliberately non-madhhab and focused
very strongly on the study of hadith.16 This pesantren became an important
training centre for religious teachers of a strict, puritan stripe.
Independence Movement, Jihad, and Darul Islam
Both the reformists and the traditionalists had generally adopted accommo-
dating attitudes towards the Dutch colonial authorities. The Japanese occu-
pation during World War II constituted an important break. The Japanese
carried out a programme of politicising and indoctrinating the Indonesian
ulama, and they created an umbrella organisation in which all Muslim asso-
ciations were represented.17 Within days after the Japanese surrender in
August 1945, Indonesian nationalist leaders declared independence; when
the first Allied troops landed to take control of the country on behalf of the
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former colonial authorities, they were not welcomed. The highest ulama of
the NU declared that in the current situation jihad was called for, because
non-Muslim forces were attempting to occupy independent Muslim terri-
tory. Ulama of other associations, throughout the country, followed suit
with similar declarations of jihad. In the following struggle for independ-
ence, youth of pesantren background, organised in militias called Hizbullah
and Sabilillah, played a prominent part.
After four years of intermittent fighting, a split occurred among the
Muslim supporters of the independence movement when the nationalist
leadership, in negotiations with the Dutch, accepted a temporary military
withdrawal from strategically important West Java. The Muslim guerrilla
units that refused to withdraw set up their own rudimentary government
under the name of Darul Islam. After independence, the Darul Islam refused
to recognise the secular republican government in Jakarta, and for more
than a decade it continued to control mountainous parts of West Java and
to successfully resist all efforts to subdue it. Insurgent movements in Aceh
and South Sulawesi joined it.18 The Darul Islam movement, which also
called itself the Islamic State of Indonesia (NII), had a shariªa court as its
major non-military institution. The political leaders were reformist Mus-
lims, but especially in West Java, it was mostly traditionalist pesantrens that
provided the movement with its fighting power. In the early 1960s, the
movement was finally vanquished and the leaders surrendered or were
killed. Decades later, it would become evident that the Darul Islam had con-
tinued as an underground movement, maintaining the old network of sup-
porters and recruiting new members.
Initially, the West Javanese Darul Islam appears to have enjoyed quite
widespread support, but after the Republican government had won inde-
pendence, most of the pesantrens in the region opted for good relations with
this government. The Japanese-created Muslim umbrella organisation,
Masyumi, was integrated into the Republic as a major political party. In
1952, the NU broke away from Masyumi to become a separate political
party, so that Masyumi became largely (though not exclusively) a Muslim re-
formist party. In both parties there were individuals who were close to the
Darul Islam, but both supported the government’s efforts to subdue it.
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Integration into the National Education System
Many pesantrens nowadays teach a government-approved curriculum con-
sisting of 70% general subjects and 30% religious subjects and are similar to
the government-run religious schools known as madrasa; they can give their
graduates the same madrasa diplomas. Insofar as they also offer more inten-
sive religious teaching, this is done at the secondary or higher levels, to stu-
dents who already have a school diploma. What distinguishes a pesantren
from a madrasa in the state system is that it is a private enterprise, usually
with dormitories where a considerable proportion of the students live, and
that education in a pesantren usually includes more traditional teaching of
classical texts in addition to the state madrasa curriculum. Moreover, most
pesantrens concentrate on students of secondary and higher levels. A
madrasah ibtida’iyah is like a primary school; madrasah tsanawiyah and ªaliyah
correspond with lower and higher secondary. Some pesantrens offer higher
levels that may be called muªallimin, i.e., ‘teacher training’, or maªhad ªali, a
name that suggests university level.
A madrasa diploma does not give access to a proper university, but after
Indonesia’s independence, one Institute for Higher Islamic Studies was es-
tablished that was accessible to madrasa graduates. Since the 1960s, the
number of such institutes, then called State Institute of Islamic Studies
(IAIN) has rapidly increased; there is now one in each provincial capital. As
a result of the madrasa curriculum and the opportunities provided by the
IAINs, most pesantrens have become integrated into the national educational
system and have to a considerable extent been brought under government
control. For a significant part of the population this development opened up
a channel for social mobility. Pesantren education was cheaper than educa-
tion in secular schools, whether private or state, and for certain families an
education in a religious school was culturally more acceptable than one in a
non-religious environment. Numerous IAIN graduates found employment
as religious teachers or in clerical positions or other jobs in the vast bu-
reaucracy of the Department of Religious Affairs (which oversees all reli-
gious education, administers marriages, runs religious courts, organises the
pilgrimage, and administers the collection and distribution of zakat). In-
creasing numbers of successful IAIN graduates have moreover been able to
move on to a general university for postgraduate studies (mostly in the hu-
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manities or social sciences) and have embarked upon careers outside the re-
ligious sphere.
Involvement in Community Development and New Discourses
Some pesantrens deliberately refused to adopt the standard madrasa curricu-
lum, for a number of different reasons. Some preferred to offer a solid reli-
gious curriculum, reading more and more difficult texts than was possible
in the standard curriculum – or different religious texts altogether (non-
madhhab or Salafi texts). Others did not wish their graduates to become civil
servants and preferred to teach them more practical knowledge. In the
1970s and 1980s, several pesantrens experimented with teaching agricultural
or technical skills besides religious subjects. This approach had been pio-
neered by the ‘agriculture pesantren’ Darul Fallah in Bogor, which was estab-
lished as early as 1960 by local Masyumi activists, but was soon closed down
because it leaders were jailed along with other Masyumi politicians. It re-
opened in 1967. The curriculum consisted of practical agricultural skills,
new technologies, relevant theoretical subjects, and the economic skills
needed for small rural enterprises, besides 25% religious subjects. The well-
connected leadership of this school found various Western aid agencies in-
terested in supporting this experiment; students came from all over In-
donesia, perhaps because of the school’s association with respected
Masyumi leaders.19
The most famous of the pesantrens that experimented with rural and
community development was that of Pabelan near Yogyakarta, which be-
longed to the Gontor ‘family.’ The kyai of this pesantren insisted on teaching
the students self-reliance and refused to give his graduates diplomas in
order to prevent them from becoming just civil servants. (Nonetheless, sev-
eral Pabelan graduates were to have successful academic careers.) Pabelan
taught a solid curriculum in Islamic subjects, with a strong emphasis on ac-
tive command of Arabic, and complemented this with practical training in
technical and agricultural skills that could be useful when the students re-
turned to their village.20 The well-known writer V.S. Naipaul, who visited Pa-
belan on his ‘Islamic journey’ in 1980, caustically asked what use it was to
teach village boys to become village boys,21 but other visitors, such as Ivan
Illich, were much more upbeat about this ‘alternative’ type of education.
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Many Indonesian social activists believed that it was precisely this type of
education that was needed to bring genuine development to the country
and not just economic growth that failed to empower the poor.
In the late 1970s and 1980s, co-operation developed between develop-
ment-oriented NGO activists and a number of pesantrens, including Pabelan,
whose leading teachers evinced a definite social commitment and the belief
in development from below. The inspiration for this co-operation came
again from Indian self-reliance movements, from the experiments of Paulo
Freire with teaching the Brazilian poor through ‘conscientisation’, and from
the radical critique of established education by thinkers like Ivan Illich. It
was, obviously, highly educated activists with international connections
who first picked up these ideas, but their choice of the pesantren as the focus
of their activities made good sense. In Suharto’s New Order Indonesia, the
government pursued a policy of depoliticisation of the rural population (as
well as the poor urban population) and made it illegal for political parties
and all sorts of associations to set up branches and have public activities in
the countryside. District towns constituted the lowest local level where ac-
tivities were permitted; reaching out to the rural population was therefore
practically impossible for them. Pesantrens were virtually the only non-state
institutions actually functioning at the grassroots level, which made them
appealing to activists who believed in bottom-up development besides or in-
stead of the government’s top-down policies.
It was at LP3ES, a development NGO founded by former student activists
of reformist Muslim and socialist backgrounds, that the idea of reaching
out to the grassroots via the pesantren and turning this traditional institu-
tion into a vehicle for rural development and empowerment of the poor was
first conceived.22 In order to identify appropriate pesantrens and gain access,
some people of NU background were recruited to co-ordinate LP3ES’s pe-
santren program. Socially committed students of the Bandung Institute of
Technology, who were barred from direct political involvement due to new
legislation following a wave of student protest in 1978, joined the effort,
with various initiatives to bring appropriate technology to the rural poor
through the pesantren. Western aid agencies – first the German Liberal
Party’s Friedrich Naumann Foundation, later various other agencies – sup-
ported these efforts financially and with expertise.23 People of pesantren
background were recruited as mediators, and gradually a group of experi-
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enced activists emerged within the conservative NU that acted as an in-
creasingly effective lobby for a reorientation of this organisation.
In 1984, an important NU congress decided that ‘social activities’, mean-
ing relief and development work, would be one of the organisation’s top pri-
orities, and it established several affiliated NGOs that were to engage in
these activities.24 The following two decades saw a dramatic increase in
NGO activity in and around the pesantrens, which at least provided a consid-
erable number of pesantren graduates with employment and training in vari-
ous practical skills. Many pesantrens that had been isolated and self-con-
tained were opened up to the outside world through these activities, broad-
ening the worldviews of both teachers and students. It is harder to assess
the impact of these activities on the welfare of the poor rural population,
however, and opinions on the economic success of the programs are di-
vided.25
The integration of the pesantren into the national education system also
had another interesting consequence: the emergence of a dynamic and rap-
idly growing circle of young Muslim intellectuals of pesantren background,
who, while studying at IAINs, were exposed to a range of other intellectual
influences that included social science, philosophy, theology of liberation
and Marxism. Partly overlapping with the environment of NGO activists,
this diffuse group of young people, sometimes dubbed the ‘progressive tra-
ditionalists’, were one of the most surprising and interesting phenomena of
the late 1980s and 1990s.26
Islam Against the New Order
The developments sketched so far took place in the most visible part of the
religious spectrum, among groups and prominent individuals who were ac-
ceptable into the New Order government and who themselves agreed in
principle, even if critically, with its policies. There were other circles that
had a more antagonistic relationship with the regime and resented its poli-
cies of social and religious engineering. Two broad groups stand out. One
consisted of the most outspoken leaders of the former Masyumi party, who
were reformist Muslims with a religious orientation and a liberal demo-
cratic political style. The party had clashed with Sukarno over the presi-
dent’s authoritarian style and its leaders had taken part in an American-
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supported regional rebellion in the late 1950s, after which the party was dis-
solved. Suharto never allowed the party to resurface and mistrusted its
most prominent leaders, the best known of whom was Mohammad Natsir.
Natsir and friends established an association for daªwa (religious propaga-
tion), the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII), with the intention of
changing society and the state by changing individual people’s attitudes,
transforming them into better Muslims.
The other group, which was even less visible, consisted of an under-
ground network of Islamic activists who strove to turn Indonesia into an Is-
lamic state. The network consisted of the remnants of the Darul Islam
movement, which had from 1949 until 1962 been in control of parts of West
Java, South Sulawesi and Aceh and as the ‘Islamic State and Army of In-
donesia’ (NII/TII) challenged the Republican government. At the grassroots
level, there had always been close relationships between the Masyumi fol-
lowing and that of Darul Islam, but the leadership of both had always been
antagonistic to one another. Masyumi considered the Republic as legitimate
and Natsir once served as a prime minister; the Darul Islam resented
Masyumi’s political support for the military operations aiming to destroy it.
The Darul Islam was a home-grown movement and never had interna-
tional contacts worth mentioning. Masyumi had been more internationally
oriented, and the DDII developed especially close contacts with the Arabian
Peninsula. It became the preferred Indonesian partner of the Saudi-spon-
sored Muslim World League (Rabitat al-ªAlam al-Islamiyya), of which Mo-
hammad Natsir was a founding member and long-time vice-president. The
DDII was the intermediary through which the ideas of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood (many of whose activists had taken refuge in Saudi Arabia and
the other Gulf states) first reached Indonesia. It published several seminal
texts in translation and was instrumental in introducing Brotherhood-style
mobilisation and moral training on university campuses.27 The DDII has
fallen increasingly under Salafi (‘Wahhabi’) influence since the 1980s.28
The pesantren at Gontor was ideologically close to the DDII. Like the
Dewan itself, it developed increasingly close relations with the Muslim
World League, which may have contributed to an increasingly more ‘puri-
tan’ attitude than in other pesantrens. It appears however that the DDII lead-
ership was disappointed with Gontor because it produced alumni who
adopted much more liberal religious views and politically accommodating
attitudes than what the DDII had hoped for – Nurcholish Madjid, who in
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1970 called for secularisation and opposed the idea of Islamic parties, being
the most prominent example.29
The DDII maintained close relations with the ‘agricultural pesantren’
Darul Fallah in Bogor, whose leading kyai, Sholeh Iskandar, had always been
a loyal Masyumi supporter and a man of moderate views who was much
loved and respected by the population of the region. Like many other West
Javanese kyais, Sholeh Iskandar had chosen to remain in Masyumi when the
Nahdlatul Ulama organisation, with all the Central and East Javanese kyais,
broke away from it to establish an independent party. In 1972, Sholeh Iskan-
dar and a handful of other prominent West Javanese kyais who were
Masyumi loyalists joined forces to establish an association of pesantrens,
BKSPP (Badan Kerjasama Pondok Pesantren, ‘Association for Co-operation be-
tween Pesantrens’), with which numerous pesantrens in West Java were to af-
filiate themselves. Most members of BKSPP were traditionalists in religious
matters but had been active in Masyumi before it was banned, and the or-
ganisation was generally perceived as a Masyumi front organisation. Under
Sholeh Iskandar’s chairmanship, the BKSPP made efforts to modernise the
management and didactic methods of its member pesantrens and to intro-
duce useful modern subjects into the curriculum. Since his death (1992), the
organisation has gradually drifted towards more puritan religious views
and drawn attention with its anti-liberal pronouncements.30
The DDII also played an active role in the establishment of a few pe-
santrens that differed emphatically from the traditionalist institutions in
their emphasis on reformist or Salafi religious thought. One of these was
the pesantren Ulil Albab in Bogor (established in 1987), which catered espe-
cially to the students at that city’s agricultural university and had the ambi-
tion of producing exemplary Muslim intellectuals. An earlier DDII initiative
that targeted a less sophisticated public was established in the Central Ja-
vanese city of Solo, a bulwark of Javanese syncretism. The latter pesantren,
Al-Mukmin, became better known by the name of the village on the edge of
Solo to which it moved after some time, Ngruki.
The Pesantren of Ngruki
The pesantren Al-Mukmin (al-Mu’min) was established in 1972 by the chair-
man of the Central Java branch of the DDII, Abdullah Sungkar.31 Among the
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co-founders was a Gontor graduate named Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, who was to
remain Sungkar’s closest collaborator for the next quarter century and his
successor upon his death in 1999. Al-Mukmin aimed to combine the best as-
pects of two models, Gontor for the teaching of Arabic, and the pesantren of
Persis in Bangil for the teaching of shariªa. Classical fiqh, the core of the tra-
ditional pesantren curriculum and also a major part of that at Gontor, was
replaced by Qur’an and hadith studies in Ngruki as it had been in Bangil.32
Sungkar, Ba’asyir and their colleagues were fiercely opposed to the Suharto
regime, which they perceived as anti-Islamic, and they were strongly influ-
enced by Muslim Brotherhood thought. This influence was to some extent
reflected in the teaching of Islamic history and doctrine in the pesantren; the
curriculum included some Salafi and Brotherhood-related materials.33 The
Brotherhood influence expressed itself mostly in ideological training and
clandestine activism that they undertook in a network of contacts outside
the pesantren.
Sungkar was an active member of a network of mosque-affiliated youth
groups, the Badan Komunikasi Remaja Masjid (BKRM), in which some of the
most radical preachers of those days were involved, many of them with
Darul Islam contacts. In 1976, Sungkar and Ba’asyir joined the underground
Darul Islam and became increasingly active in mobilising radicals outside
the pesantren. Using the organisational model of the Egyptian Brotherhood,
they set up an underground structure of cells (usrah), members of which
were recruited among the most committed of radical mosque activists but
also among ordinary neighbourhood toughs and petty criminals.34 This un-
derground organisation was also loosely referred to as ‘Jamaªah Islamiyah’,
a name that was later to gain a certain notoriety. The relationship with the
pesantren was a loose one; some of the more serious students at Ngruki were
also recruited into the usrah movement, and some alumni played a part in
extending the usrah network into other regions.
Sungkar and Ba’asyir openly opposed the state ideology of Pancasila and
at the time of the 1977 elections they called for a boycott because the only
good Muslim candidates (i.e., the former Masyumi politicians Natsir and
Roem) were not allowed to participate. Arrested for their oppositional stand
and their involvement in the Darul Islam movement, they spent four years
in prison. After his release, Sungkar spent the next few years mostly in
Jakarta, where he organised usrah groups that were part of the NII / Darul
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Islam network. When in 1985 the police closed in on this network, he and
Ba’asyir fled to Malaysia to avoid arrest.
It was around this time that Sungkar first sent a handful of followers to
Pakistan in order to take part in the Afghan jihad and gain guerrilla experi-
ence. In the following years, a few hundred followers were to receive guer-
rilla training in Afghanistan and later, after the Afghan jihad was over, in
the southern Philippines.35 In the early 1990s, Sungkar and Ba’asyir broke
with the Darul Islam leadership, partly because of personal rivalries and
partly for religious reasons: their Salafi orientation and the mystical-magi-
cal practices in which the latter indulged were incompatible. The organisa-
tion that Sungkar consolidated under his own command became known as
Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI) and, like the Darul Islam movement (DI), strove for
the establishment of an Islamic state in Southeast Asia.
For most of the 15 years he spent in Malaysia, Ba’asyir lived a frugal life
as an itinerant teacher and petty trader of medicinal herbs; in the 1990s, he
established a modest pesantren, Luqmanul Hakiem, in Johor. By most ac-
counts, Sungkar was always an activist and Ba’asyir the scholar and
preacher (though one of radical convictions). Both returned to Indonesia
after the fall of Suharto in 1998. Sungkar died in early 1999, and Ba’asyir
succeeded him as the JI network’s imam, although perhaps not in all re-
spects as the leader. He returned to Ngruki and began teaching in the pe-
santren again. In August 2000, when various factions of the previous under-
ground DI established a public association, the Majelis Mujahidin, Ba’asyir
was selected as the amir, the political and religious leader of this organisa-
tion. Other DI factions declined joining the Majelis Mujahidin, preferring to
remain underground. Ba’asyir’s friends and associates have insisted that the
terrorists who carried out the various violent actions attributed to the Ja-
ma’ah Islamiyah belonged to breakaway factions not under his command.36
Sungkar and Ba’asyir were both a source of pride and embarrassment for
the pesantren at Ngruki. Their radical reputation was not good for the
school’s relations with local authorities and it inhibited the acquisition of
students from outside the milieu that understood and supported the poli-
tics of these two teachers. Several of the teachers who stayed behind, how-
ever, shared their ideas, and the pesantren maintained contact with them
over the years through visits by students and graduates. The ICG reports
emphasise the centrality of Ngruki in the Jamaªah Islamiyah network, but
many of the JI activists involved in violent acts, and in fact several of
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Sungkar and Ba’asyir’s oldest and most loyal associates, are not Ngruki
alumni. There are indications that some JI activists were first recruited
while studying in Ngruki, but it is not entirely clear what this recruitment
meant.37
Compared to many other pesantrens, Al-Mukmin is poor and its teachers
lead a precarious life, sometimes earning a little money on the side as
preachers. Most of the students are from families that cannot afford high
fees; the pesantren appears to have few prosperous supporters. Because of its
radical reputation, few want to be seen financially supporting it. The pe-
santren carefully maintains its network of alumni, because it is through this
network that new students are recruited. A few alumni have established, or
joined, modest pesantrens themselves. There is a modest network of minor
pesantrens that have a connection with Ngruki and appear to share its values
and militant interpretation of Islam. One of these pesantrens, PP Al-Islam in
Lamongan, East Java, acquired sudden notoriety because three of the Bali
bombers were the brothers of the founder of this pesantren. One of the three,
Mukhlas or Ali Gufron, was moreover a Ngruki graduate (unlike the brother
who led the PP Al-Islam, in fact). However, it was probably more relevant
that Mukhlas was also an Afghanistan veteran and had spent several years
in Malaysia and taught in Ba’asyir’s pesantren Luqmanul Hakiem alongside
other Afghanistan veterans. The other two brothers had joined him in
Malaysia as immigrant workers.
In an operation against a Jama’ah Islamiyah cell in Central Java, the po-
lice captured an interesting document that shows that this organisation
was making efforts to establish contacts with pesantrens throughout the re-
gion for propaganda and recruitment purposes but had not been particu-
larly successful. It is a long list of pesantrens and individual teachers of reli-
gion, with indications of their religious orientation and affiliation, number
of followers, and whether or not JI had ‘access’ there in 1999 (i.e., before JI
became associated with the subsequent wave of terrorist acts).38 The con-
tacts were mostly with individual teachers who did not have their own pe-
santrens or schools. Pesantrens affiliated with the NU or Muhammadiyah were
mostly reported to be ‘inaccessible’.
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The Hidayatullah ‘Network’
The 2003 ICG report implicates a number of other pesantrens in the Jamaªah
Islamiyah, notably the ‘Hidayatullah network’. Suspected JI activists spent
brief periods in the pesantrens of this network.39 The pesantren Hidayatullah
of Balikpapan in East Kalimantan is no doubt an interesting and remarkably
successful institution. The mother pesantren was officially established in
1973 by Abdullah Said, a former DI activist and associate of the leader of the
Darul Islam movement in South Sulawesi, Kahar Muzakkar. It teaches a pu-
ritan, reformist Islam with a strong emphasis on the Qur’an and hadith.
Hidayatullah was soon much more than just another pesantren; it organ-
ised a wide range of social welfare and economic activities among the peo-
ple living around the pesantren.40 Its alumni established a rapidly growing
number of dependencies of the Hidayatullah pesantren in various parts of
the Archipelago. More recently the Hidayatullah network has transformed
itself into a formal nation-wide association, with branches in almost 200
districts all over the country. This network is closely associated with the
Bugis diaspora – the Bugis are a seafaring ethnic group originating from
South Sulawesi, and there are Bugis communities throughout the Archipel-
ago. ‘Daughter’ pesantrens or branches have been established wherever there
is a Bugis diaspora community, from Acheh to Papua. The network also ap-
pears to have connections with what remains of the South Sulawesi Darul
Islam network, but this is perhaps more a matter of sympathies than of ac-
tual organisational links.
The pesantren gained wide renown through a magazine it has published
since 1988, Suara Hidayatullah, which at its peak achieved a circulation of
52,000. The magazine reads like a broadsheet of the Islamist International;
it is militant, gives information on all the jihads being fought in the world,
is fiercely anti-Jewish and anti-Christian, and has interviews with, and sym-
pathetic articles on, all of the radical Islamic groups of the country. Hiday-
atullah has a strong sense of mission; it trains missionaries (daªi) to spread
a reformist Islamic message to non-Muslims as well as nominal or tradi-
tionalist Muslims in the most distant corners of the Archipelago.
In spite of its DI origins and the militant Islamist tone of its publica-
tions, the Hidayatullah pesantren network has from the moment of its foun-
dation made efforts to maintain excellent relations with the government,
and it has consistently been the beneficiary of government favour. The
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mother pesantren in Balikpapan was officially opened by the then Minister of
Religious Affairs, A. Mukti Ali. A decade later, the pesantren received a pres-
tigious government award, the Kalpataru prize for environmental conserva-
tion, which was presented by President Suharto himself. Later, Suharto’s
first successor, president Habibie and Megawati’s vice-president Hamzah
Haz also made official visits to this pesantren. It frequently receives foreign
visitors. In 1999, the pesantren was awarded an enormous forestry conces-
sion in East Kalimantan, as one of a very small number of pesantrens thus
favoured.41 In 2001, the Ministry of Religious Affairs designated Hidayatul-
lah as one of the bodies authorised to collect and redistribute zakat on a na-
tion-wide scale.
Pesantren Al-Zaytun
A survey of pesantrens with Islamist links is not complete without mention-
ing the pesantren Al-Zaytun in the district of Indramayu (West Java), which
has been the object of many controversies over the past few years, because
of the seemingly unlimited resources to which it has had access, because of
allegations of heterodox beliefs and practices, and because of its alleged
links with an underground DI network as well as the state intelligence or-
ganisation. The PP Al-Zaytun has drawn much attention because of its
grand, modern and fashionable architecture and the megalomaniacal ambi-
tions of its founder, a Gontor graduate and IAIN alumnus named AS (Ab-
dussalam) Panji Gumilang. Construction was begun towards the end of the
Suharto era, and the pesantren was officially opened by Suharto’s successor
Habibie in 1999. It has been receiving numerous dignitaries ever since, who
usually praised it as a symbol of the progress of Indonesian Islam. It looks
much more affluent and modern than most university campuses, with five-
story dormitories housing 1500 students each (four of them built, six more
planned), and a six-story mosque under construction that will have a capac-
ity of 150,000 worshippers. The pesantren owns a considerable amount of
land, raises cattle and fowl and organises various other economic activities,
providing its students with on-the-job training.42
The extravagant style of this pesantren has led to much speculation re-
garding the sources of its affluence, and two seemingly incompatible
sources have frequently been suggested: the Suharto family and the Darul
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Islam movement. Strange though it may seem, the pesantren has enjoyed the
warm sympathy and patronage of numerous members of the political elite,
under Suharto as well as his successors, and it also appears to be very
closely associated with one particular wing of the Darul Islam, the ‘Regional
Command IX’ (KW9).
KW9 was a network active in the larger Jakarta and Banten districts and
separate from the original DI, established by DI leaders who had surren-
dered to the army in 1962 and had later co-operated with state intelligence
officers in various covert operations. KW9 was allowed to operate relatively
freely, recruit new members, and raise money in various ways including –
allegedly – through robbery and extortion. In the 1990s, a certain Abu Toto,
who appears to be none other than Panji Gumilang, emerged as the com-
mander of KW9 and put its organisation on more solid footing in terms of
both membership and financing. Soon after the official opening of the pe-
santren, a flood of publications appeared, mostly by Islamist authors, de-
nouncing Panji Gumilang for his dubious fund-raising activities, for his de-
viation from the original DI ideals, his collusion with shady elements in the
state apparatus, and for promoting heterodox views and practices among
his followers.43 Some claim that KW9 members were taught quaint inter-
pretations of the Qur’an and were not required to pray regularly or give up
alcoholic beverages. At the same time, however, they allegedly declared the
Muslims outside their own community to be unbelievers, taking whose
property was legitimate. The community compared itself to the Prophet’s
followers in Mecca, before the establishment of the first Islamic state in
Medina. In this phase, it was reasoned, the first Muslims faced a dominant
heathen majority and their first objective was survival as a community. The
canonical obligations and interdictions of the shariªa had not yet been im-
plemented in Mecca, and KW9 similarly postponed imposing them until the
Islamic state was actually established. Members, however, had to make sac-
rifices for the movement, and everyone was required to contribute a regular
sum to the movement’s treasury.44
Despite negative publicity, the pesantren Al-Zaytun continued to attract
many students. Its founder and sheikh, Panji Gumilang, enjoyed such
strong protection that he appeared immune to all criticism. The Ministry of
Religious Affairs and the Indonesian Ulama Council (MUI) carried out inves-
tigations and found some truth to the allegations made by the pesantren’s
critics. The MUI report found that many of the teachers and students prob-
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ably have a DI background. Students are actively recruited by officers of
KW9’s regional structure, and large, not entirely voluntary contributions by
DI families constitute a major source of the pesantren’s wealth, in addition
to considerable grants received from members of the political elite. How-
ever, the report found no trace of the teaching of heterodox doctrines and
practices in the PP Al-Zaytun. The curriculum is very similar to that of other
Gontor-inspired pesantren, the report concluded.45
Instead of the pesantren being a hotbed of radical Islamist politics, then,
it would appear that this pesantren effectively mobilises an existing Islamist
network to collect funds and recruit students, who are given a mainstream
religious and vocational training in a setting that radiates accommodation
with the state and openness towards the outside world. Unlike the Hidayat-
ullah network, Al-Zaytun shows no interest in international jihadist causes;
its focus is on Indonesia, and its public discourse is a developmentalist one
that is reminiscent of Suharto’s New Order.
Conclusion
There is currently a wide range of pesantrens and madrasa in Indonesia, af-
filiated with all of the major currents in Indonesian Islam. What they have
in common is that they teach Arabic religious texts, in most cases alongside
a non-religious curriculum. Most of the pesantrens, and certainly most of the
large ones, are affiliated with Nahdlatul Ulama or share its religious out-
look. The core of their religious curriculum consists of Shafiªi fiqh, often
complemented with Sufi ethics. Many of these pesantrens are led by charis-
matic teachers, who have considerable authority among the population at
large. In election time they are therefore courted by politicians. Prior to the
2004 elections, for instance, leaders from most of the parties made high-
profile visits to pesantrens, expecting their visits to influence voters. There
have been times when the pesantrens jointly opposed government policies,
for instance, over a proposed family law believed to be contrary to the
shariªa, but most of the time these traditionalist pesantrens have accommo-
dated themselves with the government and sought its patronage.
Reformist associations established their own pesantrens, offering curricula
that corresponded to their reformist orientation, the study of fiqh being
complemented or replaced by that of Qur’an and hadith. Gontor remains the
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model for most of the reformist pesantrens, some of which remain aloof
from politics, whereas others court the government and yet others appear
to perceive themselves as part of the international Islamic movement. A
small number of pesantrens have aligned themselves with the ideas of the
Muslim Brotherhood or the Salafi movement.46
Three distinct pesantrens or networks of related pesantrens have historical
links with the underground Darul Islam movement: Ngruki, Hidayatullah
and Al-Zaytun. Both Hidayatullah and Al-Zaytun appear to owe their success
to pre-existing Darul Islam networks, the former also to the structure of the
Bugis diaspora. Both have sought, and achieved, close and cordial relations
with the government. Al-Zaytun appears even more accommodating with
the government than the average NU pesantren. Hidayatullah has, it is true,
adopted a militant and almost paranoid Islamist discourse, but its teachers
and alumni have not been directly associated with any violent activities.
This cannot be said of Ngruki; many people arrested in connection with ter-
rorist violence in Indonesia or neighbour countries have either studied
there or passed through the pesantren as visitors. What connects these men,
however, is not Ngruki but their shared experience in Afghanistan, the
southern Philippines or Malaysia; the same network includes many others
who have never studied at Ngruki – in fact, the most prominent members of
this terrorist network are not Ngruki alumni.
T R AD I T I ONA L I S T AND I S L AM I S T P E S AN T R E N S I N CON T EMPO RA R Y I NDON E S I A
239
AUP-ISIM-IS-BW-Madrasa-DEF2:BW  24-09-2008  16:54  Pagina 239
Notes
1 This pesantren was presented as the central hub in an Indonesian Al-Qaeda
network in a report prepared by Sidney Jones of the International Crisis Group,
‘Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia: the case of the “Ngruki network” in Indonesia’.
Jakarta and Brussels: International Crisis Group, August 2002. A later report by
the same author, ‘Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: damaged but still
dangerous’, Jakarta: International Crisis Group, August 2003, lists a number of
other pesantrens that appear to have a connection with the Jama’ah Islamiyah
network.
2 The term ‘modernist’, as it is commonly used in Indonesia, may be somewhat
misleading. It refers to all of the varieties of Muslim reformism, including the
most literally scripturalist. The classic study is: Deliar Noer, The Modernist
Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1940, Kuala Lumpur, etc.: Oxford University
Press, 1973.
3 Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Muslims of the Dutch East Indies and the caliphate
question’, Studia Islamika (Jakarta) vol. 2 no. 3, 1995, 115-140.
4 Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle, ‘Indonesia’s approaching elections:
politics, Islam, and public opinion’, Journal of Democracy 15(1), 2004, 109-123.
5 M.C. Ricklefs, Mystic Synthesis in Java, Norwalk, CT: EastBridge, 2006, p. 89.
6 Claude Guillot, ‘Le role historique des perdikan ou “villages francs”: le cas de
Tegalsari’, Archipel 30, 1985, 137-162.
7 J.A. van der Chys, ‘Bijdragen tot de geschiedenis van het inlandsch onderwijs’
(‘Contributions to the history of indigenous education’), Tijdschrift voor Indische
Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 14, 1864, 212-323; cf. M.C. Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese
society: Islamic and other visions (c.1830-1930), Singapore: NUS Press, 2007, pp. 49-
52.
8 The historical evidence is surveyed in: Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Pesantren and
kitab kuning: Continuity and change in a tradition of religious learning’, in: W.
Marschall (ed.), Texts from the islands: Oral and written traditions of Indonesia and the
Malay world [Ethnologica Bernensia 4], Berne: University of Berne Institute of
Ethnology, 1994, pp. 121-146. Available online at:
http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/pesantren_and
_kitab_kuning.htm.
9 On the books studied in the pesantren, and the shifts in the curriculum see:
Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Kitab kuning: books in Arabic script used in the
pesantren milieu’, Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde 146, 1990, 226-269
(available online at:
http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/kitab_kuning
.htm). There is a striking similarity to the curriculum in Kurdish madrasas, as
described in: Zeynelabidin Zinar, ‘Medrese education in Kurdistan’, Les annales
de l’autre Islam 5, 1998, 39-58 (available online at:
http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/publications/medrese_edu
cation_kurdistan.htm).
MAR T I N VAN B RU I N E S S E N
240
AUP-ISIM-IS-BW-Madrasa-DEF2:BW  24-09-2008  16:54  Pagina 240
10 On these aspects of the pesantren tradition, see also: Martin van Bruinessen,
‘Traditions for the future: the reconstruction of traditionalist discourse within
NU’, in: Greg Barton and Greg Fealy (eds), Nahdlatul Ulama, traditional Islam and
modernity in Indonesia, Clayton: Monash Asia Institute, 1996, pp. 163-189.
11 The ICG report ‘Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia’ makes the mistake of
attributing puritan ideas to traditionalist institutions, reporting that out of
over 14,000 rural pesantrens in Indonesia, some 8,900 ‘teach Salafi principles’
(p. 26). This should be ‘use the traditional (Salafiyah) curriculum and teaching
methods’. The report assumes a correlation between jihad movements and
Salafi ideas, but rightly points out that only a handful of pesantren ‘have
anything to do with JI or radical jihadism’ and that even among the latter,
most of the students ‘emerge as pious, law-abiding citizens.’
12 An earlier version of the following sections appeared in: Martin van
Bruinessen, ‘Divergent paths from Gontor: Muslim educational reform and
the travails of pluralism in Indonesia’, in: Freek L. Bakker and Jan S. Aritonang
(eds.), On the Edge of Many Worlds [Festschrift Karel A. Steenbrink], Zoetermeer:
Meinema, 2006, pp. 152-162.
13 H. Mahmud Yunus, Sejarah pendidikan Islam di Indonesia [The History of Islamic
education in Indonesia], Jakarta: Mutiara, 1979, p. 271-7. The number of
Muhammadiyah-affiliated madrasas and pesantrens has, however, continued to
increase as the organisation felt the need for more educated people with a
knowledge of Arabic and Islamic scripture.
14 Lance Castles, ‘Notes on the Islamic school at Gontor’, Indonesia 1, 1966, 30-45;
Ali Saifullah HA, ‘Daarussalaam, pondok modern Gontor’, in: M. Dawam
Rahardjo (ed.), Pesantren dan pembaharuan [The pesantren and renewal], Jakarta:
LP3ES, 1974, pp. 134-154; Mahrus Asªad, ‘Maªhad al-Juntûr bayna’l-tajdîd wa’l-
taqlîd’ [‘The school of Gontor between renewal and tradition’], Studia Islamika
vol. 3, no. 4, 1996, 165-193.
15 Yunus, Sejarah pendidikan Islam, pp. 307-314. Al Irsyad’s opting for Arabic as the
medium of instruction made it dependent on textbooks from Egypt, so that for
several decades its students read about the geography of the Arab world and
nothing or little about Indonesia. After Indonesian independence, some
subjects were taught in Indonesian. On Al Irsyad, see also the excellent study
by Natalie Mobini-Kesheh, The Hadrami Awakening: Community and Identity in the
Netherlands East Indies, 1900-1942, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Southeast Asia
Program, 1999.
16 On Persis and its pesantren, see: Howard M. Federspiel, Islam and ideology in the
emerging Indonesian state: the Persatuan Islam (PERSIS), 1923 to 1957, Leiden: Brill,
2001. Cf. my review of this book in International Journal of Middle East Studies 35
(2003), 171-173.
17 Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun: Indonesian Islam under the Japanese
Occupation 1942-1945, The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1958.
18 C. van Dijk, Rebellion under the banner of Islam: the Darul Islam in Indonesia, The
T R AD I T I ONA L I S T AND I S L AM I S T P E S AN T R E N S I N CON T EMPO RA R Y I NDON E S I A
241
AUP-ISIM-IS-BW-Madrasa-DEF2:BW  24-09-2008  16:54  Pagina 241
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981; Holk H. Dengel, Darul-Islam. Kartosuwirjos Kampf
um einen islamischen Staat in Indonesien, Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1986.
19 M. Saleh Widodo, ‘Pesantren Darul Fallah: eksperimen pesantren pertanian’ [‘The
pesantren Darul Fallah: experiment of an agricultural pesantren’, in: M. Dawam
Rahardjo (ed.), Pesantren dan pembaharuan [The pesantren and innovation], Jakarta:
LP3ES, 1974, pp. 121-133.
20 M. Dawam Rahardjo, ‘The life of santri youth: a view from the pesantren
window at Pabelan’, Sojourn: social issues in Southeast Asia 1, 1986, 32-56; M.
Habib Chirzin, ‘Impak dan pengaruh kegiatan pondok Pabelan sebagai lembaga
pendidikan dan pengembangan masyarakat desa’ [‘The impact and influence of
the activities of the pesantren of Pabelan as an institution of education and
village-level social development’], in: Pesantren: Profil kyai, pesantren dan madrasah
[Warta-PDIA no.2], Jakarta: Balai Penelitian dan Pengembangan Departemen
Agama R.I., 1981, pp. 69-78.
21 V.S. Naipaul, Among the Believers, an Islamic Journey, New York: Knopf, 1981.
22 The initials LP3ES stand for ‘Institute for Economic and Social Research,
Education and Information’. Its founders were affiliated with Masyumi and the
Socialist Party of Indonesia, two parties that had been banned during
Sukarno’s last years and initially welcomed the New Order and its pro-Western
development policies.
23 M. Dawam Rahardjo (ed.), Pergulatan dunia pesantren: membangun dari bawah [The
struggle of the pesantren world: construction from below], Jakarta: P3M, 1985;
Manfred Ziemek, Pesantren dalam perubahan sosial [The pesantren in social change],
Jakarta: P3M, 1986.
24 Martin van Bruinessen, NU: tradisi, relasi-relasi kuasa, pencarian wacana baru [NU:
tradition, power relations, and the search for a new discourse], Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1994.
25 For an assessment see: Martin van Bruinessen and Farid Wajidi, ‘Syu’un
ijtima’iyah and the kiai rakyat: traditionalist Islam, civil society and social
concerns’, in: H. Schulte Nordholt (ed.), Indonesian Transitions, Yogyakarta:
Pustaka Pelajar, 2006, pp. 205-248.
26 Djohan Effendi, ‘Progressive traditionalists: the emergence of a new discourse
in Indonesia’s Nahdlatul Ulama during the Abdurrahman Wahid era’, Ph.D.
thesis, Deakin University, Department of Religious Studies, 2000; Laode Ida,
Kaum progresif dan sekularisme baru NU [The progressives and the new secularism in
the NU], Jakarta: Erlangga, 2004; Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Liberal and
progressive voices in Indonesian Islam’, in: Shireen T. Hunter (ed.), Reformist
Voices of Islam: Mediating Religion and Modernity, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe,
forthcoming (2008).
27 Asna Husin, ‘Philosophical and sociological aspects of daªwah. A study of the
Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia’, Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1998;
Lukman Hakiem and Tamsil Linrung, Menunaikan panggilan risalah: dokumentasi
perjalanan 30 tahun Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia, Jakarta: Dewan Dakwah
Islamiyah Indonesia, 1997; Martin van Bruinessen, ‘Genealogies of Islamic
MAR T I N VAN B RU I N E S S E N
242
AUP-ISIM-IS-BW-Madrasa-DEF2:BW  24-09-2008  16:54  Pagina 242
radicalism in Indonesia’, South East Asia Research 10 no.2, 2002, 117-154
(available online at: http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin.vanbruinessen/personal/
publications/genealogies_islamic_radicalism.htm).
28 The Indonesian Salafi movement that emerged as a distinct current in the
1990s (and that is the subject of Noorhaidi’s contribution in this volume), owed
little to the DDII, however. Its founders had direct links with Salafi circles in
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
29 See the comments to this effect in: Kamal Hassan, Muslim intellectual response to
New Order modernization in Indonesia, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan Bahasa, 1980; cf.
Anthony H. Johns, ‘An Islamic system or Islamic values? Nucleus of a debate in
contemporary Indonesia’, in: William R. Roff (ed.), Islam and the Political Economy
of Meaning, London: Croom Helm, 1987, pp. 254-280.
30 M. Syafii Anwar et al., ‘The perception of pesantren communities in West Java
towards secularism, pluralism and liberalism’, Reseach report, Jakarta: ICIP,
2005.
31 The history of this pesantren is sketched in: Farha Abdul Kadir Assegaff, ‘Peran
perempuan Islam (penelitian di Pondok Pesantren Al Mukmin, Sukoharjo, Jawa
Tengah)’ [‘The role of Muslim women: research in the pesantren Al Mukmin,
Sukoharjo, Central Java], Tesis S-2, Universitas Gadjah Mada, Program Studi
Sosiologi, Jurusan Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial, 1995; Zuly Qodir, Ada apa dengan pesantren
Ngruki? [What is the matter with the pesantren of Ngruki?], Bantul: Pondok Edukasi,
2003; ES. Soepriyadi, Ngruki & jaringan terorisme: melacak jejak Abu Bakar Ba’asyir
dan jaringannya dari Ngruki sampai bom Bali [Ngruki and the terrorist network:
following the trail of Abu Bakar Ba’asyir and his network from Ngruki to the Bali
bombing], Jakarta: P.T. Al-Mawardi Prima, 2003.
32 The curriculum included the tafsîr of the Egyptian reformist Maraghi and the
works on hadith by Ibn Hajar al-ªAsqalani and by M. b. ªAli al-Shawkani (Qodir,
Ada apa dengan pesantren Ngruki, p. 52-3). Though not part of the traditional
pesantren curriculum, these works are taught in numerous more reformist-
inspired pesantren.
33 A list of books taught in Ngruki in the mid-1990s (in Qodir, Ada apa dengan
pesantren Ngruki, p. 52) mentions Jundullah [Army of God], a book that argues it is
an obligation for Muslims to establish a state based on the divine law by the
Syrian Brotherhood leader Saªid Hawwa as one of the textbooks for doctrine.
Another important text was the Salafi scholar M. Saªid al-Qahtani’s Al-walâ’
wa-l-barâ’ fî’l-islâm [Loyalty and avoidance in Islam], which warns the student not
to befriend non-Muslims or even Muslims of different persuasions. A former
student recalls the moral imperatives of al-walâ’ wa-l-barâ’ as constituting the
core of the disciplining in Ngruki (Soepriyadi, Ngruki, p. 24-5). These texts
would not be found in more traditional pesantrens, or in most of the reformist
ones.
34 The best published study of this Usrah network is: Abdul Syukur, Gerakan Usroh
di Indonesia: peristiwa Lampung 1989 [The Usroh movement in Indonesia: the Lampung
T R AD I T I ONA L I S T AND I S L AM I S T P E S AN T R E N S I N CON T EMPO RA R Y I NDON E S I A
243
AUP-ISIM-IS-BW-Madrasa-DEF2:BW  24-09-2008  16:54  Pagina 243
incident of 1989], Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2003. A good early overview, based on
court documents of trials against arrested Usrah members, is: Tapol, Indonesia:
Muslims on trial, London: Tapol and Indonesian Human Rights Campaign, 1987.
There is much useful information in a thesis by a Ngruki graduate: Muh.
Nursalim, ‘Faksi Abdullah Sungkar dalam gerakan NII era Orde Baru (studi
terhadap pemikiran dan harakah politik Abdullah Sungkar)’, Tesis Magister,
Universitas Muhammadiyah Surakarta, Program Pascasarjana, 2001. See also
Bruinessen, ‘Genealogies’ and International Crisis Group, ‘Al Qaeda’.
35 Nursalim, ‘Faksi Abdullah Sungkar’. A detailed overview of Sungkar followers
who went to Pakistan during the 1980s is given in: International Crisis Group,
‘Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: damaged but still dangerous’, Jakarta:
International Crisis Group, 2003.
36 One of Ba’asyir’s spokespersons, Fauzan Al-Anshari, claimed that whereas
Sungkar’s followers had been bound to him by a vow of obedience (bayªat), no
one had made such a vow to Ba’asyir (interview, Jakarta, 16 March 2004). There
is little doubt that Ba’asyir approved of jihad in the Moluccas in defence of the
local Muslims there, but his associates claim that a part of the Jama’ah
Islamiyah, led by Hanbali, went its own way after a meeting in which Ba’asyir
rejected violence against non-combatants (various interviews).
37 One of my informants is a former student in Al-Mukmin, who was recruited
into the NII by an older peer – not by a teacher! – in 1993, when Sungkar and
Ba’asyir were living in Malaysia. Another frequent visitor of the pesantren told
me that promising students would be singled out for special treatment. They
would be woken up in the middle of the night and told to perform nightly
prayers, after which they would be given special instruction, presumably of a
religious but secret nature.
38 ‘Daftar Kyai / Ulama / Tokoh Masyarakat di Wilayah Wakalah Jawa Wustho
(Jawwus) Bulan Robi’ul Akhir 1420 H / Juli 1999’ [List of Kyai, Ulama and
Prominent Personalities in the Region of the Central Java Command, Juli 1999].
Copy acquired by International Crisis Group; part of a set of trial documents of
which copies have been deposited in the libraries of Australian National
University (Canberra) and the KITLV (Leiden).
39 International Crisis Group, ‘Jemaah Islamiyah’, p. 26-27, uncritically repeated
in various other reports.
40 The following paragraphs owe much to Hidayatullah’s self-representations in
its journal and the websites www.hidayatullah.com/ and
http://id.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hidayatullah.
41 Reported by Margot Cohen, ‘Faith in the Forest’, Far Eastern Economic Review,
27 January 2000.
42 See the self-representation at:
www.tokohindonesia.com/ensiklopedi/a/abdussalam/index.shtml, where the
modernity of the pesantren and its excellent relations with members of the
Jakarta political elite are emphasised, mentioning especially New Order
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politicos who survived into the post-Suharto era. Two major halls in the
pesantren are named for Presidents Suharto and Sukarno (the latter was
dedicated during Megawati’s presidency); there are also buildings named after
the Golkar politicians Akbar Tanjung and Agung Laksono, suggesting
patronage and protection.
43 Al Chaidar, himself a former activist in the KW9 structure and later closer to
another wing of DI, wrote the first denunciation: Al Chaidar, Sepak terjang KW.
IX Abu Toto Syech A.S. Panji Gumilang menyelewengkan NKA-NII pasca S.M.
Kartosoewirjo [How the KW9 of Abu Toto Sheikh A.S. Panji Gumilang corrupted the post-
Kartosoewirjo Darul Islam movement], Jakarta: Madani Press, 2000. The Islamist
activist Umar Abduh published no less than three books against Panji
Gumilang and his pesantren: Umar Abduh, Membongkar gerakan sesat NII di balik
pesantren mewah Al Zaytun [Uncovering the deviant NII movement behind the posh
pesantren Al Zaytun], Jakarta: LPPI, 2001; idem, Pesantren Al-Zaytun sesat? Investigasi
mega proyek dalam Gerakan NII [Is the pesantren Al Zaytun misguided? Investigation of
a mega-project within the Darul Islam movement], Jakarta: Darul Falah, 2001; idem,
Al Zaytun Gate. Investigasi mengungkap misteri. Dajjal Indonesia membangun negara
impian Iblis [Al Zaytun-gate, investigation of a mystery: Indonesia’s Dajjal builds a
diabolical dream state], Jakarta: LPDI, 2002. Video footage of a visit to the
pesantren by the head of Indonesia’s state intelligence organisation BIN,
Hendropriyono, was widely circulated on video discs. The intelligence chief’s
unusually cordial speech, in which he threatened people who dared to slander
Al-Zaytun, was seen by many as confirmation of the intimate links between
Panji Gumilang and the intelligence apparatus.
44 Al Chaidar, Sepak terjang KW9 Abu Toto, pp. 104-8; Majelis Ulama Indonesia Team
Peneliti Ma’had Al-Zaytun, ‘Laporan lengkap hasil penelitian Ma’had al-Zaytun
Haurgeulis Indramayu’ [‘Full report on the research concerning the school Al-
Zaytun in Haurgeulis, Indramayu’], Jakarta: Majelis Ulama Indonesia, 2002.
45 Majelis Ulama Indonesia, ‘Laporan lengkap hasil penelitian Ma’had al-Zaytun
Haurgeulis Indramayu’; interviews with KH. Ma’ruf Amin, head of the MUI’s
investigating committee and with Ahmad Syafi’i Mufid, who carried out a
similar investigation for the Ministry of Religious Affairs, March 2004.
46 In the list of teachers in Central Java mentioned in note 32 above, which was
compiled by an apparent JI cell in 1999, 23 out of 368 were identified as
Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated, 7 as Salafi and 6 as Darul Islam; 143 were
affiliated with NU and 141 with Muhammadiyah. Most of the Muslim Brothers
were not teaching in pesantren but in universities and colleges.
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9 The Salafi Madrasas of Indonesia
Noorhaidi Hasan
Introduction
Indonesia has long been familiar with that Islamic education institution
called the madrasa.1 In the contemporary Indonesian context, the term
refers to primary and secondary Islamic schools adopting a modern system
of education, in which Islamic subjects are taught alongside general sub-
jects. The main aim of the madrasa is to produce graduates like those from
modern-style ‘secular’ schools, called sekolah, but is distinguished by its hav-
ing a better understanding of Islam. Today there are more than 37,000
madrasas scattered throughout Indonesia. Some of them belong to private
Islamic organisations, and another important portion are controlled by the
government’s Department of Religious Affairs.2 Another Islamic education
institution which operates in Indonesia is the pesantren. Slightly different
from the madrasa, the pesantren is a rural-based Islamic educational institu-
tion which teaches exclusively Islamic subjects, using kitab kuning (classical
Arabic books), with the main aim of producing religious authorities.3 This
institution is overwhelmingly identified with the traditionalist Nahdlatul
Ulama (NU). It is an exemplary Islamic teaching centre in which the kyai,
the traditional Javanese ªalim, serves as the central figure.4 Spurred on by
the emerging modernist discourse at the beginning of the twentieth-cen-
tury, other Muslim organisations, including Muhammadiyah, Al Irsyad and
Persis, have also developed their own pesantrens, which appear to be a strong
embodiment of Islamic modernism, combining features of both the
madrasa and pesantren systems.5
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Besides these older madrasas and pesantrens, known for their relatively
moderate understanding of Islam, there has more recently emerged a num-
ber of conservative, if not exclusivist, Islamic educational institutions of a
new type. Some of these have been involved in providing breeding grounds
for violent mobilisation conducted by militant Islamic groups that rose in
the aftermath of the collapse of Suharto’s New Order regime in May 1998.
These institutions generally grew out of Indonesia’s increasingly closer con-
nections with the dynamics of transnational Muslim politics over the last
20 years. One such example is the Salafi madrasas, Islamic teaching centres
associated with those who explicitly identify themselves as Salafis, literally
meaning the followers of the pious forefathers, al-salaf al-salih. They believe
that to follow the salaf al-salih means to submit to the absolute literal word
of the Qur’an and the sunna, and that this submission will determine
whether one can be called Muslim or not. Although these madrasas are in
some ways similar to the (traditional) pesantren, they appear to challenge all
of the aforementioned educational institutions, including the sekolah,
madrasa and pesantren. The system adopted indicates a rejection of anything
regarded as a corrupting influence of Western culture and, at the same
time, shows a marked aversion to the traditional corpus of religious
authority. Interestingly, they construct a particular system of authority di-
rectly connected to the religious authorities in the Middle East and other
parts of the Muslim world.
The developments in the aftermath of the events of 9/11 brought all Is-
lamic educational institutions into the spotlight. They received a consider-
able amount of attention from foreign observers and analysts as well as the
Indonesian authorities. Despite this, Indonesia’s Salafi madrasas remain vir-
tually unknown. These madrasas have often been confused with other con-
servative pesantrens, such as the pesantren Al-Mukmin in Ngruki, Solo, in Cen-
tral Java, which has been accused of being a central hub in the radical
Jamaªah Islamiyah network. Activists in this network, which has been active
all over Southeast Asia, were involved in various devastating bombing at-
tacks in Indonesia and the Philippines. In spite of certain ideological simi-
larities — the Ngruki pesantren also claims to be a legitimate representative
of the Salafi path (manhaj) – however, the Salafi madrasas discussed here
should be distinguished from the Ngruki pesantren. The latter, along with a
handful of pesantrens affiliated with the Persis and Al Irsyad reformist move-
ments, represents a home-grown variety of Salafism.6
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Given their mounting significance, this chapter seeks to examine how
the Salafi madrasas have developed in Indonesia and the factors that have
contributed to their proliferation. In this respect, it takes into account de-
velopments that have occurred both at the domestic and the transnational
levels. The chapter also analyses profiles of madrasas, focusing on their
physical appearance, curriculum and the background of their students.
These three aspects will shed light on the distinctiveness of these madrasas
compared to similar puritan Islamic educational institutions. Finally, this
chapter will scrutinise the madrasa network, placing an emphasis on their
transnational linkages with the Middle East.
The Expansion of Salafism in Indonesia
The history of the Salafi madrasas in Indonesia can be traced back to the
mid-1980s, when the first Salafi communities in the country were becoming
visible and assertive. The first striking signs of the expansion of Salafism in
Indonesia were the emergence of bearded males wearing long flowing robes
(jalabiyya), turbans, and trousers to their ankles (isbal), and of women wear-
ing a form of enveloping black veil (niqab). Their main concerns revolved
around the question of the purity of the faith, tawhid, and a number of
other issues centred on the call for a return to strict religious practice and
the subsequent moral integrity of individuals. A commitment to wearing
the jalabiyya by men and the niqab by women, for instance, has been viewed
by these Salafis as much more important than taking part in political activ-
ities. They believe that Muslim society must first be Islamised through a
gradual evolutionary process that includes tarbiya (education) and tasfiyya
(purification) before the implementation of the shariªa can be realised. As a
strategy to reach this end, they have been fervently committed to daªwa ac-
tivities, participating in the establishment of halqas and dauras.7
The emergence of an Indonesian Salafi movement and a network of
Salafi madrasas was part of the global expansion of the contemporary Salafi
daªwa, closely allied with the Saudi state and its own sectarian brand of Is-
lamic thought and practice, Wahhabism. Named for Muhammad ibn ªAbd
al-Wahhab (1703-1792), who launched a violent campaign against existing
religious practices, Wahhabism constitutes one particular trend in the
Salafiyya (purification) movement. Its theological foundations were derived
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from a number of classical Salafi scholars, including Ahmad ibn Hanbal
(780-855), Ahmad ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), and Muhammad ibn Qayyim al-
Jawziyya (1292-1350). Wahhabism should be sharply distinguished from an-
other movement that is generally known as Salafism and that emerged
about a century after the original Wahhabi movement. This is the mod-
ernist reformism associated with Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1898),
Muhammad ªAbduh (1849-1905), and Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-1935),
who also preached a return to the Qur’an and hadith but insisted on their ra-
tional interpretation.8
Unlike other reformist, modernist Muslim organisations that emerged
across the Muslim world, the contemporary Salafi movement is squarely
within the puritanical Salafi-Wahhabi tradition. Its adherents prefer to call
themselves Salafi primarily because of the pejorative connotations of the
term Wahhabi. Their allegiance to the Wahhabi tradition, however, is clear
from the frequent references the protagonists of this movement make to
Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya and Ibn ªAbd al-Wahhab, the three
classics of Wahhabism. Another clue is their frequent citing of fatwas issued
by contemporary Salafi-Wahhabi authorities such as the late ªAbd al-ªAziz
bin Baz (d. 1999) and Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani (d. 1999).9
The proliferation of the Salafi daªwa movement is inextricably associated
with the rising influence of Saudi Arabia in the global politics of the Muslim
world. It gained momentum in the 1970s, when the kingdom succeeded in
gaining an increasingly crucial position in the Middle East in particular and
the Muslim world in general as a consequence of the defeat of Egypt and
Syria in the Arab-Israel Wars of 1967 and 1973.10 This position was rein-
forced by the explosion in world oil prices. Since then, Saudi Arabia has
launched an immensely ambitious global campaign for the ‘Wahhabitisa-
tion’ of the umma.11 The Rabitat al-ªAlam al-Islami, set up in 1962, is the or-
ganisation responsible for this campaign, functioning as the main philan-
thropic agent in the liberal distribution of money to Islamic organisations
all over the world.12
The role of Saudi Arabia in global politics faced a serious challenge when
the Iranian Revolution erupted in 1979 and brought Ayatollah Khomeini to
power. The Saudi kingdom was haunted by the speculation that a similar
revolution could possibly wipe out its own monarchy. This anxiety was to
some extent justified by the rise of a revolutionary Islamic group within the
border of the kingdom itself. Led by Juhayman al-ªUtaybi, the group seized
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the Grand Mosque of Mecca in November 1979.13 The challenge posed by the
Iranian Revolution became more apparent when Saudi Arabia witnessed a
series of Shiªi demonstrations and Khomeini proposed that Mecca and Med-
ina be granted international status.14 Saudi Arabia tried hard to limit the
devastating effects of the revolution. At the domestic level, it sought to
prove its commitment to Islam by imposing a stricter enforcement of reli-
gious laws. At the international level, it intensified the spread of Wah-
habism, whose doctrines contain anti-Shiªi sentiments.15
The inflow of Saudi Arabian influence has come to Indonesia mainly
through the Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII, Indonesian Council
for Islamic Propagation), a daªwa organisation set up in 1967 by Muhammad
Natsir and other former leaders of the Masyumi, the first and largest Is-
lamic party banned by Sukarno, Indonesia’s first president, in 1960. Because
of Natsir’s close personal relationship with Saudi elites, the Dewan Dakwah
enjoyed Saudi support for the development of daªwa activities, including
construction of new mosques, the founding of madrasas, the distribution of
free copies of the Qur’an and other Islamic literature, the training of
preachers and related objectives. These activities, in turn, contributed to the
spread of the spirit of Islamic resurgence. The impact of the intensification
of Islamic revitalisation launched by the Dewan Dakwah was felt most
strongly on university campuses, which witnessed the rapid expansion of Is-
lamic activities, marked by the increase in studentsª readiness to observe Is-
lamic obligations.
The preconditions that had been created by the Dewan Dakwah laid a
foundation on which Saudi Arabia could develop its Wahhabi influence to a
greater extent. Particularly disquieted by the widespread impact of the Iran-
ian Revolution, Saudi Arabia attempted to reinforce its influence in Indone-
sia, for which purpose it set up the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan
Bahasa Arab (LIPIA, Institute of Islamic and Arabic Studies) in Jakarta in
1980. This institute was initially established as the Lembaga Pengajaran Ba-
hasa Arab (LPBA, Institute of Arabic Teaching), which concentrated on the
development of the teaching of Arabic. The LIPIA has turned out hundreds
of graduates, more than thirty of whom receive grants each year to con-
tinue their studies in Saudi Arabian universities. These are recruited from
among the best students, accounting for 5 to 10% of all graduates.
The appeal for volunteers to wage jihad in Afghanistan presented the
first serious challenge to the foreign students studying in Saudi Arabia with
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grants from the kingdom to prove their commitment to Islam. They were
persuaded to participate in the campaign to assist Afghan Muslims to repel
the attacks of their communist enemies. It is not surprising that after fin-
ishing their studies many of these students decided to take part in the
Afghan War. This also holds true for students from Indonesia. Hundreds of
them preferred to not return home to Indonesia immediately, preferring to
spend time in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Participating in the jihad there
turned out to be a strange kind of fieldwork for some of them. They stood
shoulder-to-shoulder on the Afghan battlefields with volunteer soldiers
from various radical organisations in the Muslim world, who found in the
Afghan war an arena in which they could channel their enthusiasm for the
defence of Islam.
The Spread of Salafi Madrasas across Indonesia
The return of the first LIPIA graduates who had completed their studies in
Saudi Arabia and had undergone their baptism by fire in the Afghan War
marked the birth of a new generation of Muslim reformists in Indonesia,
who called themselves ‘Salafis.’ Prominent among this cohort were Cham-
saha Sofwan alias Abu Nida, Ahmad Faiz Asifuddin, and Aunur Rafiq
Ghufron. Before being recruited to undertake an Arabic training pro-
gramme at the LIPIA as a preparation to study in Saudi universities, they
had studied in the madrasa and pesantren system, especially from the mod-
ernist end of the spectrum. Given this background, it is not appropriate to
characterise them as ‘lumpen intelligentsia,’ as Oliver Roy (alluding to
Marx) called the new generation of Islamic activists. Roy was referring to
people whose poor education had aroused career expectations that could
only be disappointed, and whose knowledge of Islam was either self-taught
or imparted by new institutions and who lacked the competence of inde-
pendent reasoning.16 The Indonesian Salafis are, in fact, quite well educated
and enjoy a certain respect as preachers, because of their command of Ara-
bic and their facility with Islamic sources. Many of them were originally
trained by the Dewan Dakwah, which has invested much time and energy
into the preparation of religious authorities who are able to speak Arabic
and have read classical and modern Arabic texts, and who, in contrast to
traditional ulama, adopt puritan views. As Dewan Dakwah cadres, they are
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well acquainted with the Islamist discourses on modern political Islamic
movements. More than anyone else, they were committed to the spread of
Wahhabism under the banner of the Salafi daªwa movement.
The political atmosphere in Saudi Arabia in the aftermath of the seizure
of the Grand Mosque undoubtedly contributed to the emergence of this new
reformist generation. Saudi policy, devised to demonstrate the state’s com-
mitment to Islam more clearly while suppressing radical expressions of po-
litical Islam, appeared to act as a catalyst for widespread manifestations of
Wahhabi resurgence all over the Muslim world, particularly among the
youth, university students and university staff. This phenomenon was visi-
ble in their enthusiasm for demonstrating their commitment to religious
propagation and a puritanical lifestyle, while refraining from openly criti-
cising the government.17
The Salafi daªwa movement in Indonesia began to develop on university
campuses. In the early 1990s, the movement gained a new impetus with the
arrival of other Middle Eastern graduates and Afghan War veterans.18 A man
with a slightly different profile who also returned around this time was
Ja’far Umar Thalib, who was to become Indonesia’s best known Salafi ac-
tivist. Ja’far was not a graduate of a Middle Eastern university but he was
well acquainted with the Salafi movement. Born into a Hadrami (Arab) fam-
ily, he grew up in the puritanical atmosphere of Al Irsyad and studied at the
pesantren of Persis before continuing his studies at the LIPIA. After a falling
out with a member of the teaching staff, he dropped out of the LIPIA. In
spite of this, the then LIPIA director, ªAbd al-ªAziz ªAbd Allah al-ªAmr, gave
him a grant to study at the Mawdudi Islamic Institute in Lahore, Pakistan,
from where he was able to gain support for a trip to Afghanistan.
The efforts to develop the Salafi daªwa activities gave rise to Salafi com-
munities in various cities in Indonesia. The proliferation of these local com-
munities was followed by the birth of Salafi foundations bearing names
such as As-Sunnah, Ihya al-Turath, al-Sofwa, al-Lajnah al-Khairiyyah, Lajnah
al-Istiqamah, and Wahdah Islamiyyah. The increasing attention that fund-
ing agencies in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries paid to supporting
the Salafi daªwa activities following the Gulf War in 1990 significantly facili-
tated this development.
Congruent with the efflorescence of the Salafi foundations, Salafi
madrasas emerged in various Indonesian provinces, with names associated
with the slogans or doctrines popular among the Salafis, which revolved
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around the call for the revival of the Sunna. The oldest of the Salafi
madrasas is the madrasa Ihya al-Sunnah, which was established near Yo-
gyakarta in 1994. At that time, Abu Nida, who had been concentrating his
efforts on university campuses, was becoming quite successful in recruiting
university students to the Salafi movement. Many students who had previ-
ously been Ikhwan-influenced shifted to the Salafi movement. A change of
state policy towards political Islam enabled the Salafi movement to organise
halqas and dauras (study groups) for students openly. In the late 1980s,
Suharto began introducing an Islamisation strategy that focussed specifi-
cally on the accentuation of Islamic symbols in the Indonesian public
sphere. Interest and participation in the Islamic activities developed by the
Salafi daªwa movement and other Islamic movements spread among the stu-
dents. They enjoyed a new freedom and were no longer forced to conceal
their involvement in Islamic activism.
The madrasa Ihya al-Sunnah was intended to be the centre from which
the Salafi movement co-ordinated all its daªwa activities. Ja’far Umar Thalib,
who helped Abu Nida to establish it, made it his own base. It was soon fol-
lowed by the madrasa al-Turath al-Islami, founded in the same city in 1995.
Between 1995 and 2000, a dozen other madrasas were established, most of
them by those loyal to Ja’far Umar Thalib.19 When the movement split into
a group loyal to Abu Nida and the followers of Ja’far, most of the madrasas
remained under the control of Ja’far’s faction and were led by people whom
he had trained in the Ihya al-Sunnah; only three major madrasas belong to
the Abu Nida faction.20
The madrasas and the support of their teachers (ustad) were crucial fac-
tors in Ja’far Umar Thalib’s success in mobilising followers in a new organi-
sation, the Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal-Jamaªah (FKAWJ, the
Forum of Communication for the Followers of the Sunna and the Prophet
Muhammad’s Community), after the fall of the Suharto regime in May 1998.
Unlike the earlier Salafi groups, which had been very low-key in their public
performance, the FKAWJ adopted a high public profile, with statements con-
demning Western democracy as ‘un-Islamic’ and as a source of trouble for
contemporary Indonesia. The intensification of the Salafis’ mobilisation and
their shift towards political activism and militancy went hand-in-hand with
the escalation of the communal conflict that pitted Christians against Mus-
lims in the Moluccas during Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency (1999-2001).
The Salafis began talking about the need to wage jihad in support of the
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Moluccan Muslims, which in their view was the only solution to the con-
flict. Following a massacre in Tobelo, in which more than 500 Muslims were
killed and hundreds more lost their homes, the Salafis proclaimed the es-
tablishment of a paramilitary force, the Laskar Jihad. Under the leadership
of Ja’far Umar Thalib, they stated their determination to wage jihad and de-
manded that President Wahid step down. Wahid angrily refused and in-
structed the army to prevent the Laskar Jihad from departing for the Moluc-
cas. However, the group eventually reached their destination. Supported by
fatwas declared by various Arabian Salafi scholars, they claimed that the
President’s permission was no longer necessary, since his refusal to endorse
the jihad had effectively placed him in the class of illegitimate and unjust
rulers.21 The existence of a network of Salafi madrasas closely linked to
Ja’far Umar Thalib was of crucial importance to the Laskar Jihad’s opera-
tions in the Moluccas. It was especially through these madrasas that aspir-
ing mujahidin from the countryside were recruited.
Salafi Madrasas: Different Portraits
The rapid proliferation of Salafi madrasas coincided with increased tension
among the protagonists of the movement, especially Ja’far Umar Thalib and
Abu Nida, who were competing for recognition as the movement’s legiti-
mate representative, which involved financial backing from Middle Eastern
funding foundations. Although Ja’far Umar Thalib succeeded in recruiting a
loyal following that gave him the confidence to claim that he was the chief
leader among Indonesian Salafis, the financial contributions from Gulf-
based foundations continued to flow solely into the pockets of Abu Nida
and his group. This inevitably caused increasing tension between the two,
which Ja’far exacerbated by publicly accusing his rival of ‘Sururi’ tenden-
cies, apparently in order to undermine his trustworthiness in the eyes of his
Saudi sponsors. The term ‘Sururi’ refers to Muhammad ibn Surur al-Nayef
Zayn al-ªAbidin, a scholar of Syrian origin and early Muslim Brotherhood af-
filiations, who had spent years in Saudi Arabia as a political exile but had
later become a fierce regime critic, especially after the kingdom invited US
troops to protect its territory against the threat of invasion by Saddam Hus-
sein.22 By describing his rivals as ‘Sururi’, which implied that they were con-
testing the Islamic legitimacy of the Saudi regime, Ja’far Umar Thalib man-
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aged to present himself as a Saudi loyalist and an opponent of rebellion
against established governments.
The upshot was a long-lasting conflict within the Indonesian Salafi
movement over the Sururi issue. Ja’far Umar Thalib called upon Indonesian
Salafis to remain consistent with the purity of the Salafi daªwa and not fol-
low the path of his ‘Sururi’ rivals, whom he accused of only pretending to
be Salafis while in reality practising takfir, i.e., declaring Muslim rulers to be
apostates who should not be obeyed. The commotion did not stop there. The
Sururi issue also generated tension between Ja’far’s Salafi movement and
various Islamist groups influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood as well as
the locally rooted movement for an Islamic State of Indonesia (NII, Negara
Islam Indonesia or Darul Islam). These Islamist movements had expanded
their networks with renewed vigour during the 1990s, when the Suharto
regime adopted a more accommodating attitude towards Islam. Not with-
out reason, the Islamists perceived that Ja’far’s sweeping denunciations of
Muhammad Surur and his invectives against Sayyid Qutb and the takfir doc-
trine were also directed against themselves. They took strong objection to
being branded as ‘neo-Kharijites’ who were leading Muslims astray and
were the potential cause of disaster for the umma.
These polemics did not have the result that Ja’far Umar Thalib must have
hoped for: His professed loyalty to the quietist Salafi daªwa did not persuade
the most significant Gulf-based donor foundations to choose him over his
alleged Sururi rivals. Instead, they seemed to consider his manoeuvres as di-
visive for the entire Salafi movement, as having a negative impact on the
dissemination of the Salafi message. The Abu Nida group, on the other
hand, continued receiving generous patronage, for Abu Nida was well-con-
nected and enjoyed the trust of the donor foundations. He had as a student
received a study grant from the Rabitat al-ªAlam al-Islami on the recom-
mendation of Mohammad Natsir, the then DDII chairman, and he had stud-
ied Islamic law at the Imam Muhammad ibn Saªud University in Riyadh.
During his studies, he had also worked as a staff member at the DDII
branch office in Riyadh, where he made contact with funding agencies.
After his return to Indonesia, he cultivated these contacts and carefully
managed the projects he received from the funding foundations.
In their rivalry with Abu Nida, Ja’far and his group also developed their
own network of contacts in the Middle East, paying special attention to
Yemen-based Salafi ulama, for which reason they became known as the
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‘Yemeni’ Salafis. Ja’far’s rivals came to be known more broadly as the
‘Haraki,’ i.e., politically involved Salafis – another negative label that was
first applied to them by Ja’far’s group to suggest that they were somehow
associated with political activism against the Saudi regime. In order to pre-
vent his rivals from gaining the upper hand in Indonesia, Ja’far increased
his daªwa activities and encouraged his students to establish their own
madrasas.
The conflict among Indonesian Salafis is reflected in the differences in
the physical appearance of the madrasas. The Madrasah Bin Baz, for in-
stance, is a prosperous-looking and quite large complex, with a number of
permanent buildings containing study rooms, a prayer room (musalla), an
office, dormitories, and teachers’ living quarters. As demonstrated by the
inscriptions on their walls, these buildings were donated by various person-
alities in the Middle East, particularly in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. This
madrasa is built on one hectare of land in Piyungan, Bantul, some 25 kilo-
metres south of Yogyakarta, that was donated by Sultan Hamengkubowono
of Yogyakarta. Here, nine teachers are responsible for approximately 300
(male and female) students, who are divided into three educational levels:
kindergarten, primary and secondary. The majority of them live in a dormi-
tory in which there is a strict separation between males and females.
The Imam al-Bukhari madrasa, which also belongs to Abu Nida’s group,
is located in Selokaton, Surakarta, 15 kilometres to the east of Solo, on the
main road from Solo to Purwodadi and shares many features with the
Madrasah Bin Baz. It is actually even larger and better appointed. It covers a
plot of roughly two hectares, with a dozen permanent building units, con-
sisting of study rooms, office, library, dormitory, teachers’ houses, and a
two-story mosque in front. As in the Madrasah Bin Baz, every building unit
here bears inscriptions on its walls with the name of the major donors –
mostly from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait – who financed its construction. The
school has an enrolment of 400 students who study at three different levels:
kindergarten, primary and secondary. The number of male students is four
times that of female students. All of them live in the dormitory, which has
a partition that divides the males from the females. They school has 19
teachers, all of whom live in the teachers’ housing provided by the madrasa.
These madrasas have greatly benefited from the support of their wealthy
international donors. This support appears to have been quite selective,
however, because not every ustad received the necessary financial support to
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establish a madrasa upon completion of his studies in Saudi Arabia. Many
recent graduates were basically instructed to support existing Salafi
madrasas in Indonesia. This may help explain the striking difference be-
tween the relatively few, well-funded and large madrasas of the Abu Nida
and Ahmad Faiz Asifuddin group, on the one hand, and the much more
modest ones of Ja’far’s ‘Yemeni’ Salafi network. It is precisely because the
latter did not have access to the large funding agencies with their strict cri-
teria for supporting a madrasa, that the ustads in this group established
their own small and extremely modest madrasas in the villages where they
carried out their daªwa activities. Even the Ihya al-Sunnah madrasa, which
had long served as Ja’far Umar Thalib’s headquarters, is an unadorned and
impoverished-looking place. It is located in the village of Degolan near Kali-
urang, on the slopes of Mount Merapi, approximately 16 kilometres north
of Yogyakarta. The entire madrasa, which has a modest mosque at its cen-
tre, covers a plot of no more than 300 square metres, rented for a period of
10 years There are two cramped dormitories with walls of simple bamboo
matting and with dirt floors covered with mats and plastic located about
100 metres from this mosque. It houses some 70 students, aged 7 to 17, di-
vided into three age groups. Some of them are ‘day’ students who commute
home to nearby villages. The entire teaching staff consists of four teachers,
who rent modest accommodations in the immediate area.
The case of the madrasa Minhaj al-Sunnah in Magelang is similar. This
madrasa has 120 students, aged 7 to 17 years. They occupy a small space in
the corner of a modest mosque built on former paddy fields. All of the in-
struction takes place in the mosque. A few teachers’ accommodations and a
small office are located some 100 metres from the mosque. This is similar to
conditions at the Al-Madinah madrasa, located in a village in Boyolali, some
20 kilometres from Solo. Although this madrasa has more than 100 stu-
dents, its facilities are extremely limited. A modest mosque serves as the
centre of its activities as well as the dormitory of a dozen of its students.
The madrasa As-Sunnah, at Baji Rupa in Makassar, is just as poorly
equipped, with three small wooden houses that serve as dormitories for its
students and a small, modest mosque that functions as the centre of all
madrasa activities. Four teachers teach some 50 students here, some resi-
dent and some living in nearby villages.
Although these madrasas were generally established within existing vil-
lages, the teachers and students strictly separate themselves from their
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physical surroundings. The madrasas are considered enclaves of ‘holier than
thou’ piety, that view their environments as being dangerously immoral
and self-indulgent. This attitude is, in turn, mirrored by their neighbours:
because of its air of exclusivity, the local villagers tend to view the madrasa
community, the pondok orang berjubah (hostel of men in long robes) as it is
often called with disdain, considering the inhabitants as alien and weird,
and a little threatening. These madrasas indeed appear to be separate, inde-
pendent villages that exist within real villages. Teachers, students and other
members of the madrasas are bound together in tightly-knit communities
that restrict their contacts with outsiders. With few exceptions, the stu-
dents are not allowed to make contact with the locals. The students often
appear to be suspicious of outsiders. Their life is monotonous. Their main
activities consist of praying, studying and memorising the Qur’an. Students
are also subject to certain bodily restrictions and are forced to conform to a
homogenous norm.
A recent study by Almond, Appleby, and Sivan claims that an ‘enclave
mentality’ constitutes the core of many contemporary religious fundamen-
talist movements. It is ‘the primary impulse that lies behind the rise of the
tradition so as to forestall the danger of being sucked into the vortex of
modernity.’23 Fundamentalists usually construct a ‘wall of virtue’ around
themselves that is based on moral values. This wall separates the saved,
free, and morally superior enclave from the hitherto corrupt, worldly, local
community. The enclave sharply pits the oppressive and morally defiled
general society against their own community of virtuous insiders. In con-
trast to the inside, anything outside is conceived as a polluted, contagious
and dangerous area.24
An enclave sets itself apart through spatial relations that carry symbolic
and social meanings. It is a separate space in which behaviour, language
and dress codes are strictly regulated. The severe nature of the rules serves
to emphasise the gravity of the danger posed by the world outside, a danger
that can only be warded off by the imposition of order in all aspects of life.25
Here lies the importance of authority, as a guide that steers the behaviour
of individual members. The specific patterns of behaviour, language and
dress serve as distinguishing marks setting the redeemed apart from the
outside world. In the language of a Salafi teacher, the pattern of behaviour,
language, and dress is a question of identity that cannot be negotiated:
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Whether someone is a true believer or not can be seen from his behaviour, lan-
guage, and dress. A faithful Muslim must behave like al-salaf al-salih, speak in the
language of the Qur’an and the Sunna, and wear Islamic dress such as the jal-
abiyya, in order to distinguish himself from the infidels. As the hadith states, man
tashabbaha bi qawmin fa huwa minhum: ‘whoever resembles a [infidel] group, be-
longs to that group’.26
Teaching Method and Curriculum of the Salafi Madrasas
The Salafi madrasas developed by Ja’far Umar Thalib and his network reject
all non-religious subjects in their curriculum, and this clearly distinguishes
them from the pesantrens established by reformist Muslim associations, in-
cluding those affiliated with the most puritan movement, Persis. The latter
encouraged the teaching of modern subjects, such as mathematics, geogra-
phy, and English. Like Muhammadiyah and Al Irsyad, Persis, whose reli-
gious outlook is close to Wahhabism, has been perceived by the Salafi
preachers as having lost its reformist spirit and inclining too much towards
rationalism.
The reluctance to adopt a grading system and modern subjects also dis-
tinguishes the Salafi madrasa Ihya al-Sunnah from the pesantren Al-Mukmin
in Ngruki, which has adopted many elements of Salafism in its teaching. Al-
Mukmin consists of three separate school units, Kulliyat al-Muªallimin (KMI)
and Kulliyat al-Muªallimat (KMA), for boys and girls respectively, and the
Madrasah Aliyah Al-Mukmin (MAAM). The first two schools devote the
largest portion of their curriculum to religious subjects, but also teach sec-
ular subjects such as mathematics. The Madrasah Aliyah follows the
madrasa model developed by the Department of Religious Affairs, meaning
that 70% of its curriculum consists of secular subjects. However, during re-
ligious instruction, students are introduced to puritan and militant ideas,
using books by militant ideologues of both Ikhwani and Salafi persuasions,
such as Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s Aqidah Islamiyah, Salim Saªid al-Qahtani’s al-
Wala wa-l-Bara, and Saªid Hawwa’s Jund Allah. To further bolster their mili-
tancy, some of the students are encouraged to attend extra classes in which
senior teachers voice animosity towards the government as well as the US
and its allies. On certain occasions, they are taken into the jungle to un-
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dergo physical and mental training, including hiking, mountain climbing,
and camping.27
The model of Al-Mukmin may have inspired Abu Nida, who was a
teacher at the Madrasah Aliyah in the mid-1980s, to combine the primary
and junior secondary schools with his Madrasah Bin Baz. These schools offer
the ordinary curriculum as prescribed by the Ministry of National Educa-
tion, and their students take part in the national final examinations and re-
ceive diplomas, which gives them access to state higher education. Besides
the state curriculum, the students take additional classes in religious sub-
jects in the afternoon and evening and attend taªlim (short religious lec-
tures) after collective prayer. The same occurs at the Imam al-Bukhari
madrasa established by Ahmad Faiz Asifuddin.
The students in the madrasas of the ‘Yemeni’ Salafi network study only
Islamic subjects. The teaching of general subjects and the adoption of a
state curriculum has been rejected. The system of instruction is conven-
tional in nature. Every morning the ustads, or teachers, come to the mosque
and seat themselves on the floor to begin teaching. The most senior ustad
usually takes up a position in the centre of the mosque while the other us-
tads occupy its wings. Groups of students gather around each ustad, with
copies of the Arabic text to be studied in their hands. The ustads read aloud
from the books and explain the meaning of each sentence while presenting
illustrations and examples. Sometimes they use a small blackboard to fur-
ther elaborate their explanations. Some students take notes; others simply
listen.28 In the case of Arabic language teaching, students are repeatedly
tested to make sure they mimic as fluently as possible the examples of the
sentences given by the ustad. After the ustad finishes his lesson, students are
allowed to ask questions. This continues until it is the time for noon prayer.
Between the noon prayer and afternoon prayer, students eat lunch and rest.
After the afternoon prayer, they come back to the mosque for another read-
ing session with the ustad, which continues until about an hour before the
sunset prayer. Between the sunset prayer and the evening prayer, students
read and memorise parts of the Qur’an, as prescribed by their ustad.
The main subject studied in the Salafi madrasas is not fiqh, which is the
main fare in the traditional pesantren, but Islamic theology (ªaqida), or more
precisely Wahhabi doctrine. This entails reading such works as al-Qawl al-
Mufid fi Adillat al-Tawhid by the Saudi scholar Muhammad bin Salih al-
ªUthaymin, which is a summary of Muhammad ibn ªAbd al-Wahhab’s Kitab
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al-Tawhid. In some madrasas, students are obliged to memorise the entire
text before they are allowed to study other books. Having completed this
book, they are usually obliged to study the Kitab al-Tawhid itself or annotated
commentaries of it, such as Al Qawl al-Shadid ªAla Kitab al-Tawhid by ªAbd al-
Rahman al-Suªudi. This is followed by an entire series of other books dealing
with doctrine.29
Because all of these books are in Arabic, students are first required to
study Arabic. Various aspects of Arabic are taught separately, including
nahw (basic grammar), sarf (morphology), mutalaªa (reading), imlaª (writing),
muhadatha (conversation), and balagha (rhetoric). They use popular books
taught in the traditional pesantren to study these aspects of Arabic.30 In ad-
dition to these, they make use of al-ªArabiyya li al-Nashi’in, a new, compre-
hensive Arabic textbook distributed free of charge to various Islamic educa-
tional institutions by Saudi Arabian embassies.
Wahhabi doctrine provides the foundation from which the students
move on to other subjects such as Qur’anic exegesis (tafsir), prophetic tradi-
tions (hadith), Islamic legal theory (usul al-fiqh), Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh),
and daªwa methods. For Qur’anic exegesis, works by contemporary Salafi
authorities are preferred.31 The hadith works include both classical collec-
tions such as Nawawi’s ‘Forty Hadith’ (Arbaªin) and later Salafi commen-
taries.32 The required reading materials for Islamic legal theory include both
works by classical scholars such as Juwayni and modern Salafi texts by the
Saudi authority al-ªUthaymin.33 Fiqh is taught in accordance with the Han-
bali school, using mostly works by contemporary Salafi authors, including
the well-known The Path of the Muslim by Abu Bakr al-Jaza’iri.34 Finally, stu-
dents are also required to study a number of books on the methods of
daªwa.35 All of the books in this curriculum, with the exception of Nawawi’s
Forty Hadith and Juwayni’s classical handbook of legal theory, are within the
narrow constraints as dictated by official Saudi Wahhabi teachings, and
their authors are well-known Wahhabi luminaries (or, in the case of Ibn
Taymiyya and Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, recognised by the Wahhabis as their
precursors). Through these books, students are firmly indoctrinated in the
Wahhabi doctrine and worldview.
Some of the madrasas offer special programmes for university students,
called Tadrib al-Duªat (the training for preachers) and Tarbiyat al-Nisa (educa-
tion for women). These programmes last for a certain period of time, rang-
ing from three months to one year. The Tadrib al-Duªat is designed to pro-
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duce preachers ready to conduct daªwa activities. The subjects taught in-
clude Islamic theology, tafsir, hadith, Islamic history, Islamic law, ethics, and
Arabic. The Tarbiyat al-Nisa is addressed to women and is aimed at moulding
their personality in accordance with Wahhabi teachings. In this pro-
gramme, participants study Islamic theology and Islamic jurisprudence, be-
sides engaging in a number of instructions on behaviour, fashion, gender
relations and the methods of taking care of husbands and children.
Abangan Converts
Despite the poor conditions of many madrasas and a heavy curriculum, the
students of the Salafi madrasas never seem to lose their courage and enthu-
siasm for their study of Islam. They realise that this is part of the struggle
that should be endured by a Muslim to uphold the dignity of Islam. The ma-
jority want to become preachers and devote their lives to daªwa activities.
Some of the students receive financial support from their own families to
cover their living expenses and tuition fees. But the amounts they receive
tend to be very modest: on average between 50,000 to 100,000 Rupiahs
(US$6-12) per month. Nonetheless, many families are unable to even afford
this much. Fortunately, there are some generous donors, according to one
Salafi ustad, including a sympathetic restaurant owner in Magelang, who
was willing to cover the costs for the poorest students.36
The social background of the students in these Salafi madrasas is not im-
mediately obvious; there is not a self-evident constituency for Salafism. In
my observations, many of the students are from poor rural backgrounds.
Their parents are petty merchants, artisans, unskilled labourers, factory
workers, peasants, and agricultural labourers, with many of them being
abangan rather than santri in religious disposition. Abangan is the term in-
troduced by the American anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1960) for nominal
Muslims in Java whose religious beliefs and practices are influenced by ani-
mism, Hinduism and Buddhism besides Islam. They are distinct from the
santri, who are committed to a more or less strict adherence to Islamic
norms. It is the santri’s concern with the formal, orthodox variant of Islam,
Geertz argues, that distinguishes them from the abangan. For the santri, the
abangan’s belief in invisible beings represents the influences of animism,
Hinduism, and Buddhism that should be assiduously expunged.37
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The interest that abangan people have in Islam has developed apace with
the intensification of daªwa activities pioneered by the Dewan Dakwah and
other Muslim organisations in the last three decades. Although some aban-
gan came into contact with orthodox Islam a little late, they did so with a
vengeance and adopted the most puritan and radical versions available in
late twentieth-century Indonesia. The Iranian revolution and the Saudi
counteroffensive made various styles of Islamic radicalism available that
had the added attraction of being global and thereby attractive to people
whose villages were being uprooted and decimated by accelerated moderni-
sation. Salafism, with its simple black-and-white message, must have of-
fered to at least some of the abangan who had lost their bearings in life, the
solace of moral security and a new anchor in their social lives.
Once the step to adopt orthodox Islam was taken, many former abangan
make great efforts to quickly transform themselves into ‘true’ Muslims.
Their eagerness to fully conform to their new identity and learn more about
Islam is apparent from their dedicated participation in various halqas and
dauras and their efforts to learn Arabic. Even though they find it very diffi-
cult, they are enthusiastic to learn how to correctly recite the Qur’an and
properly perform the ablutions (wuduª) and prayers (salat). Those who can al-
ready recite the Qur’an often feel they need to learn to improve their per-
formance style as well. Ashamed of the typical Javanese mispronunciations
of Arabic consonants that are sometimes ridiculed – Javanese tend to pro-
nounce the Arabic ªayn as ngain, for instance – they make great efforts to
work on their pronunciation by listening to cassettes of Qur’an recitations
(murattal) by well-known cantors from Saudi Arabia.
They often follow this up with the adoption of new, Arab-style dress and
letting their beards grow. This move is usually accompanied by a commit-
ment to distancing themselves from their current relationships and envi-
ronments. By doing so, they feel they can more readily assert their claim to
being true Muslims. They also often replace their abangan names, such as
Sutarto, Hartono, Raharjo, Suryanto, Sumarjono and Wardoyo, with more
Islamic-sounding Arabic ones like Ahmad Haris, Muhammad Khalid,
Hamzah, Ibn Usman, and Ibn Rasyid. This process of disassociation from
tradition occurs quickly.
It is obvious that the Salafi madrasas play a significant role in accelerat-
ing the process of santrinisation among the abangan. They serve as centres
for the dissemination of the Salafi daªwa movement in regions known as
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bastions of abangan culture. The Madrasah al-Madinah located in Boyolali,
for instance, recruited hundreds of abangan children, especially from the
surrounding areas in Central Java. Some of the students whom I inter-
viewed there said that they were very ashamed that both their families in
their home villages and people living in the areas around their madrasa still
believe in the spirits inhabiting the trees, in magical rings and belts, and
that they even ask spirits to help track down thieves when they are robbed.
The feeling of shame regarding these ‘superstitions’ has spurred them on to
study the ‘real Islam’ of the madrasa and to detach themselves totally from
what they now consider ‘non-Islamic traditions.’ Through their Salafi
madrasa educations, these students will become santris, committed to the
purification of Islamic belief and to the spread of the Salafi daªwa. They are,
in turn, encouraged to set up similar madrasas and develop their own daªwa
activities in newly-targeted abangan areas.
Yemen as a Model
Most Salafi madrasas in Indonesia, especially those affiliated with Ja’far
Umar Thalib and his network, use the Islamic teaching centres of the late
Muqbil ibn Hadi al-Wadiªi, as their model. He was one of the outstanding
Salafi authorities in Yemen. The repudiation of anything influenced by the
West, including the grading system and non-religious subjects, is character-
istic of Muqbil’s Islamic educational system. Ja’far Umar Thalib, Muqbil’s
first Indonesian student, claims that this system is ideally suited to the In-
donesian situation.38 Simplicity, another characteristic of Muqbil’s Islamic
teaching centres, also inspires the way that the Salafi ustads run their
madrasas.39 The ustads in these madrasas are indeed mostly graduates of
Muqbil’s teaching centres. Otherwise, they are graduates of Saudi universi-
ties or Islamic teaching centres controlled by Saudi religious authorities,
such as Muhammad bin Salih al-ªUthaymin, who was also in close contact
with Muqbil. The relations of these ustads with their Middle Eastern men-
tors are relatively close and sustained over time. They stay in contact with
their teachers through letters, by telephone and by fax, and frequently re-
quest a fatwa or simply advice from them when faced with a delicate ques-
tion. These close relations moreover enable them to send their best stu-
dents directly to the Middle East to study.
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Muqbil gained recognition as a leading Salafi authority in the early
1980s, as a result of his efforts to spread the Salafi daªwa movement in
Yemen. He acquired his grasp of the Wahhabi scholarly tradition in the
course of almost two decades of studies in Saudi Arabia. He first studied at
an Islamic teaching centre in Najran, that was run by the leading Wahhabi
scholar Muhammad bin Salih al-ªUthaymin, before enrolling at the Islamic
University of Medina. During this period, he had the opportunity to attend
the halqas of some prominent Salafi authorities, such as ªAbd al-ªAziz ªAbd
Allah bin Baz and Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Albani. (The latter had been
invited by Bin Baz to teach hadith at Medina Islamic university in 1961, when
Muqbil had just begun his studies there.) Following accusations of his in-
volvement in Juhayman al-ªUtaybi’s uprising and seizure of the Grand
Mosque of Mecca in 1979, Muqbil was arrested. Having languished in a
Saudi prison for several months, he was expelled to his native land.40
Back in Yemen, Muqbil began to spread Wahhabism by establishing the
Madrasa Dar al-Hadith al-Khayriyya in Dammaj, his native tribal region,
east of Saªda. In his efforts to spread Wahhabism, various challenges arose,
particularly from foes of the Wahhabis, namely, the Shafiªis, Ismaªilis and
Zaydis, who have traditionally dominated Saªda. They did not appreciate the
incursion of the doctrines taught by Muqbil and wanted to maintain their
dominance of the region. In fact, he sensed the bitterness of his foes, par-
ticularly that of the Zaydi sayyids, even before his departure to Saudi Arabia.
Nevertheless, he survived the attacks by his detractors because of the sup-
port of his fellow tribesmen, the Wadiªis. He even succeeded in developing
his own school into one of the exemplary teaching centres for Salafis
throughout the world. Tens of thousands of students have studied with
him, a significant number of whom came from outside Yemen, from such
diverse places as Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and
Indonesia, as well as Belgium, the United States and the United Kingdom.41
Muqbil’s relations with Saudi Arabia were complicated but also dynamic.
His imprisonment in 1979 must have been an unforgettable nightmare. He
was very critical of the Saudi royal family at the time and was at one point
even ready to denounce them as infidels. At the same time, his interest in
the dissemination of Wahhabism, however, allowed him to maintain his al-
liance with Saudi Arabia. The Holy Mosque Establishment, a charitable or-
ganisation sponsored by the Saudi government, has officially supported all
institutions of learning associated with Muqbil, including the Dammaj Cen-
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tre, the Maªabir Centre, the Maªrib Centre, the al-Hudayda Centre, and the
al-Khayr Mosque.42
In many instances, Muqbil has adopted positions supportive of Saudi
Arabian foreign policy. For instance, he was also fiercely critical of the Iran-
ian Revolution, against which he wrote a polemical tract, al-Ilhad al-Khu-
mayni fi Ard al-Haramayn (‘Khomeinian Heresy in the Land of the Two Holy
Mosques’), which served the global Wahhabi counter-offensive. Similarly,
during Yemen’s civil war in 1994, he mobilised his followers to join the bat-
tlefront, alongside various Islamist forces, against the Marxist-Leninists in
the south. This involvement earned him his reputation on the political
scene in Yemen. After the civil war was won, he remained actively involved
in Yemeni politics, co-operating with the al-Islah party, whose chief mission
was the destruction of what remained of the Marxist regime in the former
South Yemen.43 It should be noted that the Islah party was very active in
providing sanctuary for Afghan war veterans.44
Muqbil’s relations with Saudi Arabia received a further boost when he
came out in defence of Bin Baz against Muhammad ibn Surur and like-
minded people who had condemned the Saudi scholar for issuing a fatwa le-
gitimising the stationing of US troops in the kingdom. Muqbil spoke out
strongly against Muhammad ibn Surur, calling him a takfiri and thereby im-
plicitly placing him outside the community of Salafi scholars. Muqbil’s
stand on this divisive issue brought him into an alliance with Bin Baz’s
other defenders in Saudi Arabia, including Muhammad Nasir al-Din al-Al-
bani, Muhammad ibn Salih al-ªUthaymin, Rabiª ibn Hadi al-Madkhali and
Zayd Muhammad ibn Hadi al-Madkhali. These were the most influential
Saudi Salafi authorities, with whom the ustads of the Salafi madrasas in In-
donesia have also established links.
Repercussions of the Afghan War
The central position of Yemen in the growth of the Salafi madrasas in In-
donesia is indubitably related to the Afghan War. This war enabled mu-
jahidin from across the world to come into contact with one another and ex-
change information and experiences in an environment based on the ethos
of the jihad. Networks were formed and relationships established. Salafis
from around the world were united because of this war. They became ac-
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quainted with the centres of the Salafi daªwa movement and the Salafi Is-
lamic teaching centres which are located in various parts of the Muslim
world.
One of the factions of the Afghan mujahidin, which became the main des-
tination of Salafis from around the world was the Jamaªat al-Daªwa ila al-
Qur’an wa-l-Hadith. This was a strict Saudi Salafi faction led by Jamil al-Rah-
man. It had special relations with the Pakistani Ahl-i Hadith, a reformist
movement founded on the Indian Sub-continent in the nineteenth century,
which is similar to Wahhabism in many ways, particularly in terms of its re-
jection of traditional practices, such as visiting the Prophet’s grave.45 Jamil
al-Rahman himself is a graduate of a religious school, the Ahl al-Hadith in
Panjpir, which is sponsored by Saudi Arabia. Before establishing this faction
he was a member of the Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i Islami.46
The Jamaªat al-Daªwa set up its base in the isolated Afghan province of
Kunar, where the central authorities had no control. Because of the move-
ment’s relation to Wahhabism, many of the jihad volunteers from Saudi
Arabia, Jordan, and Yemen preferred this group over other mujahidin fac-
tions. With strong financial backing from private sources in Saudi Arabia
and Kuwait, it gained sufficient strength to seize control of Kunar and es-
tablish a Shura Council there. Surprisingly perhaps, considering its strong
Saudi connections, the Jamaªat al-Daªwa adopted the doctrine of takfir, de-
claring the Afghan government and all those who obeyed it to be apostates.
It was their religious duty as believers to struggle against these forces. One
consequence of the takfir doctrine was that the Afghans living in govern-
ment-controlled areas were treated like infidels, subject to the rules of fu-
tuhat (conquest), including killing the men who resisted and taking women
and children prisoners.47
The Jamaªat al-Daªwa developed a more hostile attitude towards non-
Muslims and the West in general than any of the other factions. They con-
sidered them the enemies of Islam. Members of this faction frequently at-
tacked journalists and humanitarian workers, accusing them of being
agents of the West. But the engagement of this faction on Afghanistan’s po-
litical scene ended when the Soviet Union withdrew; it retreated from the
political struggle for power that followed. Jamil al-Rahman himself then be-
came the target of assassination attempts by his rivals. The veterans of the
movement spent their time conducting what they believed were daªwa ac-
tivities. Resorting to iconoclasm, they destroyed statues and monuments
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and attacked local religious practices they considered as anathema in
Islam.48
The link between Indonesian Salafis and Muqbil’s students probably
began to develop during the Afghan war when they met as members of the
Jamaªat al-Daªwa faction. Indeed, proponents of the Salafi daªwa movement
in Indonesia generally claim that they joined this faction during their en-
gagement in the war. The importance of this faction among them is indi-
cated by the fact that some of the mosques they built upon their return to
Indonesia were named after Jamil al-Rahman.49 However, this relation was
not reinforced until Ja’far Umar Thalib decided to leave for Yemen to study
directly under Muqbil, only one year after he returned to Indonesia, which
reaffirmed the classical relationship between Yemen and Indonesia. It
should be noted that Hadrami immigrants, who began to find their way to
Indonesia in the fifteenth century, have had a great impact on the develop-
ment of Islam in the Indonesian archipelago.50 Yet, their roles had dimin-
ished significantly during the twentieth century in the wake of the emer-
gence of indigenous religious authorities, who had no connection with the
Hadramaut. The main success of Ja’far Umar Thalib as the first Indonesian
student of Muqbil was to initiate the co-operation which has enabled hun-
dreds of Indonesian Salafis to study there.
Epilogue
The mushrooming of Salafi madrasas stagnated in the aftermath of the 9/11
attacks; their networks have since then gone down hill. Several madrasas
were simply abandoned by students and were forced to close down. Various
factors contributed to this stagnation. Since the 9/11 tragedy and the US re-
sponse, the stream of Indonesian students going to Yemen (or, for that mat-
ter, to Pakistan) has practically dried up. Hundreds of foreign students who
were still living in Yemen in 2001 were hounded by the Yemeni police and
intelligence agencies and because they were suspected of having links to
Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Many of them were indeed subjected to in-
terrogation and arrest and most were ultimately forced to return home.
The ‘war on terror’ has also created problems for the Salafi madrasas in
Indonesia. They came under the suspicion of the police and intelligence
agencies as well as the media, and some ustads claim they were interrogated
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by intelligence officers soon after 9/11. Almost immediately after the Bali
bombing of October 2002, the Laskar Jihad, with which at that time most of
the Salafi madrasas were connected, suddenly issued a statement that it
was dissolving itself. Although its leaders claimed that it was due to a fatwa
issued by a Saudi scholar who objected to the movement’s involvement in
politics, it shook the followers’ confidence in their leadership. Doubts about
the ideological purity of Ja’far and other leaders were exacerbated by ru-
mours about the involvement of certain members of Indonesia’s military in
both the formation and the dissolution of the Laskar Jihad. This paralysed
the activities of at least some of the Salafi madrasas, including the
Madrasah Ihya al-Sunnah, which Ja’far Umar Thalib had at that time begun
to rebuild. More importantly perhaps, the rapid rise and even more sudden
demise of Laskar Jihad seriously undermined Ja’far’s credibility as a leader
of the Salafi daªwa movement. Many ustads in the Salafi madrasas began to
question the sincerity of Ja’far Umar Thalib’s commitment to the Salafi
path. As a result of this lack of trust amongst the chief protagonists of the
Salafi daªwa and the general tendency towards fragmentation and conflict,
the Indonesian Salafi movement has been seriously weakened.
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Notes
1 In Indonesian, the word is spelled madrasah, but I prefer to use the more
common international spelling, except where the word is part of the name of a
particular school. The Indonesian madrasa is distinguished from the pesantren,
the traditional Islamic school, by the fact that the madrasa has a mixed
(religious and general) curriculum and a grading system. A pesantren may or
may not be organised as a madrasa. To make things more complicated, the
Salafi movement uses the same term now for its own teaching institutions,
that are based on Middle Eastern models and do not include general subjects in
their curricula.
2 This number is based on data compiled by the Information Centre of the
Ministry of Religious Affairs (Pusat Data dan Informasi Departemen Agama) in
2002.
3 For a further account of the differences between these three educational
institutions, see Karel A. Steenbrink, Pesantren, Madrasah, Sekolah: Recente
Ontwikkelingen in Indonesisch Islamonderricht, Ph.D. Dissertation, Nijmegen
Catholic University, 1974.
4 On the kyai and the pesantren, see Zamakhsyari Dhofier, The Pesantren Tradition:
The Role of the Kyai in the Maintenance of Traditional Islam in Java,Tempe: Arizona
State University, 1999.
5 On the establishment of the reformist, modernist Muslim organisations and
the schools they developed, see, for instance, Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim
Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942, Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1973.
6 Persis (Persatuan Islam, Islamic Union) is the most strictly puritan of
Indonesia’s Muslim Reformist associations, known for its exclusive adherence
to the Qur’an and hadith and for its uncompromising opposition to local beliefs
and practices as well as the traditional schools of Islamic law. Al Irsyad
represents the Reformist current within Indonesia’s Arab community and has
been more oriented towards developments in the Arab heartland.
7 Halqa, literally means ‘circle’ and is a forum for the study of Islamic sciences,
in which an ustad (teacher or preacher) gives lessons based on certain books,
and his participants gather around him to listen to his lessons. It is distinct
from daura, literally meaning ‘turn’, which is a type of workshop held for a
certain period of time, ranging from one week to a month, during which
participants stay together in one place and follow specific programmes.
8 John O. Voll, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World, Second Edition,
Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1994, pp. 53-6.
9 Being firmly associated with the global Islamic resurgence, this movement also
inherited some aspects of Salafism, notably its anti-West sentiments, which
inspired the birth of the twentieth-century Islamist movements, such as the
Ikhwan al-Muslimun (Muslim Brotherhood) and the Jamaªat-i Islami (Islamic
Community).
10 Gilles Kepel, Jihad, the Trail of Political Islam, London: I.B. Tauris, 2002, p. 69.
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11 Cary Fraser, ‘In Defence of Allah’s Realm: Religion and Statecraft in Saudi
Foreign Policy Strategy’, in: Susanne Hoeber Rudolph and James Piscatori (eds.),
Transnational Religion and Fading States, Oxford: Westview Press, 1997, p. 222.
12 Reinhard Schulze, Islamischer Internationalismus im 20. Jahrhundert, Leiden: Brill,
1990, pp. 215-216; see also Kepel, Jihad, p. 72.
13 Regarding opposition movements in Saudi Arabia, see Mamoun Fandy, Saudi
Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, London: Macmillan, 1999.
14 On the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia after Khomeini’s revolution, see
Fraser, ‘In Defense of Allah’s Realm’, pp. 226-234.
15 Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics, Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1996, p. 151.
16 See Oliver Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, Harvard: Harvard University Press,
1996, pp. 84-5.
17 R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
1985, pp. 139-40.
18 The most prominent of these graduates from Saudi universities with war
experience were Yazid Abdul Qadir Jawwas, Yusuf Usman Baisa, Muhammad
Yusuf Harun, Ahmad Zawawi, and M. Zaitun Rasmin. They were among the
early leaders of the Indonesian Salafi movement.
19 These include the madrasa al-Madinah and the Imam al-Bukhari in Solo, the
Minhaj al-Sunnah in Magelang, the Lu’lu wa-l-Marjan in Semarang, the Ibn
Taymiyya in Banyumas, the al-Furqan and the al-Manshurah in Kroya, the As-
Sunnah in Cirebon and another madrasa of the same name in Makassar, the
al-Athariyah in Temenggung, the Ittibaª al-Sunnah in Sukoharjo and its
namesake in Magetan, the Al-Salafy in Jember, the Taªzim al-Sunnah in Ngawi,
the al-Bayyinah in Gresik, the al-Furqan in Cilacap and another al-Furqan in
Pekanbaru, and the Ibn Qayyim in Balikpapan. More recent additions are the
Madrasah Bin Baz, the Madrasah Al-Ansar, the Madrasah Difaª ªan al-Sunnah in
Yogyakarta and the Madrasah Ibn Taymiyyah in Solo.
20 These exceptions are the madrasa Al-Turath al-Islami in Yogyakarta, the Imam
al-Bukhari in Solo, and the As-Sunnah as in Cirebon.
21 For a detailed account of this issue, see Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam,
Militancy, and the Quest for Militancy in Post-New Order Indonesia, Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Southeast Asia Program, 2006.
22 In spite of Surur’s importance among the ‘political’ Salafis, little has been
written about him in English. The best information is in Madawi al-Rasheed,
Contesting the Saudi State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation, Cambridge
University Press, 2007, pp. 72-77.
23 Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan, Strong Religion: The
Rise of Fundamentalism around the World, Chicago and London: University of
Chicago Press, 2003, p. 30.
24 Ibid., pp. 33-7.
25 Ibid., pp. 46-52.
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26 Interview with Muhammad Ihsan, Yogyakarta, 30 December 2002.
27 Muhammad Wildan, ‘Pondok Ngruki and its Alleged Linkage with Radical
Islamism in Contemporary Indonesia’, paper presented at the International
Convention of Asia Scholars (ICAS V), UKM, Malaysia, 2-5 August 2007.
28 This method resembles the bandongan system popular in the traditional
pesantren.
29 The following works are studied: al-Usul al-Thalatha by Muhammad ibn ªAbd al-
Wahhab; al-ªAqida al-Wasitiyya by Ibn Taymiyya or its annotated commentary,
Sharh al-ªAqida al-Wasitiyya by Salih ibn Fauzan ªAli Fauzan. Other recommended
books include Nabdha fi al-ªAqida by Muhammad bin Salih al-ªUthaymin, Sharh
al-ªAqida al-Tahawiyya al-Muyassar by Muhammad ibn ªAbd al-Rahman al-Khamis,
and Kitab al-Firqa al-Najiya by Muhammad bin Jamil Zayn.
30 These include al-Nahw al-Wadih, al-Amthila al-Tasrifiyya, Qawaªid al-Sarf and al-
Balagha al-Wadiha.
31 Notably Usul al-Tafsir by Muhammad bin Salih al-ªUthaymin and Aysir al-Tafasir li
Kalam al-ªAli al-Kabir by Abu Bakr Jabir al-Jaza’iri.
32 al-Arbaªin al-Nawawiyya by Salih al-Shaykh, Mudhakkirat al-Hadith al-Nabawi by
Rabiª ibn Hadi al-Madkhali, and Darurat al-Ihtimam bi-l-Sunan al-Nabawiyya by
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Hasan al-Halabi al-Athari.
36 Interview with Abdurrahman Wonosari, Magelang, December 2002.
37 Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java, Glencoe: Free Press, 1960, pp. 121-30. For a
comparison, see Mark R. Woodward, Islam in Java: Normative Piety and Mysticism
in the Sultanate of Yogyakarta, Tucson: Association for Asian Studies, 1989.
38 Interview with Ja’far Umar Thalib, Yogyakarta, December 2002.
39 Interview with Abdurrahman Wonosari, Magelang, December 2002.
40 Bernard Haykel, ‘The Salafis in Yemen at a Crossroads: an obituary of Shaykh
Muqbil al-Wadiªi of Dammaj (d. 1422/2001)’, Jemen Report, no. 2 (October 2002).
41 Haykel, ‘The Salafis in Yemen’.
42 See Quintan Wiktorowicz, ‘The New Global Threat, Transnational Salafis and
Jihad’ Middle East Policy, vol. VIII, no. 4 (December 2001), p. 32.
43 On the link between the Yemeni Salafis and al-Islah, see Eric Watkins,
‘Islamism and Tribalism in Yemen’ in: Abdel Salam Sidahmed and
Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds.), Islamic Fundamentalism, Colorado and Oxford:
Westview Press, 1996, pp. 215-225; see also Paul Dresch and Bernard Haykel,
‘Stereotypes and Political Styles: Islamists and Tribesfolk in Yemen’, in
International Journal of Middle East Studies 27 (1995), 405-31.
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Glossary
(A = Arabic; I = Indonesian; J = Javanese; M = Malay; P = Persian; U = Urdu)
abangan (J) nominal Muslims adhering to Javanese syncretistic beliefs
ahl al-bayt (A), the family of the Prophet: primarily his daughter Fatima,
ahl-i bayt (P) son-in-law Ali and their children, by extension including
all the Prophet’s descendants
akhlfiq (A) morals, ethics, proper behaviour
ªfilim pl. ªulamfi scholar
amflr leader, commander
ªaqflda, pl. ªaqfi’id creed, doctrine; articles of faith
ªaql reason, ratio
ªaqlfl rational; the rational sciences (also maªq‡lfit), which include
philosophy but also fiqh, are distinguished from the
traditional (naql) sciences or manq‡lfit, notably hadflth
ªazfidfirfl (P) mourning ritual, especially the crying for the martyrdom
of Husayn
bidªa, pl. bidaª ‘innovation’: a belief or devotional practice that was not
present in pristine Islam and therefore must have been
adopted from alien religious or cultural practices or have been
more recently invented
daªfl, pl. duªfit preacher, missionary (literally, someone engaging in daªwa,
propagation of the faith)
dfir al-iftfi the office of the chief muftfl, the official institution where one
can request a fatwfi
dfir al-ªul‡m lit. ‘house of sciences’: higher religious school (especially in
South Asia)
dars-i nizfimfl (P, U) the traditional curriculum of South Asian madrasas, named
after the 18th-century scholar Mulla Nizamuddin of Farangi
Mahall in Lucknow
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daurah (I), dawra (A) lit. ‘circle’: a series of religious lessons or training sessions, as
given by Islamist or Salafi movements to their recruits
daªwa lit. ‘invitation [to Islam]’: propagation of the faith
dhikr (A), zikr (P, U) lit. ‘remembering’: reciting the name(s) of God or certain
pious formulas as a spiritual exercise
fahm-i dfln (P, U) ‘understanding of religion’: the most basic course of religious
knowledge in the South Asian madrasa curriculum
fazfi’il (U), fadfi’il (A) excellent qualities
(pl. of fadflla)
ffizil (U), ffidil (A) graduate of higher madrasa course (in South Asia)
fatwfi, pl. fatfiwfi opinion on a matter of religious importance, given in
response to a question
fiqh Islamic jurisprudence; Sunni Islam recognises four fiqh
schools (madhhab), the Hanafi, Shafiªi, Maliki and Hanbali
school. Shiªi fiqh or the Jaªfari madhhab is sometimes
considered a fifth orthodox school
hadflth ‘Prophetic tradition’: a report on what the Prophet said or
how he acted in a specific situation
hfifiz ‘memoriser’: a person who knows the Qur’an by heart
hajj the pilgrimage to Mecca in the month of Dhu’l-hijja
halqa study circle: traditionally consisting of the students seated
around a teacher in a mosque or madrasa; in modern Islamist
movements a closed group of followers being indoctrinated in
the movement’s understanding of Islam
hifz memorisation; esp. learning the Qur’an by heart
ªibfida, pl. ªibfidfit obligation of humans towards God (as opposed to fellow
humans), worship
ªfld al-fitr the feast ending the fasting month of Ramadan
ijtihfid solving a problem of Islamic law, for which no immediate
scriptural answer is available, by individual reasoning
ikhtilfif difference of opinion; especially the points of difference
between the various schools of jurisprudence
ªilm-i kalfim theology
imfimbargfih (U) congregation hall for Shiªa ritual ceremonies, especially those
for mourning the martyrdom of Husayn
islfih reform
T H E MADRA S A I N A S I A
280
AUP-ISIM-IS-BW-Madrasa-DEF2:BW  24-09-2008  16:55  Pagina 280
ithnfiªasharfl ‘Twelver’: the Shiªa mainstream, which recognises twelve
imams
jfihiliyya the age of ignorance, i.e., the pre-Islamic period
jamfiªa (A), congregation
jamfiªat (P, U)
jfimiªa university, centre of higher education
jamªiyya (A), association
jamªiyyat (P, U)
jihfid exertion, struggle, ‘holy war’
kenduri (M) ritual feast with a sacrificial meal
khurfiffit superstitions
kitab kuning (M, I) ‘yellow books’: classical texts in the Arabic script studied in
the pesantren and pondok (term used in Indonesia and Malaysia)
kyai (J) religious teacher, especially the head of a pesantren
lebai (M) a lower-level functionary of a mosque or surau, whose tasks
include social functions such as presiding over weddings
and funerals
madhhab (A), school of Islamic jurisprudence (the four Sunni schools are
mazhab (P, U) Hanafi, Shafiªi, Maliki and Hanbali)
madrasa, pl. madfiris school
maªhad institute; in Southeast Asia, the term also denotes madrasas of
a higher level (the maªhad ªfilfl is usually of university level)
mahram a woman’s close male relatives, who can serve as her
chaperone (i.e., those with whom marriage would constitute
incest)
majlis, pl. majfilis gathering, council
manq‡lfit ‘traditional sciences’: i.e., those based on handed down
knowledge, such as Qur’an and hadflth
maªq‡lfit ‘rational sciences’: i.e., those based on reasoning, ªaql
marsiya (P, U), poem/song of mourning, especially for the martyrs of Karbala
marthiyya (A)
maslak denomination, ‘sect’ (lit.: way, road, method)
masfi’ib catastrophes, misfortunes (especially those befalling the Shiªi
(pl. of masflba) imams)
maulvfl (U) cleric, divine (term commonly used in South Asia)
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mazhab (P, U), school of Islamic jurisprudence
madhhab (A)
mu’azzin (P, U), the person who gives the call to prayer (azfin/adhfin)
mu’adhdhin (A)
muballigh, muballigha preacher (m/f)
muhfijir emigrant; in Pakistan, the citizens who came from India at
the time of Partition
mujfihid, pl. fighter, participant in jihfid
mujfihid‡n, mujfihidfln
mujtahid, mujtahida scholar (m/f) with the authority to deliver independent
judgments on questions of Islamic law (ijtihfid); in Iran, this
title is bestowed upon the graduate who has completed the
full curriculum of the hawza
munfizara theological debate
nahw Arabic grammar: morphology
naqlfl handed down, traditional (especially said of sciences of areas
of knowledge, such as hadflth studies); cf. manq‡lfit
nauha, noha (P, U) lamentation, mourning
pesantren the Javanese variety of madrasa, usually with resident
students (santri)
pondok (M, J) traditional Islamic school (especially in Malaysia); more
specifically, the dormitory of a pesantren (from A funduq, ‘hotel,
inn’). The pondok pesantren, in Indonesia, is the entire school
complex including classrooms and dormitories
qasflda a metric poem, with a rigid rhyme scheme AA, BA, CA, DA
r‡hfinfl, pl. r‡hfinfly‡n cleric, divine
sfidfit (pl. of sayyid) descendants of the Prophet Muhammad
al-salaf al-sfilih the pious predecessors: the first three generations of Islam
Salafism puritan movement in Islam that calls for exclusive reliance
on the Qur’an and sunna
salfit the Muslim prayer (in P and U: namfiz)
santri (J, I) student in a pesantren; by extension, any strictly practising
Muslim
sarf Arabic grammar: verbal inflection
sayyid, pl. sfidfit descendant of the Prophet Muhammad
sesat (M) deviant; ‘ajaran sesat’ are deviant teachings
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shirk associating anything with God, ‘polytheism;’ to puritan
Muslims, the belief in the possibility of mediation between
humans and God, for instance, by saints, or in the
effectiveness of magical cures constitutes shirk
sunna the way of the Prophet, to be imitated by his faithful.
The Prophet’s sunna is primarily known through the hadflths,
the reports on individual instances of his words or exemplary
acts
surau (M) a small prayer house, smaller than the congregational mosque
(masjid)
tablflgh propagation, predication
tafsflr Qur’anic exegesis and commentary. A translation, because of
the degree of interpretation and choice involved, is also
referred to as a tafsflr
tajwfld the proper articulation of Qur’anic Arabic
takfflr declaring someone a kfifir or unbeliever; the term takfflrfl refers
to Islamist groups that declare nominally Muslim rulers de
facto unbelievers for not ruling according to the sharflªa,
implying these rulers should be fought
tanzflm organisation
taqlfld imitation, emulating a model; especially, following the rulings
of scholars of one particular school of Islamic jurisprudence
tarbiya education, training, disciplining
tarflqa ‘the Sufi path’: Sufi order
tasfiyya purification
tawhfld the absolute unity and uniqueness of God; for Salafis, this
implies the rejection of all authority not derived from God or
based on His will as expressed in the Qur’an and sunna
tibb medicine, healing
ªulamfi (pl. of ªfilim) scholars, divines
‡nfinfl tibb ‘Greek medicine,’ a traditional healing system based on the
theory of four humours (known as Galenic medicine in the
West); Ibn Sina’s al-Qfin‡n is the most famous work in this
discipline
usra (A), usrah, lit. ‘[nuclear] family;’ in the Muslim Brotherhood, the usra is a
usroh (M, J, I) small group of members, who have intensive contact and are
being trained / indoctrinated together
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ustfidh (A), ustad (I) teacher (term of address for a person of religious learning)
ustfiz (P, U)
wifaq pact, accord, agreement, unity; in the South Asian context an
umbrella organization of religious schools
wfiªiz preacher
waqf, pl. awqfif pious foundation
zakfit obligatory alms ‘tax,’ consisting of a specified percentage of
specific sources of income or wealth. The payment of zakat is
one of the five ‘pillars’ of Islam
zfikir, zfikira (P, U), a person who performs the dhikr (zikr), reciting God’s name
dhfikir (A) of certain pious formulas; in the South Asian Shiªa context,
the person who recites the story of Husayn’s martyrdom at
Karbala
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Acronyms and Names of Organisations,
Movements and Institutions
ABIM Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia (Malaysian Islamic Youth
Movement)
Ahl-i Hadith South Asian puritan reform movement fiercely opposed to
Sufi beliefs and practices as well as the traditional schools of
Islamic jurisprudence; the study of hadith replaces most of the
other traditional Islamic sciences
Al Irsyad Reformist association active among Indonesia’s Arab
community
Barelvi name given to the traditionalist mainstream in South Asian
Islam, strongly oriented towards Sufism and the veneration of
saints. Named after Bareilly, the residence of the leading
nineteenth-century apologist of traditionalist Islam, Raza
Ahmad Khan
BKSPP Badan Kerjasama Pondok Pesantren (Association for Co
operation between Pesantrens), a network of Islamic schools
in West Java, Indonesia, previously affiliated with the
Masyumi party
Darul Arqam Sufi-inspired religious movement in Malaysia, with branches
in Singapore and Indonesia. Transformed itself into the
trading corporation Rufaqa’ after it was banned in Malaysia
Darul Islam Indonesian political movement struggling for the
establishment of an Islamic state. First emerged during the
struggle for independence in West Java; later joined by related
movements in Aceh and South Sulawesi contesting the
authority of the secular Indonesian Republic
DDII see Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia
Deobandi one of the two mainstream movements of South Asian Islam,
named after the moderately reformist madrasa of Deoband.
Critical of Sufi orders and strongly opposed to saint worship
and other ‘popular’ practices condoned by the more
285
AUP-ISIM-IS-BW-Madrasa-DEF2:BW  24-09-2008  16:55  Pagina 285
traditionalist Barelvi movement. An estimated 65% of the
madrasas in Pakistan are Deobandi orientated
Dewan Dakwah ‘Indonesian Council for Islamic Predication,’ organisation
Islamiyah Indonesia established in 1967 by former Masyumi political leaders
DI see Darul Islam
FKAWJ Forum Komunikasi Ahlus Sunnah Wal-Jamaªah, a Salafi group
in Indonesia from which the militant Laskar Jihad emerged in
2000
Harkat-ul-Mujahidin Pakistan-based armed militant group, primarily focused on
the struggle in Kashmir
IAIN Institut Agama Islam Negeri (State Institute of Islamic
Studies), institutes for training religious teachers, judges of
Islamic courts and other religious functionaries in Indonesia
IKIM Institut Kefahaman Islam Malaysia (Malaysian Institute for
Islamic Understanding), established in 1992 by Prime Minister
Mahathir Mohamad to disseminate a modern understanding
of Islam
ISTAC International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilisation, a
research and postgraduate institute affiliated with the
International Islamic University Malaysia
Jaish-i Muhammad Pakistan-based militant group of Deobandi affiliation
Jamaªah Islamiyah Radical underground Islamist network in Southeast Asia,
members of which planned and carried out a series of
spectacular terrorist actions
Jamaªat al-Daªwa Pakistan-based militant group, affiliated with the Ahl-i Hadith
(Jamaªat al-Daªwa movement and connected with the Lashkar-i Tayyiba
ila al-Qur’an
wa-l-Hadith)
Jamaªat-i Islami Islamist movement founded by Sayyid Abu’l Aªla Mawdudi in
late colonial India. After the partition of British India, the
Pakistani and Indian branches operated largely independently
of one another
Jamiªa Millia Islamia ‘Islamic National College’, leading Muslim university in
New Delhi
Jamiªat al-Dirasat ‘College of Islamic Studies’, a radical madrasa in Karachi,
al-Islamiyya Pakistan
Jamiªat al-Zahra women’s college in the Shiªi seminary of Qom, Iran
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Jamªiyat-i Talaba-i students’ association affiliated with the Jamaªat-i Islami
Islam (also: Islami
Jamiat-e Talaba)
Jamªiyat-ul-Ulama-i association of scholars of Deobandi orientation in India,
Hind established in 1919
Jamªiyat-ul-Ulama-i association of Pakistani ulama of Deobandi orientation,
Islam established at the birth of Pakistan in 1948. Currently split
into three factions, the militant Fazlur Rahman wing, the
Samiul Haq faction and the Ajmal Qadri faction
Jamªiyat-ul-Ulama-i association of Pakistani ulama of Barelvi orientation
Pakistan
JI see Jamaªah Islamiyah and Jamaªat-i Islami
JTI see Jamªiyat-i Talaba-i Islam
JUH see Jamªiyat-ul-Ulama-i Hind
JUI see Jamªiyat-ul-Ulama-i Islam
kaum muda ‘the young people’: general term for Muslim reformist groups
in the Malay-speaking regions of Southeast Asia
kaum tua ‘the old people’: general term for traditionalist Muslims in
the Malay-speaking regions of Southeast Asia
Kumpulan Mujahidin ‘Malaysian Mujahidin Group,’ obscure militant movement
Malaysia (KMM) involved in a number of violent incidents
KW9 Komado Wilayah 9 (9th Regional Command), regional branch
of the Darul Islam movement, covering Jakarta and adjacent
districts
Lashkar-i Jhangvi offshoot of the Sipah-i Sahaba-i Pakistan, even more militantly
anti-Shiªa
Lashkar-i Tayyiba Ahl-i Hadith affiliated militant organization, considered as
the armed wing of the Markaz al-Daªwa wa-l-Irshad, based
in Murdike, Panjab, Pakistan
Laskar Jihad armed Salafi movement that took part in regional conflicts
in Indonesia during the years 2000-02
LIPIA Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Bahasa Arab
(Institute of Islamic and Arabic Studies), Saudi-funded
teaching institution in Jakarta
Majlis-i Tahaffuz-i Deoband-affiliated association ‘for the defence of the finality
Khatm-i Nabuwwat of Prophethood’, i.e., primarily an anti-Ahmadiyya association
Masyumi Indonesia’s largest Muslim party, dissolved in 1960
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Muhammadiyah Indonesian reformist association, especially active in
education and daªwa, the second largest Muslim association in
the country
MATA Majlis Agama Tertinggi (Supreme Council of Religious Affairs),
Malaysia
MUI Majelis Ulama Indonesia (Indonesian Council of Ulama),
established by the government to explain government policy
to the Muslim population and advise the government
Mutahhida Majlis-i six-party religious coalition, including Jamaªat-i Islami
Amal (MMA) and Fazlur Rahman’s JUI
Nadwat ul-ªUlama Madrasa and association based in Lucknow, India
Nahdlatul Ulama Traditionalist Muslim association in Indonesia, the country’s
largest association
NII /TII Negara Islam Indonesia / Tentara Islam Indonesia (Islamic
State of Indonesia / Islamic Army of Indonesia), alternative
name of the Darul Islam movement
NU see Nahdlatul Ulama
PAS Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party)
Persis Persatuan Islam, Indonesian puritan reformist association
PKMM Partai Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (Malay National Party of
Malaya)
PKS Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party),
Indonesian political party inspired by Muslim Brotherhood
ideology
PP Pondok Pesantren (in Indonesia)
Rabita Madaris association of Deobandi madrasas (in India)
Arabiya
Rabitat al-ªAlam Muslim World League
al-Islamiyya
RMA see Rabita Madaris Arabiya
Sipah-i Sahaba-i ‘Army of the Prophet’s Companions in Pakistan’, the first
Pakistan militant movement, emerged as an offshoot of the Deobandi
JUI
SMII Syed Maudoodi International Islamic Educational Institute,
the Jamaªat-i Islami’s most important school
Tablighi Jamaªat originally Indian missionary movement; at present probably
the largest transnational Islamic movement
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Tahrik-i Nifaz-i Pakistan’s major Shiªi political organisation (later renamed as:
Fiqh-i Jaªfariya Tahrik-i Jaªfariya Pakistan)
Tanzim al-Madaris ‘Organisation of Arabic Schools’: the association of Barelvi
al-Arabiya (traditionalist) madrasas in Pakistan
Tanzim-i Abna-i ‘Old Boys’ Organisation’, Deobandi alumni association
Qadim (in India)
UMNO United Malays National Organisation, Malaysia’s ruling party
Wifaq al-Madaris federation or union of madrasas. There are five such unions
in Pakistan. For political lobbying they are united under
the Ittihad Tanzimat Madaris Diniya (Union of Organisations
of Religious Schools)
Wifaq al-Madaris the union of Deobandi madrasas in Pakistan
al-Arabiya
Wifaq al-Madaris the union of Shiªa madrasas in Pakistan
al-Shiªa
Wifaq al-Madaris the union of Ahl-i Hadith affiliated madrasas in Pakistan
al-Salafiya
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Maps
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2. Pakistan
3. China
4. Malaysia (& Southern Thailand)
5. Java (Indonesia)
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abangan, 263-265
ªAbd al-Wahhab, Muhammad ibn, 249-
250, 261-262
ªAbduh, Muhammad, 194-195, 223-224,
250
Abdul Rahman bin Mahmud, 195
ªAbid, ªAbdur Rahim, 39
ABIM (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia),
202
Abu Nida, 252, 254-258, 261, 274
Abu Nur Institute (Damascus), 18, 183,
189
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Afghan jihad, 26, 141, 159, 233, 251-252,
267-268
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Ahl-i Bait, 123, 128
Ahl-i Hadith, 55, 68, 93, 144, 165, 268
Ahmad, Mirza Ghulam, 93
Ahmad, Nazir, 107
Ahmadiyya, 74, 77, 93, 154
Ajmal, Badruddin, 88-89, 98-99
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206, 220
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Bin Baz, Madrasa (Yogyakarta), 257, 261
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Dar al-ªUlum Deoband, see Deoband,
Dar al-ªUlum
Dar al-ªUlum al-Diniyya (Mecca), 220
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230, 232-233, 235-238, 256
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Ibn Taymiyya, Taqiy al-Din Ahmad, 250,
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